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Abstract
  This dissertation analyses a unit of the Waffen-SS during a period that was crucial to 
the Second World War and the destruction of the European Jews. The SS Cavalry 
Brigade  differed  from other  German  military  formations  as  it  fulfilled  a  special 
function. Although its origins lay in sportsmanship, this unit was quickly formed into 
an auxiliary police formation in Poland during the first two years of the war and 
developed a ‘dual role’ after the German invasion of the Soviet Union. This role 
arose from the fact that the SS cavalrymen both helped to initiate the Holocaust in 
newly occupied territories  and experienced combat  at  the front.  Acting on direct 
orders from Heinrich Himmler, the head of the SS, the soldiers – for the most part – 
were  quickly  radicalised:  in  the  Pripet  Marshes,  they  not  only  killed  Jews  and 
communists but were the first to destroy entire Jewish communities. By the end of 
1941,  they  enforced  a  brutal  occupation  policy in  Belorussia  and  Russia,  which 
aimed at eliminating all possible racial, political and military enemies of the German 
forces.  This  brutal  war  of  annihilation  also  included  the  combat  against  real  or 
suspected  partisans.  Between  December,  1941  and  June,  1942,  the  SS  Cavalry 
Brigade fought against the Red Army and suffered high losses, which necessitated 
replenishment after its withdrawal from the front. From late 1942 onwards, the unit 
lost its ‘dual role’ as it was involved in more conventional warfare, and the story of 
its  development  from  this  point  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  dissertation  which 
concentrates  on  the  years  of  1941 –  1942.  A special  focus  lies  on  the  role  and 
behaviour of the personnel of the brigade and places it in perpetrator history.
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Introduction
  Whilst  many different  German  military and paramilitary  units  involved  in  the 
Holocaust have been studied by researchers, not much has been written on the SS 
Cavalry Brigade due to a lack of access to files in eastern European archives. This 
unit belonged to the  Waffen-SS and played a special role both in the German war 
against the Soviet Union and the destruction of the European Jews.
  The brigade was deployed at an important point in history: in the summer of 1941, 
as the transition from individual acts of violence and massacres of Jews to the ‘Final 
Solution of the Jewish Question’ occurred. Whereas different ideas for deporting the 
European  Jewry  to  faraway  places  such  as  Siberia  still  seemed  feasible  at  the 
beginning of the year, plans changed dramatically after the beginning of the German 
attack on the Soviet Union. From the beginning of this campaign, Jews were killed 
by  German  military  and  paramilitary  units,  and  this  was  the  first  step  to  the 
attempted complete annihilation of Jewish communities in eastern Europe and to the 
industrial slaughter of the concentration camps.
  The special significance of the SS Cavalry Brigade lies in its ‘dual role’: the unit 
had an ideological as well as a military function. On the one hand it can be compared 
to the  Einsatzgruppen and battalions of the order police as its members also killed 
thousands of Jews. It differs from these formations on the other hand as it was a 
genuine military unit and took part in combat against the Red Army. Soldiers of the 
SS Cavalry Brigade saw themselves as elite, very similar to the members of other 
Waffen-SS units. Like them, they were ‘political soldiers’, as Bernd Wegner has put 
it.1
  But unlike other formations of the  Waffen-SS or divisions of the  Wehrmacht, this 
1 Bernd Wegner, Hitlers Politische Soldaten: Die Waffen-SS 1939 – 1945 (Paderborn, 1988).
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brigade was not just a product of the German rearmament in the 1930s. It was a 
construct that originated from the sporting interests of the German aristocracy and 
the personal initiative of a high-ranking Nazi from Munich. Thus, its development 
set it apart from the machinery of war at first, but the SS Cavalry Brigade later found 
its own way into the German war of annihilation.
  This work aims at writing a full history of the brigade for the first time, beginning 
with  the  formation  of  mounted  SS  units  in  Germany in  1931.  The  main  focus, 
however, is on the period between the summer of 1941 and the spring of 1942, when 
the two SS cavalry regiments were reorganised as a brigade and took part in the 
campaign  against  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  Holocaust. The  analysis  of  the  SS 
Cavalry Brigade is based on three aspects. First, the emphasis on the period during 
which the unit existed as a brigade is central to the way it became involved in the 
‘first wave’ of German troops committing massacres of Jews in the Soviet Union and 
what happened during that time. Second, the ideological and military role of the unit 
present a unique combination as no other German military or paramilitary formation 
during the Second World War had to fulfil a ‘dual role’ to the same degree as the SS 
Cavalry Brigade. Third, the lives and careers of the men who served in the brigade 
need to be studied. The findings provide a better insight, particularly into the field of 
perpetrator history. As a result, a ‘modern history of violence’ of this unit will be 
produced from the available information.
  It is essential to understand  the unit’s role in the SS and the conditioning of its 
members in the Nazi system. The prehistory of the SS Cavalry Brigade begins with 
Hermann Fegelein, a riding school owner’s son from Bavaria, who had sympathies 
for  the  National-Socialist  movement  and a  strong enthusiasm for  equitation.  His 
excellent connections to Heinrich Himmler secured him the leadership of a special 
riding school for the SS, which was established at Munich in 1937; two years later, 
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this school and the equestrians who trained there became part of the German war 
effort.
  From late 1939 until the German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, a cavalry 
component  of  the  Waffen-SS was built  up in  Poland under  Fegelein’s  leadership. 
With the former riding school trainees and instructors as a nucleus, two SS cavalry 
regiments were formed and used as auxiliary police units by the German occupation 
administration. They soon became involved in crimes against the Polish population, 
such as acts of ethnic cleansing, the internment of Jews in ghettos, and massacres of 
Jews and people who were considered belonging to the Polish elites. At the same 
time the SS cavalrymen were also trained for military tasks.
  Immediately before the beginning of operation  Barbarossa on 22 June, 1941 the 
two regiments were  assigned  to the forces of the  Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS. 
This was a special body of SS troops under Himmler’s direct command, to which the 
SS cavalry remained subordinate until the summer of 1942, the point in time when 
the units were withdrawn from the front to be reorganised as a cavalry division. Like 
the 1st and 2nd SS Infantry Brigades, the two other formations which belonged to it, 
the SS cavalry units  were only deployed in  the eastern European theatre  of war 
during the years of 1941 – 1942. Unlike other SS formations or divisions of the 
Wehrmacht,  they  played  a  significant  role  in  implementing  the  Nazi  policy  of 
extermination  without  being  garrisoned  in  a  western  European  country.  Outside 
Poland and the Soviet Union, the civilian population was not treated in such a brutal 
way and measures against Jews were carried out less openly.
  For the SS cavalry, the initial phase of the war was now over and the men awaited 
new tasks.  Two days  after  the  invasion  of  the  Soviet  Union,  the  1st SS  Cavalry 
Regiment was ordered to take part in a combat mission near Bialystok. Soon after 
this  operation,  both  SS  cavalry regiments  relocated  from their  garrisons  in  East 
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Prussia to the Pripet Marshes in Belorussia.2 This territory had been skirted by the 
advancing German troops for the most part because, in addition to the river Pripet 
itself, its large swamps, dense forests, and absence of roads formed several obstacles 
to  the  armoured  forces  and  supply  columns.  Therefore  troops  not  employed  in 
combat were needed to police the marshes, to break any resistance in the region and 
to set up a military administration.
  After their arrival in the operational area in late July, 1941, the forces of the SS 
cavalry were split up into fast moving subunits, some of which were attached to an 
infantry division of the  Wehrmacht in order to fight against units of the Red Army 
which  had  broken  through  the  German  lines.  The  remaining  squadrons  were 
deployed  according  to  the  task  of  crossing  and  searching  the  western  Pripet 
Marshes.3 More precise and brutal  orders were issued now: the cavalrymen were 
ordered to  ‘finally pacify’ the area,  which meant  that  they were to  fight  against 
partisans and to capture stragglers of the Red Army. The instructions included killing 
enemy soldiers in civilian clothing, armed civilians, and ‘looters’. In this context, 
‘looters’ did not mean criminals but was the term used for Jews; they were to be 
executed, except for some required specialists such as craftsmen and doctors.4 The 
instructions remained rather vague at the beginning as to the fate of Jewish women 
and children. Whereas they were to be driven into the swamps at first5, tactics were 
soon changed to killing all Jews regardless of gender or age.6 This approach, which 
was followed during two missions in the Pripet Marshes, resulted in the killing of 
2 When referring to the Soviet Socialist Republic, I will use the term ‘Belorussia’ as this was the name 
of the state in the period under observation. In connection with the contemporary country, I will refer 
to it as ‘Belarus’.
3 Kommandobefehl Nr. 19, 19 July, 1941, in VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 1, file 3.
4Regimentsbefehl Nr. 42 für den Einsatz Pripec-Sümpfe,  27 July,  1941, in BArchL, Dokumenten-
Sammlung, Ordner Verschiedenes 291-17, p. 2.
5 Transcript of a radio message from the regimental staff to the cavalry detachment of the 2nd SS 
Cavalry Regiment, 1 August, 1941, in BArchF, RS 3-8/36.
6 Report from  the commander of the cavalry detachment of the 2nd SS Cavalry Regiment, 12 August 
1941, in VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 3.
4
more  than  15,000  Jews,  partisans,  and  soldiers  of  the  Red  Army  until  mid-
September, 1941. The exact number of victims is unknown; it can be assumed that 
even more people were murdered, as the cavalrymen operated in a vast area and not 
all killings were reported.7
  From September onwards, the brigade followed the advance of the German army. 
The cavalry units were transported to Toropets in the northern sector of Army Group 
Centre, some 380 kilometres west of Moscow. They were given orders to guard the 
railway  line  from  Velikiye  Luki  to  Rzhev,  an  important  east-west  mainline,  to 
conduct reconnaissance missions and to fight against partisans in this region. Soon, 
further killings were perpetrated: a number of suspected partisans were shot, most of 
them  merely  civilians  without  identification  papers.  As  documentation  becomes 
scarcer for the second half of 1941, it is yet unclear how many people were killed 
during that time. Between Toropets and Rzhev, the brigade was engaged in heavy 
fighting against the Red Army. After the German offensive on the Soviet capital had 
bogged down in early December, the cavalry units were forced into the defence. As 
no reserves were available, the brigade was needed to defend an important sector of 
the front at the intersection of Army Group Centre and Army Group North. Despite 
heavy losses, setbacks and local retreats, it remained at the front and fought against 
superior Soviet forces.
  When spring came, only half of its former 4,000 soldiers were still combat-ready; 
more than 2,000 had been killed, wounded, declared missing in action or sick. The 
cavalry brigade was particularly weakened by a high death toll amongst the officers 
and non-commissioned officers.8 In May, the unit was relieved from the front and 
7 The two regiments reported 13,788 Jews as executed until 11 August; see report of the SS Cavalry 
Brigade,  13  August,  1941,  in  VUA,  Kommandostab  RFSS,  box  24,  file  3.  In  a  report  from 18 
September, 1941, 14,178 Jews, 1001 partisans and 699 soldiers of the Red Army were reported to 
have been shot since the end of July; see final report about the “pacification of the Pripet Marshes”, 
September 18, 1941, in VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 3.
8 Stärke und Verluste der SS-Divisionen vom 24.3. 1942, in BArchB, Persönlicher Stab Reichsführer-
SS, NS 19/1520, frame 45-47.
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withdrawn  to  Debica  in  south  eastern  Poland,  where  the  SS  had  established  a 
military training area. During the summer of 1942, a new SS cavalry division was 
formed out of the surviving brigade members and new recruits. The unit was sent to 
the eastern front, suffered heavy casualties in the winter of 1942 – 1943 and was 
replenished again after that. Until the end of the war, the division was employed in 
combat until it was finally annihilated at Budapest in February, 1945.
  Research on the SS Cavalry Brigade has to take into account a variety of sources, 
mostly original documents kept in archives across Europe. These files have to be 
analysed with great care as they originate from different countries, authorities, and 
periods. In order to establish the historical context, it is necessary to approach the SS 
as an institution within the National Socialist state. The background to this form of 
government was a power structure centred on Adolf Hitler as the supreme leader.  As 
Germany turned into a dictatorship when Hitler consolidated his power during the 
1930s, former political ideas were replaced with Nazi ideology, institutions of the 
democratic state became meaningless, and a process of radicalisation began which 
aimed at restoring the country's role and destroying its enemies. This development, 
which ultimately led to the Second World War and the Holocaust, has been analysed 
very accurately by Ian Kershaw in his two-volumed biography of Adolf Hitler,  a 
standard work for a historian researching Nazi Germany.9 
  While  the  German  government  and  its  agencies  were  synchronised,  other 
institutions of the state such as the police were nazified and arms of the Nazi party 
became executive organs. Within this system, Heinrich Himmler, the head of the SS 
and chief of the German police, was the second man after the  Führer. He became 
responsible for all matters of security and oppression of political enemies. Under his 
leadership, the SS grew from a small group of Nazi party bodyguards into a massive 
9 Ian  Kershaw,  Hitler. 1889 – 1936 (Stuttgart, 1998); Ian Kershaw,  Hitler. 1936 – 1945 (Stuttgart, 
2000).
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institution that was essentially a state within the state. At the end of the 1930s, it 
encompassed the German police and secret police, the concentration camps, an army 
of its own, and an economic empire. After the beginning of the Second World War, 
the Waffen-SS took part in the fighting whereas Himmler's technocrats planned the 
Holocaust and paramilitary SS formations executed their orders. Himmler's life and 
the role of the SS in the Third Reich are outlined very competently in the biography 
by  Peter  Longerich,  a  work  that  represents  the  current  state  of  research  on  the 
Reichsführer-SS.10
  The SS had its own principles and code of honour. Himmler saw his organisation as 
'the black order', an elite force protecting the state. Candidates were selected very 
carefully and became subject to strict discipline once they had been accepted. One of 
the first works to describe the structure and aims of the SS was written by Heinz 
Höhne in the 1960s. He noticed that the elitist nature of the organisation attracted a 
special type: highly educated intellectuals, many of whom held a law degree.11 These 
men later played an important role in the Holocaust, both as commanders of killing 
squads and as so-called 'desk murderers'. This group, which can be considered an 
elite within the elite, has been analysed in great detail by Michael Wildt in his study 
of the officer corps of the  Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich security main office), 
the  central  SS  authority  for  the  coordination  of  police  and  secret  service.12 As 
opposed  to  the  well-researched  'desk  murderers',  the  officers  of  the  SS  Cavalry 
Brigade  became  'political  soldiers'  in  a  different  way.  They  had  different 
backgrounds and joined the SS for other reasons: horse-riding, not higher education 
10 Peter Longerich, Heinrich Himmler. Biographie. (Munich 2008).
11 Heinz Höhne, The Order of the Death’s Head: the Story of Hitler’s SS (London, 1969).
12 Michael  Wildt,  Generation des Unbedingten. Das Führerkorps des Reichssicherheitshauptamtes  
(Hamburg, 2003). A prominent example of the intellectuals in the SS was Werner Best, who helped to 
build up the Sicherheitsdienst (SD), the secret service of the Nazi party. He also was involved in the 
foundation  of  the  Reichssicherheitshauptamt and  organised  killing  squads  that  were  deployed  in 
Poland. See Ulrich Herbert,  Best: biographische Studien über Radikalismus, Weltanschauung und  
Vernunft, 1903 – 1989 (Bonn, 1996).
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was  their  common  feature.  They  intended  to  pursue  a  career  in  sports  or  as 
professional soldiers and did not strive for administrative positions in the SS.
  Despite the fact that a vast amount of original sources has survived, the SS Cavalry 
Brigade has hardly been examined in academic literature as only a few authors have 
focussed on this particular unit until now. To a certain extent, this has to do with the 
fact that many of the sources which are available today were completely inaccessible 
until 1989. In order to present the historiography on the SS Cavalry Brigade, I will 
introduce the most important works which integrate it into the context of Holocaust 
research, the field which also forms the ‘general background’ to my project.
  The first accounts of the unit and its crimes were published in the 1980s and early 
1990s by Yehoshua Büchler, Karla Müller-Tupath, and Ruth Bettina Birn.13 Although 
Büchler’s  essay contains  a  few errors,  it  is  a  good  introduction  to  the  topic.  It 
contains information on the units of the Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS, a body of 
troops that was of special importance as it served as Heinrich Himmler’s ‘private 
army’ within the SS. With regard to the destruction of  the Soviet  Jews,  Büchler 
stated that mass executions committed by these units  ‘were no less significant in 
quantity  or  brutality  than  those  by  the  Einsatzgruppen’.14 This  comparison  is 
particularly remarkable as there was hardly any specific literature available on these 
formations in 1986. But despite the fact that it is very well written, the essay is too 
short to give a very detailed analysis as the focus is not on the SS cavalry alone. 
Müller-Tupath’s work deals with the biography of Kurt Becher, an SS cavalry officer 
and close aide of Hermann Fegelein. It also provides  the historical background by 
extensively quoting West German court files from the trials against officers of the 
13 Yehoshua  Büchler,  ‘Kommandostab  Reichsführer-SS:  Himmler’s  Personal  Murder  Brigades  in 
1941’,  Holocaust  and Genocide Studies 1  (1986),  pp.  11-25;  Karla  Müller-Tupath,  Reichsführers 
gehorsamster  Becher.  Eine  deutsche  Karriere (Hamburg  1982);  Ruth  Bettina  Birn,  ‘Zweierlei 
Wirklichkeit? Fallbeispiele zur Partisanenbekämpfung im Osten’, in B. Wegner (ed.), Zwei Wege nach  
Moskau. Vom Hitler – Stalin-Pakt bis zum ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’ (Munich, 1991), pp. 275-290.
14 Büchler, ‘Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS’, p. 14.
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brigade, but as it is based on the life of one particular person its scope is also not 
broad enough.15 In her article on partisan warfare, Ruth Bettina Birn clearly proves 
that the missions of the SS Cavalry Brigade were not primarily part  of the anti-
Partisan campaign, as was often stated in German literature after the Second World 
War. Instead, Birn incorporates its actions within the context of the Holocaust and 
the war of annihilation against the Soviet Union.
  So  far,  the  brigade  has  been  analysed  in  detailed  monographs  only  by  two 
historians: Paul J. Wilson and Martin Cüppers.16 Wilson’s study concentrates on the 
prewar Equestrian SS within the Nazi state and analyses the role of this organisation 
as part of the Allgemeine SS. Despite of its importance in presenting the prehistory of 
the SS Cavalry Brigade, this work does not provide enough information on the unit’s 
deployment in the Soviet Union or on how Fegelein’s men helped to initiate a new 
phase of the Holocaust. 
  Cüppers, on the other hand, demonstrates the organisation and operations of the 
Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS and its subunits in a very detailed and capable way. 
In general, his work focuses on the  Kommandostab  and could have provided more 
information on the SS Cavalry Brigade, especially on the formation of the unit and 
its  combat  missions.17 However,  Cüppers  also  presents  a  very  important 
15 For this dissertation, I have used the second edition of the work, which was published in Berlin in 
1999. It  consists of a revised version of the original  and contains significantly more information, 
especially on Becher’s life after 1945 and judicial proceedings against him.
16 Paul J.  Wilson,  Himmler's  Cavalry: The Equestrian SS, 1930-1945 (Atglen, PA, 2000);  Martin 
Cüppers,  Wegbereiter  der  Shoah:  die  Waffen-SS,  der  Kommandostab  Reichsführer-SS  und  die  
Judenvernichtung 1939 – 1945 (Darmstadt, 2005). A comparison and short summary of the missions 
of the brigade's two cavalry regiments in the summer of 1941 is given in another essay by Cüppers, 
‘Vorreiter der Shoah. Ein Vergleich der Einsätze beider SS-Kavallerieregimenter im August 1941’, in 
T. C. Richter (ed.), Krieg und Verbrechen. Situation und Intention: Fallbeispiele (Munich, 2006), pp. 
87-99.
17 In a contribution to a work by Christopher Browning,  Jürgen Matthäus warned of overestimating 
the role of  the  Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS,  two years  before the book by Cüppers  was even 
published. The article by Matthäus also outlines the beginning of the Holocaust in the Soviet Union 
very competently and can be used to gain an overview on the subject; see Christopher R. Browning, 
Die  Entfesselung  der  ‘Endlösung’.  Nationalsozialistische  Judenpolitik  1939  –  1942.  Mit  einem 
Beitrag von Jürgen Matthäus (Munich, 2003), pp. 405-420. A critical assessment of Cüppers’s work 
can also be found in a review by Raul Hilberg, ‘The Kommandostab Revisited’, Yad Vashem Studies  
34 (2006), pp. 355-367.
9
consideration, namely that the brigade escalated the practice of executions soon after 
the beginning of  operation ‘Barbarossa’and therefore has  an exceptional  position 
within the context of German mobile killing squads. Battalions of the order police, 
for example, committed massacres with thousands of victims at Bialystok and Brest-
Litovsk  in  late  June  and  early  July,  1941.18 But  as  opposed to  police  units  and 
Einsatzgruppen which targeted Jewish males, the SS Cavalry Brigade  was the first 
formation to destroy entire Jewish communities, including women and children.
  My project follows a different approach than the research of Wilson and Cüppers as 
it aims at reconstructing and analysing the history of the SS Cavalry Brigade in 1941 
– 1942 outside the primary context of the Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS. Instead, 
the  focus  is  on  the  combined  ideological  and  military  role  of  the  unit  and  the 
question of  how it  worked as an institution in an environment of mass violence. 
Based on the delineation of its deployment,  my work will also explore the  combat 
value of the brigade at the front in more detail. 
  In the field of perpetrator history, the two best-known and perhaps most significant 
works  have  been  written  by Christopher  Browning  and Daniel  Goldhagen.  Both 
authors focussed on a police formation, the Reserve Police Battalion 101.19 They 
included a history of the battalion and examine the role of its men in the Holocaust. 
The  two  authors  arrived  at  different  conclusions  in  the  question  of  how  the 
policemen became perpetrators  and also used their main source, questionings from 
postwar trials, in a different way.
18 Edward B. Westermann,  Hitler’s Police Battalions: Enforcing Racial War in the East  (Lawrence, 
KS 2005),  pp.  174-177;  Wolfgang  Curilla,  Die deutsche  Ordnungspolizei  und  der  Holocaust  im  
Baltikum und in Weißrußland 1941 – 1944 (Paderborn, 2006), pp. 511-518 and pp. 570-574. The 
massacre at Bialystok, which was committed by Police Battalion 309 on 27 June, 1941, claimed the 
lives of about 2,000 victims. Two weeks later, about 4,000 Jews and 400 non-Jewish Soviet citizens 
were murdered by Police Battalion 307 at Brest-Litovsk (the exact date could not be ascertained by 
historical research). For the executions at Bialystok and Brest-Litovsk, see also below, p. 85.
19 Christopher  Browning,  Ordinary  men:  Reserve  Police  Battalion  101  and  the  final  solution  in  
Poland (Harmondsworth,  2001);  Daniel  Jonah Goldhagen,  Hitler's  willing executioners:  ordinary 
Germans and the Holocaust (London, 1996).
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  Goldhagen blamed a specific, ‘eliminationist’ form of anti-Semitism. According to 
his study, this attitude was typical of all Germans and motivated them to kill the 
Jews. This monocausal approach has been widely dismissed by historians as it does 
not  take  into  account  other  ideological  and  situational  aspects,  such  as  anti-
Bolshevism or the ‘war of annihilation’ waged by the Germans in eastern Europe, 
where virtually everybody could be perceived as an enemy. In contrast, Browning 
offers  a  more  productive  multicausal  explanation  and  shows  in  detail  how  the 
policemen  behaved  when  they  were  ordered  to  kill,  as  well  as  referring  to 
psychological  experiments  conducted  by  Stanley  Milgram and  Philip  Zimbardo. 
These  have  proven  that  almost  everybody  is  able  to  inflict  violence  on  others. 
Browning relates their results to the German policemen and states that although most 
of the members of the battalion took part in committing crimes of a genocidal nature, 
the  circumstances  of  each  of  these  crimes  have  to  be  analysed  separately  and 
thoroughly in order to find out more about why they happened. He arrives at the 
conclusion that the circumstances of war and racism, two factors which had mutually 
intensifying  effects,  as  well  as  peer  pressure  and  careerism,  were  combined and 
turned the policemen into killers.
  Browning’s approach also differs in his use of testimony from the trial of former 
members of the police battalion. As opposed to Goldhagen, who left out statements 
which disproved his overall argument (namely that all policemen agreed with what 
they  had  to  do),  Browning  explains  a  variety  of  different  attitudes  and  fears 
contained in the court files and thus presents a view which is based on a broader 
range of sources. Leaning towards Browning, I will use a multi-layered evaluation of 
sources,  which  is  very  important  as  court  files  form a  major  component  of  the 
primary  sources  I  am  using,  and  avoid  the  monocausal  approach  taken  by 
Goldhagen. This method of collecting, interpreting and cross-checking of sources is 
11
also described by Devin Pendas in his article on testimony; Pendas referred to the 
controversy between Browning and Goldhagen about the use of testimony and also 
to the use of other sources from court proceedings against Nazi perpetrators.20
  A similar  approach has also been taken by Harald Welzer:  based on a  general 
overview of the state of research in perpetrator history, he delineates the process of 
becoming a killer in a very detailed way, starting with the anti-Semitic campaigns 
launched by the Nazis from 1933, continuing with the dehumanisation of the Jews 
and finally their mass annihilation at the hands of killing squads in eastern Europe. 
According  to  his  approach,  humans  are  capable  of  viewing  ‘their  actions  as 
something independent of their own person’ when they can integrate them into a 
special ‘frame of reference’ such as war.21 He particularly stresses the importance of 
the  social  framework  and  individual  situations  in  which  the  perpetrators  found 
themselves when ordered to kill, and the social affiliation of their victims, which was 
first  eroded  by dehumanisation  and  finally  erased  by execution.  This  method  of 
analysis was also used in another work by Sönke Neitzel and Harald Welzer, which 
centres on wiretaps of German prisoners of war. It contains information on soldiers 
of the  Wehrmacht and the  Waffen-SS and thus helps to compare the motivation of 
men belonging to these organisations.22 In my work, I will use this approach in order 
to examine how and why the SS cavalrymen came to fulfil their particular role in the 
Holocaust.
  An examination of the SS Cavalry Brigade and its ‘dual role’ also has to analyse the 
military performance  of  the  unit  and  to  integrate  the  results  into  the  operational 
history of the  Waffen-SS. This overarching context to the research topic is still  a 
20 Devin Pendas, ‘Testimony’, in M. Dobson and B. Ziemann (eds.), Reading Primary Sources: The  
Interpretation of texts from nineteenth- and twentieth-century history (London, New York 2009), pp. 
226-242.
21 Harald Welzer,  Täter: wie aus ganz normalen Menschen Massenmörder werden (Frankfurt 2005), 
p. 14.
22 Sönke  Neitzel  and  Harald  Welzer,  Soldaten.  Protokolle  vom  Kämpfen,  Töten  und  Sterben  
(Frankfurt, 2011).
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desideratum of research as there is hardly any scholarly literature available. In order 
to gain an overview of this field, rather dated standard works have to be used, most 
of  which  describe  the  SS and the  Waffen-SS in  general  without  reference  to  the 
brigade  or  only mention  it  briefly.23 There is  also  a  huge array of  non-scholarly 
works which could be summarised as belonging to the genre of 'militaria literature'. 
These books focus on military missions of  the  Waffen-SS  in  general and tend to 
neglect the aspect of ideology, which is why they are hardly of any use for this 
dissertation.24 Thus, the brigade's deployment at the front has to be delineated largely 
on the basis of primary sources.
  For the interpretation of the behaviour of SS soldiers in a battle situation, however, 
three recent publications can be used. The book by Jean-Luc Leleu, despite the fact 
that it  focuses on SS divisions in the Western European theatre of war and  hardly 
mentions the SS Cavalry Brigade, constitutes a new standard work on the expansion, 
structure, ideology, and combat performance of the Waffen-SS.25 As opposed to this 
approach, the work by Neitzel and Welzer contains information on soldiers of the 
Wehrmacht as well as of the Waffen-SS and thus provides an opportunity to compare 
their military competence and ideological motivation. René Rohrkamp's work on the 
social profile of the Waffen-SS supports the theory of a further radicalisation of SS 
units during the Second World War.26 As far as the influence of combat situations and 
the characteristics of fighting against the Red Army are concerned, I will show how 
23 Kurt-Gerhard Klietmann, Die Waffen-SS. Eine Dokumentation (Osnabrück, 1965), George H. Stein, 
The Waffen SS: Hitler’s Elite Guard at War, 1939 – 1945 (Ithaca, N.Y., London, 1966), and Höhne, 
The Order of the Death’s Head.  See also the following compilation: Georg Tessin,  Verbände und 
Truppen  der  deutschen  Wehrmacht  und  Waffen-SS  im  Zweiten  Weltkrieg  1939-1945.  20  Bände 
(Osnabrück, 1967). Whereas Klietmann at least provides a brief summary of the military operations of 
the SS Cavalry Brigade, Stein and Höhne hardly mention it at all. Tessin only presents the structure of 
the unit.
24 See for example Herbert Walther, Die Waffen-SS. Eine Bilddokumentation (Wölfersheim-Berstadt, 
1994); Christopher Ailsby,  Waffen SS: The Illustrated History, 1923-1945 (Minneapolis, MN 1998); 
Tim Ripley, The Waffen-SS At War: Hitler's Praetorians 1925-1945 (Minneapolis, MN 2004).
25 Jean-Luc Leleu, La Waffen-SS. Soldats politiques en guerre (Paris, 2007).
26 René Rohrkamp, ‘Weltanschaulich gefestigte Kämpfer’: Die Soldaten der Waffen-SS 1933 – 1945.  
Organisation – Personal – Sozialstrukturen (Paderborn, Munich, Vienna, Zurich, 2010).
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soldiers of the SS Cavalry Brigade went beyond carrying out orders and how their 
behaviour  was  shaped by the  criminal  intentions  of  their  superiors.  This  can  be 
achieved by contrasting findings  from primary sources  and the  above mentioned 
secondary literature with the argumentation of Omer Bartov.27 
  After 1945,  some veterans  of the SS cavalry presented their view in the form of 
Kameradenliteratur (comrade literature).28 These works do not describe events very 
accurately but aim at commemorating wartime experience. They rather glorify the 
virtues of the German soldier in general and depict everyday life in the mounted 
units as well as combat operations.  The most important publication in this context 
was written by a former non-commissioned officer who served in the 1st SS Cavalry 
Regiment during the mission in the Pripet Marshes.29 These books help to explain the 
mentality  of  the  men  of  the  SS  Cavalry  Brigade:  between  them,  a  strong  bond 
existed, based on horse-riding and the development of the later cavalry role.
  In order to transcend the current state of research, many different primary sources 
have to be analysed. The general state of source material is very good as information 
of various kinds can be found, such as German SS and military documentation. For 
original documents on the deployment and intentions of the SS Cavalry Brigade, two 
national record offices are of great importance. The Central Military Archive of the 
Czech Republic at Prague has extensive German holdings, which were captured by 
27 Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941 – 1945, German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare  
(Basingstoke, 1985). To understand the specific atmosphere of Waffen-SS units, especially their power 
of endurance even in critical situations, the work by Jean-Luc Leleu again is of great importance (see 
above).
28 See for  example the self-published works by a former member of the 8th SS Cavalry Division 
Florian Geyer: Hans-Otto Wachter, Wir funkten. Geschichte der Funkkompanie Nachrichtenabteilung 
8 "Florian Geyer" (Kassel, 1979); Hans-Otto Wachter, ...und nur dafür! Erinnerungen und Gedanken  
ehemaliger  Soldaten,  die  auszogen,  um  ihr  Vaterland  zu  verteidigen (Kassel,  1984);  Hans-Otto 
Wachter,  Als die Feuer brannten... Erinnerungen und Gedanken ehemaliger Soldaten, die auszogen, 
um ihr Vaterland zu verteidigen (Kassel, 1984); Hans-Otto Wachter,  Unsere Kavallerie-Division in 
der Dokumentation des II. Weltkrieges: Soldaten der "Florian Geyer" fotografierten (Kassel, 1984). 
These works constitute collages of first-hand accounts, photographs, and other documents rather than 
actual books. Despite the fact that Wachter himself only joined the 8th SS Cavalry Division in 1943, 
they also contain many items and anecdotes from 1941 – 1942, which the author received from other 
veterans of the SS cavalry units.
29 Hanns Bayer, Die Kavallerie der Waffen-SS (Heidelberg 1980).
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the Czechs after the end of the war. These files comprise documents from Waffen-SS 
divisions  and other  SS agencies,  the  Wehrmacht,  and the  Nazi  party.30 The most 
significant  source  complex  in  this  context  is  that  of  the  Kommandostab 
Reichsführer-SS, in which orders, daily reports (mostly in the form of radio message 
transcripts) and special mission reports of the SS Cavalry Brigade from the period 
under observation can be found. They provide key information on the advance into 
Belorussia, killings committed by the brigade and police units,  combat operations 
against the Red Army during the advance on Moscow, and the heavy losses of the SS 
cavalry after the collapse of the German offensive in the winter of 1941 – 1942. The 
documentation of the Kommandostab files also shows different levels of the chain of 
command: reports were issued by the brigade staff as well as the next higher SS 
authority, the  Höherer SS- und Polizeiführer ‘Mitte’ (Higher SS and Police Leader 
‘Centre’),  SS-Gruppenführer Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, who was in charge of 
all SS and police units not employed in combat in the central sector of the German 
eastern front. Therefore, each hierarchy level gives a different picture of the general 
situation.
  The  Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv at  Freiburg  is  the  second  institution  which 
preserves sources on the SS Cavalry Brigade.31 As opposed to the above-mentioned 
cohesive body of SS material  available in Prague,  the documentation at  Freiburg 
30 This archive is subordinate to the Czech Ministry of Defence and holds the records of the Czech and 
Czechoslovakian armed forces from the time of the Austro-Hungarian empire until 1975. The content 
and state of indexing of the German holdings are described in a short article: Zuzana Pivcová, ‘Das 
Militärhistorische  Archiv  in  Prag  und  seine  deutschen  Bestände’,  in: Militärgeschichtliche  
Mitteilungen 52 (1993), pp. 429-435.  Some of the documents of the SS Cavalry Brigade, together 
with the war diary of the Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS and material on other units subordinate to 
this institution (such as the 1st and 2nd SS Infantry Brigade), were published in 1965; see Unsere Ehre 
heißt Treue. Kriegstagebuch des Kommandostabes Reichsführer-SS, Tätigkeitsberichte der 1. und 2.  
SS-Inf.-Brigade, der 1. SS-Kav.-Brigade und von Sonderkommandos der SS, ed. F. Baade and others 
(Vienna,  Frankfurt,  Zurich,  1965).  Further  information  on  the  brigade  can  also  be  found  in  the 
documentation of its successor, the 8th SS Cavalry Division Florian Geyer, which is kept at Prague as 
well.
31 This is part of the German Federal Archive and responsible for preserving the documentation of the 
German armed forces from 1864 until the present day. For the holdings and role of this archive, see 
Andreas Kunz,  ‘Das  Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv  in  Freiburg  i.Br.  Quell(en)  deutscher 
Militärgeschichte von 1864 bis heute’, Militärgeschichte. Zeitschrift für historische Bildung 4 (2008), 
pp. 14-17.
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consists of different types of files. Amongst them are many documents relating to the 
establishment and deployment of the two regiments in Poland, which illustrate the 
organisational matters the two regiments had to face between 1939 and 1941. They 
also give information on various other aspects, such as the involvement of the SS 
cavalry in crimes against the Polish population, especially the Jews. By using these 
documents, it is possible to describe a continuity of development: the various reports 
and orders prove the formation of mounted SS units which from a very early stage 
served ideological as well as military purposes. The archival holdings also contain 
evidence for crimes such as direct orders for murder issued by Himmler and radio 
message transcripts which gave daily updates on the progress of executions in the 
east.
  As the SS Cavalry Brigade closely cooperated with units of the Wehrmacht in the 
first phase of the campaign against the Soviet Union, it is also possible to prove the 
military and ideological character of the unit by means of analysing army sources, 
which  are  also  accessible  at  Freiburg.  Thus,  it  can  be  examined  how  the  SS 
cavalrymen  adapted  to  different  situations,  such  as  the  fight  against  Red  Army 
stragglers and partisans as well  as at  the front, and how this was viewed by the 
leadership of the army units they were subordinated to. This study also goes beyond 
the analysis of individual divisions or army corps and includes the institution of the 
Befehlshaber des rückwärtigen Heeresgebiets Mitte (supreme commander of the rear 
areas  of  Army  Group  Centre),  general  Max  von  Schenckendorff,  who  closely 
cooperated  with  the  Höherer  SS-  und  Polizeiführer  ‘Mitte’ and  the  SS  Cavalry 
Brigade.32
  The branch of the German Bundesarchiv at Lichterfelde, Berlin, also holds a large 
32 The institution of the supreme commanders of the army rear areas has also been outlined very 
competently  in  a  recent  source:  Jörn  Hasenclever,  Wehrmacht  und  Besatzungspolitik  in  der  
Sowjetunion: die Befehlshaber der rückwärtigen Heeresgebiete 1941 – 1943 (Paderborn, 2010).
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amount of material on the SS which particularly helps to delineate the early phase of 
the SS cavalry, especially the close connection between Himmler and Fegelein that 
helped  to  create  a  military unit  from the  Fegelein riding school  at  Munich.  The 
records of the former Berlin Document Center, an Allied organisation which was 
founded  to  support  the  ‘denazification’ of  Germany in  the  late  1940s,  comprise 
several  databases  with  files  on  hundreds  of  thousands  former  SS  officers,  non-
commissioned officers and men, such as the SSO (SS organisations) database which 
holds information on life data, military careers, awards of medals and decorations, 
and Nazi party membership. Files from the SSO database can be used for outlining 
biographies of members of the brigade.
  Court  files  form the  second large  source  complex  which  has  to  be  taken into 
account. In the 1960s, two trials against former officers of the two regiments that 
made up the cavalry brigade were held in West Germany. In the trial against Gustav 
Lombard and other officers of the 1st SS Cavalry Regiment, no verdict was returned. 
In  the  other  trial  against  Franz  Magill  and  other  officers  of  the  2nd SS  Cavalry 
Regiment, four defendants were sentenced to prison sentences of four and five years 
and  one  was  acquitted.  The  records  of  these  legal  proceedings are  kept  at  the 
Ludwigsburg  branch  of  the  German  Bundesarchiv and  the  Niedersächsisches 
Landesarchiv - Staatsarchiv at Wolfenbüttel. They contain questionings of hundreds 
of some 400 former SS cavalrymen as well as the indictments and conclusions of the 
two cases and also other documents such as testimonies of survivors.33 The result of 
the Magill trial was also published in an academic series in 1979.34
33 In  the trial  against  Gustav Lombard and others,  more than 230 witnesses were questioned; see 
Cüppers,  Wegbereiter,  p. 324. Not all  of them, however,  had served with the 1st Regiment or the 
bicycle reconnaissance battalion during the missions in the Pripet Marshes; some of the witnesses 
were questioned because they had served under Fegelein at  another  point  in time,  such as  Egon 
Birkigt (see chapter 1). For the proceedings against Franz Magill and others, about 170 former SS 
cavalrymen  were  interrogated;  see  Zwischenbericht  der  Sonderkommission  Z  [zum  Stand  der 
Ermittlungen mit umfangreichen Adressenlisten] vom 12.11. 1962, in StAW, 62 Nds. Fb.2, Nr. 1268, 
pp. 43-98.
34Justiz und NS-Verbrechen: Sammlung deutscher Strafurteile wegen nationalsozialistischer Tötungs- 
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  Apart from using primary and secondary sources, I also conducted interviews with 
two investigators who worked on the Magill case: a former police inspector and a 
retired  regional  prosecutor.35 These  talks  not  only  provided  information  on  the 
involvement of the SS Cavalry Brigade in the Holocaust, but also provided valuable 
reflections  on the  mindsets  of  the officers  as  well  as  the ordinary soldiers.  This 
perspective helped me to view aspects of perpetrator history not only in the abstract, 
academic sense but also to understand them as part of real life as well as judicial 
proceedings: why did a man commit a crime and how could he be brought to justice 
for it? Moreover, both interview partners elaborated on the situation in postwar West 
Germany, where the prosecution of Nazi crimes was not a priority of legal authorities 
and  investigations  against  such  perpetrators  were  often  impeded  by  the 
circumstances.  In  addition  to  illustrating  investigation  methods  and  giving  of 
evidence, the two interviews also facilitate working with testimony as they can help 
to  identify  and  interpret  different  narratives  and  layers  of  information  in  the 
interrogation transcripts. 
  The three most important explanations offered by former SS cavalrymen for their 
behaviour, which will be addressed in the appropriate chapters of the thesis, were 
designed to conceal the actual contribution or role of individuals in the crimes. Many 
veterans described an atmosphere of harshness and sometimes excessive punishment 
in their units as a reason for not refusing orders to kill Jews. In order to negate or 
extenuate their own involvement in executions, they said that they had perceived this 
as ‘putative duress’.36  Secondly, some of the questioned justified killings as military 
verbrechen 1945 – 1966. Bd. 20: Die vom 12.04.1964 bis zum 03.04.1965 ergangenen Strafurteile.  
Lfd.  Nr.  569-590,  ed.  I.  Sagel-Grande  and  others  (Amsterdam,  1979),  pp.  24-105.  This  series 
incorporates  conclusions  of  all  Nazi  trials  conducted  in  Germany,  including  those  held  in  East 
Germany until 1989. As these works only comprise cases which ended with a sentence or an acquittal, 
the Lombard trial is not included in the series.
35 These  interviews  were  carried  out  on  26  January  and  3  August,  2011  respectively.  Based  on 
information from court files, I have also attempted to find former SS cavalrymen in order to interview 
them; unfortunately, this was in vain as most of them have passed away already.
36 Auszüge aus Vernehmungsprotokollen von Schwadronsangehörigen, in:  BArchL, B 162/5539, pp. 
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necessity by claiming that they had been part of the brigade's deployment in partisan 
warfare.  Finally,  when  confronted  with  solid  evidence  former  soldiers  made 
exculpatory statements, for example by stating that they only played an auxiliary role 
in an execution.37
  In  order  to  interpret  the  validity  of  testimony,  investigation  methods  and 
weaknesses of the judicial system have to be taken into account as well. First,  a 
contrast between the rank groups amongst the SS veterans becomes evident, which 
results  from the focus of the questionings.38 Former officers showed a pattern of 
testimony which differred from that of the ranks as they denied their participation in 
the killings, especially their personal responsibility. Their former subordinates, on 
the  other  hand,  sometimes  took  to  answering  questions  evasively  or  making 
exculpatory statements but were not generally in denial. When questioned, most of 
them did not even make use of their right to remain silent. Some appeared to be glad 
to relieve their consciences and described the events in graphic detail. Both kinds of 
behaviour  during the  hearings  were classified as  normal  by judicial  authorities.39 
The  veterans  were  not  specifically  questioned about  their  attitude  towards  Jews. 
Despite the fact that some of the men had shared anti-Semitic prejudice common in 
German society,  the investigators assumed that a general hatred for Jews had not 
been  the  case.  When  asked  for  their  personal  impression  of  the  former  SS 
1629-1653;  interview with Dr Heinrich K., retired regional prosecutor in Braunschweig, 3 August, 
2011.
37 Interview with Bernhard D., retired chief inspector of the Landeskriminalamt Niedersachsen, 26 
January, 2011; interview with Dr Heinrich K., retired regional prosecutor in Braunschweig, 3 August, 
2011.
38 During the questionings before the Magill trial, two distinctions were made: between witnesses and 
defendants  as  well  as  between  officers  and  men.  Former  officers  from  the  rank  of  SS-
Untersturmführer and above were questioned as defendants (because investigators assumed that as 
superiors these men had been able to know right from wrong), whereas all other veterans were heard 
as  witnesses,  apart  from perpetrators  of  excesses.  See  interview with  Bernhard  D.,  retired  chief 
inspector of the Landeskriminalamt Niedersachsen, 26 January, 2011; interview with Dr Heinrich K., 
retired regional prosecutor in Braunschweig, 3 August, 2011.
39 Interview with Bernhard D., retired chief inspector of the Landeskriminalamt Niedersachsen, 26 
January, 2011; interview with Dr Heinrich K., retired regional prosecutor in Braunschweig, 3 August, 
2011.
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cavalrymen, the investigators supported the image of non-ideological perpetrators 
who  had  killed  under  orders.  From  their  experience  in  the  Magill  trial,  they 
concluded that this had happened due to the special circumstances the soldiers had 
found themselves in, not because of their strong support for National Socialism or 
personal anti-Semitism.40
  Interrogation protocols also reflect a characteristic of the West German penal code: 
as  laws  regarding  the  punishment  of  genocide,  crimes  against  humanity,  or 
participation in the Holocaust did not exist or were not applicable, perpetrators had 
to be charged with murder or accessory to murder instead.41 In order to fulfil the 
elements of murder, reasons such as lust to kill, greed, satisfaction of sexual instinct, 
or  other  ‘base  motives’ such  as  racial  hatred  had  to  be  proven.42 Witnesses  and 
defendants very carefully tried to avoid the impression of having killed out of ‘base 
motives’,  which  might  be  another  reason  for  the  absence  of  ideology  from the 
questionings.43 The work of the investigators was also impaired by another factor. 
Exposing lies and, ultimately, establishing the individual role of witnesses and the 
guilt of defendants required expert knowledge of Nazi Germany and the SS Cavalry 
40 Interview with Bernhard D., retired chief inspector of the Landeskriminalamt Niedersachsen, 26 
January, 2011; interview with Dr Heinrich K., retired regional prosecutor in Braunschweig, 3 August, 
2011.
41 After the end of the Second World War, a completely new justice system had to be built up in both 
parts of Germany. This process was impeded by many factors, such as the allied supremacy over 
German courts  between  1945 and  1949.  As this  dissertation  refers  to  court  proceedings  in  West 
Germany, the development in the German Democratic Republic will not be examined in this context. 
On the prosecution of  Nazi  crimes in  West Germany during the 1960s,  see  Michael  Greve,  Der 
justitielle  und  rechtspolitische  Umgang  mit  den  NS-Gewaltverbrechen  in  den  sechziger  Jahren 
(Frankfurt, 2001). For problems resulting from the allied legislature and an insufficient penal code, 
see ibid., pp. 17-18. See also Edith Raim, Der Wiederaufbau der Justiz in Westdeutschland und die  
Ahndung von NS-Verbrechen in der Besatzungszeit 1945 – 1949, in Jürgen Finger and others (eds.), 
Vom Recht zur Geschichte: Akten aus NS-Prozessen als Quellen der Zeitgeschichte (Göttingen, 2009), 
pp. 57-58. The punishment of genocide was only introduced into the West German penal code in 
1954. As laws cannot be applied with retrospective effect in Germany, this law was of no use during 
the court proceedings against former members of the SS Cavalry Brigade. See Kerstin Freudiger, Die 
juristische Aufarbeitung von NS-Verbrechen (Tübingen, 2002), pp. 31-32.
42 Freudiger, Die juristische Aufarbeitung von NS-Verbrechen, pp. 35-36.
43 Konrad Kwiet,  ‘Von Tätern zu Befehlsempfängern.  Legendenbildung und Strafverfolgung nach 
1945’,  in  J.  Matthäus  (ed.),  Ausbildungsziel  Judenmord?  ‘Weltanschauliche  Erziehung’ von  SS,  
Polizei und Waffen-SS im Rahmen der Endlösung (Frankfurt, 2003), pp. 122-125 and pp. 128-129. 
Kwiet refers to questionings of former members of the SS Cavalry Brigade including Franz Magill. 
He also quotes from documents regarding proceedings against former policemen and members of the 
security police and the security service.
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Brigade.  This  prerequisite  could  not  always  be  fulfilled by policemen who were 
assigned to the proceedings as hardly any specific literature on the Holocaust was 
available in the early 1960s. In order to ensure a thorough preparation of the trials, 
investigators had to  resort  to  archival  research to  gain the necessary background 
knowledge.44
  The structure of my work is based on chronological order. Each chapter follows the 
‘frame of reference’ model according to the method developed by Harald Welzer in 
order to establish the background and development of the SS cavalry with a special 
focus on perpetrator history.
  The first section outlines the formation of mounted SS units and their incorporation 
into Nazi concepts of ideology and the creation of a police state from the early 1930s 
until the beginning of the Second World War. This also involves the role of sports, 
particularly horse-riding, and the build-up of armed formations within the SS.
  The second part of the work surveys the growth of the SS cavalry regiments in 
Poland and their function as occupation units between late 1939 and early 1941. It 
shows how sportsmen and farmers were turned into soldiers and took part in acts of 
mass violence such as the destruction of the Polish elites and Jews. Two years after 
the beginning of the war, the SS cavalrymen were embedded into a new command 
structure and had begun their training for deployment in combat.
  A subsequent chapter examines the role of the two SS Cavalry Regiments in the 
opening phase of operation  Barbarossa,  the German attack on the Soviet  Union. 
Now part of the forces of the  Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS, Himmler’s ‘private 
army’, Fegelein’s men took part in a short combat mission. Against the background 
of the nascent Holocaust,  the cavalry units began to develop their ‘dual role’ and 
44 Interview with  Dr  Heinrich  K.,  retired  regional  prosecutor  in  Braunschweig,  3  August,  2011; 
interview with  Bernhard  D.,  retired  chief  inspector  of  the  Landeskriminalamt  Niedersachsen,  26 
January, 2011.
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were soon included in the German occupation plans. This chapter also includes an 
excursus on the officer corps of the SS cavalry, which points out how Nazi ideology 
shaped the lives of its leadership and which effect the special function of the unit had 
on individuals, and another section on minor combat missions in Belorussia. 
  The fourth chapter analyses the deployment of the brigade in Belorussia between 
July and September, 1941, and the crimes the unit committed in this area. The aim of 
this section is not only to follow the general route of the SS cavalry through the 
Pripet Marshes in a documentary approach but to explain the importance of the unit 
in the inception of the next phase of the Holocaust, the annihilation of entire Jewish 
communities.  For  this  period,  the  aspect  of  perpetrator  history  is  of  special 
importance:  whereas  no  documents  on  the  process  of  SS  cavalrymen  becoming 
killers in Poland exist, this can be demonstrated in a detailed way for their mission in 
Belorussia. The amalgamation of the regiments to a brigade fell into this time as 
well, as did the first real combat operation of the unit. 
  Despite the fact that partisan warfare was an actual task only for a comparatively 
short time, it was of great importance for the SS cavalry: even when Fegelein’s men 
did not have to  face a threat  from guerrillas in  Poland and Belorussia,  the fight 
against  insurgents  served  as  a  welcome  reason  for  concealing  the  real  mission 
objective,  namely  mass  killings.  The  development  of  this  justification  and  real 
partisan warfare of the unit in Russia will be outlined in the fifth chapter.
  The sixth section analyses military operations of the SS Cavalry Brigade from late 
1941 until  early 1942. These include the participation of the unit  in  the German 
advance on Moscow, the ensuing fighting near Rzhev, and the defence of this sector 
until the spring of 1942. The SS cavalrymen were now no longer involved in large-
scale massacres, but their conduct will be examined regarding individual cases of 
atrocities  as  well.  As  their  frame  of  reference  during  this  period  of  time  was 
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determined by combat, the performance of the soldiers forms an essential part of this 
chapter. By means of an excursus,  this aspect will be integrated into the context of 
the operational history of the Waffen-SS.
  The interpretation of events such as military actions and massacres, together with 
an evaluation of biographies and the application of the most important models and 
theories in perpetrator history can help to answer the central research question of the 
work: What factors shaped the institutional-level conduct of the SS Cavalry Brigade 
as an instrument of ideological terror, and as a combat force? In the analysis of these 
two capacities, the main focus is on the role of the brigade as a mobile killing squad. 
This emphasis is based on the unit's particular importance in the development of the 
Final Solution. The ideological aspect, however, is closely related to the military part 
of  the  brigade's  deployment  in  the  Soviet  Union:  despite  the  fact  that  the  SS 
cavalrymen were the first to initiate the indiscriminate killing of all Jews, the key to 
understanding their special situation lies in the combination of both factors.
  The history of the unit and the biographies of SS cavalrymen will be integrated into 
the  historical  context  and  into  the  field  of  Holocaust  research.  By incorporating 
English primary and secondary sources into the research and by translating German 
terms within the text I am hoping to transcend the German context and to conduct a 
study that contains material and findings which have not been analysed until now.
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1) Elite sportsmen in the SS: the pre-war  Reiterstandarten   in the Nazi state 
  The forming of the units that later made up the SS Cavalry Brigade was a gradual 
process  which  began  before  the  outbreak  of  the  Second  World  War.  It  was 
intrinsically tied to the lives of several SS officers, most notably Hermann Fegelein, 
and also to the development of mounted paramilitary formations in Germany.
  In the early 1930s the two most important Nazi paramilitary organisations, the 
Sturmabteilung (SA)  and  the  Schutzstaffel (SS)  grew  rapidly;  they  were  joined 
primarily by war veterans and people who had been members of other rightwing 
organisations before. Their leaders, Ernst Röhm and Heinrich Himmler, established a 
strict hierarchy in their respective institutions, both of which were based on military 
principles and closely resembled one another in structure and terminology. In other 
respects,  mainly regarding their  tasks,  they were very different:  the SA were the 
‘boots on the ground’ for the fight against political enemies whereas the SS was an 
elite force which served as a bodyguard for Hitler and the party leadership; it was 
also designated to discipline the SA in the case of revolt.45 In the years before Hitler 
came to power and in the early days of the Nazi regime, the administration of the SS 
was subject to many changes. From late 1934 onwards, it  became more effectively 
structured and took on the basic organisational form it was to keep until its end in 
1945. The institution, which was also known under the generic term of Allgemeine 
SS, consisted of several main administrative offices or Hauptämter. Nationwide, the 
SS  was  divided  into main  sections,  the  so-called  Oberabschnitte,  which 
corresponded  with the  military  districts.  Below  them  came  the  Abschnitte,  or 
districts, of which there were about three in each Oberabschnitt.46 On this regional 
45 Höhne, The Order of the Death’s Head, pp. 56-59.
46 Lumsden, R., Himmler’s Black Order. A History of the SS, 1923 – 1945 (Stroud, 1997), pp. 22-34.
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level, the SS built up its manpower in regimental units, the so-called Standarten, a 
scheme that paralleled the organisation of the SA. There were  Fußstandarten and 
Reiterstandarten,  which  were  the  equivalent  of  infantry  or  cavalry  regiments 
respectively. The mounted component was summarised as Reiter-SA and Reiter-SS.47
  Many  of  the  new  paramilitary  detachments  were  understrength  in  the  years 
preceding the Nazi takeover. Whereas the Standarte as the standard SS unit had been 
established by 1930, individual units often only grew big enough to constitute a full 
Standarte from 1933 onwards. Often, an individual Sturm (company or squadron) or 
Reitersturm (mounted  company or  squadron)  was  founded first.48 As  far  as  new 
mounted units were concerned, this process was inconsistent throughout the country 
as there were some regional differences. As the SA had begun to establish mounted 
units  in  1930,  the  Reiter-SA  was already dominant  in  some parts  of  the country 
before the  Reiter-SS started to follow suit a year later. Until 1933, civilian riding 
clubs of all kinds continued to exist parallel to the  Reiterstandarten that had been 
founded so far.  After Adolf Hitler had come to power, two different developments 
influenced the expansion of mounted paramilitary units. Firstly, a decree issued by 
the Ministry of the Interior required that all rural riding associations in Germany had 
to  become  part  of  the  SA or  the  SS,  a  measure  which  served  the  purpose  of 
Gleichschaltung and  militarisation  of  the  German  society under  the  Nazis.  As  a 
result, both organisations soon were caught up in a competition for recruitment of 
experienced  horsemen  and  influence  over  certain  interest  groups,  which  lasted 
several years.49 Due to their different strength and social composition, there was a 
47 Justiz  und  NS-Verbrechen:  Sammlung  deutscher  Strafurteile  wegen  nationalsozialistischer  
Tötungsverbrechen 1945 – 1966. Bd. 20, p. 39; Lumsden, Himmler’s Black Order, p. 37.
48  Lumsden, Himmler’s Black Order, pp. 32-33.
49 Justiz  und  NS-Verbrechen:  Sammlung  deutscher  Strafurteile  wegen  nationalsozialistischer  
Tötungsverbrechen 1945 – 1966. Bd. 20, p. 39; Michael H.  Kater, ‘Zum gegenseitigen Verständnis 
von  SA  und  SS  in  der  Sozialgeschichte  des  Nationalsozialismus  von  1925  bis  1939‘,  in 
Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 62 (1975), p. 360; Wilson, Himmler's Cavalry, 
p. 17 and  pp. 71-76.
25
significant difference in the intention, role, and appearance of mounted formations 
between the SA and SS. Röhm's organisation intended to broaden its selection of 
leisure  time facilities  in  order  to  appeal  to  people  from a  wider  range  of  social 
backgrounds.50 Most  of  its  members,  however,  were  farmers.  From  1933,  the 
requirement of owning a horse was abolished and the strength of the horse units 
increased rapidly: whereas in 1935 88,000 men were members of the Reiter-SA, their 
number rose to 200,000 in 1939. The Reiter-SS, on the other hand, never had more 
than about 12,000 members throughout the 1930s.51
  Heinrich  Himmler,  the  leader  of  the  SS,  intended  to  integrate  the  rural  elites, 
including  many members  of  the  German nobility,  into  his  organisation.  For  this 
purpose,  he  solicited  the  more  exclusive  rural  equestrian  associations  and 
incorporated several horse-breeding farms into the structure of the Reiter-SS as well. 
Although the SA had followed this approach already and taken over a majority of the 
riding clubs and associations in Germany, the SS was more successful in the main 
horse  breeding  areas  such  as  East  Prussia,  Holstein,  Oldenburg,  Hanover  and 
Westphalia. Despite the fact that it exerted a growing influence over all aspects of 
horse riding and breeding in Germany, the SS had to make concessions to influential 
noblemen. In order to win them over, Himmler accepted members of the equestrian 
associations  into the SS regardless of their  political  views,  a step which sparked 
protest from the ‘old fighters’ within the organisation.52 For new candidates of the 
Reiterstürme, he also suspended the freeze on entry into the Nazi party, which had 
been introduced in May, 1933.53 As a result, the horsemen within the SS were elite 
50 Peter Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone: Geschichte der SA (München, 1989), p. 93.
51 Wilson, Himmler's Cavalry, pp. 72-73. The author assumes that during the 1930s about 20,000 men 
passed through the ranks of the Reiter-SS; see ibid., p. 20.
52 Höhne,  The Order of the Death’s Head,  pp. 137-138;  Wilson,  Himmler's Cavalry,  p. 10; Berno 
Bahro, ‘Der Sport und seine Rolle in der nationalsozialistischen Elitetruppe SS’,  Historical Social  
Research 32 (2007), p. 87.
53 Kater, ‘Zum gegenseitigen Verständnis von SA und SS’, p. 360.
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from the  beginning;  the  formations  had a  largely  ceremonial  and  representative 
character,  committed to  the advancement  of equitation.  Unlike other  paramilitary 
arms of the Nazi party, the Reiterstandarten did not display radicalism and brutality 
in public as they did not have to guard Nazi politicians or concentration camps and 
were not used for street fighting or intimidation of Jews. Although there is some 
evidence which indicates a preparation for paramilitary duties as well  as military 
service, the focus on sports and the representative character was dominant.54 Later 
successes  in  national  and  international  equestrian  competitions showed  that 
Himmler’s elite policy was paying off throughout the 1930s, as opposed to the mass 
inclusion of new members into mounted units of the SA: the most talented horsemen 
could be found in the Reiter-SS.55
  In some cases the roots of a local  Reitersturm can be traced back to rightwing 
extremist organisations that were active long before the Nazi takeover. Munich, the 
city which was later referred to as  Hauptstadt der Bewegung, is most important in 
this context: the SS Reitersturm there was created in February, 1931.56 Its founders 
were 25 former members of the  Bund Oberland, the successor of the paramilitary 
Freikorps Oberland.57 After the  Reitersturm had been set up, a cooperation with a 
54 SS equestrians were also trained as a mounted police force, for example in manning roadblocks and 
barricades,  and  sometimes  carried  out  security  duty  at  events  of  the  Nazi  party;  see  Wilson, 
Himmler's Cavalry, pp. 24-25. Due to the small size of the organisation (especially when compared to 
the SA), it can be assumed that they were not employed in this role very often. See also Lumsden, 
Himmler’s Black Order, p. 37.
55 Wilson, Himmler's Cavalry, p. 76.
56 Mathias Rösch, Die Münchner NSDAP 1925 – 1933: eine Untersuchung zur inneren Struktur der 
NSDAP in der Weimarer Republik (München, 2002), p. 260. According to the first document signed 
by Fegelein which refers to the two SS cavalry regiments as a brigade and can therefore be viewed as 
the ‘founding document’ of the unit, the beginning of the Reitersturm at Munich even dated back to 
1929;  see  Schreiben  an  die  Kommandeure  und  Chefs  der  SS-Kav.Brigade,  1  August,  1941,  in 
BArchF, RS 3-8/20. It is likely, though, that Fegelein gave a wrong date here in order to make the unit 
look more like an ‘old guard’ that had existed even before the Nazi party started to win millions of 
votes in 1930. The unit name and abbreviation  he gave in the document from 1941, ‘1. Reitersturm 
3/I/1 der allgemeinen SS’, stood for the 3rd Reitersturm of the 1st Sturmbann (battalion) of the 1st 
Standarte. The SS Reitersturm at Munich only existed under this name and in this subdivision from 
February, 1931 onwards; see again Rösch, Die Münchner NSDAP 1925 – 1933, p. 260-261.
57 Freikorps Oberland had been one of the best-known and most radical Freikorps units. Its men were 
involved in many of the politically motivated conflicts of the immediate postwar period, such as the 
fight for the Annaberg in Upper Silesia in 1921. The  Freikorps was dissolved in the same year but 
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local riding school owned by a man named Johann Fegelein facilitated its training: 
he lent  horses  to  them  and provided regular  riding instructions  for  its  members, 
which  he  also  did for  members  of  the  SA at  that  time.58 Fegelein  was a  former 
cavalry lieutenant of the German imperial army and veteran of the First World War. 
He had rented a riding hall  on the premises of an army barracks where he gave 
lessons himself; these were very popular, especially with university students.59 Both 
Fegelein and his  young customers shared the political  views of the Nazis before 
1933: university students at Munich became more and more radical at this time and 
Fegelein also provided a venue for gatherings of the NSDAP at the horse breeding 
farm he owned on  the  outskirts  of  town.60 Egon  Birkigt,  who led  the  equestrian 
section of the university sports programme at Munich, stated after 1945 that he had 
joined  the  SS-Reitersturm with  all  his  companions  in  1933  after  becoming 
acquainted with Hermann Fegelein, Johann's son.61
reformed under its new name Bund Oberland soon afterwards. It then participated in the Beer Hall 
Putsch of 1923; see Hans Fenske,  Konservativismus und Rechtsradikalismus in Bayern nach 1918 
(Bad Homburg, 1969), p. 53 and p. 159. Amongst its members was Josef “Sepp” Dietrich, who later 
founded the  Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler and became one of the highest-ranking and most decorated 
soldiers of the Waffen-SS. For Dietrich, see Christopher Clark, ‘Josef ‘Sepp’ Dietrich. Landsknecht im 
Dienste  Hitlers’,  in  R.  Smelser  and  E.  Syring  (eds.),  Die  SS  –  Elite  unter  dem  Totenkopf.  30  
Lebensläufe (Paderborn, Munich, Vienna, Zurich 2000), pp. 119-133; his membership of  Freikorps 
and Bund Oberland is described on p. 120. See also James J. Weingartner, ‘Sepp Dietrich, Heinrich 
Himmler, and the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, 1933 – 1938’, Central European History 1 (1968), p. 
265.
58 Volker  Riess, ‘Hermann Fegelein.  Parvenü ohne Skrupel’,  in Smelser and Syring,  Die SS – Elite  
unter dem Totenkopf, p. 161; Rösch, M., Die Münchner NSDAP 1925 – 1933, p. 260; Indra Schöller, 
‘Die Universitätsreitschule München von ihrer Gründung im Jahre 1927 bis zur  Schenkung an die 
Universität  München’,  in  E.  Kraus  (ed.),  Beiträge  zur  Geschichte  der  Ludwig-Maximilians-
Universität München, Band 1 – Die Universität München im Dritten Reich, Aufsätze Teil I  (Munich, 
2006), p. 106.
59 Riess,  ‘Fegelein’,  p.  160;  Schöller,  ‘Die Universitätsreitschule München’,  p.  106.  According to 
Schöller, the popularity of Fegelein’s courses with students could already be observed in 1928, when a 
university  professor  listed  the  major  riding  schools  in  Munich  and  compared  their  prices  and 
popularity with those of the university riding school. See Schreiben Moser an Rektorat vom 10.11. 
1928, in University Archive Munich, Sen 725, quoted ibid., pp. 105-106.
60 Ibid.,  p.  106.  For  the  use  of  Fegelein's  farm  as  a  venue,  see  Eichenlaubträger  SS-Oberführer 
Fegelein, Völkischer Beobachter, 24 December, 1942, in BArchB, SSO Hermann Fegelein. See also 
Bahro, ‘Der Sport und seine Rolle in der nationalsozialistischen Elitetruppe SS’, p. 88.
61 Vernehmung Egon Birkigt vom 22.3. 1960, in BArchL, B 162/5544, p. n40. Birkigt later became a 
Hauptsturmführer in the Waffen-SS and served in the SS cavalry in various functions until the end of 
the war. His assignments included service as squadron commander in the 1st SS Cavalry Regiment in 
Warsaw, the organisation of horse races at the main riding school in Munich and front-line duty in the 
Ukraine in 1944.
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  Another mounted SS formation of particular importance was the 1st SS-Reitersturm 
at Berlin, which stands out because at least three men who later played important 
roles in the SS belonged to it in the early years of the Nazi regime. In addition, it 
fulfilled a ceremonial duty: upon request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its riders 
served high-ranking state guests as escorts and interpreters, or formed a guard of 
honour  during  visits  of  foreign  politicians  and  diplomats.62 For  these  purposes, 
knowledge of foreign languages and etiquette were essential,  requirements which 
were easily met by the members of the unit which, like the rest of Reiterstandarte 7, 
consisted of ‘diplomats and attachés from the Ministry of Intelligence and the Justice 
Department  with  numerous  students,  high-level  civil  servants,  and  members  of 
Berlin’s leading social  circles (nobles  and the financial  elite)’.63 Two particularly 
prominent  equestrians  in  this  Reiterstandarte were  Gustav  Adolph  von  Halem, 
deputy Chief of Protocol in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Prince Bernhard zur 
Lippe-Biesterfeld,  the  Dutch  prince  consort.64 Events  attended  by  the  1st SS-
Reitersturm included the annual  Reichsparteitag at Nuremberg, the 1936 Olympics 
at Berlin, and state visits of Benito Mussolini and Miklós Horthy. The visit of the 
Duce,  which  lasted  several  days,  was  accompanied  by  the  SS  men  from  the 
beginning to the end. In his memoirs, Gustav Lombard also mentions an incognito 
visit of Edward Duke of Windsor at Hermann  Göring’s residence in Brandenburg, 
where  an  SS  equestrian  officer  from  Berlin  served  as  an  escort  to  the  guest. 
According to Lombard, the Duke of Windsor conferred with Hitler and warned him 
of  Winston  Churchill.65 After  the  war,  the  special  support  role  of  the  1st SS-
Reitersturm, the eloquent behaviour of its men, the valuable connections they made 
62 Lebenserinnerungen des Generalmajors der Waffen-SS und SS-Brigadeführers Gustav Lombard, in: 
BArchF, MSg 2/13509, p. 17. This source will from now on be abbreviated as ‘Lebenserinnerungen 
Gustav Lombard’. See also Jens Westemeier, Joachim Peiper (1915-1976): Zwischen Totenkopf und  
Ritterkreuz. Lebensweg eines SS-Führers (Bissendorf, 2006), p. 9. 
63 Wilson, Himmler’s Cavalry, p. 26.
64 Ibid., p. 27.
65 Lebenserinnerungen Gustav Lombard, pp. 17-23.
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with foreign diplomats, and perhaps also the membership of famous sportsmen and 
the  Dutch  prince  consort  influenced  the  assessment  of  the  mounted  SS  at  the 
Nuremberg Trials: unaware of the later crimes of the SS cavalry, the Allied tribunal 
excluded this part of the SS from being declared a criminal organisation.66 
  But the 1st SS-Reitersturm was not only a spare-time activity for diplomats – it was 
also the starting point for several men with very different political ambitions. The 
roster of 1933 – 1934 almost reads like a ‘who’s who’ of the later SS leadership. 
Gustav Lombard, for example, first commanded one of the platoons, later the entire 
Sturm. During the war, he led the 1st SS Cavalry Regiment in 1941 and later rose to 
the rank of Brigadeführer in the Waffen-SS.67 Under him, a young man began his SS 
career in this company: Joachim Peiper, who later served as Himmler's adjutant and 
became a highly decorated officer in the Waffen-SS.68 In the time he could spare from 
his administrative duties in Berlin, Hans Kammler practiced his favourite sport in the 
Reitersturm, where he had the rank of Unterscharführer. Some years later, he was in 
an  executive  position  in  the  SS  main  office  for  economic  administration  and 
responsible for all construction work in concentration camps, which also included 
gas chambers and underground factories of the German arms industry.69
  These two  Reiterstürme are the two most prominent examples for the growth of 
small mounted units into larger ones. When membership increased throughout the 
1930s,  the  early  Reiterstürme  were  embedded  in  Reiterstandarten:  the  unit  at 
66 Wilson, Himmler‘s Cavalry, pp. 172-173.
67 Dienstlaufbahn  Gustav  Lombard,  in:  BArchB,  SSO  Gustav  Lombard;  Vernehmung  Gustav 
Lombard vom 10.3. 1964, in:  BArchL, B 162/5540, p. e67 f.,  quoted in Martin  Cüppers, ‘Gustav 
Lombard – ein engagierter Judenmörder aus der Waffen-SS’, in K. M. Mallmann and G. Paul (eds.), 
Karrieren der Gewalt: Nationalsozialistische Täterbiographien  (Darmstadt, 2004), p. 151, footnote 
43.
68 Westemeier, Peiper, pp. 1-2, pp. 7-13, and pp. 25-57.
69 Rainer Fröbe, ‘Hans Kammler. Technokrat der Vernichtung’, in Smelser and Syring, Die SS – Elite  
unter  dem Totenkopf,  pp.  305-319.  For  Kammler‘s career  in  the  SS and  his  involvement  in  the 
concentration  camp  system,  see  pp.  307-317.  See  also  the  following  source: 
http://www.gtgj.de/archiv/indexa.html?kammler_leb39.html (accessed on 8 January, 2011).
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Munich,  for  example,  became  part  of  Reiterstandarte  15.  By  1939, 21 
Reiterstandarten of the Allgemeine SS were formed all over Germany, some of which 
were based at places where garrisons of army cavalry with excellent riding facilities 
existed, such as Insterburg in East Prussia.70 From 1933 onwards, equestrians could 
only  practise  competitive  sports  in  Germany  as  members  of  the  SA  and  SS 
Reiterstürme.  In  order  to  take  part  in  tournaments,  championships  or  even  the 
Olympics, they had to join these formations unless they were not cavalrymen in the 
regular  Reichswehr anyway.  Thus,  being  a  member  of  the  mounted  SS  did  not 
necessarily mean being a fanatical National socialist in the first years of the Third 
Reich.  Many future  members  of  the  SS Cavalry Brigade,  among  them not  only 
officers but also non-commissioned officers and men, had found their way into its 
ranks through their sport, not their political attitude.71
  During the first six years of the Third Reich, a passion for equitation was the only 
feature  common  to  members  of  the  Reiterstandarten;  otherwise,  a  strong 
heterogeneity could be observed: from former  Freikorps fighters to noblemen and 
from skilled professionals to peasants, many different types were represented. As a 
result  of  Himmler’s  easing  of  the  conditions  for  admission  in  order  to  attract 
members  of  the  German  upper  classes,  many  men  who  had  retained  their 
conservative  and  nationalist  viewpoint  entered  the  Reiterstandarten.72 Open 
70 Inspekteur der Reiterei, 15 February, 1939, in BArchB, NS 31/346, quoted in Bahro, ‘Der Sport und 
seine Rolle in der nationalsozialistischen Elitetruppe SS’, p. 87; Lumsden, Himmler‘s Black Order, p. 
38; see also Friedrich, Stahl, (ed.), Heereseinteilung 1939: Gliederung, Standorte und Kommandeure  
sämtlicher  Einheiten und Dienststellen des Friedensheeres am 3.1. 1939 und die Kriegsgliederung  
vom 1.9. 1939 (Friedberg, 1980), p. 24.
71 Justiz  und  NS-Verbrechen:  Sammlung  deutscher  Strafurteile  wegen  nationalsozialistischer  
Tötungsverbrechen 1945 – 1966. Bd. 20, p. 39; Wilson, Himmler's Cavalry, p. 17.
72 As the political background of new members was often not checked thoroughly, other ‘men with 
unwanted political tendencies’ joined the mounted SS as well, in one case even a communist; see 
Wilson,  Himmler's  Cavalry,  p.  17.  Also,  the  Reiter-SS became  more  selective  from about  1935 
onwards as Himmler wanted to ‘recruit only horse owners or their sons’, whereas previously poor 
farmers who did not own a horse had been accepted as well; see ibid., p. 21. This change was brought 
about by the intention to ‘expel opportunists and the unskilled’; see ibid., p. 20. It also coincides with 
the beginning of national and international sporting success of the mounted units.
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opposition, however, was not tolerated: in 1933, eleven equestrians who refused to 
take the SS oath were interned in concentration camps. A year later, the  Reiter-SS 
leader of East Prussia, Anton Freiherr von Hohberg und Buchwald, became one of 
the victims of the Night of the Long Knives: as a former member of the Stahlhelm, 
he  had  passed  on  internal  matters  of  the  SS  to  the  Reichswehr just  before  the 
disempowerment of the SA.73 Although most of the SS horsemen were loyal to the 
Reichsführer, the Reiter-SS cannot easily be compared to other branches of the SS or 
the SA.
  Several factors seem to suggest if not the character of non-Nazi units then at least 
two other possible interpretations: the frame of reference for the pre-war mounted SS 
was  dominated  by elite  sport  rather  than  politics,  with  some SS horsemen  even 
showing deviant behaviour and views different from National Socialism. Many men 
became  part  of  this  organisation  by  chance  as  they  had  belonged  to  equestrian 
associations and intended to carry on practising their sport, which was only possible 
in the mounted SS or its SA counterpart. Interrogators after the war concluded from 
this that a large number of the veterans had originally joined the mounted SS as a 
result of their passion, not because of its political position.74 Others, especially from 
the rural elites, joined the Reiterstandarten out of opportunism after Hitler had come 
to power. They wanted to position themselves in the new system, for which the SS 
and its even more elitist mounted section were much better suited than the rather 
proletarian SA. As the case of von Hohberg und Buchwald and the protest of the ‘old 
fighters’ against the acceptance of ‘reactionaries’ show, the mounted SS was by no 
means a uniform stronghold of the new regime. It  did, however, contain a broad 
spectrum of right-wing political opinions from the more moderate conservatism of 
73 Kater, ‘Zum gegenseitigen Verständnis von SA und SS’, pp. 359-360;  Höhne,  The Order of the 
Death’s Head, p.121 and p. 138.
74 Interview with Dr Heinrich K., retired regional prosecutor in Braunschweig, 3 August, 2011.
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the Prussian nobility to the radicalism of the Nazis.
  It must not, however, be forgotten that all members of these units, whatever their 
personal background, political opinion, or social standing was, lived in the society of 
a dictatorship. Thus, they were exposed to, aware of and sometimes actively engaged 
in the policies and measures of the Nazi regime. The mounted SS as a whole did not 
become an instrument of anti-Jewish policy before 1939, despite the fact that it was 
part  of  one  of  the  paramilitary formations  of  the  NSDAP.  There  were,  however, 
intersections between organised equitation in the SS and the repressive system of the 
Nazi state even at this stage.  As far as the officers are concerned, a high level of 
acceptance  of  these  methods,  if  not  an  involvement  in  their  implementation  is 
suggested by multiple  examples. Several men who later became officers in the SS 
cavalry served in a concentration camp guard unit at some point of their career, for 
example Heimo Hierthes, a regimental commander, and squadron leaders Siegfried 
Kotthaus,  Kurt  Wegener,  and  Ulrich Goertz.75 There is  no evidence,  however,  to 
suggest the deployment of a Reiterstandarte or one of its subunits for guard duty in 
one of the camps.76 Involvement into the crimes of the Nazi regime did occur but 
only at an individual, not a group level; Kotthaus for instance was involved in the 
riots  during  the  Reichspogromnacht and  personally  set  fire  to  the  synagogue  at 
Wuppertal.77 
75 Hierthes served in the  Totenkopfsturmbann ‘Brandenburg’ (the guard unit of the Sachsenhausen 
concentration camp)  and later  at  Buchenwald before  the  outbreak  of  the war;  see  BArchB,  SSO 
Heimo Hierthes. Kotthaus was a guard at Esterwegen concentration camp before he joined the SS 
cavalry in Poland; see curriculum vitae of Siegfried Kotthaus (1940), in: BArchB, SSO Siegfried 
Kotthaus. Wegener served in the Totenkopfsturmbann ‘Brandenburg’ as well; see curriculum vitae of 
Kurt Wegener, 8 March, 1938, in: BArchB, SSO Kurt Wegener. Goertz received training as a platoon 
leader at  Dachau and later commanded a company of the  Totenkopfstandarte at Oranienburg (the 
successor  of  the  Totenkopfsturmbann  ‘Brandenburg’);  see  Dienstlaufbahn  des  Goertz,  Ulrich 
(undated), in: BArchB, SSO Ulrich Goertz.
76 According to the homepage of the Federal Archive, Reiterstandarte 15 from Munich was involved 
in guarding the Dachau concentration camp: see the sources on ‘Pferde im Einsatz bei Wehrmacht und 
Waffen-SS’,  http://www.bundesarchiv.de/oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/bilder_dokumente/00943/index-
11.html.de (accessed on  7 January, 2011). But according to the Dachau memorial, SS horsemen or 
other mounted forces never belonged to the guard troops there; it is possible though that members of 
Reiterstandarte 15 received training at the SS recruit depot at Dachau. This information was obtained 
through an email from Dirk Riedel from the Dachau memorial on 15 April, 2010.
77 Cüppers, Wegbereiter, p. 117.
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  These men were the very opposite of men like Anton Freiherr von Hohberg und 
Buchwald: as part of the new elite, they spearheaded radical measures rather than 
just being bystanders. Moreover, men who later rose to prominent positions in the SS 
had already been members of the pre-war Reiterstandarten, such as Joachim Peiper 
or Hans Kammler. Thus, it can be assumed that those who held higher ranks in the 
pre-war mounted SS and their comrades who rose through the ranks at the same time 
predominantly, but not exclusively, supported Hitler’s aims and Himmler’s methods. 
Regarding  the  ordinary  members,  post-war  investigators  noticed  anti-Semitic 
undertones  in  some  of  their  statements.  Presumably,  these  views  had  already 
predated the Nazi takeover; from 1933, they correlated with the general policy of the 
regime which skilfully exploited them. Although a majority of the veterans had a 
distinct rural background, which often ruled out strong personal contacts with Jews 
in their native regions, some of the men felt a kind of ‘social envy’ as Jews were 
perceived as being more educated and belonging to the upper class. They disliked 
them  as  they  disliked  anybody  who  stood  above  the  ‘ordinary  workers’ in  the 
German social system, but they had not entered the SS to kill Jews.78 
  The establishment owned by Johann Fegelein is the best-known example of the 
transformation of a local riding school into an SS training centre for equestrians. The 
most important personality to emerge from there was  his son Hermann, who had 
been a passionate equestrian since his childhood and was also one of Germany´s top 
show  jumpers.  He  worked  as  a  riding  instructor  and  soon  took  over  the  SS-
Reitersturm,  which had become based at  the school.79 In  the  mid-1930s,  he also 
assumed  control  over  the  school  itself,  which  overlapped  with  the  growing 
importance of the institute and the plans of turning it into the main riding school for 
78 Interview with Bernhard D., retired chief inspector of the Landeskriminalamt Niedersachsen, 26 
January, 2011; interview with Dr Heinrich K., retired regional prosecutor in Braunschweig, 3 August, 
2011.
79 Riess,  ‘Fegelein’,  p.  161;  Bahro,  ‘Der  Sport  und  seine  Rolle  in  der  nationalsozialistischen 
Elitetruppe SS’, p. 88.
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the SS.80 By this time, the old location at a barracks in the borough of Neuhausen no 
longer suited Himmler’s ambitious goals: in late 1936, he gave the order to build a 
new facility which was to become a ‘riding academy’ that provided a selection of 
equestrians and horses. Designed as a school for members of the SS and police, it 
was  predominantly  an  institution  that  was  to  assure  that  the  SS  was  being 
successfully represented at international tournaments. This project was energetically 
and generously promoted by Christian Weber, the chairman of the local Nazi party, 
who took a great interest in equitation. He provided some of his own land holdings 
and used his personal connections to raise funds of 500,000  reichsmarks from the 
state of Bavaria and the city and district of Munich. Thus, a state-of-the-art institute 
was built on the site of the Fegelein horse-breeding farm in the suburb of Riem and 
the new SS-Hauptreitschule was handed over to Heinrich Himmler ceremoniously on 
25 July, 1937.81 
  Fegelein and Weber greatly benefitted from this situation: the former remained in 
charge of the institution in its new form, an appointment which greatly boosted his 
own career, whereas the latter now also became his direct superior as Himmler made 
him  inspector  of  the  SS  riding  schools  in  1937.82 The  riding  school  and  the 
80 It is not known when exactly Fegelein took over his father’s riding school. Riess assumes that this 
happened in June, 1936 whereas Fegelein’s SS file states 1 October, 1936 as a date. See see Riess, 
‘Fegelein’,  p.  162,  and  Dienstlaufbahn  des  Fegelein,  Hermann  Otto  (undated),  BArchB,  SSO 
Hermann Fegelein.
81 Christian Weber was an infamously corrupt Nazi party bigwig and close friend of Hitler’s since the 
Kampfzeit; like Heinrich Himmler and Josef ‘Sepp’ Dietrich, he was an ‘old fighter’ and a veteran of 
the Beer Hall Putsch with a Freikorps background..He held various functions in the Nazi party until 
the end of the war; just after the German surrender in 1945, he died in a car accident on his way to an 
Allied  interrogation  camp.  For  a  detailed  account  of  his  life,  see Thomas  Martin,  ‘Aspekte  der 
politischen  Biographie  eines  lokalen  NS-Funktionärs.  Der  Fall  Christian  Weber’,  Zeitschrift  für  
Bayerische Landesgeschichte  57 (1994), pp. 435-484. For Weber’s role in supporting the SS riding 
school, see ibid., pp. 472-473. Another work describes Weber’s life in a non-scholarly, satirical way 
but also uses archival material; see Herbert Rosendorfer, Die Nacht der Amazonen: Roman (Munich, 
1992). For the transformation of the horse-breeding farm into the main riding school see also Bahro, 
‘Der Sport  und seine Rolle  in der nationalsozialistischen Elitetruppe SS’,  p.  88.  This article  also 
mentions the fact that apart from the main riding school at Munich, there also was a smaller school at 
Forst (in the Lausitz area in eastern Germany); see ibid., p. 88.
82 Their  new  positions  as  commander  and  inspector  earned  Fegelein  and  Weber  the  ranks  of 
Standartenführer and Brigadeführer in the SS respectively; see Riess, ‘Fegelein’, p. 162, and Martin, 
‘Der Fall Christian Weber’, p. 456.
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advancement  of equitation within the SS,  however,  were not  the only matters  in 
which these two men teamed up. By supporting a brutal act of Arisierung in 1938, 
Fegelein also showed that he shared the criminal energy and corruption for which 
Weber was notorious even amongst the functionaries of the Munich NSDAP. This 
incident  occurred on the  night  of  8  November,  1938,  a  day before  the  so-called 
Reichspogromnacht, during which the radical basis of the Nazi party incited anti-
Jewish riots throughout the entire country. Under the command of Christian Weber, 
Hermann Fegelein and a number of other SS men in plain clothes raided the house of 
Baron Rudolf Hirsch, a wealthy Jewish nobleman. They set fire to the building, kept 
fire fighters and police from interfering, and beat up Hirsch’s brother. They pushed 
Hirsch around, trying to intimidate him into selling his villa to Weber at a low price. 
A day later,  Hirsch  was arrested  and sent  to  the  concentration  camp at  Dachau, 
‘where he was badly abused, and from which he was eventually released only after 
promising to sell his property immediately’.83
  From the beginning, the SS-Hauptreitschule had a special status within the SS as it 
was  highly  privileged:  it  received  the  same  status  as  an  Abschnitt and  became 
directly  subordinate  to  the  SS  main  office  in  Berlin.84 It  was  designed  as  a 
counterpart of the army cavalry school at Hanover, the only other institution to train 
high-class equestrians in Germany. A continuous rivalry between the sportsmen of 
the  two  schools  ensued  as  the  SS  tried  to  put  an  end  to  the  domination  the 
Wehrmacht had enjoyed for many years. The necessary means for this attempt were 
available to them: in terms of personal, material, and horses the equipment was at the 
highest level. In 1938, Adolf Hitler himself made a donation of 10,000 reichsmarks 
to the SS-Hauptreitschule. As a result of these efforts and the talent of its students, it 
83 Alan E.  Steinweis,  Kristallnacht 1938 (Harvard,  2009),  pp.  79-80;  Martin,  ‘Der Fall  Christian 
Weber’, pp. 470-471.
84 Martin, ‘Der Fall Christian Weber’, p. 472.
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soon evolved as a training ground for elite equestrians in Germany.85
  For Heinrich Himmler, sport in general was highly important: in his opinion,  SS 
men were not only to keep in shape but to be in constant readiness to combat, which 
they  had  already seen  during  the  political  unrest  of  the  Kampfzeit before  1933. 
Urging the members of his organisation to do sports served as a means of discipline 
and enabled Himmler to conduct a selection of the best for the elite force of the Nazi 
party. Intense competition, both within the SS and on a national level, was promoted 
and  numerous  different  sports,  for  example  athletics,  swimming,  fencing  or 
equitation,  were  strongly  advanced.  Himmler  always  demanded  top  performance 
from his men in order to improve the standing of his organisation through sporting 
success,  especially  compared  with  the  Wehrmacht.  He  also  introduced  a  unified 
sports  system with  various  events  throughout  the  year.  To establish  performance 
records, he ordered all SS men to gain the sports badge of the SA and ideally the 
Reich sports badge; members of riding formations were also urged to gain the riding 
sports badge.86
  Equitation played a special  role in the world of German sport as it  was highly 
esteemed.  In return for the generous advancement of this particular sport,  the SS 
leadership  expected  the  equestrians  of  the  SS-Hauptreitschule to  take  part  in  all 
available horse riding tournaments. The high expectations were met by numerous 
victories: in 1935 Günter Temme, a non-commissioned officer in the Reiter-SS, won 
the German show-jumping derby at Hamburg. In 1935, 1936 and 1937, SS riders 
won all three equestrian championships in Germany. In no other field of sport did the 
SS become so successful: this record was unmatched even by their bitter rivals of the 
Wehrmacht and helped the organisation to gain further prestige.87
85 Riess,  ‘Fegelein’,  p.  162;  Bahro,  ‘Der  Sport  und  seine  Rolle  in  der  nationalsozialistischen 
Elitetruppe SS’, p. 88; Martin, ‘Der Fall Christian Weber’, p. 472.
86 Bahro, ‘Der Sport und seine Rolle in der nationalsozialistischen Elitetruppe SS’, p. 78 and p. 81-82.
87 Bahro, ‘Der Sport und seine Rolle in der nationalsozialistischen Elitetruppe SS’, p. 88; Höhne, The 
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  In other disciplines, SS athletes were often less triumphant. At the NS-Kampfspiele, 
a  national  competition  with  tournaments  in  athletics,  swimming,  boxing, 
weightlifting, fencing, and other sports, sportsmen of the Wehrmacht proved to be far 
more successful. As only equitation (and fencing to some extent) could be dominated 
by the SS,  Himmler’s attempt to create an elite and to emancipate the SS from its 
secondary role behind the Wehrmacht was thwarted.88
  As the  SS equestrians  continued to  beat  their  competitors  on  a  national  level, 
Hermann  Fegelein  set  himself  a  new  target:  participation  in  the  1940  Olympic 
Games. But the preparation was already overshadowed by the danger of a new war 
in  Europe.  When troops were mobilised for  the annexation of Austria  in March, 
1938, Fegelein  appealed to Heinrich Himmler and asked for the integration of his 
sportsmen  and horses  into  Himmler’s  personal  staff  to  protect  them from being 
drafted, which was denied.89 During the Sudeten crisis, a mobilisation plan which 
included the SS riding school in  the army cavalry was introduced.  In  a  letter  to 
Himmler, Fegelein expressed his fears of losing his Olympic candidates to the army 
cavalry school at Hanover and asked for them to remain in the SS.90 But this attempt, 
too,  failed as Himmler only intended to save the horses but would not spare the 
men.91 The  guarantee  given  by  the  Reichsführer was  then  realised  by  another 
personal  connection:  Fegelein’s  friend  Karl  von  Eberstein,  head  of  the  Munich 
police, incorporated the horses into the police stock and thus took them out of reach 
of the Wehrmacht.92
  As  far  as  the  possible  call-up  of  the  equestrians  was  concerned,  the  state  of 
Order of the Death’s Head, p. 137.
88 Bahro, ‘Der Sport und seine Rolle in der nationalsozialistischen Elitetruppe SS’, p. 90.
89 Schreiben des Stabsführers des persönlichen Stabes RFSS an SS-Standartenführer Fegelein vom 
7.4. 1938, in: BArchB, NS 19/1167, fol. 12.
90 Schreiben Fegeleins an Himmler vom 6.9. 1938, in: BArchB, NS 19/1167, fols. 32-35, quoted in 
Riess, ‘Fegelein’, p. 162.
91 Schreiben des Persönlichen Stabes RFSS an Fegelein vom 15.9.1938, in: BArchB, NS 19/1167, fol. 
42, quoted in Bahro, ‘Der Sport und seine Rolle in der nationalsozialistischen Elitetruppe SS’, p. 89.
92 Riess, ‘Fegelein’, pp. 162-163.
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uncertainty continued throughout the year 1939 and became even more pressing with 
the deterioration in German – Polish relations. Finally, Himmler gave his consent to 
their integration into the armed formations of the SS, which was implemented on 
September  14,  1939.93 A combination  of  three  different  factors  had  decided  this 
question and thus become the base of the SS cavalry: Fegelein’s personal ambitions, 
his connections to Heinrich Himmler, and the rivalry between Wehrmacht and SS.
  According to the memoirs of Gustav Lombard, who later became commander of the 
1st SS Cavalry Regiment, cooperation between the regular armed forces and the SS 
proved to be less problematic in another field: after consultations with army officials, 
Lombard was able to set up a special officer candidate platoon within the  1st SS-
Reitersturm in Berlin, which he commanded. As early as 1933, young SS equestrians 
who  wanted  to  become  officers  in  the  army  cavalry  or  artillery  after  finishing 
secondary school received their basic riding instruction here. From February 1 to 
mid-March,  1934, Lombard and 31 other  SS horsemen took a training course to 
become platoon leaders  in  a  cavalry squadron at  Perleberg,  a  subunit  of  Reiter-
Regiment  4 from  Potsdam.94 This  army  regiment  had  been  involved  in  border 
skirmishes in Upper Silesia in 1919 and 1920; also, it had seen action against rioters 
in Brandenburg a few months later. Throughout the Weimar Republic, extra recruits 
were  trained  illegally  in  this  unit:  the  so-called  Zeitfreiwillige (short-service 
volunteers) enlisted for nine months only and formed a ‘silent reserve’ afterwards, a 
clear breach of the Treaty of Versailles.95 Thus, it was presumably no coincidence 
93 Schreiben des Generalinspekteurs der verstärkten SS-Totenkopfstandarten an die Inspektion der SS-
Reiterei vom 14.9. 1939 über die sofortige Unterstellung der Reitschule unter die verstärkten SS-
Totenkopfstandarten, in: BArchB, NS 19/1167, fol. 98.
94 Lebenserinnerungen Gustav Lombard,  p.  16.  In  his memoirs,  Lombard stated that  he had also 
approached an artillery regiment in Potsdam and other cavalry units at Rathenow and Stendal; the 
document does not provide information on similar training courses for SS men at these garrisons. 
95 ‘Die Geschichte des ehemaligen 4. (Preuß.) Reiterregiments zu Potsdam’, vorgetragen am 27. Juni 
1974  vor  dem  Offizierskorps  des  Panzer-Bataillons  24  in  Braunschweig  von  dem  ehemaligen 
Angehörigen der 1. Eskadron Fritz Wiechmann, quoted in ‘Der Meldereiter’ Nr. 2/1975, in: BArchF, 
MSg 3/4046, p. 1 and p. 7.
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that the SS men were trained by this particular regiment.
  Until the Blood Purge of 30 June – 2 July, 1934, which saw the disempowerment of 
the SA and the murder of its leader, Ernst Röhm, courses like this one for members 
of the SS were an exception. In the early days of the Nazi regime, the army preferred 
to cooperate with the SA: the party force, which already had formed border guard 
units before 1933, provided a much needed reserve for the Reichswehr. The military 
instructions received by a small number of SS men, including the Staff Guard of the 
Reich  Chancellory under  the  command of  Sepp Dietrich  (the  predecessor  of  the 
Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler), did not compare to the officer training of 13,000 SA 
leaders and the agreement between the army and the SA of July, 1933, to prepare 
250,000 men from the ranks of the SA for the case of defence.96 Activities such as 
the  course  initiated  by  Lombard,  although  they  prove  military  training  of  SS 
members at  a very early stage,  only marked an intermediate step.  Even after  the 
summer of 1934, when the SS had won the power struggle within the Nazi party and 
the SA was no longer a part of strategic planning, it was units of the Allgemeine SS 
which  did  the  preliminary  work  for  the  regular  armed  forces,  despite  their 
paramilitary character. The role of the Reiterstandarten serves as a perfect example 
for this development: in late 1936, the mounted SS formations were ordered by the 
SS main office to intensify the recruitment of young men with a rural background 
and the riding and driving training of their members. After positive feedback from 
the army on former SS horsemen, this  measure was to ensure that  the  SS-Reiter 
would later make well qualified soldiers in mounted and horse-drawn units of the 
Wehrmacht.97
96 Robert John O’Neill, The German Army and The Nazi Party, 1933 – 1939 (London, 1966), pp. 32-
34; Weingartner, ‘Sepp Dietrich, Heinrich Himmler, and the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler’, pp. 267-
268.
97 Schreiben des  Chefs  des  SS-Hauptamtes,  SS-Gruppenführer  Heißmeyer,  vom 22.11.  1936 betr. 
Vormilitärische[r] Reit- und Fahrausbildung bei den SS-Reitereinheiten, in: BArchB, NS 31/346, fol. 
6. According to Wilson, Himmler’s Cavalry, p. 21, most former SS equestrians who were called up for 
service in the Wehrmacht after the reintroduction of the draft in 1935 requested to serve in a cavalry 
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  At  the  same  time,  the  process  of  creating  substantial  armed  forces  under  the 
command of the SS was already under way: as part of Heinrich Himmler’s intention 
to  strengthen his  organisation within the Nazi  state, two formations  in  particular 
were  strongly  expanded.  The  Verfügungstruppe  (VT) was  a  military  force.  It 
consisted mainly of infantry regiments, four of which were formed between 1933 
and 1939; they were to form the core of a future SS army. The first of these units was 
Hitler’s personal bodyguard, the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler. This unit and the other 
regiments built up later were exclusively at Hitler’s disposal. For that reason, they 
were referred to as Verfügungstruppe.98 During the German invasion of Poland, the 
regiments were attached to army groups of the regular  Wehrmacht and took part in 
the fighting.99 The Totenkopfverbände  (TV) were paramilitary units which ran and 
guarded the concentration camps. By 1939, four Death´s Head regiments had been 
established: three in Germany and one in Austria.100
  As divisions of the Nazi party, the VT and the TV were subordinate only to Hitler 
and constituted a purely national-socialist  counterweight  to  the regular  army and 
police. Despite strong resistance from the old elites, especially those in the military, 
Himmler prevailed: his initiative to establish these units as armed formations and to 
emphasise their role as executive organs of the state was backed by the Führer with 
the decree of 17 August, 1938. This act guaranteed the independence of the SS from 
the Wehrmacht and explained the duties of the different armed SS divisions. The VT 
was to be employed alongside units of the regular army in wartime or to be used 
domestically, if necessary. The TV were to fulfil ‘special police tasks’. Service in the 
regiment. For that purpose, they could also acquire a special certificate, the so-called  Reiterschein, 
which would allow them to be placed in such a unit rather than in a different branch of the army; see 
ibid., p. 25.
98 See  Hans  Buchheim  and  others,  Anatomie  des  SS-Staates  Band  1:  Die  SS  –  das 
Herrschaftsinstrument. Befehl und Gehorsam. (Olten 1967), pp. 161-164; Wegner, Hitlers Politische 
Soldaten, p. 103 and p. 120.
99 Wegner, Hitlers Politische Soldaten, pp. 124-128.
100 Totenkopfverbände  translates as  Death´s Head units.  See Buchheim,  Anatomie des SS-Staates, p. 
162 and p. 164.
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VT was to count as regular military service whereas service in the TV was not.101 In 
the case of mobilization for war or in times of political unrest, the  Death’s Head 
units were to form a so-called Polizeiverstärkung (police strengthening). New police 
forces, made up of SS reservists aged 25-35, were to be armed and trained in recruit 
depots of the TV. While the TV units were either deployed for ‘special police tasks’ 
or  training  reinforcements,  the  concentration  camps  were  to  be  guarded  by  SS 
reservists aged 45 or older.102
  Another act that emphasized the military character of the  VT was passed on 18 
May, 1939. In this decree, the VT was granted artillery and other support regiments. 
Moreover, the maximum number of troops the SS was allowed to recruit and arm 
was given: the VT should not exceed the strength of 20,000 men, the TV 14,000 and 
the  Polizeiverstärkung 25,000.103 The  TV,  apart  from their  duty  to  train  reserve 
forces, were also to drill replacements for the VT in wartime, which meant that they 
were  now  also  given  military  tasks.104 The  necessary  manpower  for  the 
Polizeiverstärkung was called up by means of the Notdienstverordnung (emergency 
order) of 15 October, 1938. According to this decree,  draftees  could be trained for 
military service in a very short time.105 Training started in peacetime already: from 
mid-January  1939,  reservists  of  the  SS  received  their  draft  calls.106 Immediately 
before the outbreak of war in 1939, the VT numbered around 18,000 men and the 
strength of the TV had risen to more than 8,000.107
101 Buchheim,  Anatomie des SS-Staates, pp. 168-170; Wegner,  Hitlers Politische Soldaten, pp. 114-
115.
102 Buchheim,  Anatomie des SS-Staates, pp. 175-176; Wegner,  Hitlers Politische Soldaten, pp. 114-
115 and p. 123.
103 Wegner, Hitlers Politische Soldaten, pp. 120-121.
104 Ibid., p. 123.
105 Buchheim,  Anatomie des  SS-Staates,  p.  176;  for  the three decrees  of  1938 and 1939 see  also 
Charles W. Sydnor, Soldiers of Destruction. The SS Death’s Head Division, 1933 – 1945. (Princeton 
1977), pp. 32-35.
106 Wegner, Hitlers Politische Soldaten, p. 122 and pp. 124-125.
107 Testimony of R. Brill at the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg, 5 August, 1946, 
in: IMT vol.  XX, p. 372, quoted in Wegner, Hitlers Politische Soldaten, p. 125. See also Rede des 
Reichsführers-SS  bei  der  SS-Gruppenführertagung in  Posen  am  4.  Oktober  1943,  Nuremberg 
Document 1919-PS, quoted in Stein, The Waffen SS, p. 27.
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  The fate of the SS equestrians now became closely linked to the armed forces of the 
SS as well. As they had not yet undergone military training they were included in the 
set-up  of  new guard  forces  which  would  soon be  needed  for  the  occupation  of 
Poland.  Thus,  a  place  within  the  framework of  SS infantry,  SS guard  units  and 
administrative planning had been found for Fegelein and his men; ideally, it did not 
involve frontline duty. At the same time, many others were in a similar position: after 
1 September, full use of the Notdienstverordnung was made as tens of thousands of 
SS reservists were called up again for active service in the Polizeiverstärkung. The 
reservists  were  used  to  form so-called  verstärkte Totenkopfstandarten (reinforced 
Death’s Head regiments).108 
  New methods were also introduced to support the growth of the armed SS. Until the 
beginning of the war, the SS had not been allowed to advertise as the Wehrmacht did 
not want to lose potential conscripts. These regulations were now eased.109 On 19 
September, 1939 a  recruitment campaign for the SS was mounted in the German 
press. It called for volunteers born in 1921 and 1922 who had not been drafted by the 
army yet. If qualified, they were offered a career as an officer during their service 
and a takeover into police or public service after finishing their time in the armed 
forces.110 As a result of lowering the age limit and offering job opportunities, high 
numbers of volunteers could be enlisted.111 By the end of the year, the strength of the 
armed SS formations had risen to 56,000. This number only refers to the combined 
strength of the  Verfügungstruppe and units of the  Polizeiverstärkung, and excludes 
the regular Death´s Head units.112 For the newly formed police strengthening force an 
108 Rolf  Michaelis,  Die Waffen-SS. Dokumentation über die personelle Zusammensetzung und den  
Einsatz  der  Waffen-SS. (Berlin  2006),  p.  312;  for  an  example  of  an  SS  draft  call  for  the 
Polizeiverstärkung from late 1939 see ibid., p. 313; see also Wegner, Hitlers Politische Soldaten, pp. 
125-126.
109 Buchheim, Anatomie des SS-Staates, pp. 165-166.
110 Michaelis, Dokumentation, p. 312.
111 Wegner, Hitlers Politische Soldaten, pp. 125-126.
112 Schreiben des Insp. für Statistik an den RF-SS vom 1.3. 1943, BArchK, Slg. Schum. / 436, quoted 
in: Wegner, Hitlers Politische Soldaten, p. 126.
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actual  strength  of  around 36,000 men  can  be  assumed  at  the  end of  1939.113 In 
November, the VT and the TV were also given a new name: Waffen-SS (armed SS). 
Within one year, this new name had fully replaced the terms Verfügungstruppe and 
Totenkopfverbände.114
  At  the  beginning  of  the Second World War,  the  Equestrian SS did not  have  a 
military component yet. The development of the Waffen-SS, too, was still at an early 
stage. Two of the most important factors which later influenced the conduct of the SS 
Cavalry Brigade, however, had already been fulfilled. First,  the close relationship 
between  Heinrich  Himmler  and  Hermann  Fegelein  proved  to  be  resilient  and 
productive:  the  Reichsführer could  employ  his  horsemen  for  representation  and 
gained  more  support  from  the  German  upper  class  whereas  Fegelein  enjoyed 
unprecedented freedom and showed great skill in building up a highly talented cadre 
of  sportsmen.  He  was  also  able  to  use  his  rapport  with  Himmler  to  keep  his 
privileges when war broke out: despite the fact that they had no combat value,  the 
equestrians from Munich were incorporated into the mobilisation scheme of the SS 
and police rather than being drafted into the Wehrmacht. Second, subalterns from the 
Reiterstandarten such as Gustav Lombard soon made up the officer corps of the SS 
cavalry regiments  in  Poland.  They were dedicated  National  socialists  who stood 
behind  their  commander  and  executed  his  aims  with  great  initiative.  Thus,  the 
prerequisites for the foundation of a new mounted unit in the SS had been met; they 
were soon to be put to the test on an institutional level.
113 Testimony of R. Brill at the IMT, quoted in Wegner, Hitlers Politische Soldaten; see footnote 63.
114 Wegner, Hitlers Politische Soldaten, pp. 127-128.
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2) Brutal occupation: the cultural formation of the SS cavalry in Poland
  From late 1939 until mid-1941, the SS cavalry units underwent the most drastic 
change since  their  formation.  Not  only did a  comparatively small  group of  men 
separate from the  Reiterstandarten in Germany to build up a new unit; they also 
became members  of  an  executive  organ of  German  occupation  in  Poland.  Their 
frame of reference changed from peace to war which meant that the men not only 
shared radical views which formed the background to discrimination and exclusion 
of certain groups of people, but openly committed acts of violence against various 
sections of the Polish population. The two years in the General Government can be 
divided into three phases: the initial stage from September, 1939 until the summer of 
1940,  during  which  new  recruits  were  integrated  and  trained  continuously;  a 
transitional period from mid-1940 until spring, 1941, which saw a massive turnover 
of personnel;  and the final  phase from February until  June,  1941,  when the two 
regiments assumed a structure similar to that of their  Wehrmacht equivalents. Fully 
working military units and comradely bonds amongst the men could only be formed 
in the last months before their departure into the Soviet Union.115
  Although the SS cavalry did not have to face a military threat and was involved in 
anti-partisan operations only on a few occasions whilst based in Poland, the men 
were to be trained, hardened, and readied for future combat missions. This task put 
the regiments under pressure, especially after half the personnel had to be replaced in 
1940. What would have been a standard procedure in an established military unit 
was perverted by the criminal ambitions of the officers and some of the men; it was 
115 When he left the 2nd Regiment in early September, 1941,  Standartenführer Hierthes stated in his 
final address to the unit that it only had been assembled and trained in its current form since the 
month of April of that year. Due to fulfilling all of its tasks, however, it was now to be viewed as a 
fully-fledged military unit; see Regimentsbefehl Nr. 28/41,  2nd SS Cavalry Regiment, 2 September, 
1941, in: BArchF, RS 4/986, p. 41.
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also obstructed by the participation in the first phase of a war of annihilation. The 
effect of war in shaping the minds of men and ultimately resulting in crimes against 
humanity has also been observed with other SS units and was described by Harald 
Welzer and Sönke Neitzel in a study of tapping protocols of German prisoners of 
war. They found that a special set of conditions was created during wartime which 
made soldiers do things they would not have normally done. This set, which made up 
the war frame of reference, consisted of a strict military framework and hierarchy 
and the incorporation of men into a system of formal obligations and time-specific as 
well as group-specific perceptions of their environment, which made them kill Jews 
or fanatically defend their country even when they were not convinced of National 
Socialist ideology.116 Regarding the SS cavalry, it can be assumed that the changed 
frame  of  reference,  together  with  a  different  composition  of  the  units  and  a 
habituation to violence served as a preparation of what was to come from mid-1941 
onwards. Three factors determined the process which turned members of mounted 
SS units  into cavalry soldiers of the  Waffen-SS:  military drill,  indoctrination,  and 
participation in anti-Jewish and anti-Polish measures. In order to assess the personal 
and ideological motivation of the soldiers, it is necessary to analyse and balance the 
three above mentioned elements in the context of the SS cavalry’s deployment in 
Poland from 1939 – 1941.
  From the outset, the war against Poland was fought not only for military, but also 
for ideological aims. Adolf Hitler had ordered the SS to eliminate the ruling classes 
of the country.  For this  mission,  which received the code name 'Tannenberg',  six 
killing squads, the so-called Einsatzgruppen, were assembled from various branches 
of the police and SS during the summer of 1939.117 Responsible for this was  SS-
116 Sönke Neitzel and Harald Welzer, Soldaten. Protokolle vom Kämpfen, Töten und Sterben (Frank-
furt, 2011), pp. 390-394.
117 Alexander B. Rossino,  Hitler Strikes Poland. Blitzkrieg,  Ideology, and Atrocity (Lawrence, KS 
2003), p. 29.
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Gruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich, the head of the SS security police and security 
service. But this was not an operation of the SS alone: Heydrich also consulted with 
the quartermaster-general of the Wehrmacht, general Eduard Wagner, 'to construct a 
system  of  mutual  assistance  and  support  in  matters  of  security  behind  German 
lines'.118  From the crossing of the Polish border, this cooperation resulted in mass 
murder:  units of the SS and police, the army, and other formations not only executed 
people  who  were  considered  to  be  part  of  the  Polish  elites,  but  also  suspected 
insurgents  (often  innocents  who  were  mistaken  for  partisans  by  inexperienced 
German soldiers),  prisoners of war, and Jews.119 Until  the end of the year,  about 
50,000 Poles fell victim to the Germans; at least 7,000 of them were Jews.120
  Historical researchers long held the view that the Wehrmacht had been 'tragically 
entangled' in the killing of civilians in Poland: whereas the soldiers fought bravely 
and honourably, the SS committed atrocities.121 More recent works, however, have 
shed  new  light  on  the  role  of  the  German  armed  forces  during  and  after  this 
campaign. Numerous acts of violence have been documented and it can be assumed 
that  16,000  Poles  were  killed  by members  of  Wehrmacht units  until  the  end  of 
October, 1939.122 This did not only happen during combat operations or missions 
against  insurgents.  Ideological  measures  were  often  carried  out  by army and SS 
concertedly because both agencies pursued the same aim: the destruction of certain 
ethnic, religious and other groups within the Polish society. Although the brutality of 
the German policy sparked protest  from some members  of  the  leadership  of  the 
118 Ibid., pp. 29-30.
119 Jochen Böhler, ‘‘Tragische Verstrickung‘ oder Auftakt zum Vernichtungskrieg? Die Wehrmacht in 
Polen 1939’, in K. M. Mallmann and B. Musial (eds.),  Genesis des Genozids.  Polen 1939 – 1941 
(Darmstadt, 2004), pp. 40-50. As examples for the cooperation of  Wehrmacht and SS, Rossino has 
described the cases of the German advance into the Polish Corridor and East Upper Silesia, both of 
which claimed many victims among the civilian population. See Rossino, Hitler Strikes Poland, pp. 
59-74 and pp. 74-85.
120 Rossino, Hitler Strikes Poland, p. 234.
121 The view of the 'entanglement' of the  Wehrmacht was first formulated by Martin Broszat in his 
work Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik 1939 – 1945 (Stuttgart, 1961), p. 28; see Böhler, 'Tragische 
Verstrickung', p. 36.
122 Rossino, Hitler Strikes Poland, pp. 86-87.
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German army in Poland and some killings were prevented by the intervention of 
local military commanders, Wehrmacht and SS worked hand in hand in what was to 
become the beginning of a war of annihilation.123 The agreements and cooperation 
between the two institutions significantly paralleled what happened before the attack 
on the USSR two years later.
  The  quick  victory also  enabled  the  Germans  to  implement  plans  for  radically 
transforming Poland. Several new territories were annexed to Germany, these being 
West Prussia, the Warthegau, and East Upper Silesia. The eastern half of the country, 
which was referred to  as  Generalgouvernement  (General  Government),  remained 
occupied  and  a  German  administration  was  established.124 The  newly  annexed 
territories were to be cleared of all Jews and Gypsies. The Jews were then to be 
driven eastward, either into the Lublin region of the General Government (where a 
‘Judenreservat’, a reservation for Jews, was planned) or even across the new border 
into the Soviet occupied part of Poland. Jews who were already living in the General 
Government were deprived of all their rights, interned in ghettos and many of them 
were taken to Germany for forced labour. Apart from them, many Poles, too, were to 
be deported from the western part of the country. Instead of these groups, ethnic 
Germans from Eastern Europe were to  be resettled.125 In the following years the 
course of  the  German occupation became even more radical. Forced labour was 
introduced for all Jews in  the General Government. They were assigned to newly-
123 Jochen Böhler, Auftakt zum Vernichtungskrieg: Die Wehrmacht in Polen 1939 (Frankfurt 2006), pp. 
219-220 and pp. 246-247. For the prevention of killings and the protest of Wehrmacht commanders, 
see also Böhler, 'Tragische Verstrickung', pp. 36-37. Opposition from the Wehrmacht, however, was of 
no avail: on 4 October, 1939, Adolf Hitler sanctioned the killings by decreeing an amnesty for all 
crimes which had been committed  in the newly occupied territories since the beginning of the war. 
Three  weeks  later,  the  military  administration  of  Poland  ended.  See  Dorothee  Weitbrecht, 
'Ermächtigung zur Vernichtung. Die Einsatzgruppen in Polen im Herbst 1939', in K. M. Mallmann 
and B. Musial (eds.), Genesis des Genozids. Polen 1939 – 1941 (Darmstadt, 2004), pp. 65-66.
124 Horst Rohde, ‘Hitlers erster ‘Blitzkrieg’ und seine Auswirkungen auf Nordosteuropa’, in K. A. 
Maier (ed.), Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Bd. 2: Die Errichtung der Hegemonie auf  
dem europäischen Kontinent (Stuttgart, 1979), pp. 111-126, pp. 126-131, and p. 138.
125 Christopher R. Browning, ‘Nazi Resettlement Policy and the Search for a Solution to the Jewish 
Question, 1939-1941’, German Studies Review 9 (1986), pp. 501-503.
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built labour camps, construction work for SS units and other tasks.126
  The beginning of the war and the enlargement and deployment of armed SS units 
led  to  a  significant  reduction  of  the  Allgemeine  SS:  of  its  250,000  men,  about 
175,000 were drafted into the  Wehrmacht and the  Waffen-SS, with the majority of 
them joining the army. Most of the regular activities had to be reduced due to a lack 
of manpower, or changed to help the war effort: the Standarten were confined to a 
support role and provided guard units and welfare functions for members who had 
been drafted and their families. The prewar structure of infantry and equestrian units 
of the paramilitary SS continued to exist, but predominantly on paper.127 An example 
for this was  Reiterstandarte 20 from Tilsit in East Prussia, the staff of which only 
consisted of a sick SS-Oberscharführer and a female secretary after the outbreak of 
war.128 This development concerned almost all of the  11,161 men of the peacetime 
mounted formations in Germany, with the exception of the SS riders from Munich.129 
In  September  1939,  they  were  put  under  the  control  of  the  verstärkte 
Totenkopfstandarten and the riding school was turned into a depot for training new 
recruits. About 250 volunteers and as many horses were assembled in Berlin by the 
end of the month and sent to Poland. Like other such formations, it was to reinforce 
German police units and thus to execute the orders of the occupation administration. 
Hermann Fegelein, by that time a  Standartenführer (colonel) in the SS, was now 
employed  in  the  armed  SS  as  Obersturmbannführer (lieutenant  colonel)  and 
appointed commander of the unit.130 
126 Martin Cüppers, ‘‘...  auf eine so saubere und SS-mäßige Art’. Die Waffen-SS in Polen 1939 – 
1941’,  in  K.  M.  Mallmann  and  B.  Musial  (eds.),  Genesis  des  Genozids.  Polen  1939  –  1941 
(Darmstadt, 2004), p. 97.
127 Lumsden, Himmler’s Black Order, pp. 47-47 and p. 50.
128 Justiz  und  NS-Verbrechen:  Sammlung  deutscher  Strafurteile  wegen  nationalsozialistischer  
Tötungsverbrechen  1945  –  1966.  Bd.  17:  Die  vom  04.11.1960  bis  zum  21.11.1961  ergangenen  
Strafurteile. Lfd. Nr. 500-523, ed. I. Sagel-Grande and others (Amsterdam, 1977), p. 432.
129 For the pre-war strength of the Equestrian SS, see Wilson, Himmler's Cavalry, p. 13.
130 For the buildup from the beginning of the war, see  Riess, ‘Fegelein’, p.  163. In  Cüppers, ‘SS-
mäßige Art’, pp. 92-93 it is stated that the first detail of the SS cavalry units numbered 451 men 
altogether whereas Riess assumed a strength of 250 men. This number is also given in Rolf Michaelis, 
Die Kavallerie-Divisionen der Waffen-SS. (Erlangen 1993), p. 7 and Bayer, Kavallerie der Waffen-SS, 
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  The unit arrived in Poland shortly after the end of hostilities. It consisted of two 
detachments  with  two  mounted  squadrons  each.  The  first  detachment  with  the 
squadrons 1 and 4 was deployed in and around Lodz, the second detachment with the 
squadrons 2 and 3 was based in the region of Poznan.131 The cavalry unit as a whole 
was  referred  to  as  Berittene  Abteilung der verstärkten Totenkopfstandarten  
(Polizeiverstärkung) (mounted detachment of the reinforced Death’s Head regiments 
/ police strengthening).132 After their arrival in the operational area,  the SS riders 
came under the command of the  Ordnungspolizei.133 Small groups of three or four 
men under  the  command  of  a  non-commissioned officer  were  allocated  to  local 
police posts. The second squadron alone was spread out in 19 such small units across 
the entire  Poznan district.134 In  addition to being scattered over  a  large area,  the 
different squadrons were also far from their full strength. At first, most of them did 
not number more than 40-50 men.135
  Two  months  after  their  arrival  in  Poland  the  cavalry  squadrons  underwent 
substantial changes in structure and deployment.  On 15 November, 1939, Himmler 
ordered  the  formation  to  be  renamed  as  1.  SS-Totenkopf-Reiterstandarte (1st SS 
Death’s  Head  Cavalry  Regiment).136 Its structure  was  now  expanded  from  the 
original four to thirteen squadrons, including two artillery batteries equipped with 
p. 5. The difference between the two figures probably is based on the inclusion of police volunteers by 
Cüppers; for this aspect see Wilson, Himmler's Cavalry, p. 146.
131 Cüppers, ‘SS-mäßige Art’, pp. 92-93.
132 Riess, ‘Fegelein’, p. 163; see also Zwischenbericht der Sonderkommission Z, p. 573, according to 
which the unit also operated under the name Polizeiverstärkung Ost.
133 The  Ordnungspolizei  (order  police)  was  the  German  uniformed  police,  as  opposed  to  the 
Sicherheitspolizei (security  police),  the  political  branch  of  the  German  police  which  since  1936 
combined the  Kriminalpolizei (criminal investigation department) and the  Geheime Staatspolizei or 
Gestapo, the secret police. In 1939, the order police had a strength of 131,000 men. In preparation for 
war, mobile units with a strength of about 500 men, the so-called police battalions, were deployed. In 
Poland, 21 such battalions supported the occupation regime as guard units and killing squads. See 
Curilla,  Die deutsche Ordnungspolizei und der Holocaust im Baltikum und in Weißrußland 1941 –  
1944,  pp.  53-57;  see  also  Deutsche  Hochschule  der  Polizei  and  others  (eds.):  Ordnung  und 
Vernichtung – Die Polizei im NS-Staat (Münster, 2011), pp. 34-41.
134 Cüppers, Wegbereiter, p. 29.
135 Michaelis, Kavallerie-Divisionen, p. 8.
136 Riess, ‘Fegelein’, p. 163.
50
horse-drawn guns. By mid-December, 1939, the existing and newly formed subunits 
of the 1st SS Death´s Head Cavalry Regiment were garrisoned at Warsaw, Garwolin, 
Seroczyn, Zamosc, Cholm, Tarnow, Krakow, Kielce, Lodz, Radom and Lublin. At 
Lucmierz  near  Lodz  a  recruit  training  squadron  and  a training  facility  for  non-
commissioned  officers were  founded.  Thus,  the  entire  General  Government  had 
become an operational area for the SS cavalry.137 Recruitment was extended: ethnic 
Germans from the General Government and other eastern European countries began 
to join the units.138 Further transfers of SS volunteers from Germany increased the 
number  of  SS  cavalrymen  to  587  by  the  end  of  the  year:  46  officers,  91  non-
commissioned officers and 450 men with 455 horses altogether.139
  The mounted SS units were now supposed to assume a different character: after the 
withdrawal of the small details from the police posts they were to be reorganised as 
cavalry squadrons, a process that was impeded by many problems. Accommodation 
for soldiers and horses had to be found or built from scratch; in many cases, the men 
had to improvise.140 Their riding and military training, which had been neglected so 
far, was intensified and the SS riders were now finally turned into cavalry soldiers.141 
But  despite  the  fact  that  the  pre-war  Reiterstandarten had  been  paramilitary 
formations already they could not be converted into military units easily. Often, the 
137 Cüppers, Wegbereiter, p. 29; Bayer, Kavallerie der Waffen-SS, p. 9.
138 From late October 1939, the SS cavalry started recruitment drives in districts of Lodz where many 
Germans lived and amongst former Polish soldiers in prisoner-of-war camps. Also, they integrated 
members of former German militias, the so-called  Volksdeutscher Selbstschutz,  which had formed 
immediately after the German invasion; see Cüppers, Wegbereiter, p. 87. Other ethnic German recruits 
joined  the  German  military  in  Poland  and  were  then  transferred  to  the  mounted  SS  units;  see 
Vernehmung von Ferdinand Henschke vom 5.12. 1962, in: StAW, 62 Nds. Fb.2, Zwischenbericht zum 
Stand der Ermittlungen 1962, Nr. 1013, p. 175. Recruits from other countries entered the SS cavalry 
in late 1939 as well, for example from Slovakia. A former cavalryman stated that he served in an SS 
cavalry squadron together with six comrades from his Slovakian hometown; see Vernehmung von 
Adolf  Michalik  vom  11.12.  1962,  in:  StAW,  62  Nds.  Fb.2,  Zwischenbericht  zum  Stand  der 
Ermittlungen 1962, Nr. 1013, pp. 241-243.
139 Bayer,  Kavallerie der Waffen-SS,  p. 5; this number represents the strength of the unit as of 15 
December, 1939.
140 Ibid., p. 6.
141 Justiz  und  NS-Verbrechen:  Sammlung  deutscher  Strafurteile  wegen  nationalsozialistischer  
Tötungsverbrechen 1945 – 1966. Bd. 20, p. 39.
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squadron commanders and junior ranks were not qualified enough: most of them had 
never completed officer training as they had only served in the paramilitary SS until 
1939 or had never risen above non-commissioned officer rank in the army.142 They 
tried to compensate for this weakness with extreme rigour and put recruits through 
tough exercises, a procedure a former cavalryman later referred to as ‘persecution of 
the Christians’. He stated that the military drill he and his comrades received in their 
squadron at Krakow aimed at completely breaking their personality and that it even 
caused older reservists of the Wehrmacht, who were based in the same barracks, to 
protest repeatedly.143 
  Although the veteran only voiced this opinion after the war, some of the criticism 
he mentioned must have reached Hermann Fegelein during the formative period of 
the regiments. In a situation report he compiled in August, 1940, after many of the 
initial volunteers and recruits had left the SS cavalry again, he confirmed this (and, 
indirectly, also the aim of breaking individuals):
If one [man] or the other is unhappy with the work in his squadron nowadays 
or  subsequently  mutinies  about  it,  then  it  is  because  of  his  own  flawed 
character.  […]  These  cowards  who  now  bitch  about  their  superiors 
somewhere  at  home or  because  they  have  been  asked  to  do  so  by some 
agency are being called cowards because they did not have the courage as 
soldiers  to follow the complaints  procedure [and] stand freely and openly 
before their superiors. The General Government has formed officer and man 
142 Only Heimo Hierthes had been a reserve officer in the German army; see Stammrollenauszug von 
Heimo Hierthes, in: BArchB, SSO Heimo Hierthes. Stefan Charwat had served as a captain in the 
Rumanian cavalry, whereas Franz Magill and Kurt Wegener had been non-commissioned officers in 
the  Reichswehr and the  Wehrmacht air  force respectively.  For Charwat,  see StAW,  62 Nds. Fb.2, 
Personalunterlagen (Kopien), Nr. 1060, p. 36.  For Magill, see Dienstlaufbahn des Magill, Franz, in 
BArchB, SSO Franz Magill.  For  Wegener,  see  Lebenslauf  von Kurt  Wegener vom 8.3.  1938, in: 
BArchB,  SSO Kurt Wegener. None of the others,  including Hermann Fegelein,  ever received full 
officer training. For Fegelein, see Riess, ‘Fegelein’, pp. 160-161.
143 Testimony of Bernd Wenzel, in: BArchL, trial against Magill and others, B 162/2329, p. 1644.
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into different men to some extent […] Those who were weak were broken.144
  Superiors also resorted to severe punishment even for minimal breaches of duty: a 
former soldier said that his platoon leader had him imprisoned for three days for 
answering back to him on a trivial matter.145 One soldier was sentenced to a year’s 
imprisonment  and  exclusion  from  the  SS  for  stealing  money  from  a  comrade; 
another man received nine months’ imprisonment for drink-driving and illegal use of 
an SS vehicle.146 There is evidence for mistreatment as well: a charge against an SS-
Obersturmführer from the 2nd Regiment, who allegedly had beaten a soldier with a 
riding crop, was dismissed as there had been no witnesses. The reason for dismissing 
the case was given as follows: 
Thus, there is only the testimony of the person pressing charges against the 
defendant, whereupon it cannot be assumed that an SS officer would deny a 
crime once committed by him for fear of punishment and that he would not 
stand by his deed.147 
This ruling in favour of the defendant shows the strong sense of honour within the 
officer corps of the SS cavalry, which apparently was worth more than the word of 
an ordinary man. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the rank and file 
often did not dare to ‘follow the complaints procedure and stand freely and openly 
144 Stimmungsbericht des 1. SS-Totenkopf-Reiterregiments, 13 August 1940, in: VUA, 8th SS Cavalry 
Division Florian Geyer, box 1, file 7.
145 Vernehmung von Helmut Fenslaf, in: BArchL, B 162/5539, pp. 1647-1648.
146 Tagesbefehl Nr. 15 des Kommandostabes Reichsführer-SS vom 5.8. 1941, in: BArchF, RS 4/1003, 
pp. 21-22. The verdicts against the two soldiers were passed on 19 and 24 July, 1941; the first case 
referred  to  an  incident  from April,  1941,  whereas  the  second  incident  had  happened  during  the 
training period in East Prussia in July, 1941.
147 Verfügung vom 30.10. 1940, SS-Kav. Rgt. 2, in: BArchF, RS 4/906, p. 9.
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before their superiors’, as Fegelein had remarked two months earlier.
  In late 1939,  the incorporation of the regiment into the structure of the German 
occupation forces changed as well. With effect from 15 December, its command was 
transferred  from  the  regular  police  to  the  Höherer  SS-  und  Polizeiführer  ‘Ost’ 
(HSSPF ‘Ost’, Higher SS and Police Leader ‘East’) who coordinated all police and 
SS  forces  in  the  General  Government.148 In  November,  1939,  this  function  was 
fulfilled  by  SS-Obergruppenführer Friedrich  Wilhelm  Krüger.149 The  SS  cavalry 
regiment was embedded in an effective chain of command. Orders and instructions 
came either from the SS headquarters in Berlin or from SS and police  agencies  in 
Warsaw.  Although the Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei (KdS, head of  security 
police)  was  also  authorized  to  issue  orders  the  central  authority  coordinating 
operations was always the HSSPF ‘Ost’.150
  The cavalry regiment continued to be confronted with organisational problems. 
Whereas the initial lack of manpower could slowly be overcome by recruitment of 
ethnic  Germans  in  Poland  and  allocations  of  reservists  and  volunteers  from 
Germany, the units remained poorly equipped. The most important good of a cavalry 
unit, its horses, had to be commandeered from all over Germany and even also in 
Poland.151 Even months after  its  deployment,  one of the batteries  did not  have a 
single piece of artillery but was only equipped with rifles and two machine guns.152 
At least some of the cavalry squadrons were likewise inadequately armed: the men 
carried sub-machine guns, officers had their own pistols and other weapons were not 
available.153 The regiment turned to the Wehrmacht for help and negotiated with the 
148 Cüppers,  Wegbereiter, p. 29 and  Riess, ‘Fegelein’, p.  163.  Bayer,  Kavallerie der Waffen-SS,  p. 5 
and Michaelis, Kavalleriedivisionen, p. 7 give 15 November, 1939 as a date for this change.
149 Ruth Bettina Birn,  Die höheren SS- und Polizeiführer: Himmlers Vertreter im Reich und in den  
besetzten Gebieten. (Düsseldorf, 1986), pp. 187-188.
150 Birn, Die höheren SS- und Polizeiführer, p. 187; Michaelis, Kavallerie-Divisionen, p. 7.
151 Bayer, Kavallerie der Waffen-SS, p. 6.
152 Tät.Ber. Reit. Batt. 1. SS-T-RS v. 27.2. 1940, BArchF, RS 4/496, quoted in: Cüppers, Wegbereiter, 
pp. 31-32.
153 Bayer, Kavallerie der Waffen-SS, p. 5.
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German supreme commander in Poland, colonel general  von Blaskowitz.  Finally, 
light and heavy machine guns, field guns and grenade launchers could be obtained, 
supplemented by engineering, anti-tank and signals equipment. Some of the weapons 
came from the former Polish and Czech armies.154
  Other things also proved to be in short supply: there were not enough uniforms, 
meaning that some of the men had to wear civilian clothes. Some of the squadrons 
did not have warm clothing for the winter.155 The men were also malnourished as the 
units did not receive enough supplies. Sometimes the soldiers just stopped trains or 
truck  columns and requisitioned coal,  food or  other  goods – a  fact  that  sparked 
protest  from  Himmler  and  Göring.156 In  March  1940,  Himmler  prohibited  the 
acquisition  of  foodstuffs  altogether,  especially  the  requisitioning  of  cattle.157 
Suffering from hunger and a lack of medical care led to a generally bad state of 
health in some of the squadrons. In the 5th squadron of the 2nd SS Cavalry Regiment, 
for example, many men reported sick and shirking was a common phenomenon.158
  A lack of discipline could also be observed amongst the higher ranks: they were 
involved in acts of theft and corruption. In Warsaw, where the regimental staff was 
based,  officers sold stolen luxury goods to an army depot and tried to exchange 
invalid  Polish  Zloty  into  legal  currency.159 The  most  notorious  example  for  the 
ruthless practice of the cavalry officers was  SS-Sturmbannführer Albert  Faßbender. 
In  1940,  he  embezzled  large  amounts  of  money  after  liquidating  a  well-known 
former Jewish fur business, the Apfelbaum company. He also got the secretary of the 
previous owner pregnant and had her husband shot in a Gestapo prison in Warsaw.160 
154 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
155 Tät.Ber.  5.  Schwdr.  1.  SS-T-RS  v.  2.5.  1940,  in:  BArchF,  RS  4/540,  quoted  in  Cüppers, 
Wegbereiter, p. 32; Tät.Ber. 9. Ersatz-Schwdr. 1. SS-T-RS v. 28.1. 1940, in: BArchF, RS 4/495, ibid.
156 Bef. Kdr. SS-T-RS v. 19.2. 1940, in: BArchF, RS 4/418, ibid.
157 Bayer, Kavallerie der Waffen-SS, p. 8.
158 Tät.Ber.  Reit.  Batt.  1.  SS-T-RS  v.  27.2.  1940,  in:  BArchF,  RS  4/496,  quoted  in  Cüppers, 
Wegbereiter, p. 32; Tät.Ber. 5. Schwdr. 2. SS-T-RS v. 27.9. 1940, in: BArchF, RS 4/66, ibid.
159 Cüppers, Wegbereiter, pp. 29-30.
160 Eugen Kogon,  Der SS-Staat. Das System der deutschen Konzentrationslager (Munich, 2000), p. 
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Hermann Fegelein,  the  commander  of  the  unit,  was  accused  of  getting  a  Polish 
woman pregnant and of forcing her to abort the child.161 In March 1940 the SS riding 
school at Munich was searched by the Gestapo and many of the stolen goods were 
found there. Fegelein claimed not to have enriched himself personally but to have 
transferred profits to the riding school. Thanks to his good connections to Himmler 
the charge was withdrawn.162
  Despite grave logistical  difficulties, the SS cavalry regiment continued to grow 
until it had reached its authorised strength of 4,000 men at the end of April, 1940.163 
The leaders of the unit were well aware of the fact  that a change in quality was 
necessary now: more than half of the regiment consisted of farmers,  show jumpers 
and competition riders who were in the SS cavalry ‘because they loved horses’. They 
had been members of riding clubs before 1933, then entered the Allgemeine SS and 
volunteered or were drafted into the verstärkte Totenkopfstandarten after the war had 
broken  out.  Another  group  were  draftees  who  had  originally  applied  for  police 
service and were enlisted when the regiment was still part of the Polizeiverstärkung 
in late 1939.  For the most part these men were more than thirty years old and had 
difficulties  in  getting  through  a  harsh  training  schedule.164 Thus,  they  were  not 
exactly the military elite Himmler sought to create with the  Waffen-SS.  Although 
Hermann Fegelein and SS-Sturmbannführer Franz Magill (a squadron commander in 
the SS cavalry who from late 1939 prepared the deployment of a second cavalry 
regiment) were full of praise about their achievements, it was clear that most of the 
men from the original  Reiterstandarten would be of no use during future missions 
372; Riess, ‘Fegelein’, p. 164.
161 Riess, ‘Fegelein’, p. 164.
162 Riess, ‘Fegelein’, p. 164; see also Cüppers, Wegbereiter, p. 30.
163 Bayer, Kavallerie der Waffen-SS, p. 7 and p. 10.
164 Stimmungsbericht des 1. SS-Totenkopf-Reiterregiments, 13 August 1940, in: VUA, 8th SS Cavalry 
Division Florian Geyer, box 1, file 7; Stimmungsbericht des SS-Totenkopf-Reiterregiments 2 Lublin, 
13 August  1940,  ibid.;  Zwischenbericht  der  Sonderkommission Z [des  LKA Niedersachsen]  vom 
12.11. 1962, in: StAW, 62 Nds. Fb.2, Nr. 1268, p. 48.
56
and could serve their country better in their original professions.165 Their place was 
to be taken by young recruits, many of whom had joined the regiment already. The 
composition of these three groups – farmers and equestrians, police candidates, and 
young volunteers – reflected the methods of recruitment used by the  Waffen-SS in 
1939 – 1940 and at the same time shows the elements which became characteristics 
of  the  SS  cavalry:  its  foundation  in  equitation  as  well  as  the  high  degree  of 
voluntariness and rural background of many of its soldiers.
  In order to improve the combat readiness of the unit, three measures were taken: up 
to August, 1940, 2,043 reservists aged thirty years or older were discharged. This 
changed the social composition of the squadrons as the proportion of farmers was 
greatly reduced: 90% of those who left the units had an agricultural background. 
Some of them, however,  still  remained in the horse units  along with other older 
troopers  who had been  enlisted  as  auxiliary policemen.166 As  a  second step,  the 
regiment was divided into two detachments in May, 1940, allowing the organisation 
of the SS cavalry. This was an improvement as those who stayed now formed the 
cadre  for  the  existing  regiment  as  well  as  a  new  one,  the  2.  SS-Totenkopf-
Reiterstandarte (2nd SS Death’s Head Cavalry Regiment).167 The new formation was 
based  at  Lublin  and  commanded  by  Franz  Magill.168 Another  measure  was  the 
ongoing enlistment of young SS volunteers: on 28 July, 1940 the two regiments had 
165 Stimmungsbericht des 1. SS-Totenkopf-Reiterregiments, 13 August 1940, in: VUA, 8th SS Cavalry 
Division Florian Geyer, box 1, file 7; Stimmungsbericht des SS-Totenkopf-Reiterregiments 2 Lublin, 
13 August  1940,  ibid.  For the career  of Franz  Magill,  see  Justiz  und NS-Verbrechen: Sammlung 
deutscher Strafurteile wegen nationalsozialistischer Tötungsverbrechen 1945 – 1966. Bd. 20, pp. 28-
29; see also the excursus on the officer corps of the SS cavalry regiments in chapter 3.
166 Stimmungsbericht des 1. SS-Totenkopf-Reiterregiments, 13 August 1940, in: VUA, 8th SS Cavalry 
Division Florian Geyer, box 1, file 7. The discharge of older soldiers was a process that concerned the 
entire  Waffen-SS at the same time and mirrored a large-scale demobilisation the  Wehrmacht carried 
out after the victory over France; see Rohrkamp, Weltanschaulich gefestigte Kämpfer, p. 310, pp. 328-
329, and p. 331.
167 Riess, ‘Fegelein’, p. 164-165.
168 Martin  Cüppers,  ‘Wegbereiter  der  Shoah.  Ein  Vergleich  der  Einsätze  beider  SS-
Kavallerieregimenter im August 1941’, in T. C. Richter (ed.),  Krieg und Verbrechen. Situation und 
Intention: Fallbeispiele (Munich 2006), p. 90.
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reached the strength of 1829 and 1511 men respectively.169 Based on these three 
steps,  the  growth  of  the  units  continued  until  the  beginning  of  operation 
‘Barbarossa’.
  After the change of personnel in the summer of 1940, the group of the  young 
volunteers  began  to  form  the  third  major  component  of  the  unit’s  manpower 
alongside the SS reservists and police volunteers, who were considerably older. The 
new recruits belonged to the group of the so-called ‘adapted pupils’ who had been 
brought up in Nazi Germany and reached adulthood after 1933.170 They joined in the 
winter of 1939 – 1940 and during two other recruitment drives in April and autumn, 
1940. At their enlistment, their future branch of service within the Waffen-SS had not 
been specified so that they could have been allocated to any other unit as well.171 In 
the SS cavalry, these recruits added to the general heterogeneity of the lower ranks.
  Their reasons to volunteer for the SS were varied. A veteran who compiled a unit 
history after the war mentioned a sense of duty, the readiness to stand up for one’s 
nation, and the desire to serve in an elite force as possible motivations.172 The same 
attitude  can  be  found  in  the  self-published  accounts  of  another  former  SS 
cavalryman who stated that he and his comrades 'only wanted one thing: to be good 
soldiers defending their  fatherland in times of war'.173 It  can be assumed that the 
memoirs only show one side of the truth as veterans of the SS cavalry had good 
reason to stress these 'apolitical' motives and their own integrity during the post-war 
years.  In  the  volumes  put  together  by  Wachter,  contributions  from  alleged 
169 Klietmann, Die Waffen-SS, p. 355.
170 Dieter  Frey and Helmut Rez, ‘Population and Predators: Preconditions for the Holocaust From a 
Control-Theoretical Perspective’, in  L. S. Newman and R. Erber (eds.),  Understanding Genocide: 
The Social Psychology of the Holocaust (Oxford, 2002), pp. 213-214.
171 Bayer, Kavallerie der Waffen-SS, p. 7; interview with Dr Heinrich K., retired regional prosecutor in 
Braunschweig, 3 August, 2011.
172 Bayer, Kavallerie der Waffen-SS, p. 7.
173 Wachter, Unsere Kavallerie-Division in der Dokumentation des II. Weltkrieges, inside cover of the 
front page. The quote is part of a 'disclaimer' which describes Wachter's motivation to compile the 
work. He distances himself and his former comrades from right-wing ideology and claims that the 
book only aims at commemorating their wartime experience.
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perpetrators are followed seamlessly by those from younger men who only served at 
the front during the second half of the war, which casts doubt on the selection of the 
contributors and the content.174 Apart from the rather euphemised versions presented 
by  veterans  in  their  memoirs,  other  factors  for  joining  the  Waffen-SS may have 
played a role in wartime, such as interest in a military career or a secure job after a 
period of military service.175 
  The cavalrymen, like all members of the Waffen-SS, were not only to carry out their 
duty as soldiers but also to be instructed on National Socialism. In a general service 
regulation from September, 1940, the chief of staff of the SS-Führungshauptamt, SS-
Gruppenführer Hans Jüttner, formulated the aim of their education: to turn the men 
into political soldiers.176 Instruction on National Socialist policy and concepts of the 
enemy  has  been  documented  for  the  SS  cavalry  during  that  time  as  well  as 
screenings of propaganda films and lectures on the life of Adolf Hitler. It becomes 
evident, however, that this effort has not been very consistent: the schooling, which 
was  supposed to  be  conducted  by squadron commanders  on a  weekly basis  and 
battalion commanders every month, often did not take place at all as the officers had 
other commitments. Sometimes the recruits’ command of German was insufficient to 
understand the content of the lessons: many of the volunteers from Eastern Europe 
had  to  take  German  lessons  first.  Celebrations  of  the  Führer’s birthday and  the 
showing of films (anti-Semitic propaganda films like Jud Süß and Der ewige Jude as 
174 The  book  Unsere  Kavallerie-Division in  der  Dokumentation  des  II.  Weltkrieges,  for  example, 
contains  a  foreword  which  was  written  by  Johannes  Göhler.  During  the  missions  in  the  Pripet 
Marshes,  Göhler  had  led  a  platoon in  the  third squadron of  the  1st Regiment  of  the  SS Cavalry 
Brigade. In the Lombard trial, he was questioned as a defendant; like other former officers from the 
regiment, he was acquitted in 1970. He later became chairman of the 'Veterans Association of the 
Cavalry  Divisions  of  the  former  Waffen-SS'.  See  Wachter,  Unsere  Kavallerie-Division  in  der  
Dokumentation  des II. Weltkrieges,  p. 6, Führerstellenbesetzungsliste beider Kavallerie-Regimenter 
vom 30.7. 1941, BArchF, RS 3-8/91, and Einstellungsverfügung gg. Lombard u.a., pp. 1746-1747.
175 According  to  Rolf  Michaelis,  Die  Waffen-SS.  Dokumentation  über  die  personelle  
Zusammensetzung und den Einsatz der Waffen-SS (Berlin, 2006), p. 312, volunteers were offered  a 
takeover into police or public service after their time in the SS.
176 Dienstanweisung für  WE-Führer,  SS-Führungshauptamt,  14 September,  1940,  in:  BArchF,  RS 
4/215, pp. 4-5.
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well  as  war  movies  or  unpolitical  films)  were  generally  well  received  but  it  is 
unlikely  that  they,  together  with  the  instructions,  provided  a  very  thorough 
indoctrination.177 The  most  important  aspect  about  the  education  of  the  men  in 
Poland is the priority given to anti-Semitic content: new recruits often learned about 
‘the Jewish problem’ before they were even introduced to topics such as German 
history or Bolshevism.178
  Although it is not possible to generalise when it comes to assessing a group of 
about  2,000 men,  a  higher  level  of  political  motivation  can  be  assumed for  the 
younger SS candidates than for the older reservists: in one squadron, recruits did not 
need a special ideological induction before participation in propaganda lessons as 
they  were  said  to  have  undergone  appropriate  schooling  in  the  Hitlerjugend 
already.179 One soldier who had entered the 1st Regiment in autumn, 1940 was even a 
protégé  of  SS-Gruppenführer  Oswald  Pohl,  the  head  of  the  SS  main  office  for 
economic  administration  who  was  responsible  for  all  concentration  camps. 
According to Pohl, the private had graduated from a Nazi elite school, came from an 
old soldier family and intended to become an SS officer.  In a letter  to Hermann 
Fegelein,  Pohl recommended sending him on an officer training course;  Fegelein 
replied in favour of this request.180
  Another example proves the attitude of the young recruits in the SS cavalry even 
more vividly. In a field-post letter to a friend, dating from 19 March, 1942, a trooper 
of  the  veterinary  training  company  at  Radom  expressed  his  grief  about  having 
177 Jürgen Förster, ‘Die weltanschauliche Erziehung in der Waffen-SS: ‘Kein totes Wissen, sondern 
lebendiger  Nationalsozialismus‘‘,  in  J.  Matthäus  (ed.),  Ausbildungsziel  Judenmord? 
‘Weltanschauliche Erziehung‘ von SS, Polizei und Waffen-SS im Rahmen der Endlösung (Frankfurt, 
2003), pp. 97-99. See also Schreiben des SS-Führunghauptamtes an das SS-T-Kavallerieregiment 1 
vom  4.2.  1941  betr.  Anfertigung  von  Monatsberichten  der  Führer  des  Referates 
W[eltanschauliche]E[rziehung], in: BArchF, RS 4/215, pp. 2-3.
178 Cüppers, ‘SS-mäßige Art’, pp. 94-95 and Cüppers, Wegbereiter, p. 103.
179 Cüppers, Wegbereiter, p. 104.
180 Oswald  Pohl,  SS-Gruppenführer  und  Generalleutnant  der  Waffen-SS,  an  Standartenführer 
Hermann Fegelein, 14 August, 1941, in: BArchF, RS 4/212 (1 von 2), pp. 88-89; Hermann Fegelein 
an SS-Gruppenführer und Generalleutnant der Waffen-SS Oswald Pohl, 4 September, 1941, ibid., p. 
83.
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missed a raid by his unit:
Dear Armin,
I think I wrote to you some time ago already that I ended up in the beautiful 
Polish country again. The service here is alright, we learn to ride [horses], 
you can imagine that I quite enjoy that. For a few days, I have been lying in 
the sick bay with terrible diarrhoea. In a way it is quite nice for one can have 
a real lie-in again, but it has its disadvantages as well. Yesterday I missed a 
really big thing. The company cracked down on three Polish villages and shot 
a great lot of Poles.
Whether I will stay here in Radom is uncertain again. Hopefully we will get 
to the front soon. Our riding training is quite done so that we can count on 
getting out in fourteen days to three weeks.
How  are  you?  Are  you  Jungenzugführer yet?  […]  How  is  Siegfried 
Löwenberger,  is he still  leading a  Jungenzug,  please write to me in detail 
whom  you  put  in  charge  as  subalterns  etc.  […]  Please  go  to  the  Bann 
[administrative  office  of  the  Hitlerjugend]  and  tell  them to  send  me  my 
leadership ID and a service certificate, I urgently need it because I want to 
apply as an officer candidate in the SS. I’ve written to the Bann a couple of 
times already but not received anything. Please do me that favour and see 
that I get these things.
Now [I am] finished. All best and regards,
Your friend Emmerich.181
181 Letter from SS-Oberreiter Emmerich, member of a Veterinär-Ersatzkompanie in Radom, Poland, to 
Armin Düsterfest in Rückwerda, near Litzmannstadt (Lodz), 19 March, 1942, in: WLL, file 703. The 
archive does not have any background information on this document, such as how it was obtained or 
what happened to the SS trooper. The terms Jungenzugführer and Jungenzug are misspellings in the 
original: the correct forms are Jungzugführer and Jungzug.
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  This rare personal document refers to crimes of the SS cavalry and bears witness to 
the fact that its training units in Poland were involved in acts of mass violence. The 
soldier jumps between the missions of his unit and his former occupation with the 
Hitlerjugend back home without  any difficulty,  showing how quickly he became 
integrated into a new frame of reference in which shootings of Poles were perfectly 
acceptable. The letter exemplifies  the sometimes astonishing openness with which 
the men spoke about the crimes they committed.182 However, it has to be approached 
cautiously as it was written during a later period. But despite the fact that the writer 
had  not  witnessed  the  murders  in  Belorussia,  this  document  might  serve  as  an 
illustration of the cavalry soldiers' possible mentality in 1940. It can be assumed that 
the situation described in the letter applied to many SS cavalrymen who had joined 
the units earlier: like the writer, they had come to the  Waffen-SS directly from the 
Hitlerjugend. For men like him or Pohl’s protégé, a career in this institution became 
an option worth  considering.  As the cavalry regiments  were in  constant  need of 
qualified subalterns, this was much encouraged: there was often a smooth transition 
between the rank groups as experienced ordinary soldiers became non-commissioned 
officers either through NCO training courses or later through battlefield promotions; 
others underwent officer training.183
  Although the SS cavalry units were struggling to adjust to the military role and did 
not seem to have undergone very intense propaganda indoctrination, their members 
fulfilled the political function very quickly: the squadrons of the SS cavalry regiment 
were significantly involved in the implementation of the occupation policy from the 
outset. Under the authority of the HSSPF ‘Ost’, Waffen-SS units formed a ‘decisive 
executive body’ of the German occupation forces alongside the regular police and 
182 For similar examples and their interpretation, see Welzer, Täter, pp. 102-104, p. 116.
183 Bayer, Kavallerie der Waffen-SS, p. 15.
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the Sicherheitspolizei.184 All three phases of the SS cavalry’s deployment in Poland 
are characterised by an involvement in ideologically motivated crimes: throughout 
the rank groups, there was a high willingness not only to engage in expulsions and 
executions by command but also to commit criminal acts out of their own volition, 
many of which were triggered by personal anti-Semitism. What stands out in this 
context is the role of the officers, especially the squadron leaders, who led the way 
by enforcing a policy of oppression of Poles and Jews; their orders, which were full 
of anti-Semitic statements and racial stereotypes, prove the humiliation, abuse, and 
murder  of  the  local  population,  sometimes  with  hundreds  of  victims.  It  can  be 
assumed  that  the  officers  in  particular  now  saw  their  prejudices  against  Jews 
confirmed by the appalling conditions under which many Polish Jews were living.185 
  One of the first missions of the SS cavalry was the killing of Poles who were 
considered as belonging to the country’s elite: politicians, aristocrats, businessmen, 
academics, clerics and officers. The regimental staff and the 1st cavalry  squadron 
were employed alongside police units in mass executions in and near Warsaw. These 
took  place  in  the  Palmiry  forest  and  in  the  garden  of  the  parliament  from  7 
December, 1939. In the forest alone, more than 1700 people were killed, members of 
the  elite  as  well  as  many Jews.  The  massacres  continued  at  least  until  October 
1940.186 In Lodz, too, drastic  measures against the local elites were taken: between 
September and November 1939, hundreds of people were arrested by the Gestapo.187 
They were then transported to nearby Lucmierz in trucks and shot by members of the 
SS cavalry’s recruit  training squadron. According to Polish witnesses the killings 
continued until the unit’s withdrawal in spring 1941.188
184 Cüppers, ‘SS-mäßige Art’, p. 96.
185 Cüppers, Wegbereiter, pp. 36-60.
186 Ibid., p. 99.
187 According to Riess, ‘Fegelein’, p. 163, the massacres occurred between November, 1939 und April, 
1940.
188 Cüppers, ‘SS-mäßige Art’, pp. 99-100.
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  Waffen-SS troops were also largely involved in the displacement of Jews from the 
Warthegau,  a  part  of  western  Poland  that  had  been  annexed  to  Germany.  The 
cavalrymen helped to establish a ghetto in Lodz into which the evicted Jews were 
deported. Some of them were also interned in smaller ghettos in the Lodz region.189 
Poles, too, were driven into the General Government by the SS riders. At the same 
time, they supported the resettlement of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe. These 
measures  were  part  of  Himmler’s  policy  of  ‘Germanization’,  a  project  that  was 
intended to expand German settlement and influence further eastward.190 After the 
deportation of Jews and Poles, Gypsies from the western provinces suffered the same 
fate.191 The final destination for many Polish Jews became the Lublin district, the 
designated area for the so-called ‘Judenreservat’ or ‘Reichsghetto’. After the arrival 
of deportation trains, local German commanders in some cases decided to push the 
Jews even further eastward, across the river Bug into the Soviet occupied zone.192
  To  an  increasing  degree,  Jews  were  not  only  disadvantaged,  humiliated  and 
segregated but also murdered. The killings were carried out by Waffen-SS or police 
units, often in cooperation. There is evidence that the SS cavalry regiment took part 
in these actions as well: in early December, the 5th squadron guarded a transport of 
1018  Jewish  men  who  were  to  be  driven  over  the  German-Soviet  line  of 
demarcation.  The Jews were marched some 25 miles from Chelm to Hrubieszow 
near the border. At least 440 of them were shot along the way because they were too 
weak; these killings took place in public. Once Hrubieszow was reached, 1000 local 
Jews were forced to join the group but the Soviet guards refused to let the deportees 
cross the border. Survivors later spoke of a ‘death march’.193 A few weeks later, 600 
Jews from Lublin arrived at Chelm by train. Along the way, dysentery had broken 
189 Ibid., p. 96.
190 Browning, ‘Nazi Resettlement Policy’, pp. 501-503; Cüppers, ‘SS-mäßige Art’, p. 100.
191 Longerich, Himmler, pp. 689-692.
192 Browning, ‘Nazi Resettlement Policy’, pp. 501-503.
193 Cüppers, ‘SS-mäßige Art’, pp. 97-98.
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out amongst the passengers and some of them had died already. The commander of 
the cavalry squadron, SS-Obersturmführer Reichenwallner, decided to execute all of 
the remaining Jews to avoid a health hazard for the Chelm district. On the next day, 
more than 550 Jews were shot outside the town by the cavalry squadron and local 
German police.194
  The German forces also fought ruthlessly against partisans and saboteurs of any 
kind.  For  the  SS  cavalry,  this  became  another  important  task:  whereas  some 
squadrons, such as the first squadron under Waldemar Fegelein, Hermann’s brother, 
predominantly  carried  out  executions,  subunits  in  rural  areas  frequently  were 
engaged in operations against insurgents.195 In late March and early April 1940 the 
SS cavalry regiment and other German formations attempted to eliminate a group of 
partisans which consisted of former soldiers of the Polish army. This led to a large-
scale operation in the area between Radom and Kielce. Although Fegelein’s riders 
and a police battalion tried to encircle the insurgents, half of the approximately one 
hundred men managed to escape. Despite heavy criticism from the German supreme 
command in Poland, Fegelein was awarded the Iron Cross Second Class for this 
operation.196 Extreme brutality was shown in the course of action: in a neighbouring 
village,  all  men  of  military age  were  shot  by units  of  the  8th SS  Death’s  Head 
regiment  on 7 April.197 On the following day,  members of  SS cavalry squadrons 
executed 250 Polish men in other nearby villages.198 Both the proceedings of this 
operation and the way it was viewed by Hermann Fegelein became characteristic for 
the unit’s later conduct in the Soviet Union. He himself gave the following comment 
in  his  report  of  10  April:  ‘The  set  tasks  of  burning  down  guilty  villages  and 
194 Ibid., p. 98.
195 Wilson, Himmler’s Cavalry, pp. 148-151, and Müller-Tupath, Becher, pp. 22-27.
196 Riess, ‘Fegelein’, p. 164.
197 Einsatzbericht Kdr. 8. SS-T-St. v. 18.5. 1940, in:  BArchB, NS 19/3505, quoted in:  Cüppers, ‘SS-
mäßige Art’, p. 100.
198 Gefechtsbericht Kdr. 1. SS-T-RS v. 10.4.  1940, in: VUA, 8th SS Cavalry Division Florian Geyer, 
box 3, file 22, quoted in: Cüppers, ‘SS-mäßige Art’, p. 100.
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executing sinister elements were completed in such a clean and decent SS-worthy 
way that every doubt about the troops’ strength of character had to be eliminated’.199
  When examining the motives of SS cavalrymen, it is striking that members of all 
hierarchy levels  quickly adjusted to  the role  of  the unit  and their  particular  task 
within  it.  Even when the  mounted  formations  were  still  in  the  process  of  being 
established, they were already deployed for occupation duties including expulsions 
and killings. As a reason for the motivation and spirit of officers and NCO’s and 
commending their good example, Franz Magill stated that they were ‘old SS men’ 
for the most part.200 Despite some frictions, the ordinary men did their duty as well, 
as  Hermann  Fegelein  stated  in  a  report  to  the  command  of  the  Waffen-SS: 
‘Sometimes it was not easy to carry out all the executions and Sonderaktionen as the 
most  severe  strains  of  morale  had  to  be  asked  from the  men  day by  day’.  He 
continued by saying that he did not ‘have to punish a man for disobedience or breach 
of duty in a single case’.201 What he did not say was that his soldiers often went far 
beyond their orders and humiliated, abused, robbed, or even killed Jews and Poles 
without any orders, often out of base motives. Many of them, including their officers 
up to Fegelein himself, behaved more like an unleashed band of mercenaries than the 
highly  disciplined  soldiers  he  intended  to  develop.  With  and  without  displaying 
personal anti-Semitism, they exploited the exceptional circumstances of serving in 
an occupied country.202
  It is significant that the officer corps of the SS cavalry managed to implement a 
brutal occupation policy with two different (although partly overlapping) contingents 
of men without difficulties regarding the obedience of killing orders: both the ‘older’ 
199 Ibid.
200 Stimmungsbericht des SS-Totenkopf-Reiterregiments 2 Lublin, 13 August 1940, in: VUA, 8th SS 
Cavalry Division Florian Geyer, box 1, file 7.
201 Stimmungsbericht des 1. SS-Totenkopf-Reiterregiments, 13 August 1940, in: VUA, 8th SS Cavalry 
Division Florian Geyer, box 1, file 7.
202 Cüppers, ‘SS-mäßige Art’, pp. 90-111, especially pp. 90-91, pp. 96-97, and pp. 102-104; Cüppers, 
Wegbereiter, pp. 36-42.
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group  (reservists  and  police  volunteers)  and  the  ‘younger’ group  consisting  of 
Waffen-SS volunteers  functioned as  planned.  As protocols  from questionings  and 
original documents from the SS in most cases do not contain personal testimony on 
the reasons for participation in executions, research has to balance various arguments 
and facts,  one of which is membership in National Socialist  organisations.203 The 
high  percentage  of  members  of  the  Allgemeine  SS amongst  the  men  of  the  SS 
Cavalry Brigade – more than 40% – was interpreted by Martin Cüppers as a ‘distinct 
commitment to National Socialism’ that proves their  classification as ‘ideological 
soldiers’.204 This analysis appears to be justified when viewed in the context of the 
crimes the SS cavalrymen were involved in from 1939 – 1941; also, it is possible 
that this applied to a large number of non-commissioned officers and men as well as 
to the majority of the officer corps. 
  What this assumption does not take into account, however, is that membership in 
the Allgemeine SS and joining the Waffen-SS were two different things: SS reservists 
who were called up according to the Notdienstverordnung of 15 October, 1938 did 
have the opportunity to join the  Wehrmacht and were not forced to participate in 
atrocities. Those who stayed chose to remain within a frame of reference which was 
characterised  by  radical  measures  and  ultimately  resulted  in  even  worse  crimes 
against  humanity.  They  were  joined  by  young  volunteers,  for  whom  it  can  be 
assumed that voluntariness also meant a willingness to follow any orders, including 
criminal ones.205 These findings regarding call-up procedures and  voluntary entry 
into the SS also apply to the Reiterstandarten in Poland: being a member of the pre-
203 In postwar questionings, former SS cavalrymen were not asked about their membership in the Nazi 
party. Some gave particulars about this voluntarily but in most of the protocols no information on 
political activity can be found.
204 Cüppers, Wegbereiter, p. 353. Cüppers does not mention a particular date on which this percentage 
has been found; from the reference to the SS Cavalry Brigade in the text it can be concluded that this 
must have been between the formation of the brigade in the summer of 1941 and the beginning of the 
battle between Rzhev and Toropez in the winter of 1941 – 1942.
205 Rohrkamp, Weltanschaulich gefestigte Kämpfer, pp. 332-333.
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war mounted SS units alone cannot be viewed as an indicator of support for Nazi 
ideology  as  both  the  paramilitary  Reiterstandarten and  the  SS-Totenkopf-
Reiterstandarten (until the summer of 1940) mostly consisted of former members of 
equestrian associations which had been integrated into the SS without further ado a 
few years  earlier.  As has  been  stated  above,  these  institutions  were  made up  of 
sportsmen  who  did  not  necessarily  share  the  views  and  participate  in  radical 
measures  of  the  regime.  Moreover,  the  figure  given  by  Cüppers  almost  exactly 
matches the contingent of about 2,000 soldiers (or 40 – 50% of the 4,000 men who 
had been incorporated since the beginning of the war) who remained in the two SS 
cavalry regiments  after  the discharge of  the  reservists  in  the  summer of  1940.206 
Despite  the  fact  that  many  young  recruits  had  been  enlisted  as  well,  it  can  be 
assumed that  there  still  was  a  strong element  of  older  equestrians  present  in  the 
units.207 
  The years 1940 and 1941 saw further organisational changes both in the SS in 
general and the mounted formations. In August, 1940 the SS-Führungshauptamt (SS 
main command office) was founded, an institution responsible for the deployment 
and equipment of all Waffen-SS units. The newly-formed reinforced SS infantry and 
cavalry  regiments,  which  had  been  under  the  control  of  the  Inspekteur  der  
verstärkten Totenkopfstandarten (inspection  of  the  reinforced  Death’s  Head 
regiments) nominally and under the command of an SS, police or military authority 
in Germany or the occupied territories locally,  were now also integrated into the 
Waffen-SS.  Their  command  was  transferred  to  the  Kommando  der  Waffen-SS 
206 Stimmungsbericht des 1. SS-Totenkopf-Reiterregiments, 13 August 1940, in: VUA, 8th SS Cavalry 
Division  Florian Geyer, box 1, file 7. This document states that 90% of the 2,043 men who were 
discharged  had  an  agricultural  background;  it  does  not  give  the  proportion  of  men  from  the 
Allgemeine SS, volunteers etc.
207 See also Stimmungsbericht des SS-Totenkopf-Reiterregiments 2 Lublin, 13 August 1940, in: VUA, 
8th SS Cavalry Division Florian Geyer, box 1, file 7; the commander of the 2nd Regiment stated that 
many replacements who had been drafted later were also older, which indicates that they had come 
from the pre-war Reiterstandarten. 
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(Waffen-SS command) as the inspection of the reinforced Death’s Head regiments 
was  disbanded.208 The  two cavalry regiments  were  renamed  SS-Totenkopf-Reiter-
Regimenter, a designation which was to be short-lived.209
  As the separation of command structure and training units proved to be problematic 
the two regiments  were amalgamated again in  November,  1940.  They were then 
reorganised  as  two  half-regiments,  consisting  of  two  detachments each.  The 
formations were now referred to as SS-Totenkopf-Kavallerie-Regimenter (SS Death´s 
Head Cavalry Regiments).210 Nominally, the second regiment was still subordinate to 
the  first  regiment  and  there  was  only  one  regimental  staff. When  assessing  the 
organisation of the regiments in early 1941, Fegelein found that this situation would 
not be practicable, should the two regiments be employed in combat. He therefore 
requested the forming of a second staff unit and made further suggestions as to the 
composition and armament of the SS cavalry, with the aim of deploying two fully 
combat-ready  regiments.  For  training  purposes,  a  new  recruit  depot  was  to  be 
established at Warsaw.211
  In order to obtain information on possible improvement regarding the structure of 
the units,  Hermann Fegelein also sought  advice from the staff  of the 1st Cavalry 
Division of the  Wehrmacht,  which was based in Warsaw at that time, too.212 The 
relationship with the army officers seems to have been rather cordial, as is proven by 
mutual visits; on one occasion, 27 officers from the division were guests of the 1st SS 
Cavalry Regiment.213 This fact was not unusual: in an earlier report, Fegelein had 
208 Cüppers, Wegbereiter, p. 27.
209 Michaelis, Dokumentation, p. 312 and p. 314.
210 Cüppers, Wegbereiter, p. 30; Klietmann, Die Waffen-SS, p. 355; Riess, ‘Fegelein’, p. 165.
211 Schreiben des Kommandeurs des SS-Kavallerieregiments 1 an den Befehlshaber Ost der Waffen-
SS im Generalgouvernement vom 15.2. 1941, in: VUA, 8th SS Cavalry Division Florian Geyer, box 1, 
file 4; Vorschlag zur Kriegsgliederung der Kav.-Regimenter vom 15.2. 1941, ibid.
212 Schreiben des Kommandeurs des SS-Kavallerieregiments 1 an den Befehlshaber Ost der Waffen-
SS im Generalgouvernement vom 15.2. 1941, in: VUA, 8th SS Cavalry Division Florian Geyer, box 1, 
file 4.
213 Tätigkeitsbericht der Abt. Ia, 1. Kavalleriedivision, Woche vom 3.3. - 9.3.  1941, in: BArchF, RH 
29-1/3, p. 32; the visit took place on 7 March, 1941.
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already mentioned the good rapport SS cavalry units had built with army and air 
force commanders in Poland, amongst them general Max von Schenckendorff, who 
later was to play an important role for Fegelein and his men.214 With the 1st Cavalry 
Division, however, it was different as there was not only consultation: according to 
situation reports of the deputy commander from February and March, 1941, a second 
brigade staff within the division was being considered to which the 1st SS Cavalry 
Regiment would become subordinate, and thus an incorporation of the unit into a 
larger  army  formation.215 This  idea,  which  certainly  would  not  have  been  to 
Himmler's liking, was not implemented but it does show how keen Fegelein was to 
turn his cavalry into a combat unit (or at least to attach it to one) even before the 
German attack on the Soviet Union.
  Fegelein’s other plans found the approval of  the  SS-Führungshauptamt  and were 
implemented according to his suggestions.216 In March, 1941, the two regiments and 
their squadrons were restructured again and renamed for the third time within a year, 
this time to  SS-Kavallerie-Regimenter.  The 2nd SS Cavalry Regiment was now an 
independent unit.217 The transition of the SS cavalry from the Death´s Head units to 
the Waffen-SS was also marked by a formal change: instead of death’s head insignia 
the soldiers now wore SS runes on the collar of their uniform.218 This composition, 
which was to last  until  after the beginning of the German invasion of the Soviet 
Union,  comprised a new partition of both regiments.  There were two regimental 
staffs now and the horse squadrons were combined in a Reitende Abteilung (cavalry 
214 Stimmungsbericht des 1. SS-Totenkopf-Reiterregiments, 13 August 1940, in: VUA, 8th SS Cavalry 
Division Florian Geyer, box 1, file 7.
215 Tätigkeitsbericht der Abt. Ia, 1. Kavalleriedivision, Woche vom 17.2. - 23.2. 1941, in: BArchF, RH 
29-1/3, p. 30; Tätigkeitsbericht der Abt. Ia, 1. Kavalleriedivision, Woche vom 3.3. - 9.3. 1941, ibid., p. 
32.
216 Befehl zur Umgliederung des SS-Kav.Rgts vom 26.2. 1941, in: BArchB, NS 19/3489, fol. 6.
217 Befehl des Kommandeurs des SS-Kavallerieregiments 1 vom 21.3. 1941, in: VUA, 8th SS Cavalry 
Division Florian Geyer, box 1, file 4; Befehl des Kommandeurs des SS-Kavallerieregiments 1 vom 
28.3. 1941, ibid.
218 Michaelis, Dokumentation, p. 314.
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detachment).  In  the  1st SS  Cavalry  Regiment  under  Hermann  Fegelein,  this 
detachment was commanded by SS-Sturmbannführer Gustav Lombard; in the 2nd SS 
Cavalry  Regiment  under  Franz  Magill,  it  was  headed  by  SS-Hauptsturmführer 
Herbert Schönfeldt.219 In an earlier personnel review, Magill had been assessed as not 
qualified  for  commanding  a  cavalry  regiment.  He  was  therefore  replaced  as 
regimental commander by SS-Obersturmbannführer Heimo Hierthes on April 10 and 
given  command of the  Reitende Abteilung.220 Schönfeldt became head of the fifth 
squadron in the 2nd SS Cavalry Regiment.221
  Each of the two cavalry regiments was composed of a staff squadron, a supply unit, 
four  cavalry  squadrons,  and  four  so-called  ‘technical  squadrons’ equipped  with 
heavy weapons.  The  staff  squadron comprised  administration  and other  services, 
such as a signals platoon, a reconnaissance platoon on motorcycles, a platoon that 
acquired  and  broke  in  new horses,  and  a  drum and bugle  corps.  Supplies  were 
provided by the Leichte Kavallerie-Kolonne. Its three sections were responsible for 
the transport  of  ammunition  for  the entire  unit,  oats  for  its  horses,  and  personal 
belongings  of  the  SS  cavalrymen;  it  also  comprised  a  blacksmith’s  shop.  The 
Reitende Abteilung was made up of the first four squadrons of the regiment. The 
first, second, and third squadron were regular mounted subunits with infantry arms 
and one or two light machine guns each; they consisted of three platoons (with four 
squads each) and a supply troop. The fourth squadron was the mounted machine gun 
squadron;  it  had two machine  gun platoons  with  four  machine  guns  each  and a 
platoon armed with grenade launchers.  The cavalry detachment was headed by a 
219 Führerstellenbesetzungsliste der SS-Kavallerie-Regimenter 1 und 2 vom 18.3. 1941, in: VUA, 8th 
SS Cavalry Division Florian Geyer, box 1, file 1.
220 According  to  Justiz  und  NS-Verbrechen:  Sammlung  deutscher  Strafurteile  wegen  
nationalsozialistischer  Tötungsverbrechen  1945  –  1966.  Bd.  20,  p.  39,  Hierthes  was  assigned 
command of the regiment in April. On 21 June, 1941, he was promoted to SS-Standartenführer and 
officially appointed commander. See also Beurteilung Franz Magill vom 21.8. 1940, in: BArchB, SSO 
Franz Magill.
221 Führerstellenbesetzungsliste beider Kavallerie-Regimenter vom 30.7. 1941, BArchF, RS 3-8/91.
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staff  squadron,  which  also  had  its  own  anti-tank  platoon.  The  fifth  squadron 
consisted of  three platoons,  each of  which  was armed with two 7,5 cm infantry 
support  guns; the sixth squadron comprised an engineer platoon  and an  anti-tank 
platoon; the seventh squadron was a  reconnaissance squadron on bicycles and the 
eighth squadron was the  Reitende Batterie which comprised four platoons armed 
with one 10,5 cm field gun each.222
  To assure the successful cooperation of all squadrons and services of the  1st SS 
Cavalry Regiment in its  new structure,  a field exercise in the Rembertów training 
area near Warsaw was conducted in early June, 1941. During this practice, a quick 
advance  of  the  entire  regiment  towards  enemy positions  with  machine  guns  and 
artillery was demonstrated. Special attention was paid to artillery support, covering 
fire and the quick exchange of information between the heavy weapons squadrons.223 
On the same day the situation for the field exercise was announced, Fegelein also 
issued a  long list  of  complaints  and orders  for improvement  of  parade duty and 
combat training.224 It shows that he was aiming at creating a formation that worked 
absolutely precisely in peacetime, down to the last turn and piece of clothing. In a 
battle situation, however, every man was to know his duty and to carry it out with 
confidence, swiftness and momentum. The new orders were addressed to all sections 
and subunits of the regiment and involved many points which soon were to gain 
importance, such as reconnaissance patrols, training of specialists who were able to 
fight on their own if necessary, regulations for marches and signals, camouflage and 
222 Befehl  zur  Umgliederung  des  SS-Kav.Rgts  vom  26.2.  1941,  BArchB,  NS  19/3489,  fol.  6; 
Abschlußbericht  der  ZStL  vom  20.8.  1963,  Beteiligung  der  SS-Kavalleriebrigade  Fegelein  an 
Vernichtungsaktionen  gegenüber  der  jüdischen  Bevölkerung  im  Pripjetgebiet  /  Weißrußland  im 
Sommer 1941 (Lombard u.a.), in: BArchL, B 162/5527, pp. 356-359; this source will from now on be 
abbreviated as ‘Abschlußbericht der ZStL vom 20.8. 1963’.  Justiz und NS-Verbrechen: Sammlung 
deutscher Strafurteile wegen nationalsozialistischer Tötungsverbrechen 1945 – 1966. Bd. 20, p. 39-
40; Vernehmung Otto Prade vom 30.10. 1962, in: BArchL, B 162/5543, p. 29.
223 Lage – Blau für das Gefechtsschießen am 6.6. 1941, in: BArchF, RS 4/724, pp. 9-12.
224 Beanstandungen bei den Schwadronen im Exerzier- und Gefechtsdienst vom 5.6. 1941, in: BArchF, 
RS 4/724, pp. 13-18.
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the use of heavy weapons. Evidently, the SS cavalry had ceased to be a motley crew 
of  horse  riding  enthusiasts  and  already  progressed  beyond  being  a  mere  police 
auxiliary or occupation unit. It was now intensely preparing for mobile warfare that 
required the successful collaboration of a multitude of men, arms and equipment.
  The SS had a far bigger body of troops at its disposal in 1941 than it had enjoyed 
two years  before,  an improvement  that  greatly facilitated  the  preparation  for  the 
upcoming campaign in the east. Compared to the last pre-war figures, the personnel 
of the armed SS had exploded in number in late 1939 and early 1940. Beside the two 
cavalry regiments, twelve new infantry regiments had been formed, for the most part 
in  Poland,  Bohemia  and  Moravia.225 These  Death’s  Head  units  had  served  as 
occupation forces either at their place of formation or at other locations throughout 
Europe. At the beginning of the German campaign against Holland, Belgium, and 
France in April, 1940 they had a combined strength of more than  125,000 men.226 
This number rose further to around 150,000 in August, 1940, thus marking a sixfold 
increase  in  manpower  in  only  one  year.227 Also, ethnic  Germans,  the  so-called 
Volksdeutsche, joined SS units in the areas of deployment, mainly in Eastern Europe. 
To those who could be mustered in newly occupied areas were added many others 
who  came  from  Romania,  Yugoslavia  or  Slovakia  after  intense  SS  recruitment 
campaigns  in  their  native  regions.228 This  general  trend  also  applied  to the  SS 
cavalry: many Volksdeutsche joined the two regiments in Poland.229
225 For a list of these new units, see Michaelis, Dokumentation, pp. 312-319.
226 Stein, The Waffen SS, p. 27.
227 Ibid., p. 27.
228 Cüppers, Wegbereiter, pp. 87-89.
229 Cüppers,  ‘SS-mäßige  Art’,  p.  94;  Michaelis,  Kavalleriedivisionen,  p.  10;  see  also  Bayer, 
Kavallerie der Waffen-SS, p. 8. The allocation of ethnic Germans to the subunits of the SS cavalry 
varied from squadron to squadron but became significantly higher after the turnover of personnel in 
the  summer  of  1940.  The  exact  contingent  of  Volksdeutsche for  the  two  regiments  cannot  be 
ascertained. From the available documents, however, it becomes clear that it could be as high as 41% 
of the rank and file  in some squadrons;  see Personalliste 1.  Schwdr.  SS-KR 2 v.  27.4.  1941, in: 
BArchF, RS 4/912, quoted in  Cüppers,  Wegbereiter, p. 370. Another example for this development 
was given by a former platoon leader from the second squadron of the same regiment. He testified 
after the war that the men of the platoon he took over in the spring of 1941 came from the Banat and 
Transylvania regions in Romania; see Vernehmung von Helmut Guggolz vom 14.3. 1962, in: StAW, 
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  This development is no coincidence: as two recent studies on Nazi perpetrators 
have shown, there was a connection between provenance and political radicalism.230 
In the samples researched by Michael Mann as well as Gerhard Paul and Klaus-
Michael Mallmann, the number of people from contested German border regions 
such as Upper Silesia or from provinces which had been annexed by other countries 
as a consequence of the Treaty of Versailles was disproportionately high.231 Ethnic 
Germans who had lived outside the borders of Germany during the interwar period 
often had experienced unrest, oppression or expulsion. Many of them responded to 
this with extreme nationalism, anti-Semitism and revisionism, a development that 
helped  to  turn  them  into  perpetrators  when  genocide  began.  From  1939,  they 
displayed  great  brutality  as  members  of  German  military  or  paramilitary 
formations.232 This  is  exemplified  by  the  crimes  of  the  so-called  Volksdeutscher  
Selbstschutz, a militia consisting of ethnic Germans that was organised by the SS in 
Poland.  Units  of  the  Selbstschutz became  responsible  for  the  murder  and 
displacement of tens of thousands of Polish citizens: between 20,000 and 30,000 
people were killed by the German militias within the first months of the Second 
World War.233 
  As the command structure of the SS in the occupied territories was about to move 
further eastward in the course of strategic planning for the invasion of the Soviet 
62 Nds. Fb.2, Befehle (Kopien) 1941, Nr. 1019, p. 294.
230 Michael  Mann,  Die  dunkle  Seite  der  Demokratie:  eine  Theorie  der  ethnischen  Säuberung 
(Hamburg,   2007);  Klaus-Michael  Mallmann  and  Gerhard  Paul  (eds.),  Karrieren  der  Gewalt:  
Nationalsozialistische Täterbiographien (Darmstadt, 2004). Based on West German court files from 
proceedings against Nazi  perpetrators,  Mann surveyed 1581 people from different  groups: former 
members  of  the  Reich Security Main Office (RSHA),  Higher  SS and Police Leaders,  Nazi  party 
gauleiter and  high-ranking  officers  of  the  Einsatzgruppen;  see  Mann,  Die  dunkle  Seite  der 
Demokratie,  pp.  321-323.  The  work  edited  by  Mallmann  and  Paul  presents  23  biographies  of 
perpetrators (21 of them male, 2 female) from various branches  of the SS and police as well as the 
Wehrmacht; see Mallmann and Paul, Karrieren der Gewalt, p. 6.
231 Mann, Die dunkle Seite der Demokratie, pp. 329-336, Mallmann and Paul, Karrieren der Gewalt, 
p. 7.
232 Mann, Die dunkle Seite der Demokratie, pp. 288-289, p. 315, p. 341, and p. 351; Mallmann and 
Paul, Karrieren der Gewalt, p. 7.
233 Böhler, Auftakt zum Vernichtungskrieg, pp. 231-234. On the crimes of the German militias, see also 
Christian Jansen and Arno Weckbecker, Der 'Volksdeutsche Selbstschutz' in Polen 1939/40 (Munich, 
1992).
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Union, the institution of the Höherer SS- und Polizeiführer ‘Ost’ (HSSPF ‘Ost’) was 
no  longer  needed  in  Poland  and  was  therefore  dissolved.  The  two  SS  cavalry 
regiments were put under the control of the SS-Führungshauptamt on April 9, 1941 
but  remained  based  in  Poland.234 At  the  same  time,  Himmler  developed  new 
institutions that were to perform special tasks under his command: a new command 
organisation  within the SS and three new HSSPF who were to be installed in the 
western parts of the Soviet Union as his direct representatives. On 7 April, 1941 the 
so-called  Einsatzstab Reichsführer-SS was formed.  On 6 May, it was renamed the 
Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS im SS-Führungshauptamt. This special agency was 
to act as the central SS command of forces deployed in the territories for which the 
new HSSPF were responsible. It was organised like an army staff with branches for 
training, reconnaissance, administration, military intelligence and medical services. 
The troops that were to be put under the control of this staff could be deployed by 
the HSSPF as an executive force but remained subordinate to Himmler at the same 
time.235
  Like in Poland in 1939, the HSSPF in the Soviet Union were to be responsible for 
safeguarding  the  occupied  territories  by  means  of  using  SS  and  police  units  to 
combat insurgents and to persecute Jews and members of communist organisations. 
Regarding logistic support, the HSSPF were subordinate to the army; they also had 
to  coordinate SS operations with army commanders in their area of responsibility. 
All of these tasks were established by an order from 21 May, 1941.236 As heads of the 
SS occupation administration in the Soviet Union, three men were appointed in the 
spring  and  summer  of  1941:  SS-Gruppenführer  Hans-Adolf  Prützmann  was 
234 Cüppers, Wegbereiter, p. 70.
235 Ibid., pp. 64-66.
236 Hans  Buchheim  and  others (eds.),  Anatomie  des  SS-Staates.  Bd.2:  Nationalsozialistische 
Konzentrationslager, 1933-1945. Befehl und Gehorsam. (Munich, 1967), pp. 184-185; Ruth Bettina 
Birn, Die höheren SS- und Polizeiführer: Himmlers Vertreter im Reich und in den besetzten Gebieten 
(Düsseldorf, 1986), pp. 169-172.
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responsible for the Baltic states and northern Russia as HSSPF ‘Rußland-Nord’, SS-
Gruppenführer Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski was in charge of Belorussia as HSSPF 
‘Rußland-Mitte’ and  SS-Obergruppenführer  Friedrich  Jeckeln  controlled  the  third 
sector with southern Russia and the Ukraine as HSSPF ‘Rußland-Süd’.237
  At  a  meeting  with  Himmler  in  Berlin  on  16  June,  Fegelein  reported  that  the 
formation of the SS cavalry was now complete.238 On 20 June,  their command was 
transferred to the Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS, effective from the next day.239 In 
addition to the cavalry regiments, further units were integrated into the forces of the 
Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS. In late April, the 1st SS Infantry Brigade had been 
formed out of the SS infantry regiments 8 and 10 which were based in Poland. The 
former staff of the HSSPF ‘Ost’ had become the new brigade staff. At the same time, 
the 2nd SS Infantry Brigade was formed out of the SS infantry regiments 4 and 14 in 
the Netherlands. The new brigade was transferred to Warsaw soon afterwards.240 To 
these formations  added the newly-formed  Begleitbataillon Reichsführer-SS which 
was to guard Himmler´s command posts in the east,  a number of smaller supply 
companies and a unit from Hamburg consisting of Danish SS volunteers.241 Thus, 
Himmler was able to deploy almost twenty thousand highly mobile SS troops under 
his immediate command. On 22 June, 1941, the combat strength of the two cavalry 
regiments and the two infantry brigades totalled 16,328 men: 4,036 in the cavalry, 
5354 in the 1st SS Infantry Brigade and 6938 in the 2nd SS Infantry Brigade.242
  As a result of the two years of being stationed in Poland, the SS cavalry units had 
237 Birn, Die höheren SS- und Polizeiführer, pp. 73-75.
238 Peter Witte, Der Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers 1941/42 (Hamburg, 1999), p. 175.
239 Kriegstagebuch Nr. 1 des Kommandostabes-RFSS (16.6. – 31.12. 1941), entry from 20 June, 1941, 
in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 1, file 100; according to Befehl RFSS vom 17.6. 1941, BArchB, 
NS 33/231, quoted in  Cüppers,  Wegbereiter, p. 73, and Befehl  RFSS vom 17.6. 1941, BArchB, NS 
19/3508, quoted in Longerich, Himmler, p. 539, Himmler had ordered this transfer on 17 June already, 
also with effect from 21 June.
240 Cüppers, Wegbereiter, p. 71.
241 Ibid., pp. 72; Kriegstagebuch Nr. 1 des Kommandostabes-RFSS (16.6. – 31.12. 1941), entry from 
20 June, 1941, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 1, file 100.
242Aufstellung der Stärken und Verluste der SS-Divisonen vom 24.3. 1942, in: BArchB, NS 19/1520.
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become a force that managed to combine men with many different backgrounds. 
Under the command of fanatical officers, both those who had been socialised in the 
society of Nazi Germany (sportsmen as well as SS volunteers) and those who had 
entered the regiments as volunteers from other countries worked together in fulfilling 
mostly ideological tasks. Difficulties in their completion, such as an adjustment to 
killing, hardly appear in the documents; non-conformist behaviour such as a refusal 
to participate is completely absent from the reports. Although the SS cavalry was 
still in the process of becoming a military unit and field exercises on a regimental 
scale could only be conducted in the late spring of 1941, officers aimed at turning the 
men into willing subordinates by enforcing a strict regime from the very beginning.
  Regarding the initial research question, it can be stated that the two SS cavalry 
regiments had become an instrument of ideological terror whilst serving in Poland. 
Of the three factors which were prominent in the development of the mounted units 
between 1939 and 1941, drill and discipline as well as the involvement in radical 
measures can be considered as more important than the effect of propaganda on the 
men. Political instruction could not be given on a regular basis; moreover, many of 
the  younger  recruits  had  been  indoctrinated  to  some  extent  already.  The  strong 
National Socialist attitude and strictness of the officers served as a guideline for all 
of the men; after the personnel turnover of mid-1940, the radical element grew even 
stronger and now included more of the ordinary soldiers as well.  In combination 
with the immediate involvement in the German policy of transforming the General 
Government, these factors served as the first steps in turning the SS cavalrymen into 
‘ideological  soldiers’. From the summer of 1941,  they showed that they were as 
brutal and efficient as any other military or paramilitary formation involved in mass 
violence in the East, including the soon notorious Einsatzgruppen.
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3) The SS cavalry at the beginning of operation ‘Barbarossa’
The  Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS   and the SS Cavalry Brigade in the first phase of  
the campaign
  Within four  weeks  of  the German attack on the Soviet  Union,  three important 
developments  shaped  the  further  deployment  and  character  of  the  SS  cavalry 
regiments. Firstly, the war in the East was a war of annihilation in which military and 
ideological aims coincided; secondly, the vast distances and a lack of German troops 
soon took their  toll,  both regarding difficulties in occupation and in combat;  and 
finally,  the mounted SS units  under Fegelein’s command combined the necessary 
features to fulfil both functions, which is why Heinrich Himmler sent them into the 
Soviet Union. There, they fully developed the ‘dual role’ which became the main 
feature of their operations until mid-1942. The period from late June until early July, 
1941, can be considered the key turning point in this context: the SS cavalrymen had 
their first encounter with Soviet troops; shortly afterwards, Himmler informed them 
about  their  new  task  and  operational  area  in  Belorussia.  Despite  the  fact  that 
Fegelein’s men were involved in combat operations that were comparatively small 
and localised, this aspect, too, is of importance: these missions were detached from 
the mass killings committed by the two regiments in August as they did not include 
civilians. This chapter describes how the duality of the unit’s character originated 
during the opening phase of operation ‘Barbarossa’, and how its capabilities were 
first put to the test at Bialystok and in the Pripet Marshes. In addition, the officer 
corps of the SS cavalry is analysed with a special focus on ideological motivation 
and military skills.
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  From the second half of 1940, an invasion of the Soviet Union was planned by 
Adolf  Hitler  and  the  German  army  High  Command.  According  to  the  military 
objectives presented by Hitler’s  order  from 18 December,  1940, ‘the bulk of the 
Russian army, based in western Russia, was to be destroyed in bold operations by 
advancing tank columns’. The German force was to be subdivided into three army 
groups: one each for the northern, middle, and southern sector of the front. A retreat 
of Soviet forces was to be prevented. The final intention was to reach a general line 
between the Volga and the town of Arkhangelsk. Thus, the Soviet air force would not 
be able  to  attack Germany anymore;  German bombers  in  turn would  be able  to 
destroy the remaining Soviet industry in the Urals. The plan for attack received the 
code name ‘Barbarossa’.243
  There  was a  strong interdependence  of  strategic  and economic  aims:  not  only 
should the  Soviet  military and political  power be destroyed but  living space and 
resources for Germans were to be conquered. In the long term, autarky was to be 
achieved, especially by using Ukrainian grain and Caucasian oil.244 This would make 
Germany invulnerable  to  attacks  from Great  Britain  and  the  United  States.  The 
annihilation of the Soviet Union would also deprive the Allies of another partner and 
would eventually allow Germany to fight for global power.245 The expansion of the 
German sphere of influence was to be achieved at a high cost. In order to procure 
food  supplies  for  the  German  population  and  the  army,  the  government  and  its 
economic and military experts aimed at a radical exploitation of Soviet agricultural 
resources and accepted possible famines and the decimation of the local population 
in some parts of the occupied territories. The death of twenty to thirty millions of 
243 Weisung Nr. 21 Fall Barbarossa vom 18.12. 1940, BArchF, RW 4 / v. 522, quoted in Gerd R. 
Ueberschär and Wolfram Wette (eds.),  Der deutsche  Überfall  auf  die Sowjetunion. ‘Unternehmen 
Barbarossa’ 1941 (Frankfurt, 1991), p. 244 ff.
244 Rolf-Dieter Müller, ‘Von der Wirtschaftsallianz zum kolonialen Ausbeutungskrieg’, in: H. Boog 
and  others  (eds.),  Das  Deutsche  Reich  und  der  Zweite  Weltkrieg,  Bd.  4:  Der  Angriff  auf  die  
Sowjetunion  (Stuttgart, 1987), pp. 113-119.
245 Ueberschär and Wette, ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’, p. 87.
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Slavs  was  anticipated.246 Ideology became the  third  important  factor.  In  order  to 
implement the Nazi doctrine in the new theatre of war, Hitler issued several orders in 
quick succession between March and June, 1941. They aimed at coordinating the 
German  forces  and  their  tasks,  at  identifying,  dehumanising,  and  destroying 
opponents, and at providing legal protection for perpetrators.
  First, the military objectives were extended. On 3 March, 1941, Hitler amended the 
strategic plan developed by the German army High Command and made clear that 
this  war  was  to  be  fought  differently  on  the  German  side.  In  his  opinion  the 
impending  confrontation  was  not  only  a  clash  of  two  armies  but  also  of  two 
ideologies: National Socialism and its antagonist, ‘Judaeo-Bolshevism’. The Soviet 
form of government was to be destroyed along with its leading class, the so-called 
‘Judaeo-Bolshevist intelligence’, and the enemy armed forces. The Soviet Union was 
to be dissolved and the formation of a Russian nation state was to be prevented.247
  Ten days later, the army and the SS arrived at an agreement to ensure a successful 
cooperation and to avoid frictions between the two institutions as there had been 
during the Polish campaign. The quartermaster-general of the  Wehrmacht, general 
Eduard Wagner,  and the head of the SS security police and security service,  SS-
Gruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich, conceptualized a division of labour: whereas the 
army was to conquer the country, the SS was to ‘pacify’ the hinterland of the front 
and  thus  to  prepare  the  ground  for  establishing  a  new  administration.  Forces 
deployed by the SS were to carry out ‘special tasks’ in the prospective operational 
area of the army.248 On 28 April, the new directive was further specified by an order 
issued by the supreme commander of the German army, field marshal Walther von 
246 Götz Aly and Susanne Heim,  Architects of annihilation: Auschwitz and the logic of destruction 
(London, 2002), pp. 234-252.
247 Percy  Ernst  Schramm,  (ed.), Kriegstagebuch  des  Oberkommandos  der  Wehrmacht  
(Wehrmachtführungsstab) 1940 – 1945.  Bd.  1,  1.  August  1940 –  31.  Dezember  1941 (Frankfurt, 
1965), p. 341.
248 Richtlinien auf Sondergebieten zur Weisung Nr. 21 (Fall Barbarossa) vom 13.3. 1941, IMT, vol. 
26, p. 53 ff., quoted in Ueberschär and Wette, ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’, pp. 246-248.
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Brauchitsch. He described the tasks of the SS formations as intelligence and combat 
missions: information and material on organisations, groups, and individuals deemed 
to be ‘enemies of the Reich’ was to be secured; these enemies were to be destroyed. 
In  order  to  execute  these  tasks,  special  operation  forces  of  the  SS  were  to  be 
deployed.  They  were  subordinate  to  the  army  only  in  matters  of  logistics  and 
received their orders directly from Heydrich. Within the scope of their missions, they 
were authorised to ‘implement executive measures towards the civilian population 
on their own authority’.249
  These two documents provided the legal basis for the deployment of the so-called 
Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (task forces of the security police 
and  the  security  service,  the  Nazi  party  secret  service).  According  to  von 
Brauchitsch’s  order,  these  SS units  were to  consist  of  Einsatzkommandos,  which 
operated  in  rear  areas,  and  Sonderkommandos,  which  followed  close  behind  the 
advancing  army  units.250 Despite  the  use  of  camouflage  language,  such  as 
‘investigation of and combat against enemy activity’, the army command knew very 
well  that  from  the  beginning  of  the  campaign  against  the  Soviet  Union,  the 
Einsatzgruppen and other SS and police units would primarily pursue the aim of 
killing Jews and communists in the occupied territories.251
  Four Einsatzgruppen were assembled in May and June, 1941. Their personnel came 
from all  branches  of  the  SS  and  police.  Each  Einsatzgruppe was  assigned  to  a 
German army group or other military force:  Einsatzgruppe A  was to follow Army 
Group North into the Baltic states towards Leningrad,  Einsatzgruppe B  was to be 
249 Regelung des Einsatzes der Sicherheitspolizei  und des SD im Verbande des Heeres vom 28.4. 
1941, quoted in Ueberschär and Wette, “Unternehmen Barbarossa“, pp. 249-250.
250 Helmut Langerbein, Hitler’s death squads. The logic of mass murder (College Station, TX 2004), 
p.  29.  The  terms  Einsatzkommando and  Sonderkommando both translate  as  ‘task  force’,  as  does 
Einsatzgruppe.
251 Jürgen  Förster, ‘Das andere Gesicht des Krieges: Das 'Unternehmen Barbarossa' als Eroberungs- 
und Vernichtungskrieg’, in R. G. Förster (ed.), ‘‘Unternehmen Barbarossa'. Zum historischen Ort der  
deutsch-sowjetischen Beziehungen von 1933 bis Herbst 1941’ (Munich, 1993), p. 155.
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deployed with Army Group Centre in Belorussia, Einsatzgruppe C was attached to 
Army  Group  South  and  was  to  advance  into  the  northern  Ukraine,  and 
Einsatzgruppe D was to move forward into the southern Ukraine and towards the 
Crimea  with  the  Romanians.  The  combined  manpower  of  the  four  task  forces 
amounted to just under 3,000 men; an  Einsatzgruppe comprised about 500 to 990 
men and was subdivided into two Einsatzkommandos and two Sonderkommandos.252
  Immediately  before  the  allocation  of  the  German  forces  for  ‘Barbarossa’ was 
completed, the Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS became involved as well. The staff 
unit received the order to relocate from Berlin to  Treskau near Poznan on 16 June 
and arrived there on the following day.253 On 19 June, 1941, the commander of the 
Kommandostab,  SS-Brigadeführer Kurt  Knoblauch, liaised with the First  General 
Staff  Officer  of  Army  Group  B,  lieutenant  colonel  Henning  von  Tresckow,  at 
Poznan.254 They discussed the future tasks for the brigades and cavalry regiments of 
the  Kommandostab and their cooperation with the army group.255 Knoblauch was 
ordered  to  move  his  staff  forward  to  Arys  in  East  Prussia,  a  town  close  to  the 
German-Soviet line of demarcation, where it was to be put under the control of the 
Ninth  Army.  The  subordinate  units  of  the  Kommandostab,  which  were  based  in 
Poland and Germany, were to follow.256 Their mission, according to von Tresckow’s 
instructions  to  the  command  of  the  Ninth  Army,  was  to  improve  the  defence 
252 Helmut  Krausnick  and  Hans-Heinrich  Wilhelm,  Die Truppe  des  Weltanschauungskrieges.  Die  
Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD 1938-1942 (Stuttgart, 1981), pp. 141-147.
253 Kriegstagebuch Nr. 1 des Kommandostabes-RFSS (16.6. – 31.12.  1941), entries from 16 and 17 
June,  1941,  in:  VUA,  Kommandostab  RFSS,  box  1,  file  100;  this  source  will  from now on  be 
abbreviated as ‘KTB KDOS’.
254 According to Christian Gerlach, Men of 20 July and the War in the Soviet Union, in H. Heer and K. 
Naumann (eds.),  War of Extermination: The German Military in World War II, 1941 – 1944 (New 
York, Oxford 2000), p. 131, this meeting took place in the military training area at Arys, where the 
Kommandostab only arrived two days later. Army Group B was renamed Army Group Centre on June 
22, 1941; KTB KDOS, entry from 19 June, 1941.
255 Staff of the Reichsführer-SS at the SS main command office, chief of staff, to Chief of SS main 
command office, 19 June, 1941, in: BArchF, SF-02/37542, quoted in Gerlach, Men of 20 July, p. 131; 
BArchB, NS 33/43, quoted in: Winfried Heinemann, ‘Kriegführung und militärischer Widerstand im 
Bereich der Heeresgruppe Mitte an der Ostfront’, in: G. R. Ueberschär (ed.), NS-Verbrechen und der  
militärische Widerstand gegen Hitler (Darmstadt, 2000), p. 79.
256 KTB KDOS, entry from 19 June, 1941.
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readiness of the 42nd Corps in the sector between Augustowo and Ostrolenka and to 
prevent the Red Army from entering East Prussia. This was only temporary: the SS 
formations were to return under Himmler’s command as soon as possible.257
  On the following day, the first of Knoblauch’s units were on their way to Arys and 
an order from the Ninth Army gave the necessary details about their deployment and 
subordination under the 42nd Corps, a reserve formation that was to provide cover for 
the left flank of the army during the attack. It is remarkable that this order stated that 
the SS forces were subordinate to the  corps ‘in every respect, incl. deployment’, a 
fact  that  was  soon to  be capitalised on by the  Wehrmacht.258 The 1st and 2nd SS 
Infantry Brigade arrived in Arys around 22 June.259 The 1st SS Cavalry regiment was 
supposed to move from Warsaw into a designated assembly area near Arys on 24 
June via a waypoint further south; the squadrons of the 2nd SS Cavalry Regiment 
only arrived at their destination between 29 June and 1 July as they had to cover the 
distance from Krakow to East Prussia.260
  Together with the Einsatzgruppen and the troops of the Kommandostab, Heinrich 
Himmler was able to deploy twenty-three battalions of the German order police for 
the invasion of the Soviet Union; these formations had a combined manpower of 
11,640 men and 420 officers. The central institution that coordinated this effort were 
the three  Higher SS and Police Leaders, each of whom was assigned one of three 
police regiments intended for deployment in the East. Every regiment consisted of 
three  battalions.  In  each  of  the  three  sectors  of  the  operational  area,  three  more 
257 Kriegstagebuch der 9. Armee, entry from 19 June, 1941, in: BArchF, RH 20–9/11; and Anlagen 
vom 18. und 20. Juni 1941 zum Kriegstagebuch der 9. Armee, ibid., RH 20–9/20, quoted in Günther 
Gillessen, ‘Tresckow und der Entschluß zum Hochverrat. Eine Nachschau zur Kontroverse über die 
Motive’, Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 58 (2010), p. 374.
258 KTB KDOS, entry from 20 June, 1941.
259 Kommandobefehl Nr. 2 vom 21.6. 1941, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 1, file 170; KTB 
KDOS, entries from 22 June, 1941.
260 Kommandobefehl Nr. 2 vom 21.6. 1941, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 1, file 170; Befehl 
zum Heranziehen des SS-Kavallerie-Rgt. 1 vom 21.6. 1941, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 1, 
file 170; KTB KDOS, entry from 1 July, 1941; Lebenserinnerungen Gustav Lombard, p. 16.
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battalions  were to  be deployed with a  security division of the  Wehrmacht in  the 
hinterland.  To  these  eighteen  units  added  three  battalions  of  a  Special  Purposes 
police regiment and a police cavalry battalion, both of which were to be deployed in 
the Ukraine, and the four companies of Police Battalion 9, which were divided up 
amongst the Einsatzgruppen to serve along the entire front.261 The main aim of these 
paramilitary and military formations  under  the  command of  the  HSSPF was  the 
safeguarding  of  the  German  rear.  This  rather  broadly defined  task  and the  units 
which  were  assembled  for  its  implementation  were  covered  by  the  decree  of 
Heydrich and Wagner from 13 March, 1941.262
  When the  allocation  of  troops  reached its  final  stage  in  May,  1941,  two other 
important  orders  were  issued.  A decree  on  military  jurisdiction  ordered  German 
soldiers to fight relentlessly against civilian insurgents,  authorised reprisals against 
the civilian population and exempted military personnel from prosecution.263 This 
order of the regular army also applied to the SS: as civilians had been withdrawn 
from military jurisdiction, the Einsatzgruppen had unlimited authority over them.264 
The second order was the so-called Kommissarbefehl, a direct order for the murder 
of Soviet political commissars. These officers were viewed as ‘initiators of barbaric 
Asian combat  methods’ who would incite  Red Army soldiers  to put up stubborn 
resistance and mistreat German prisoners of war. German soldiers were to kill them 
immediately in combat or when they resisted against their capture.265 By laying out 
261 Westermann,  Hitler’s  Police  Battalions,  pp.  163-164;  Peter  Longerich,  Heinrich  Himmler.  
Biographie (Munich, 2008), p. 539.
262 Andrej  Angrick  and  others,  ‘‘Da  hätte  man  schon  ein  Tagebuch  führen  müssen’.  Das 
Polizeibataillon 322 und die Judenmorde im Bereich der Heesgruppe Mitte während des Sommers 
und Herbstes 1941’, in  H. Grabitz and others (eds.),  Die Normalität des Verbrechens.  Bilanz und 
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263 Erlaß über die Ausübung der Kriegsgerichtsbarkeit im Gebiet  ‘Barbarossa’ und über besondere 
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these directives  and setting up special  formations to  implement  them, Hitler  had 
overcome all obstacles to  the kind of warfare he envisioned. The combination of 
military,  economic  and  ideological  objectives  aimed  at  a  war  of  annihilation. 
Especially  the  SS units  adopted  this  principle,  but  it  soon became clear  that  all 
German  military  and  paramilitary  formations  involved  in  the  hostilities  and  the 
establishment of an occupation administration were part of this cruel concept.
  Operation ‘Barbarossa’  was launched on 22 June,  1941. More than 3.5 million 
soldiers of the Wehrmacht, the Waffen-SS and the German allies invaded the Baltic 
states, Belorussia and the Ukraine along a front stretched from the Baltic Sea to the 
Black Sea. The German force comprised 153 divisions which were concentrated in 
three army groups: Army Group North aimed its advance on Leningrad, Army Group 
Centre headed for Moscow and Army Group South targeted Kiev.266 The Soviets 
were taken by surprise. As the majority of their forces were concentrated in areas 
close to the border and the Germans sought to attack with a local superiority, many 
units were overrun in the first days of the offensive. By destroying large numbers of 
Soviet planes on the ground, the German air force gained air superiority along the 
entire front. Tank columns of the  Wehrmacht penetrated deep into Soviet territory 
and carried out pincer movements, especially in the sector of Army Group Centre, 
the  focal  point  of  the  campaign.  This  strategy  led  to  several  large  battles  of 
encirclement; in the battle of Bialystok and Minsk alone, more than 300,000 Red 
Army soldiers were taken prisoner. Despite the fact that the Red Army offered fierce 
resistance, the German advance went on quickly. After three weeks the Germans had 
taken Riga, Minsk and large parts of the Ukraine. The German High Command was 
generally optimistic about reaching all objectives as planned.267
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  The combat troops of the Kommandostab did not play an active role on the first day 
of the invasion. Their mission in the occupied territories was not to start until ten 
days after the beginning of the attack, when a German military administration was 
established. But on 23 June, Hitler ordered the closing of a gap in the front of the 
Ninth  Army,  which  was  attacking  Soviet  positions  near  Bialystok.  This  strategic 
decision required the assignment of the 1st SS Cavalry Regiment to the 87th infantry 
division, a unit of the 42nd Corps.268 At the same time, the two regiments of the 1st SS 
Infantry Brigade and one regiment of the  2nd SS Infantry Brigade were ordered to 
secure the border area around Grajewo and Augustowo.269
  Instead of proceeding to Arys, the 1st SS cavalry regiment now headed for the sector 
of the 87th infantry division. Hermann Fegelein was able to liaise with the divisional 
commander, lieutenant general von Studnitz, on the same day.270 The division had 
broken through the fortifications on the German – Soviet line of demarcation on the 
first  day of  the  attack.271 Two days  later,  it  was  given  the  task  of  pursuing  the 
retreating  Soviets  eastward  and  blocking  crossings  over  the  Biebrza  and  Narew 
rivers.  The  final  aim  was  the  capture  of  the  fortress  at  Osowiec,  an  important 
stronghold on the way to Bialystok.272 The motorised elements of the SS cavalry 
regiment covered the right flank of the division and relieved a vanguard of the 187th 
infantry regiment at Wizna on 24 June. It was not possible to employ the mounted 
squadrons for this as they still lagged far behind.273 A former cavalryman later stated 
that they had had to ride from Warsaw towards Bialystok in forced marches to reach 
268 Dienstbesprechung des SS-Gruppenführers Jüttner beim Kommandostab RF-SS am 2.7. 1941, in: 
VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 1, file 170.
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270 Kurzer Gefechtsbericht über die Tätigkeit der 87.  Div. v. 22. – 27.6. 1941, in: BArchF, RS 26-
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271 Ibid., pp. 78-81.
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86
the combat zone as quickly as possible. After two days, the horses were exhausted 
and had to be left behind. The soldiers were then transported to the front in lorries 
and took part in the fighting as infantrymen.274 The horse-drawn artillery batteries 
had the same problem; some of their gun crews improvised by taking whatever was 
available as a towing vehicle, even staff cars, and kept pushing forward.275
  On 25 June, the advanced subunits were ordered to cross the Narew at Wizna and to 
push forward in a northeasterly direction to cut off the garrison at Osowiec. After 
ferrying across the river they encountered resistance at  a destroyed bridge a few 
kilometres east of Wizna. As they were unable to break it, the commander of the 87th 
division ordered them to retreat and to cross the Biebrza river further north.276 The 
rerouted mobile forces of the regiment negotiated the stream and the swampy and 
densely wooded lowlands east of it while the cavalry squadrons were moving up to 
them. At midnight on 26 June, the SS cavalry had reached its destination; the fortress 
was taken on the same day by the 187th infantry regiment.277 The cavalrymen were 
then ordered to conduct reconnaissance to the east and southeast, in the direction of 
Bialystok. Soon afterwards, they received a new order: their assignment with the 87th 
division ended as Himmler assumed their command again on the evening of 27 June, 
a decision which also affected the other units of the  Kommandostab.278  Although 
they had been surprised by the Germans, Soviet troops in the Bialystok area had 
defended well, counterattacked wherever possible and made good use of the difficult 
terrain  and  their  own  artillery.279 As  a  result,  the  Wehrmacht suffered  high 
274 Vernehmung von Otto  Krumwiede  vom 14.3.  1963,  in:  BArchL,  B 162/5539,  p.  g43;  Bayer, 
Kavallerie der Waffen-SS, p. 21.
275 Bayer, Kavallerie der Waffen-SS, p. 21.
276 Kurzer Gefechtsbericht, p. 82.
277 Kurzer Gefechtsbericht, pp. 83-85; Kriegstagebuch Nr. 4 der 87. Infanteriedivision, entry from 26 
June, 1941.
278 Kriegstagebuch Nr. 4 der 87. Infanteriedivision, entry from 27 June, 1941; KTB KDOS, entry from 
27 June, 1941.
279 Kurzer Gefechtsbericht, pp. 78-84.
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casualties.280 The  commander  of  the  Ninth  Army,  colonel  general  Adolf  Strauß, 
personally  thanked  the  commander  of  the  Kommandostab  Reichsführer-SS,  SS-
Brigadeführer Kurt Knoblauch, for the support of the SS in his sector, a gesture that 
also referred to the 1st SS Infantry Brigade which had been deployed further north at 
the same time.281
  Himmler’s decision to reassume control had been brought about by a conflict of 
interest with the Wehrmacht, which had sent the SS cavalry and subunits of the two 
infantry brigades straight into combat instead of only deploying them as a reserve. 
The Ninth Army even tried to keep the  Kommandostab units after the threat of a 
Soviet  invasion of East  Prussia had been eliminated; parts  of the 2nd SS Infantry 
Brigade were to support the occupation of Vilnius.282 Himmler then intervened and 
prohibited this mission; in his order to the Kommandostab of 27 June, he made clear 
that he did not want his troops to be deployed for occupation duties as this ‘was 
contrary  to  the  general  agreements’.  Unless  combat  situations  necessitated  it, 
Himmler wanted to prevent SS forces from being assigned to the Wehrmacht longer 
than necessary.283 This question of authority was finally solved later on the same day 
by  the  withdrawal  of  the  remaining  Kommandostab forces.  Officially,  Himmler 
justified this by referring to ‘other  tasks’ his combat troops were to carry out.284 In 
reality,  he was less worried about  his troops using up their strength in exhaustive 
battles  and  occupation  duties but  rather  irate  about  the  arrogance  of  Wehrmacht 
commanders who used SS units as they pleased, scattered them over a wide area and 
280 Kurzer Gefechtsbericht, p. 85; 87. Infanterie-Division, Abt. Ia,  an A.O.K. 9, 16 July, 1941, in: 
Anlage III zum KTB der 87. ID, Teil 4 (Meldungen), in: BArchF, RH 26-87/26.
281 KTB KDOS, entry from 27 June, 1941.
282 KTB KDOS, entry from 26 June, 1941.
283 KTB  KDOS,  entry  from  27  June,  1941.  The  ‘general  agreements’ are  not  specified  in  the 
Kommandostab files; they could refer to the talks between Heydrich and Wagner, but also to those 
between Knoblauch and von Tresckow. See Gillessen, ‘Tresckow und der Entschluß zum Hochverrat’, 
p. 375.
284 KTB KDOS, entry from 27 June, 1941.
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placed older SS officers under the command of young army officers.285
  As the  1st SS cavalry regiment had now successfully passed its baptism of fire, 
Hermann Fegelein organised a parade of the regiment which was attended by the 
commander of the 87th division on 28 June.286 On the same day, he wrote to  SS-
Brigadeführer Walter Krüger, the former commander of the 1st SS Infantry Brigade, 
and asked him to leave the regiment at the front.287 Apparently Fegelein hoped that a 
senior officer would convince Knoblauch or even Himmler that the SS cavalrymen 
were as capable and combat-ready as any army regiment. This document is of special 
importance as it shows Fegelein’s ambition to improve the standing of the SS cavalry 
by  depicting  the  endurance  and  valour  of  his  men.  According  to  the  letter,  the 
vanguard  of  the  1st SS  cavalry regiment  had  managed  to  cross  the  Narew river 
quickly and with low casualties,  despite a  difficult  encounter with Soviet  troops. 
Since the beginning of the campaign, the SS riders had covered a distance of 500 
kilometres  without  any  rest.  They  were  still  employed  as  foremost  German 
reconnaissance unit in this sector of the front. Even though this first combat mission 
had only lasted a few days and infantry formations of the Wehrmacht had borne the 
brunt  of  the  fighting,  Fegelein  stressed  the  distinguished  conduct  and  the  still 
arduous  situation  of  his  unit.  He  also  expressed  his  concern  that  no  one  would 
believe the  exploits and difficulties his soldiers had mastered if the regiment was 
withdrawn from the fighting after just a few days.288 
  Like in Poland, where the SS cavalry had taken part in a rather unsuccessful anti-
285 Aktenvermerk  Knoblauch  vom  28.6.  1941,  in  BArchF,  SF-02/37542,  quoted  in:  Gillessen, 
‘Tresckow und der Entschluß zum Hochverrat’, p. 376. In his article, Gillessen stresses the urgent 
action by Himmler and disagrees with Gerlach, who had interpreted this intervention as a conflict 
about ‘minor tactical misunderstandings’; see Christian Gerlach, ‘Hitlergegner bei der Heeresgruppe 
Mitte  und  die  ‘verbrecherischen  Befehle’’,  in  G.  R.  Ueberschär  (ed.),  NS-Verbrechen  und  der  
militärische Widerstand gegen Hitler (Darmstadt, 2000), p. 75, footnote 54. Cüppers, too, views this 
incident as a question of authority, not a tactical issue; see Cüppers, Wegbereiter, p. 127.
286 Kriegstagebuch Nr. 4 der 87. Infanteriedivision, entry from 28 June, 1941.
287 Schreiben Fegeleins an SS-Brigadeführer Krüger vom 28.6. 1941, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, 
box 1, file 170.
288 Ibid.
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Partisan  operation,  Fegelein  exaggerated  the  role  played  by  the  regiment  as  he 
viewed  the  flank  cover  and  reconnaissance  near  Bialystok  as  a  combat  mission 
worthy of a fully-fledged military unit, a position he would later take up again in 
Belorussia.  Later,  Fegelein’s  position  was  partially  supported  by  the  glorifying 
depiction given in the memoirs of Hanns Bayer, formerly of the 5th squadron of the 
1st SS  cavalry  regiment.  He  describes  an  encounter  during  which  a  mixed  unit 
consisting of men of the 5th, 6th and 7th squadron destroyed Soviet artillery, anti-tank, 
and  machine  gun  positions  at  a  river  crossing.  Although  he  admits  that  the  SS 
cavalrymen only experienced the battle near Bialystok from the fringes, including 
the forced surrender of the cavalry role due to the exhaustion of the horses, he views 
the  fighting  as  a  baptism  of  fire  during  which  even  the  youngest  and  least 
experienced cavalrymen stood their ground.289
  Others from the rank and file,  however,  gave a  different  account  of their  first 
combat mission. Because of the quick German advance and transport problems, only 
some of the men actually took part  in combat.  A former member of the infantry 
support gun squadron said that his section crossed the Narew but did not fire a single 
shot.290 The mounted machine gun squadron patrolled the forests in their sector but 
did not make contact with the enemy.291 It is also hard to ascertain the losses of the 
SS cavalry during this mission. Whereas Fegelein described them as ‘low’, another 
former officer only stated that there had been casualties.292 The files of the regiment 
only list the loss of one cavalryman who had died on 26 June near Monki.293 By 
289 Bayer, Kavallerie der Waffen-SS, p. 22.
290 Vernehmung von Rudolf Schmidt vom 11.6. 1968, in: BArchL, B 162/5542, p. j132.
291 Vernehmung von Josef Zorn vom 21.5. 1963, in: BArchL, B 162/5542, p. i27.
292 Schreiben Fegeleins an Krüger vom 28.6. 1941, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 1, file 170; 
Vernehmung von Willi Geier vom 14.9. 1962, in: BArchL, B 162/5542, p. i13.
293 Verlustmeldung an die Auskunftsstelle f. Kriegerverluste d. Waffen-SS [Berlin] vom 29.8. 1941, 1. 
Totenkopf-Reiter-Rgt.;  Versetzung,  Urlaub,  Verleihung  von  Auszeichnungen  usw.  von  Juli  – 
September  1941,  in:  BArchF,  RS 4/212  (2),  p.  65.  This  file  does  not  contain  information  about 
wounded or missing cavalrymen. Bayer,  however,  mentions the injury of an  SS-Untersturmführer  
from the bicycle squadron; see Kavallerie der Waffen-SS, p. 22.
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contrast,  132 soldiers of  the 87th division were killed, 511 were wounded and 27 
went missing during the first five days of operation Barbarossa.294
  By demanding further deployment of the SS cavalry at the front, Fegelein aimed at 
two different objectives: testing the skills of his men in combat and enhancing the 
prestige  of  his  unit,  which  in  turn  would  also  improve  his  own reputation  as  a 
military leader. His burning ambition was a key factor in developing the combat role 
of the SS cavalry as he had created the unit and was responsible for its missions in 
the operational area.  This characterisation is also supported by court files from the 
proceedings against former members of the 1st SS cavalry regiment. Here, Fegelein 
was depicted as being eager to fight and impatiently striving for promotions and 
decorations.295 In this respect, Fegelein’s efforts proved to be quite successful as some 
of the SS cavalrymen were awarded the Iron Cross Second Class by the 87th division. 
When  this  unit  had  used  up  its  contingent  of  decorations,  Himmler  personally 
requested more medals.296 As a result, ten SS soldiers were awarded the Iron Cross 
Second Class  and  Hermann Fegelein  received  the  Iron  Cross  First  Class  for  his 
leadership.297
  On 28 June, the combat units received orders for relocation to the area between 
Arys and Lyck in  East Prussia, where the staff had taken its headquarters already. 
The 1st SS Infantry Brigade was sent on to Cracow from there after two days; the 2nd 
SS  Infantry  Brigade  and  the  1st SS  Cavalry  Regiment  remained  in  the  region, 
together with the 2nd SS Cavalry Regiment, various support formations and an anti-
aircraft battalion. All of these formations had arrived in the designated area in late 
294 Kurzer Gefechtsbericht über die Tätigkeit der 87. Div., p. 85.
295 Abschlußbericht der Zentralen Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen vom 20.8. 1963, p. 359 and p. 
378. According to a former SS cavalry officer, Fegelein even approached Wehrmacht commanders for 
combat  missions  but  was  unsuccessful.  See  Vernehmung von  Egon  Birkigt vom 22.3.  1960,  in: 
BArchL, B 162/5544, p. n44.
296 KTB KDOS, entry from 1 July, 1941.
297 Situation report of the HSSPF Centre, 16 August, 1941, in VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 1, file 
4; Dienstbesprechung des SS-Gruppenführers Jüttner beim Kommandostab RF-SS am 2.7. 1941, in: 
VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 1, file 170.
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June and early July and were billeted in small villages.298 From the beginning of July, 
the missions and combat-readiness of the Kommandostab units were assessed. On 2 
July, the chief of staff of the SS-Führungshauptamt, SS-Gruppenführer Hans Jüttner, 
held  a  meeting  with  the  head  of  the  Kommandostab,  SS-Brigadeführer Kurt 
Knoblauch, and the subordinate brigade and regimental commanders.  Jüttner, who 
was responsible for all supplies, training, and recruitment of the  Waffen-SS, found 
that there were significant shortages of men, vehicles, and equipment in the 1st and 
2nd SS Infantry Brigade, mostly caused by the rapid expansion and restructuring of 
the Waffen-SS in the spring and summer of 1941. The two cavalry regiments were in 
a better position as they had almost full manpower and enough vehicles; the only 
issue for them was a lack of signallers and signals equipment. The Kommandostab 
was  pressed  for  time  to  redress  these  problems as  further  deployment  of  its 
formations in the Soviet Union was imminent.299
  While the SS forces of the  Kommandostab had experienced the beginning of the 
campaign in the East behind the frontline in Lithuania and in combat near Bialystok, 
the first phase of the Holocaust was implemented by SS and police units, but also by 
the  Wehrmacht.  From the  outset  of  hostilities  between  Germany  and  the  Soviet 
Union, radical anti-Jewish policy not only took the form of searches and subsequent 
executions in rural areas, but also that of mass executions. On 27 June, 1941, the 
men of Police Battalion 309 committed hundreds of killings in the Jewish quarter of 
Bialystok and drove several hundred more Jews into a synagogue, which was then 
set on fire. This massacre resulted in the deaths of at least 2,000 Jews and was the 
first large independent klling operation committed by a police battalion in the Soviet 
298 Kommandobefehl Nr. 10 vom 28.6. 1941, in:  in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 1, file 170; 
KTB KDOS, entries from 27, 28 and 30 June and 1 July, 1941.
299 Dienstbesprechung des SS-Gruppenführers Jüttner beim Kommandostab RF-SS am 2.7.  1941, in 
in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 1, file 170. According to the files of the commander of the rear 
area  of  Army  Group  Centre,  the  two  regiments  had  3500  horses  and  430  vehicles  including 
motorcycles at their disposal before they left East Prussia again; see Korpsbefehl Nr. 32 v. 21.7. 1941, 
in: BArchF, RH 22/224, p. 164.
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Union.300 In mid-July, Police Battalion 307 murdered about 4,000 Jews and 400 non-
Jewish Soviet citizens at Brest-Litovsk over the course of several days.301 Both units, 
however, still had refrained from the killing of Jewish women and children for the 
most part: the executions at Bialystok and Brest-Litovsk did not constitute attempts 
to eliminate all Jews in that particular town.302
  After the killings had begun, they were soon extended to more groups of victims. 
On 2 July, Reinhard Heydrich sent a letter to the higher SS and police leaders in 
which he ordered to execute all functionaries of the Comintern, all communist party 
leaders, party officials of the central committee and local committees, Jews in party 
and  state  positions,  saboteurs,  snipers  and  assassins.303 This  order  is  of  great 
importance  as  the  groups  of  people  mentioned  served  as  mere  guidelines:  SS 
commanders were given the freedom to select whom they executed, according to the 
situation in the field.304 Nine days later, the commander of Police Regiment Centre, 
lieutenant colonel Max Montua, gave out an order he had received from the HSSPF 
Centre to the men of the three police battalions under his command. This directive 
further specified the existing orders regarding the Jews: all  male Jews who were 
300 Westermann,  Hitler’s Police Battalions, pp. 174-175; Curilla,  Die deutsche Ordnungspolizei und 
der Holocaust im Baltikum und in Weißrußland 1941 – 1944, pp. 511-518. See also Stefan Klemp, 
'Nicht ermittelt'.  Polizeibataillone und die Nachkriegsjustiz. Ein Handbuch (Essen,  2011), pp. 272-
275. This work represents the current state of research on the German order police. It is the second 
edition of the book, which was originally published in Essen in 2005. It consists of a revised version 
of the original and contains significantly more information on various police units, court proceedings, 
and numbers of victims.
301 Westermann,  Hitler’s Police Battalions, pp. 176-177; Curilla,  Die deutsche Ordnungspolizei und 
der Holocaust im Baltikum und in Weißrußland 1941 – 1944, pp. 570-574; Klemp, 'Nicht ermittelt', 
pp. 261-263.
302 Both at Bialystok and Brest-Litovsk, some Jewish women and children were killed as well. Apart 
from individual shootings which were described by witnesses, it is not possible to quantify this further 
regarding the massacres as a whole. See Westermann, Hitler’s Police Battalions, p. 175, Curilla, Die 
deutsche Ordnungspolizei und der Holocaust im Baltikum und in Weißrußland 1941 – 1944, pp. 515-
516 and pp. 571-574, and Klemp, 'Nicht ermittelt',  p. 274. For a more detailed delineation of this 
aspect, see chapter 4.
303 BArchK, R 70 Sowjetunion/32 and R 58/241,  quoted in Die Einsatzgruppen in der besetzten  
Sowjetunion 1941/42: Die Tätigkeits- und Lageberichte des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, 
ed. P. Klein and A. Angrick (Berlin, 1997), p. 325.
304 Michael  Wildt, Generation des Unbedingten. Das Führungskorps des Reichssicherheitshauptam-
tes (Hamburg, 2002), pp. 559-561.
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between seventeen and forty-five years old were to be shot immediately as looters.305
  As opposed to battalions of the order police, the Einsatzgruppen only entered the 
Soviet Union from the last days of June onwards. However, they began carrying out 
their  tasks  immediately after  crossing the border.306 Their  strategy was to  follow 
army units closely so that as many Jews as possible could be captured. It was part of 
the agreement between the army and the SS that mobile killing units were allowed to 
enter front-line areas as well.  But they did not only move eastward: split up into 
independent subunits, they also operated in rear areas, covering great distances in the 
occupied territories.307 SS commanders soon developed a standardised system to kill 
their victims. They assembled killing squads depending on the number of Jews in 
their  operational  area;  the  size  of  the  units  varied  from  four  men  to  a  whole 
company-sized  Einsatzkommando or  Sonderkommando.  Supported  by  army  and 
police units as well as local collaborators, they rounded up the local Jewish men and 
led them to a prepared grave outside their village or town. There, they took their 
clothes and valuables and murdered them in groups by shooting them in the neck or 
machine-gunning them. The victims, unarmed and confused, offered no resistance.308 
  Along  the  entire  eastern  front,  the  four  Einsatzgruppen began  to  shape  the 
Holocaust and German occupation policy. To the initiative of the commanders and 
the activity of the killing squads added other factors: in some regions, especially in 
the Baltic  states  and the Ukraine,  the Germans were  supported  by many willing 
collaborators  who  took  part  in  pogroms  or  formed  militias  which  joined  in  the 
305 Order from the commander of Police Regiment Centre, 11 July, 1941, in: VUA, N POL.RGT. (1), 
file 7. This order also contained particulars about killing methods: Executions were to be conducted 
outside towns and villages and away from roads; graves were to be levelled and it was forbidden to 
watch and photograph the killings. Battalion and company commanders were to look after the men 
who  carried  out  the  operations  and  erase  the  impressions  of  the  day  by  organising  ‘comradely 
evenings’. See also Hilberg, ‘The Kommandostab Revisited’, pp. 360-361.
306 Krausnick and Wilhelm, Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges, pp. 173-196.
307 Raul Hilberg, The destruction of the European Jews (New York 1978), p. 191.
308 Ibid., pp. 208-210.
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killing.309 The combination of a very effective division of labour and habituation to 
violence  within  the  units,  together  with  the  cooperation  of  locals  and  different 
German  agencies,  caused  enormous  bloodshed  within  the  first  five  weeks  of 
operation ‘Barbarossa’: until the end of July, 1941, 63,000 people were murdered by 
the  forces  of  the  SS  security police  and the  security  service.  About  90% of  the 
victims were Jews.310
  The Wehrmacht also became involved in acts of mass violence as it fought a war of 
annihilation  parallel  to  the  operations  against  the  Red  Army.  An  unprecedented 
brutality was shown and basic humanitarian principles were not observed.311 Some of 
the first victims were Soviet prisoners of war, many of whom were killed or died 
under the appalling living conditions in the camps.312 In accordance with the orders 
issued  before  the  attack,  captured  political  commissars  were  murdered.  Jewish 
prisoners of war soon fell victim to mass executions as well.  Wehrmacht and SS 
worked hand in hand: military units singled out the victims while Einsatzgruppen or 
309 Pogroms at Lvov in the Ukraine, for example, claimed the lives of at least 5,000 Jews until the end 
of July, 1941. In Latvia, the Germans could dispose of an auxiliary police force under the command of 
Viktors  Arajs  which  killed  hundreds  of  Jews  and  other  'undesirables'  in  cooperation  with 
Einsatzgruppe A in mid-July, 1941; see Jürgen  Matthäus, ‘Das ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’ und der 
Beginn  der  Judenvernichtung,  Juni  –  Dezember  1941’,  in  Browning, Die  Entfesselung  der  
‘Endlösung’, p. 392. In Lithuania, local collaborators formed a subunit of Einsatzkommando 3 under 
the command of Joachim Hamann, the notorious 'Rollkommando Hamann', which shot at least 60,000 
Jewish men, women, and children until the beginning of October, 1941 and thus killed almost half of 
the 133,346 mostly Jewish victims reported by  Einsatzkommando 3  until the end of the year; see 
Krausnick  and  Wilhelm,  Die Truppe  des  Weltanschauungskrieges,  pp.  283-284,  and  Matthäus  in 
Browning, Die Entfesselung der ‘Endlösung’,  p. 399. Further south, Ukrainian militias composed of 
locals  supported  the  killing  operations  of  Einsatzgruppe  C and  Einsatzgruppe  D;  see  Yaacov 
Lozowick,  ‘Rollbahn  Mord.  The  Early  Activities  of  Einsatzgruppe  C’,  Holocaust  and Genocide 
Studies 2 (1987), pp. 9-11.
310 Matthäus in Browning, Die Entfesselung der ‘Endlösung’, pp. 380-383.
311 The crimes of the  Wehrmacht in the war against  the Soviet  Union were also the subject  of a 
controversial exhibition, which had been organised by the Institute for Social Research at Hamburg. 
Under the title „Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 – 1944“, it toured Germany and 
Austria from 1995 to 1999. After sparking harsh criticism for misinterpreting sources and generally 
accusing German soldiers of having committed atrocities, it ceased to be shown for two years and 
reopened under the title “Verbrechen der Wehrmacht. Dimensionen des Vernichtungskrieges 1941 – 
1944“ in 2001. It was shown until 2004; see the homepage of the exhibition, http://www.verbrechen-
der-wehrmacht.de (accessed on 5 July, 2012).
312 In the autumn of 1941, about 6,000 Red Army soldiers died in German prison camps on a daily 
basis. Until the spring of 1942, more than two million of the 3,5 million Soviet prisoners of war had 
lost their lives. See Matthäus in Browning, Die Entfesselung der ‘Endlösung’, pp. 360-361.
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their subunits carried out the killings.313 Some army formations even played an active 
role in genocide: the 707th infantry division was responsible for the killing of more 
than 10,000 Jews in 1941.314
  It is, however, still difficult to ascertain the contribution of the German army to the 
Holocaust. According to the actual state of historical research, the role of Wehrmacht 
soldiers was determined by several factors such as division of labour, distance from 
the front, and branch of service. The main responsibility of the army in this context, 
as has been identified by Christian Hartmann, is based on the fact that it tolerated, 
supported or even welcomed the Nazi policy of annihilation.315 Within this frame of 
general acceptance, two main groups of perpetrators can be identified: high-ranking 
staff officers such as the commanders of armies and army groups who coordinated 
the deployment  of  Wehrmacht and SS units,  and army formations  which became 
killing squads themselves.316 As far as the Ostheer as a whole is concerned, a clear 
distinction has to be made: the main purpose of the majority of its soldiers was the 
fight against the Red Army and the involvement of front-line troops in executions of 
Jews was an exception. Guard troops in the hinterland, such as units of the military 
police  and  military  secret  police,  local  military  headquarters,  and  some security 
divisions committed most of the killings that can be attributed to army units.317 These 
313 Christian  Streit,  ‘Die  Behandlung  der  sowjetischen  Kriegsgefangenen  und  völkerrechtliche 
Probleme des Krieges gegen die Sowjetunion’, in Ueberschär and Wette, ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’, 
pp. 164-165.
314 Peter  Lieb,  ‘Täter  aus  Überzeugung?  Oberst  Carl  von  Andrian  und  die  Judenmorde  der  707. 
Infanteriedivision 1941/42’, Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 52 (2004), p. 536.
315 Christian  Hartmann,  Wehrmacht  im  Ostkrieg.  Front  und  militärisches  Hinterland  1941/42 
(München, 2009), p. 659. The supporting role of the army will be explained in more detail in chapter 
4 and chapter 5.
316 Hartmann,  Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg,  pp.  659-660. Of special importance in this context  are the 
supreme commanders of the army rear areas who supervised a network of occupation forces and 
agencies.  The  cooperation  of  the  supreme commander  of  the  rear  areas  of  Army Group  Centre, 
general Max von Schenckendorff, with the SS will be outlined in chapter 4. On the institution of the 
supreme commanders of the army rear areas, see Hasenclever, Wehrmacht und Besatzungspolitik. 
317 Christian  Hartmann,  ‘Verbrecherischer  Krieg – verbrecherische Wehrmacht?  Überlegungen zur 
Struktur des deutschen Ostheeres 1941 – 1944’,  Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 52 (2004),  pp. 
31-32.
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formations are not, however, representative for the German army in the East.318 It can 
be assumed that only a comparatively small number of Wehrmacht soldiers took part 
in executions.319 
  But not only the designated killing units and the army committed atrocities.  The 
Gestapo at Tilsit, for example, was tasked with assembling an Einsatzkommando of 
all available forces in order to execute Jews and Lithuanian communists in a zone of 
25 kilometres east of the border. As the Tilsit Gestapo only had a limited number of 
men  at  its  disposal,  members  of  the  security  service,  the  border  police,  and 
Lithuanian collaborators were ordered to carry out arrests and executions as well. At 
Naumiestis, 220 Jews were executed by a killing squad consisting of SS men from 
subunits of  Reiterstandarte 20 and  SS-Standarte 105 from Memel, German border 
policemen and Lithuanian militiamen in July, 1941. This massacre was supervised 
by the commander of the Reiterstandarte and one of his squadron commanders; in 
the  course  of  this  operation,  they  also  had  dozens  of  local  Jews  arrested  and 
transported  them  back  to  Germany  for  forced  labour.320 Thus,  men  from  the 
paramilitary mounted SS participated in  the Holocaust  in  the Soviet  Union even 
before the SS cavalrymen under Fegelein’s command. 
  In East Prussia,  Kommandostab officers  hastened to improve the training of their 
soldiers as men from the two SS infantry brigades in particular were still lacking 
318 Hartmann, Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg, p. 660.
319 Dieter Pohl estimates that “several tens of thousands“ of  Wehrmacht soldiers were involved in 
“selection, organisation, execution, cordon duty at shootings or handovers [of victims] to the security 
police”.  This can be considered a very small  group given that  about 10 million members  of  the 
Wehrmacht served in the Soviet Union throughout the war; see Dieter Pohl, Die Wehrmacht und der 
Mord  an  den  Juden  in  den  besetzten  sowjetischen  Gebieten,  in  W.  Kaiser  (ed.),  Täter  im 
Vernichtungskrieg.  Der  Überfall  auf  die  Sowjetunion und  der  Völkermord  an den  Juden (Berlin, 
2002), p. 50, quoted in Hartmann, Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg, p. 661.
320Justiz  und  NS-Verbrechen:  Sammlung  deutscher  Strafurteile  wegen  nationalsozialistischer  
Tötungsverbrechen  1945  –  1966.  Bd.  20,  pp.  277-378;  Justiz  und  NS-Verbrechen:  Sammlung 
deutscher Strafurteile wegen nationalsozialistischer Tötungsverbrechen 1945 – 1966. Bd. 17, pp. 417-
495.The  exact  date  of  the  killing  could  not  be  defined  in  the  two  postwar  trials  against  the 
perpetrators; the courts assumed it took place either on 5 July, 1941, or on 19 July, 1941. For their role 
in the massacre, the two SS officers from the  Reiterstandarte both received a sentence of lifelong 
imprisonment. See also Wilson, Himmler’s Cavalry, p. 172, and Krausnick and Wilhelm, Die Truppe 
des Weltanschauungskrieges, p. 601.
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combat  experience.  Therefore,  they  underwent  field  exercises  which  aimed  at 
preparing them for situations they might encounter in their new theatre of operations, 
for example fighting in wooded and built-up areas and encircling and annihilating an 
enemy who might also appear in the form of partisan groups.321 The SS cavalry, on 
the  other  hand,  was  more  experienced.  This  had  been  acknowledged  by  SS-
Gruppenführer Jüttner as well; in the meeting, he had complimented Fegelein on the 
conduct  of  his  men  in  battle  and  on  winning  the  Iron  Cross  First  Class.322 
Nevertheless, both cavalry regiments also used the time in East Prussia  for intense 
preparation.  In  the  military  training  area  at  Arys  and the  vicinity,  they received 
further instruction and conducted manoeuvres. These included infantry and cavalry 
exercise, route and night marches, target practice, and alert drills. Training continued 
for almost three weeks until mid-July.323 At the same time, weapons and equipment 
were repaired and replenished as part of the daily routine.324 The SS cavalrymen also 
got some free time and enjoyed the summer in  Masuria  while they could.  Some 
viewed  the  time  they  spent  in  East  Prussia  as  a  rather  lazy  rest  period  and 
complained about boredom but others enjoyed the break as they anticipated further 
combat.325
  In addition to the military training, indoctrination was part of the schedule as well: 
a former soldier of the  1st SS Cavalry Regiment recalled how one of the officers 
lectured  his  squadron  on  treatment  of  the  population  in  the  occupied  territories, 
stating that ‘Russians, Slavs and Jews were inferior people’. The SS soldiers ‘could 
321 KTB KDOS, entries from 9 July and 14 July, 1941.
322 Dienstbesprechung des SS-Gruppenführers Jüttner beim Kommandostab RF-SS am 2.7. 1941, in: 
VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 1, file 170.
323 KTB KDOS, entries from 9, 13, 14, and 18, July 1941; activity reports of the  1st SS Cavalry 
Regiment from 4 to 7 July, 1941, and 17 to 24 July, 1941, in: VUA, box 24, file 1; activity reports of 
the 2nd SS Cavalry Regiment from 10 to 20 July, 1941, ibid.
324 Activity reports of the 1st SS Cavalry Regiment from 4 July to 7 July, 1941, and 17 July to 20 July, 
1941, in: VUA, box 24, file 1.
325 Cüppers, Wegbereiter, p. 130; Bayer, Kavallerie der Waffen-SS, pp. 24-26.
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shoot  them  without  qualms  or  compunction’.326 This  briefing  followed  detailed 
directives which had been given out by the Kommandostab in mid-July regarding the 
content  of  instructions:  SS officers  were  to  teach  their  soldiers  about  the  Soviet 
Union, with a special focus on the Jewish population, politics, the Soviet state and 
economy.  Jewry  and  Bolshevism  were  identified  as  the  main  enemies  of  the 
Germans. As before in Poland, however, political indoctrination did not play a major 
role in the summer of 1941: the implementation of the lessons was soon rendered 
almost impossible due to the constant relocations and missions of the subordinate 
units.  Propaganda  only  reached  the  men  in  different  forms,  namely  occasional 
distributions  of  SS  and  Nazi  newspapers  such  as  Das  Schwarze  Korps and 
Völkischer Beobachter, and the propagation of field marshal von Reichenau’s order 
of  10  October,  1941,  regarding  the  treatment  of  the  enemy  and  the  intended 
destruction of the ‘Jewish-Bolshevist  system’.327 By this  time,  the soldiers of the 
Kommandostab were already following their own radical interpretation of ideology 
in the field.
  Despite the favourable assessment Fegelein had received from his superiors, the 
first  mission  also  had  shown severe  shortcomings  of  the  cavalry  units.  Though 
considered to be highly mobile, the mounted squadrons depended on many baggage 
and support vehicles to provide food and medical care for the horses and were far too 
slow and ponderous.328 As a result, they had not been able to keep up with the fast 
moving front. The two SS cavalry regiments could be considered the gem of the 
Waffen-SS but  they  were  not  suitable  for  mobile  warfare,  a  flaw  that  was 
unsustainable in the fast advances of the campaign against the Soviet Union.329 Apart 
from the enforcement of an intense training schedule and maintenance of weapons 
326 Vernehmung von Friedrich Bischoff vom 14.11. 1969, in: BArchL, B 162/5541, pp. g120-121.
327 Förster in Matthäus, Ausbildungsziel Judenmord, pp. 100-102 and pp. 198-201.
328  Abschlußbericht der ZStL vom 20.8. 1963, pp. 357-358.
329  Ibid., pp. 359.
99
and vehicles, Fegelein also sought another way to improve the mobility of the SS 
cavalry.  Whilst  based  in  Arys,  he  convinced  Himmler  to  let  him  turn  the  two 
regiments into a cavalry brigade under his superior command, a development that 
was implemented step by step in the following weeks including a combination of the 
heavy weapons squadrons and the formation of a reconnaissance battalion.330
  It was easy for Fegelein to gain access to Himmler as his benefactor was in East 
Prussia at that time: on 25 June, he had travelled to East Prussia in a special train, the 
so-called  ‘Sonderzug Heinrich’,  and  now he  directed  the  deployment  of  SS and 
police units in occupied Europe from the front.331 This train was then based near 
Hitler’s  headquarters,  the  ‘Wolfsschanze’ at  Rastenburg,  and  served  as  a  mobile 
command post.  From here,  Himmler  went  to  briefings  at  the  ‘Wolfsschanze’ and 
stayed  in  touch  with  the  SS  main  office  in  Berlin.332 He  also  met  with  SS 
commanders there: on 30 June, the head  of the  Kommandostab,  SS-Brigadeführer 
Kurt  Knoblauch,  the two brigade commanders and Hermann Fegelein attended a 
meeting at the train.333 
  Five days  later,  Himmler  visited  the 1st SS Cavalry Regiment.  He inspected  a 
parade of its squadrons and delivered a speech to the men about their  upcoming 
deployment in the Soviet Union. According to former cavalry soldiers, he said that 
‘hard days and tough missions’ lay ahead of them in the course of which they ‘would 
ride until the Urals and many of them would not return’.334 Himmler hinted at an 
operation in the Pripet Marshes, an area in which 80% of the population were Jews. 
330 Ibid.
331 Witte, Der Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers, p. 180.
332 Ibid., p. 29-30.
333 Radio message to the commander of the 1st SS Cavalry Regiment from June 30, 1941, in: VUA, 
box 1, file 170.
334 KTB KDOS, entry from 5 July, 1941; Einstellungsverfügung StA München 117 Js 1/64 gg. Gesele, 
Lombard u.a.  vom 22.12. 1970, in: BArchL, B 162/5531, p. 1752; Cüppers,  Wegbereiter,  p.  131; 
Vernehmung von Samuel Grieb vom 23.7. 1963, BArchL, B 162/5538, p. b53; see also Vernehmung 
von Rudolf Fröhlich vom 19.4. 1963, BArchL, B 162/5538, p. b23; Vernehmung von Heinz Frenken 
vom 24.6. 1963, BArchL, B 162/5539, p. c3; Vernehmung von Johann Schmid vom 30.10. 1962, 
BArchL, B 162/5541, p. h36; Vernehmung von Paul Klose vom 2.12. 1968, BArchL, B 162/5542, p. 
j137; Vernehmung von Willy Geier vom 14.9. 1962, BArchL, B 162/5542, p. i13.
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The task of the SS cavalrymen was to completely rid this region of them and he 
hoped that he could rely on his soldiers in this respect.335 According to one soldier, 
Himmler offered each man who could not cope with the ‘special tasks’ which would 
be asked of him a transfer to another unit. Nobody took this offer because the men 
did not anticipate mass shootings of Jews.336 He ended by saying, ‘The tasks of the 
future will demand of you to be hard but bear in mind that every hard day, every hard 
hour in your life has its meaning for the future of the German people’, and added, 
‘You have to be hard as stone, but not brutal’.337
  It is striking that most of the former cavalrymen who were questioned about this 
incident after the war turned to what appear to be exculpatory statements: they said 
that they had not heard the speech because they were occupied with other tasks such 
as guard duty or because they had been too far away from Himmler; some said they 
did not remember the content, others claimed to have heard about it through their 
comrades.338 Whereas several men recalled references to ‘hard days’ and a ‘ride to 
the Urals’, the upcoming ‘special tasks’ and the possibility to evade participation in 
them were only mentioned by one former SS soldier respectively.  Other veterans 
explicitly  negated  either  one  or  both  of  these  details  in  their  interrogation.339 
Interestingly,  neither  the  intention  of  fighting  against  regular  Soviet  troops  nor 
against  partisans  was  mentioned  by  any of  the  witnesses  as  part  of  the  speech 
although many former cavalrymen stated that these had been their actual tasks in the 
335 Vernehmung von Paul Klose vom 2.12. 1968, BArchL, B 162/5542, p. j137.
336 Vernehmung von Horst Winkler vom 17.7. 1962, BArchL, B 162/5542, p. j2; Vernehmung von 
Arno Kuk vom 18.10. 1965, BArchL, B 162/5542, p. j119.
337 Bayer, Kavallerie der Waffen-SS, p. 24; Vernehmung von Arno Kuk vom 18.10. 1965, BArchL, B 
162/5542, p. j119.
338 Vernehmung von August Gerber vom 24.6. 1963, BArchL, B 162/5541, p. h7; Vernehmung von 
Daniel Teske vom 4.10. 1962, BArchL, B 162/5542, p. j36; Vernehmung von Karl Neumann vom 
30.7. 1962, BArchL, B 162/5542, p. j9; Vernehmung von Bruno Schröder vom 4.10. 1962, BArchL, B 
162/5542, p.  j43;  Vernehmung von Heinz  Frenken vom 24.6.  1963, BArchL,  B 162/5539, p.  c3; 
Vernehmung von Rudolf Fröhlich vom 19.4. 1963, BArchL, B 162/5538, p. b23.
339 In the testimonies quoted here, the mention of executions was negated by Johann Schmid and Arno 
Kuk.  An  exemption  from the  mission  (without  a  reference  to  executions)  was  denied  by Heinz 
Frenken. Both exemptions and executions were negated by Karl Neumann and Daniel Teske.
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Pripet Marshes. This omission and the fact that many other details did come to light 
in the course of the postwar investigations make it likely that most of the men denied 
the real  content  of  the  speech.  Thus,  the investigators  could not  accuse them of 
cognisance and of not having taken an opportunity to stay out of the killing.
  The speech is of great importance for the history of the SS Cavalry Brigade as it 
was given  immediately before its deployment in Belorussia. At that time, the unit 
had already been used in a ‘dual role’ – as a military formation as well as a killing 
squad. It was now to be fully included in the German war of annihilation against the 
Soviet Union, where it would play the same role on a much larger scale and claim an 
even higher death toll. The significance of Himmler’s address lies in its timing as 
well as its content: although he and other high SS and police officials such as Kurt 
Daluege and Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski visited many different units and spoke to 
the men, sometimes explicitly referring to the destruction of Jews and communists, 
this mostly happened after the beginning of executions, not before.340 And as far as 
the duty of the men is concerned, there is only one other documented case which is 
comparable: Reserve Police Battalion 101. Its commander, major Trapp, briefed the 
men about an upcoming killing mission as well and offered them to step out if they 
did not  feel  up to  their  task.341 Unlike him and his  policemen,  Himmler  and his 
cavalrymen were used to the murder of innocent people. But like Trapp, Himmler 
gave  them a  choice  and  even  the  option  to  ask  for  a  transfer.  As  the  aim,  the 
cleansing of the Pripet Marshes and the victims of this policy, the Jews, were clearly 
defined, his speech was much more than a ‘pep talk’ but rather a preparation of what 
was to come. For the SS cavalry it was a pivot: from now on this formation, like the 
340 Other examples are the visit Himmler and Daluege paid to Police Battalion 322 at Bialystok on 8 
July, 1941, just after this unit had started to execute Jews. Here, Daluege demanded the destruction of 
Bolshevism in a speech; see Browning, Ordinary men, p. 13. On 12 or 13 July, 1941, the Higher SS 
and Police  Leader  Centre,  Erich  von dem Bach-Zelewski,  delivered  a  justifying speech  at  a  site 
outside Bialystok where killings were conducted by members of Police Battalions 316 and 322; see 
ibid., p. 14.
341 Browning, Ordinary men, p. 2.
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police battalions and the  Einsatzgruppen,  would spearhead the German policy of 
mass  violence  in  a  designated  sector,  instead  of  being  deployed  locally  as  an 
executive force.
  At the same time, Himmler finalised his plan of ‘pacifying’ the occupied territories 
in the east by developing a concept for the deployment of the Kommandostab units. 
They were to be used alongside the Einsatzgruppen and police battalions; their main 
task was to eliminate all political and ‘racial’ enemies of the Germans.342 Not only 
did they constitute an elementary part of the manpower available to the Waffen-SS on 
the eastern front; their immediate availability and the experience of some of the units 
in Poland made them the ideal tool for the war of annihilation. As some of their 
regiments had already seen combat, the evaluation of that first mission could now be 
considered in the planning as well. The intended deployment in the hinterland did 
not require rapid movements over great distances of the cavalry as they did in the 
opening phase of the campaign; instead the two SS cavalry regiments would act on 
their  own initiative like the  Einsatzgruppen.  Also, they were to be ‘hardened’ by 
these tasks and the cavalrymen, especially the officers, could gain more experience 
without  having  to  be  in  the  front  line,  an  aspect  that  was  to  improve  their 
performance in later combat missions. This also applied to the still rather unproven 
infantry brigades of the Kommandostab.343
  As the fighting continued,  the German government developed plans on how to 
secure the newly occupied territories. At the beginning of hostilities, the executive 
authority in the operational area was the supreme commander of the German army.344 
Two  weeks  later,  the  troops  had  advanced  so  far  eastward  that  a  military 
administration could be formed. The territory under its control was divided into three 
342 Büchler, ‘Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS’, p. 15.
343 Einstellungsverfügung gg. Lombard u.a., pp. 1749-1750.
344 Jürgen Förster, ‘Die Sicherung des ‘Lebensraumes’’, in H. Boog and others (eds.), Das Deutsche 
Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Bd. 4: Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion  (Stuttgart, 1987), p. 1030.
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Rückwärtige Heeresgebiete (Army Group Rear Areas), which constituted most of the 
occupied areas, three  Rückwärtige Armeegebiete (Army Rear Areas) closer to the 
front and the combat zone at the frontline itself. Army Group and Army Rear Areas 
corresponded to the sectors of the army groups North, Centre, and South; they were 
established on 2 July, 3 July and 9 July respectively.345 The main objective of the 
military agencies was the protection of supply depots, supply lines, railway lines, 
communications facilities, and airports. They were also responsible for guarding and 
deporting Soviet prisoners of war. At their command were Feldkommandanturen (FK 
or  regional  headquarters)  and  Ortskommandanturen (OK or  urban  headquarters), 
army and police forces,  and military police units.  The commanders of rear areas 
could also dispose of the  Waffen-SS and police formations under the control of the 
higher SS and police leaders in their sector, if necessary.346
  Although the organisation of army and SS in the hinterland seemed to be clearly 
defined, the coordination of SS troop movements with the Wehrmacht did not work 
very well at the beginning of the German campaign. The military administration was 
not  notified  when  contingents  of  the  Kommandostab crossed  the  Reich  border. 
General  Wagner,  the  quartermaster-general  of  the  Wehrmacht,  requested  to  be 
informed about the intentions of Waffen-SS formations before they entered the army 
group rear areas so that army commanders could ensure their logistical support via 
the HSSPF. The SS also was to give the names, strength, places of deployment and 
tasks of these units.347 Himmler responded to this request by going even one step 
345 Alexander Dallin,  German Rule in Russia 1941 – 1945. A study in occupation politics  (London, 
1981), p. 96;  Förster in Boog,  Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, p. 1033; Dieter Pohl, 
Die Herrschaft  der  Wehrmacht.  Deutsche  Militärbesatzung und einheimische  Bevölkerung in  der  
Sowjetunion 1941 – 1944 (Munich, 2008), pp. 97-103.
346 For a detailed description of the structure and functions of the staff of an army group rear area 
(using the example of the commander of the rear area of Army Group North,  general  Franz von 
Roques), see Hasenclever, Wehrmacht und Besatzungspolitik, pp. 135-140. See also Förster in Boog, 
Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, p. 1031.  The work by Hasenclever also provides a 
definition of the functions of Feldkommandanturen and Ortskommandanturen; see ibid., pp. 149-150.
347 Hilberg,  ‘The  Kommandostab  Revisited’,  p.  360;  Schreiben  des  OKH an  den  Kommandostab 
Reichsführer-SS vom 5.7. 1941 zum Einsatz von Verbänden der Waffen-SS im rückw. Heeresgebiet, 
in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 1, file 170.
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further: on 10 July, he emphasised the authority of the HSSPF by ordering that ‘all 
SS  and  police  formations  are  explicitly  subordinate  to  the  higher  SS and police 
leaders  after  crossing  the  Reich  borders’.348 This  order  also  included  the 
Einsatzgruppen, as was specified in the war diary of the Kommandostab.349 Thus, SS 
and police forces were now also tactically assigned to the HSSPF, a measure which 
enhanced  their  status  and  gave  them  much  more  power  than  before,  especially 
compared to the army commanders in the rear areas. Himmler in turn was in the 
comfortable position of being able to leave the planning of missions and deployment 
of the units to his representatives who knew the situation in the field better than 
himself.350 On 14 July, a corresponding order was issued to the formations of the 
Kommandostab.351
  Heinrich Himmler announced the assignment of the SS cavalry units to the HSSPF 
Mitte, von dem Bach-Zelewski, during a visit to his headquarters at Bialystok on 10 
July,  when  their imminent  deployment  was  planned  as  well.352 But  before  more 
German paramilitary units were sent on their way, another important condition had 
to be met: the establishment of a political administration.
  On 16 July, 1941 a conference was held at which Hitler presented his ideas of the 
future occupation policy in  the east  and consulted high government  and military 
representatives  such  as  Hermann  Göring,  Alfred  Rosenberg  and  Wilhelm  Keitel 
about  the  executive  positions  which  were  to  be  filled  in  the  civilian  occupation 
administration.  Rosenberg  was  appointed  minister  for  the  occupied  eastern 
territories;  subordinate  to  him  were  Hinrich  Lohse  and  Erich  Koch,  two  Nazi 
348 Berlin RMDI Nr. 494 10/7 1817 [10 July, 1941], BArchB, NS 19/1671, quoted in Westermann, 
Hitler’s Police Battalions, p. 165; see also VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 1, file 170.
349 KTB KDOS, entry from 10 July, 1941.
350 Cüppers, Wegbereiter, p. 132.
351 Kommandobefehl Nr. 18 vom 14.7. 1941, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 1, file 170.
352 Witte,  Der  Dienstkalender  Heinrich  Himmlers,  p.  183;  Justiz  und  NS-Verbrechen:  Sammlung 
deutscher Strafurteile wegen nationalsozialistischer Tötungsverbrechen 1945 – 1966. Bd. 20, pp. 41-
42;  Peter  Longerich,  Politik  der  Vernichtung.  Eine  Gesamtdarstellung  der  nationalsozialistischen  
Judenverfolgung (Munich, 1998), pp. 366-367.
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gauleiter who were to govern newly-formed provinces in the Baltic states and the 
Ukraine as ‘Reich commissars’. Heinrich Himmler, who did not attend the meeting, 
was to have the same responsibilities as in the Reich, a role which was defined in a 
decree issued by Hitler on the following day. According to this document, Himmler 
became responsible for securing the east by exercising police powers. For this task 
he had to use his governors, the higher SS and police leaders, whose work was to be 
coordinated with the Reich commissars.353
  This  summit  talk  coincided  with  a  slowdown of  the  German advance  and the 
emergence of  security problems in the hinterland. Although the primary objectives 
had largely been achieved, the Red Army had been underestimated: it had not been 
destroyed west of the Dvina – Dnieper line as planned and its fighting spirit could 
not be quelled. Moreover,  the flaws of the German strategy became obvious. The 
forces were spread too thinly and suffered high losses, reserves became scarce and 
vast  territories  had  not  been  occupied  in  the  first  phase  of  the  campaign.  Most 
important in this context were the Pripet Marshes in southern Belorussia and the 
northern Ukraine. This lowland, which was also known as Polesie, stretched  250 
miles from west to east and 130 miles from north to south. For the most part it had 
been avoided by German troops;  it  now lay like  a  wedge between Army Group 
Centre and Army Group South. While these groups kept on pushing eastward, Soviet 
forces which had retreated into the marshes threatened their flanks. They conducted 
counterattacks,  a  development  that  not  only delayed but  increasingly jeopardised 
German operations, especially in the Ukraine.354
353 Erlaß des Führers über die polizeiliche Sicherung der neu besetzten Ostgebiete vom 17. Juli 1941, 
quoted in Longerich, Politik der Vernichtung, pp. 362-363.
354 Ueberschär and Wette, ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’, pp. 97-98; Klink in Boog, Das Deutsche Reich  
und der Zweite Weltkrieg, p. 457 and pp. 483-486. On the problem of the Pripet Marshes in German 
and Soviet strategy, see also Rolf-Dieter Müller, Der Feind steht im Osten. Hitlers geheime Pläne für  
einen Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion im Jahr 1939 (Berlin, 2011), p. 226. According to this work, the 
use of the Pripet Marshes as a natural barrier providing cover for troops defending the western Soviet 
Union was already described by marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky in 1920. His ideas were taken into 
account  by the  Wehrmacht twenty years  later:  by downplaying  the  possibility  of  a  threat  to  the 
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  To the regular enemy troops who were trapped behind the German lines was added 
another problem: the possible threat from Soviet partisans. In his first speech to the 
Soviet  people after  the German invasion,  Joseph Stalin called for a people’s war 
against  the invaders.  He demanded that  ‘guerrilla units’ and ‘diversionist  groups’ 
were  formed  in  the  occupied  areas.  These  formations  were  supposed  to  destroy 
enemy transport, communication and logistics so that the Germans and their allies 
would find it impossible to control Soviet territory.355 Despite this address, partisans 
did not pose a threat to German troops in the summer of 1941. Although the training 
of guerrilla fighters had been part of the Soviet military doctrine, the government 
could not deploy them now: partisan warfare had been neglected as an option in the 
1930s,  when the Red Army was built  up as an offensive and highly mechanised 
force. Supply depots for partisans had been closed and instructors had fallen victim 
to Stalin’s purges. As a result, no plans or preparations had been made.356 There was 
no organised partisan movement: resistance, if existent, was isolated and the Soviet 
government did not make an effort to coordinate the forces of the Communist party, 
the  state  security  organs  and  the  Red  Army.357 Guerrilla  groups  lacked  training, 
military experience, and leadership. They were poorly equipped and often did not 
even have enough weapons.358 The Germans, though, saw a possibility to justify their 
harsh measures against the Soviet population.359 At the meeting of 16 July, Hitler 
said, referring to Stalin’s speech: ‘This partisan warfare gives us an advantage by 
German flanks which came out of the marshes,  colonel  general  Franz Halder ensured that  Hitler 
accepted his operational plan with the focus on a quick advance on Moscow.
355 Pravda, 3 July, 1941, p. 1, translated in Stalin, Joseph, The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 
(New York, 1945), p. 15, quoted in: Kenneth Slepyan, Stalin’s guerrillas: Soviet partisans in World  
War II (Lawrence, KS 2006), p. 15.
356 Slepyan, Stalin’s guerrillas, pp. 19-22; Richard J. Overy, Russia’s War. (London, 1999), p. 143. For 
an overview of partisan warfare in the Soviet Union that presents the relevant literature, especially on 
the  prewar  period  and  the  opening  phase  of  the  war,  see  Hasenclever,  Wehrmacht  und 
Besatzungspolitik, p. 345.
357 Benjamin V. Shepherd, War in the Wild East: the German army and Soviet partisans (Cambridge, 
Mass., 2004), pp. 60-63; Slepyan, Stalin’s guerrillas, p. 25.
358 Slepyan, Stalin’s guerrillas, pp. 27-28 and pp. 31-32.
359 Matthäus in Browning, Die Entfesselung der ‘Endlösung’, pp. 406-407.
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enabling us to destroy everything in our path. [...] In this vast area, peace must be 
imposed as quickly as possible, and to achieve this, it is necessary to execute even 
anyone who doesn't give us a straight look’.360
  Not only German combat units lacked personnel. The mobile killing squads, too, 
were  overstretched,  especially  in  Belorussia  and  the  Ukraine,  to  the  point  of  a 
‘security vacuum’.361 In many areas of dense Jewish population, no measures could 
be  taken,  especially  in  some  parts  of  Belorussia  and  the  Ukraine.  In  order  to 
persecute Jews and also to  combat  Red Army  units  and partisans who had taken 
refuge in these areas, special German units were needed as the Pripet Marshes in 
particular  posed  a  huge  problem.  Regular  army  formations  had  proven  to  be 
inadequately equipped and trained for combing through the marshes; also, they were 
urgently needed elsewhere.362 The Einsatzgruppen, on the other hand, were not able 
to conduct fast, large-scale operations in the intended area as they lacked manpower 
and mobility.363
  As opposed to the less flexible army and Einsatzgruppen units, the two SS cavalry 
regiments were seen as the German formations which met the criteria for this task. 
They were equipped to army standards and considered to be a perfect match for the 
role of a light patrol unit in difficult terrain. Moreover, their men had experience in 
serving as  an occupation force and had already proven their  brutality in  Poland. 
Their problems with the slower supply units could be tackled by Fegelein’s plan of 
restructuring the two regiments. Now that a political administration in the occupied 
territories had been established, all obstacles for the deployment of Kommandostab 
360 Trial  of  the  major  war  criminals  before  the  International  Military  Tribunal,  Nuremberg,  14  
November 1945 - 1 October 1946: official text in the English language. Vol. 38, Documents and other  
material in evidence, numbers 185-L to 1216-RF (Nuremberg, 1949), document L-221, pp. 68-94, 
quoted in Büchler, ‘Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS’, p. 14.
361 Büchler, ‘Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS’, p. 13.
362 Klink  in  Boog,  Das  Deutsche  Reich  und  der  Zweite  Weltkrieg,  pp.  477-478;  Büchler, 
‘Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS’, p. 13. 
363 Matthäus in Browning, Die Entfesselung der ‘Endlösung’, p. 407.
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units had been removed and Himmler decided to send them into the Soviet Union 
again.
  On 14  July,  the  Kommandostab had  reported  operational  readiness  to  the  SS-
Führungshauptamt in Berlin.  The 1st SS Cavalry Regiment was combat-ready; the 
motorised subunits of the second regiment were not yet  fully operational.364 Five 
days later, on 19 July, the SS Cavalry received an order from Himmler to relocate to 
the area of Baranovichi in Belorussia on 21 July.  There, its  formations would be 
subordinate to the Higher SS and Police Leader Centre, SS-Gruppenführer Erich von 
dem  Bach-Zelewski.  Any  deployment  of  the  cavalry  was  subject  to  Himmler’s 
approval.  Hermann  Fegelein  was  now  also  assigned  command  over  the  2nd SS 
Cavalry Regiment; thus, the two units, which had a combined strength of 3,970 men 
when their departure was ordered, collectively became a cavalry brigade.365 On the 
same day, von dem Bach-Zelewski was informed by Himmler that the SS Cavalry 
had  been  placed  at  his  disposal.  Their  task  was  ‘to  comb  the  Pripet  Marshes 
systematically’, an operation which was to be planned elaborately by the HSSPF.366 
In this last telex, the unit was referred to as ‘SS-Reiterbrigade’ (SS Cavalry Brigade) 
for the very first time whereas the previous order had only called it  ‘Kavallerie-
Verband’ (cavalry  formation).  The  two  messages  are  the  first  proof  of  the 
amalgamation of the two units to form an SS Cavalry Brigade.367
364 KTB KDOS, entry from 14 July, 1941.
365 Kommandobefehl  Nr.  19  vom 19.7.  1941,  in:  VUA,  Kommandostab  RFSS,  box  1,  file  170; 
Cüppers,  Wegbereiter,  p.  135.  For  the  numerical  strength,  see  Kommandostab  RFSS, 
Kriegsstärkenachweisungen  und Sollstärken v.  19.7.  1941,  in:  VUA, box  14,  file  107,  quoted in: 
Klaus-Michael  Mallmann and others,  Deutscher Osten 1939 – 1945. Der Weltanschauungskrieg in  
Fotos und Texten (Darmstadt, 2003), p. 143.
366 Fernschreiben Nr. 110 v. 19.7. 1941, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 1, file 170.
367 Abschlußbericht der ZStL vom 20.8. 1963, pp. 359-360; see also Bayer, Kavallerie der Waffen-SS, 
p. 14.
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Minor combat operations in the Pripet Marshes
  Before the SS cavalry had even fully arrived in Belorussia, it already got caught up 
in the German struggle for the security of the vast hinterland of the front. For some 
of its soldiers, a mission similar of that to the 1st Regiment at Bialystok was now 
about to develop: without a clear concept of the enemy, they were deployed as a 
support  force  of  the  Wehrmacht in  a  particular  sector,  whereas  most  of  their 
comrades began to target the Jewish population at the same time. Although only a 
few squadrons of the brigade took part  in this operation,  which was a mere side 
scene to the much larger context of the fighting of German Army Group Centre, it is 
important to view this episode as it exemplifies many later missions during which 
the SS cavalrymen were confronted with similar threats. Apart from regular Soviet 
forces,  many  of  which  had  been  bypassed  by  the  Germans,  small  groups  and 
individual stragglers occurred as well, applying hit-and-run tactics that were hard to 
counter for the inexperienced German soldiers.
  On the northern fringe of the Pripet Marshes a serious threat to the German advance 
emerged in late July:  Soviet contingents with an estimated strength of two cavalry 
divisions had pushed forward from the gap between Army Group Centre and Army 
Group South and tried to break through the German lines to escape encirclement. As 
there were few transport routes in this sector, this development threatened to disrupt 
the German supply lines, particularly the railway from Minsk to Bobruisk and the 
important road from Brest-Litovsk to Bobruisk, which was one of the main east – 
west  thoroughfares  in  the  rear  area  of  Army  Group  Centre  and  referred  to  as 
Rollbahn  1.  To  defend  this  road,  the  commander  of  the  rear  area  sent  ahead  a 
vanguard  of  the  SS  cavalry  regiments  and  subordinated  it  to  the  162nd infantry 
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division of the Wehrmacht.368 The advance party consisted of the sixth squadron and 
a platoon with infantry support guns of the 1st SS cavalry regiment and the bicycle 
squadrons of both regiments. Its subunits arrived in the designated area late on 27 
July and early on 28 July.369
  On 2 August, a squad of the motorcycle platoon of the 2nd Regiment was ambushed 
by a group of about 30 Red Army stragglers and lost an NCO in the ensuing fight. 
Two other SS soldiers were wounded.370 In the following days, the sixth squadron of 
the  2nd Regiment,  with  its  engineer  and  anti-tank  platoons  operating  separately, 
attempted to track down the troop that had attacked their comrades. The stragglers 
could not be located; moreover, in another fire-fight that took place in the same area 
on 6 August, an SS trooper of the light cavalry column was wounded. The failure of 
the  initial  searches  sparked  harsh  criticism  from Fegelein  towards  Hierthes,  the 
regimental commander. After another unsuccessful raid on 11 August, the anti-tank 
platoon received a  tip  from a local  and carried out a  patrol  in the swamps near 
Starobin on 13 August. This led to the destruction of an abandoned Soviet border 
fortress and the discovery of a still occupied Soviet barracks in the swamps. This 
368 KTB KDOS, entries from 27 and 28 July, 1941; see also Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom 24. – 
27.7. 1941, SS-Kav. Rgt. 1, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 1; Korpsbefehl Nr. 35 vom 
28.7.  1941,  Befehlshaber  des  rückwärtigen  Heeresgebiets  Mitte,  in:  BArchF,  RS 22/224,  p.  183; 
Tätigkeitsbericht Nr. 9 [des Kommandostabes] für die Woche vom 4.-10.8. [19]41, August 12, 1941, 
in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 10, file 93, p. 53.
369 Bericht über die Tätigkeit der V[oraus].A[bteilung] vom 27.7. – 3.8. 1941, 12 August, 1941, in 
Unsere Ehre heißt Treue, p. 221; Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom 28. – 30.7. 1941, SS-Kav. Rgt. 2, 
in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 2; Kriegstagebuch der 162. Infanteriedivision (23.5.  – 
20.11. 1941), in: BArchF, RS 26-162/7, p. 36; Funkspruch Nr. 9, Kav.-Brig an Kdo. Stb. RF-SS, 28 
July, 1941, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 1, file 170.
370 For the ambush on the motorcycle squad, see Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit v. 31.7. – 3.8. 1941, SS-
Kav. Rgt. 2; see also radio message no. 3 from HSSPF Mitte to KDOS RFSS, 3 August, 1941, in: 
VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 1, file 4. According to the final report of the vanguard, one NCO 
was killed and four soldiers were wounded, two of them badly; see Zusammenfassende Meldung über 
die Kampfhandlungen der Vorausabteilung der SS-Kav.Brigade, 11 August, 1941, in  Unsere Ehre  
heißt  Treue,  pp.  227-228.  As the report  of the 2nd Regiment  for this incident  only speaks of two 
wounded and Fegelein wrongly lists it under operations of the vanguard (to which the motorcycle 
platoon did not belong), it can be assumed that he wanted the report to sound more intense as far as 
the engagement of his men in combat is concerned. Another source backs the version of the dead 
soldier: according to a former corporal of the 2nd Regiment’s engineer platoon, his unit suffered the 
first deadly casualty due to an ambush on 2 August, 1941. See Vernehmung von Fritz Gierisch vom 
10.3. 1962, in: StAW, 62 Nds. Fb.2, Befehle (Kopien), Nr. 1010, pp. 276-277.
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outpost, which had been bypassed by the German advance, was taken in an infantry 
assault, in the course of which five Soviet soldiers were killed and about 20 were 
wounded; others escaped into the swamps. The anti-tank platoon suffered no losses 
during this mission, which according to the platoon commander destroyed the Soviet 
group that had carried out the ambush earlier. It was probably the only time soldiers 
of the 2nd Regiment were involved in combat during the first mission in the Pripet 
Marshes.371
  In the combat zone between Sluck and Bobruisk, the situation was confusing. The 
main  German  force  in  this  sector  was  the  162nd infantry  division;  it  was 
overstretched as it had been pushed forward hastily as a task force just a few days 
before,  together  with  units  from the  87th and  252nd infantry  division  as  well  as 
Security Regiment 2. Since 25 July,  they had been fighting against Soviet  troops 
around Sluck in the forests and near the main road, where German defences had been 
pushed  back  but  enemy attacks  could  be  repelled.372 Three  days  later,  the  162nd 
infantry division was ordered to continue securing the  Rollbahn and to locate the 
positions of enemy units. For this purpose, it was now also reinforced with Police 
Battalion  307  and  two  battalions  of  the  252nd infantry  division.373 When  the  SS 
vanguard arrived at Starye Dorogy east of Sluck, where its mission was to start, three 
enemy units had been spotted. The 32nd Soviet cavalry division stood north of the 
highway for the most part; some of its subunits were south of it and shelled it with 
artillery. Two others, the 43rd and 47th Soviet cavalry divisions, operated south of the 
Rollbahn.  During  the  following  three  days,  the  SS  squadrons  conducted 
371 Bericht über den Einsatz des Pak-Zuges am 13.8. 1941 in Wielickowicze Nowe, 15 August, 1941, 
in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 3. For the wounding of the trooper, see Tätigkeitsbericht 
für die Zeit  vom 6.-10.8.  1941, 11 August,  1941, SS Cavalry Brigade, in:  VUA, Kommandostab 
RFSS, box 24, file 3; for Fegelein’s criticism, see Cüppers, Wegbereiter, p. 181.
372 Kriegstagebuch der 162. Infanteriedivision (23.5.  – 20.11. 1941), in: BArchF, RS 26-162/7,  pp. 
28-36.
373 Korpsbefehl  Nr.  35  vom 28.7.  1941,  Befehlshaber  des  rückwärtigen  Heeresgebiets  Mitte,  in: 
BArchF, RS 22/224, p. 183.
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reconnaissance on both sides of the road and thus helped to prepare an attack of the 
162nd infantry division to the south, which started on 1 August. In the scouting area, 
the vanguard got caught up in skirmishes with Soviet cavalry squadrons repeatedly; 
in some of these situations, the soldiers had to defend themselves in every direction 
but they suffered no losses.374 Police Battalion 307, which had scouted a sector near 
Sluzk further west, had found itself in the same situation. In the village of Starobin, a 
part of the unit suddenly came under fire, pushed forward and outflanked a group of 
about 150 Soviet  soldiers;  some of them died in the fighting,  the remainder was 
executed.375
  When the German forces began the assault on the Soviet cavalry divisions south of 
the road from Sluck to Bobruisk, the SS vanguard advanced with them. It was to 
destroy enemy troops, stragglers and partisans in the area between Starye Dorogy 
and  Gluck.376 Thus,  the  SS  squadrons,  together  with  units  of  the  252nd infantry 
division, formed the western boundary of encirclement and kept Soviet forces from 
evading, whereas the 162nd division carried out the main thrust to the south further 
eastward.377 The offensive went according to plan: the opposing forces were pushed 
away from the main road and driven to the southeast.  At the same time, the 87th 
division fought off attacks from the north and deployed troops against enemy cavalry 
northeast of the Rollbahn, towards the railway line Minsk – Bobruisk. South of the 
road, the SS squadrons and units of the 252nd infantry division blocked escape routes 
374 Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit v. 27. – 31.7. 1941, SS-Kav. Rgt. 1, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, 
box 24, file 1, p. 485; Bericht über die Tätigkeit der V[oraus].A[bteilung] vom 27.7. – 3.8. 1941, in 
Unsere Ehre heißt Treue, pp. 221-222; Bericht über die Kämpfe im rückw[ärtigen] Heeresgebiet Mitte 
v.  24.7.  –  11.8.  1941,  17  August,  1941,  Befehlshaber  des  rückwärtigen  Heeresgebiets  Mitte,  in: 
BArchF, RS 22/224, p. 220.
375 Erkundungs- und Aufklärungsergebnis vom 29.7. 1941 südlich Sluzk, 30 July, 1941, in: BArchF, 
RS 3-8/20.
376 Bericht über die Feindlage bei der SS-Kav.-Brigade am 8.8. 1941 [received by the Kommandostab 
on 12 August, 1941], in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 10, file 93, p. 61.
377 Bericht über die Tätigkeit der V[oraus].A[bteilung] vom 27.7. – 3.8. 1941, in Unsere Ehre heißt  
Treue, pp. 222-223; Kriegstagebuch der 162. Infanteriedivision (23.5.  – 20.11. 1941), in: BArchF, RS 
26-162/7, pp. 40-43; Korpsbefehl Nr. 36 vom 1.8. 1941, Befehlshaber des rückwärtigen Heeresgebiets 
Mitte, in: BArchF, RH 22/224, p. 186.
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to the west, combed the forests and engaged Red Army forces in combat where they 
met them, mostly having to deal with small and medium-sized combat groups. After 
six days, the bulk of the 32nd, 43rd, and 47th Soviet divisions had been  surrounded, 
scattered,  and  destroyed  on  both  sides  of  the  main  thoroughfare.  However,  the 
fighting in this  area continued as another Soviet  unit,  the 121st infantry division, 
appeared; it had not made contact with the enemy so far as its regiments had kept 
themselves hidden in the forests northwest of Sluck for several weeks. On 6 August, 
this division broke through German defences and crossed  Rollbahn 1 to the south. 
Although it was well-equipped with artillery and other heavy weapons and fortunate 
enough to overrun thinly spread opposing forces, it was surrounded in the following 
days by units of the 162nd and 252nd infantry divisions, Police Battalions 307 and 
316, and the vanguard of the SS cavalry.  After about five days,  the division had 
suffered the same fate as the Soviet cavalry before. The commander of the rear area 
of  Army Group  Centre  considered  the  two  missions,  which  had  destroyed  four 
enemy divisions, a complete success.378
  During this operation, there were thousands of Soviet casualties: in total, 2,593 Red 
Army men were taken prisoner and about 4,000 had been killed. The SS vanguard 
alone reported having destroyed or dispersed five Soviet squadrons and two artillery 
batteries, which led to the annihilation of two Soviet cavalry regiments. At least 200 
enemy soldiers were killed and more than 400 were captured. The 162nd division 
378 Kriegstagebuch der 162. Infanteriedivision (23.5.  – 20.11. 1941), in: BArchF, RS 26-162/7, pp. 
43-53; Kriegstagebuch Nr. 4 der 87. Infanteriedivision (25.5. - 19.8. 1941), Abschnitt d (27.7. – 19.8. 
1941), in: BArchF, RH 26-87/22; Korpsbefehl Nr. 36 vom 1.8. 1941, Befehlshaber des rückwärtigen 
Heeresgebiets  Mitte,  in:  BArchF,  RH  22/224,  p.  186;  Bericht  über  die  Tätigkeit  der 
V[oraus].A[bteilung] vom 27.7. – 3.8. 1941, in: Unsere Ehre heißt Treue, p. 223-226; Bericht über die 
Feindlage bei  der SS-Kav.-Brigade am 8.8. 1941, [received by the  Kommandostab on 12 August, 
1941], in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 10, file 93, p. 62;  Korpsbefehl Nr. 38 vom 8.8. 1941, 
Befehlshaber des rückwärtigen Heeresgebiets Mitte, in: BArchF, RS 22/224, p. 192; Bericht über die 
Kämpfe im rückw[ärtigen] Heeresgebiet Mitte v. 24.7. – 11.8. 1941, in: Unsere Ehre heißt Treue, p. 
220  and  pp.  224-226;  Korpsbefehl  Nr.  39  vom  11.8.  1941,  Befehlshaber  des  rückwärtigen 
Heeresgebiets Mitte, in: BArchF, RS 22/224, p. 201. The combat operations in the entire sector were 
also outlined in a sketch which can be found in the Kommandostab files; see VUA, Kommandostab 
RFSS, box 10, file 93.
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counted another four hundred prisoners; many others, though, escaped to the east or 
hid in the forests. Also, 1100 horses were captured and  36 artillery and anti-tank 
pieces as well as great scores of small arms and ammunition could be secured.379 
German losses were far smaller: in the SS vanguard, eight men were wounded and 
one had gone missing.380 Of the 162nd division, 89 soldiers had been killed, 257 had 
been wounded and nine were missing.381 The 87th division suffered losses of 77 dead 
and 144 wounded during the fighting in this area.382
  Fighting in the densely wooded, swampy and often impassable area was largely 
patrol-based  on  both  sides.  It  often  ensued after  chance  encounters  as  the  exact 
position  of  the  Soviet  cavalry  was  unclear;  even  after  the  beginning  of  the 
encirclement,  the Germans could not always tell  whether  Soviet  forces had been 
trapped or just escaped in another direction. The SS commanders had to cover great 
distances in order to reconnoitre and engage the enemy, who appeared in contingents 
ranging  from  patrols  up  to  whole  regiments  and  sometimes  outnumbered  the 
Germans.  The  Soviet  cavalry  divisions  consisted  mostly  of  Cossacks  and 
Caucasians, who were described as ‘skilful and tough fighters’.383 In their attempts to 
379 Bericht über die Tätigkeit der V[oraus].A[bteilung] vom 3. – 12.8. 1941, in:  Unsere Ehre heißt  
Treue, pp. 225-226;  Bericht über die Kämpfe im rückw[ärtigen] Heeresgebiet Mitte v. 24.7. – 11.8. 
1941,  p.  224  and  p.  226;  Zusammenfassende  Meldung  über  die  Kampfhandlungen  der 
Vorausabteilung der SS-Kav.Brigade, 11 August, 1941, in: Unsere Ehre heißt Treue, pp. 227-228. The 
number of Soviet casualties cannot be ascertained as only estimates are being given in the sources 
from Wehrmacht and SS.
380 Zusammenfassende Meldung über die Kampfhandlungen der Vorausabteilung der SS-Kav.Brigade, 
11 August, 1941, in: Unsere Ehre heißt Treue, pp. 227-228. This report also contains the ambush on 
the motorcycle platoon (see above), which was not part of the vanguard; therefore, I did not quote the 
casualties from that incident (1 killed, four wounded according to Fegelein as opposed to 1 killed, two 
wounded who were reported by the 2nd Regiment). The HSSPF Mitte, however,  spoke of two SS 
cavalrymen who had been killed during the vanguard operation when their car hit a landmine; see 
Maschinelle Abschrift des Tagebuchs des Chefs der Bandenkampfverbände, SS-Obergruppenführer 
und General der Polizei Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski vom 25. Juni 1941 bis 22. Jan. 1945, entry 
from 14 August, 1941, BArchB, R 20/45b, p. 8. In the files of the SS Cavalry Brigade, however, no 
information about these two losses can be found.
381 Bericht über die Kämpfe im rückw[ärtigen] Heeresgebiet Mitte v. 24.7. – 11.8. 1941, 17 August, 
1941, Befehlshaber des rückwärtigen Heeresgebiets Mitte, in: BArchF, RS 22/224, p. 221 and p. 224.
382 Bericht über die Kämpfe im rückw[ärtigen] Heeresgebiet Mitte v. 24.7. – 11.8.  1941, 17 August, 
1941, Befehlshaber des rückwärtigen Heeresgebiets Mitte, in: BArchF, RS 22/224, pp. 221-222; the 
war diary of 87th division does not give the number of losses but only describes them as „grave“.
383 Bericht über die Tätigkeit der V[oraus].A[bteilung] vom 27.7. – 3.8. 1941, in: Unsere Ehre heißt  
Treue, pp. 222-223; Bericht über die Tätigkeit der V[oraus].A[bteilung] vom 3. – 12.8. 1941, August 
12, 1941, in: Unsere Ehre heißt Treue, pp. 224-226; Kriegstagebuch der 162. Infanteriedivision, (23.5. 
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break out of the encirclement, they had carried out heavy attacks locally and used 
artillery. Some new tactics were applied in response to this which should be of use to 
the  SS  Cavalry  Brigade  throughout  the  entire  course  of  the  deployment  in  the 
swampland.  Squadrons  were  split  up  into  more  effective  platoons,  for  example 
bicycle or anti-tank units, to carry out long range patrols. To secure or seal off an 
area,  they  used  the  ‘hedgehog’ technique:  along  a  given  line,  circular  defence 
positions were formed which could observe and fight in all directions.384
  As a result of the first two weeks in Belorussia, it can be stated that despite the 
involvement of large contingents of German and Soviet troops in the fighting, the SS 
vanguard had not taken part in a major combat operation. However, all of its parts 
had made contact with the enemy and gained some valuable experience in combat 
and also in coordination with other units and agencies, such as Wehrmacht divisions, 
the HSSPF, and the Command of the Rear Area of Army Group Centre, which would 
be very important for their further deployment in the Pripet Marshes. Step by step, 
the SS cavalrymen came closer to Himmler’s aim of ‘hardening’ by accustoming 
them  to  warfare.385 The  mission  along  the  Brest  –  Bobruisk  highway  shows 
significant parallels to the earlier deployment of the 1st Regiment near Bialystok as 
only subunits of the SS cavalry were involved in both cases. Instead of operating 
independently, they rather supported the  Wehrmacht. Moreover, Hermann Fegelein 
– 20.11. 1941), in: BArchF, RS 26-162/7, pp. 45-47; Kriegstagebuch Nr. 4 der 87. Infanteriedivision 
(25.5. - 19.8. 1941), Abschnitt d (27.7. – 19.8. 1941), in: BArchF, RH 26-87/22; Bericht über die 
Kämpfe im rückw[ärtigen] Heeresgebiet Mitte v. 24.7. – 11.8. 1941, in: Unsere Ehre heißt Treue, p. 
222;  Bericht  über  die  Feindlage  bei  der  SS-Kav.-Brigade  am  8.8.  1941,  [received  by  the 
Kommandostab on 12 August, 1941], in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 10, file 93, p. 61.
384 Bericht über die Tätigkeit der V[oraus].A[bteilung] vom 27.7. – 3.8. 1941, 12 August, 1941, in: 
Unsere Ehre heißt Treue, pp. 221-223; Bericht über die Tätigkeit der V[oraus].A[bteilung] vom 3. – 
12.8. 1941, 12 August, 1941, in: Unsere Ehre heißt Treue, pp. 224-226; Bericht über die Feindlage bei 
der SS-Kav.-Brigade am 8.8. 1941, [received by the Kommandostab on 12 August, 1941], in: VUA, 
Kommandostab RFSS, box 10, file 93, p. 62; according to a sketch in the Kommandostab files, the SS 
vanguard  took  up  hedgehog  positions  along  a  line  from  north  to  south.  These  hedgehogs  were 
supposed to form the western boundary of encirclement and to secure the area to the rear at the same 
time. They sealed off the zone between the main road and a parallel road further south while Police 
Battalion 307 advanced along both roads; for this sketch, see VUA, box 1, file 170. This tactic had 
been introduced in the Kommandosonderbefehl of 28 July, 1941.
385 Einstellungsverfügung gg. Lombard u.a., pp. 1749-1750.
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again exploited the conduct of his officers and men in order to improve the standing 
of the unit.
  The behaviour of the SS cavalrymen in combat was shaped by the nature of their 
mission, in this case a hasty improvisation in an operational area where the situation 
and intentions of the enemy were unclear. It can be assumed that they did well under 
the  circumstances  as  they  took  hardly  any losses  and  managed  to  master  some 
difficult situations. But as only a small part of the SS cavalry force became involved 
in  the  fighting  with  the  vanguard,  it  is  not  possible  to  draw conclusions  on the 
performance of the entire unit. Combat on an institutional level only took place at the 
end of the year, when the brigade was based at Toropets. In Belorussia, the ‘dual 
role’ of  the  unit  soon developed further  as  both  the  mounted  squadrons  and the 
motorised  elements  of  the  SS  cavalry  began  to  carry  out  criminal  orders  of  an 
ideological nature which they had received from the Wehrmacht and SS commands 
respectively.
Excursus: The officer corps of the SS Cavalry Regiments
  From the early days of the mounted SS, the officer corps shaped the development 
of the unit. Its members were mainly responsible for establishing a high standard of 
equitation in the initial phase during the 1930s. That horse-riding was more than just 
a leisure activity can be seen in the continuity with which it permeated the lives of 
several SS cavalry officers, both in civilian life and military service. To personal 
passion was added political opinion and career options in various forms. As far as 
equitation as a sport was concerned, the officer corps of the SS cavalry was active, 
successful, and skilled: Hermann Fegelein and his younger brother Waldemar won 
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great  fame as show-jumpers even before the foundation of the SS riding school, 
while Franz Magill had worked as a riding instructor in the Reichswehr cavalry, at a 
riding school in Berlin (which later became home to  Reiterstandarte 7), and at the 
SS-Junkerschule in  Braunschweig.  Others  had  been  professional  soldiers  or 
reservists in the cavalry, such as war veterans Heimo Hierthes and Johann Schmid, 
or Kurt Wegener, who joined the mounted branch of the army after the First World 
War.  Stefan  Charwat  was  a  captain  in  the  Romanian  cavalry before  he came to 
Germany in 1940.386 
  When a  regimental  structure was being built  up from late  1939, more officers 
joined  the  SS cavalry until  it  was  fully operational  two years  later.  The  brigade 
commander, Hermann Fegelein, the regimental commanders, the leaders of the two 
Reitende Abteilungen, and the squadron commanders of these detachments (which 
were responsible for most of the killings), represent a sample of the officer corps of 
the  entire  unit  during  the  year  1941,  when  the  SS  cavalry  was  involved  in  the 
invasion of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the Holocaust. This sample, which 
comprises thirteen men who were born between 1895 and 1912, is  based on the 
roster of 30 July, 1941.387 Two main groups can be identified here: the war veterans 
on the one hand, and the significantly younger members of the so-called war youth 
generation on the other. In the sample, both groups were almost equally represented: 
386 Stammrollenauszug von Heimo Hierthes, in: BArchB, SSO Heimo Hierthes; Dienstlaufbahn von 
Johann Schmid, in BArchB, SSO Johann Schmid;  Justiz und NS-Verbrechen: Sammlung deutscher  
Strafurteile wegen nationalsozialistischer Tötungsverbrechen 1945 – 1966. Bd. 20, p. 28; Lebenslauf 
von  Kurt  Wegener  vom  8.3.  1938,  in:  BArchB,  SSO  Kurt  Wegener;  StAW,  62  Nds.  Fb.2, 
Personalunterlagen (Kopien), Nr. 1060, p. 36.
387 Information on this group was obtained mainly through the former Berlin Document Center (now a 
part of the German Federal Archive at Berlin), which holds the so-called SSO (SS officers) database. 
There, personnel files of the group defined above were viewed with two exceptions: the file of Stefan 
Charwat is not in the database; as Charwat was an ethnic German from Romania who only came to 
Germany after the beginning of the war, it is possible that his file was stored by another agency within 
the SS. Some information on this officer could, however, be found in the court files from the trial 
against Franz Magill and others; see StAW, 62 Nds. Fb.2, Personalunterlagen (Kopien), Nr. 1060, pp. 
36-40. The file of Herbert Schönfeldt could not be accessed during a visit to the Federal Archive in 
the spring of 2011; thus, information on one person from the defined group of fourteen men was 
missing  so  that  only  thirteen  men  could  be  included  in  the  sample.  For  the  roster,  see 
Führerstellenbesetzungsliste vom 30.7. 1941, in: BArchF, RS 3-8/91.
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six  were  veterans,  whereas  seven  belonged  to  the  war  youth  generation.388 The 
former could look back on military service in the First World War and sometimes in 
the interwar period as well.  Some of them had joined divisions of the Nazi party 
before Hitler had come to power and thus were ‘old fighters’ of the Nazi movement. 
As opposed to them, the latter had been socialised in the interwar years and made a 
career  in  the  Nazi  state  and  the  Allgemeine  SS.389 On  the  whole,  however,  war 
veterans and former Reichswehr soldiers continued to dominate the officer corps of 
the mounted SS until after the beginning of the Second World War: in August, 1940, 
their proportion of the squadron commanders in both cavalry regiments was given as 
75%. Gradually, the units were joined by young war volunteers and officer cadets.390 
  The  characteristics  both  age  groups  in  the  officer  corps  had  in  common were 
enthusiasm for horse-riding and a strong dedication to the National Socialist idea. As 
far as an extreme political attitude is concerned, several examples stand out: Hierthes 
had fought against the Weimar Republic in the Freikorps Epp and participated in the 
Beer Hall Putsch as a member of the same radical organisation as Heinrich Himmler, 
the Bund Reichskriegsflagge.391 Siegfried Kotthaus was an ‘old fighter’ as well as he 
had joined the NSDAP before 1933, an attribute he shared with Walter Dunsch and 
Hermann Fegelein.392 Gustav Lombard and Ulrich Goertz, too, managed to combine 
388 Gustav Lombard is an exception in this sample: although he was born in 1895, he did not serve in 
the military during the First World War as he was living in the United States from 1913 – 1919. For 
his biography, see Martin Cüppers, ‘Gustav Lombard – ein engagierter Judenmörder aus der Waffen-
SS’,  in  K.  M.  Mallmann  and  G.  Paul  (eds.),  Karrieren  der  Gewalt:  Nationalsozialistische  
Täterbiographien (Darmstadt,  2004),  pp.  145-156;  Cüppers,  Wegbereiter,  p.  95.  See  also 
Lebenserinnerungen des Generalmajors der Waffen-SS und SS-Brigadeführers Gustav Lombard, in: 
BArchF, MSg 2/13509.
389 The war youth generation is defined as the age cohort born between 1900 and the first years of the 
First World War; see Dieter  Frey and Helmut Rez, ‘Population and Predators: Preconditions for the 
Holocaust From a Control-Theoretical Perspective’, in  L. S. Newman and R. Erber (eds.),  Under-
standing Genocide: The Social Psychology of the Holocaust (Oxford, 2002), pp. 210-211.
390 Stimmungsbericht des 1. SS-Totenkopf-Reiterregiments, 13 August 1940, in: VUA, 8th SS Cavalry 
Division  Florian Geyer,  box  1,  file  7;  Michaelis,  Dokumentation,  p.  317;  Michaelis,  Kavallerie-
Divisionen, p. 18.
391 Stammrollenauszug von Heimo Hierthes (undated), in: BArchB, SSO Heimo Hierthes; Gesuch um 
Wiederverwendung vom 11.2. 1937, ibid. For Himmler’s role in the putsch, see Longerich, Himmler, 
pp. 73-74.
392 Stammkartenabschnitt  von Siegfried Kotthaus (undated),  in:  BArchB, SSO Siegfried Kotthaus; 
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personal interest in equitation with a career in the SS. Goertz, the second youngest 
man in the sample, stated at the age of 22 already that he intended to ‘take up service 
in the Schutzstaffel as a profession for life’.393
  Once the men had become part of the leadership of the mounted SS, in some cases 
via training in the concentration camp system, they formed an  effective hierarchy 
which is proven by the unit’s deployment in Poland: Hermann Fegelein received his 
orders from the higher SS and police leader ‘Ost’ in the General Government, but he 
left it to his subalterns to execute them. That he fully approved of their often very 
brutal  conduct  is  illustrated by reports  he compiled after  missions of the cavalry 
squadrons,  most  notably by his  infamous  statement  on  the  destruction  of  Polish 
villages  after  an  unsuccessful  counter  insurgency operation  between  Radom and 
Kielce. This leadership principle, which first evolved between 1939 and 1941, shows 
the special role of the middle level of the chain of command within the hierarchy of 
the unit: upon general instructions from Fegelein, other officers took the initiative 
and  implemented  whatever  task  the  unit  was  ordered  to  carry  out.  During  the 
deployment  in  Poland,  this  middle  level  consisted  of  the  squadron commanders; 
when the SS cavalry became a brigade in Belorussia, this task was fulfilled by the 
commanders of the mounted detachments, who in turn briefed their subordinates. It 
is notable that Fegelein hardly ever appeared at an execution site to supervise the 
killings. Thus, he did not have to suffer from mental-health problems which were 
triggered by those terrible scenes, as did his superior Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, 
who had visited the SS cavalry in the field very often.394
Personalbericht und Beurteilung von Siegfried Kotthaus vom 18.6. 1940, ibid.; Dienstlaufbahn von 
Walter Dunsch (undated), in: BArchB, SSO Walter Dunsch; Dienstlaufbahn von Hermann Fegelein 
vom 15.8. 1931 bis zum 27.8. 1940, in: BArchB, SSO Hermann Fegelein.
393 Erklärung [by Ulrich Goertz] vom 5.6. 1934, in: BArchB, SSO Ulrich Goertz.
394 For von dem Bach-Zelewski’s problems, see Andrej  Angrick,  ‘Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski. 
Himmlers  Mann  für  alle  Fälle’,  in  R.  Smelser  and  E.  Syring  (eds.),  Die  SS  –  Elite  unter  dem 
Totenkopf.  30 Lebensläufe (Paderborn,  Munich,  Vienna,  Zurich 2000),  p.  40.  There are only two 
accounts that actually place Fegelein at a killing site. He is said to have been present at the failed 
attempt  of  driving  Jews  into  a  lake;  see  Müller-Tupath,  Becher,  p.  107.  Also,  he  might  have 
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  Amongst the officers of the 1st Regiment and later the SS Cavalry Brigade, Gustav 
Lombard began to stand out in Poland already because of his ruthlessness as well as 
strong anti-Semitism. This continued in Belorussia: as commander of the mounted 
detachment, he won Fegelein’s favour by following an approach that was different 
from that pursued by the more hesitant Magill. Lombard’s method of annihilating 
entire  Jewish  communities  soon  became  the  standard  for  all  SS  and  police 
formations  in  Eastern  Europe:  by  interpreting  Himmler’s  orders  in  the  widest 
possible way, he was ‘working towards the  Führer’ just as his superiors expected 
him to do. Moreover, his loyal service in the SS cavalry, to which military fortune 
was later added, was the beginning of a career that was almost as impressive as that 
of Fegelein: until the end of the war, he rose to the official position of divisional 
commander  and  the  rank  of  SS-Brigadeführer.  His  example  shows  that  being 
unscrupulous,  brutal,  and well-connected  as  a  protégé  of  Hermann Fegelein  was 
even more important than being an ‘old fighter’ like Heimo Hierthes or a disciplined 
officer like the luckless Magill.395 Moreover, Gustav Lombard was a prime example 
of a radical organiser who made the Holocaust possible in the first place. 
  Hermann Gadischke represents the middle level in the hierarchy of the SS cavalry: 
as squadron commander in Poland, he displayed such a brutality towards the Jews 
who lived near the garrison that his own men nicknamed him ‘tiger of Kielce’.396 
Unlike  Lombard  who tried  to  be  a  fatherly superior  to  his  men,  Gadischke  was 
radicalised the behaviour of the SS cavalrymen at Mosyr in early September, 1941; see  Cüppers, 
Wegbereiter,  p.  197. A biographical  study  of  Fegelein  indicates  faults  in  his  character,  such  as 
unscrupulousness, an inclination to violence, and possible alcoholism but no mental problems as von 
dem Bach-Zelewski showed them. See Riess, ‘Fegelein’, p. 170.
395 Cüppers, ‘Gustav Lombard’, pp. 145-156; see especially pp. 150-151; Martin Cüppers, ‘Vorreiter 
der  Shoah.  Ein Vergleich der  Einsätze beider  SS-Kavallerieregimenter  im August  1941’,  in T.  C. 
Richter, (ed.),  Krieg und Verbrechen. Situation und Intention: Fallbeispiele (Munich, 2006), pp. 87-
99; Dienstlaufbahn von Gustav Lombard, in: BArchB, SSO Gustav Lombard. For the principle of 
'working towards the Führer', see the correspondent chapter in Kershaw, Hitler. 1889 – 1936, pp. 663-
744.
396 Vernehmung von Paul Klose vom 2.12. 1968, in:  BArchL,  B 162/5542, p. j137. According to 
another former trooper, Gadischke was called ‘tiger of Lukow – Camienna’; see  Vernehmung von 
Klaas Kruizenga vom 9.4. 1964, in: BArchL, B 162/5542, p. j67.
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feared and disliked. Former cavalrymen who served under him recalled him as being 
a brutal drunkard and referred to him as ‘bluthund’ or ‘sauhund’ even twenty years 
after the war. He led the machine-gun squadron of the 1st Regiment in the Pripet 
Marshes,  personally  supervised  executions  and  shot  people  himself  on  two 
occasions.397 But  not  only  did  he  become  responsible  for  many  killings  as 
commanding officer: he also committed murder out of base motives. According to 
the testimony of a former soldier of his squadron, Gadischke ordered one man to 
shoot a two-year old child because it had cried and disturbed him when the unit was 
quartered  in  a  village  in  Belorussia.  The  soldier  obeyed  the  order.398 Gadischke 
lacked the education and connections of men like Fegelein or Lombard; if they were 
the  organisers  of  mass  murder  then  he  was  the  executioner.  Of  the  men  in  the 
sample,  he  is  perhaps  most  comparable  with  other  low-level  personnel  of  the 
Holocaust, such as junior ranks in the concentration camp guard units. By fighting 
bravely during the brigade’s nemesis at Rzhev, however, he built on the valour for 
which he had been decorated during the First World War, and Hermann Fegelein 
recommended  him  for  the  German  Cross  in  Gold.399 Thus,  Gadischke  perfectly 
embodied the ‘dual role’ of the SS Cavalry Brigade. 
  The same applies to some of the younger officers from the sample, particularly 
Hans-Viktor von Zastrow and Ulrich Goertz. As members of the so-called war youth 
generation,  they  were  missing  Gadischke’s  frontline  experience  but  soon 
distinguished  themselves  in  the  Soviet  Union:  von  Zastrow  was  commended  at 
Turov, whereas Goertz had won both classes of the Iron Cross since the beginning of 
397 Abschlußbericht der ZStl vom 20.8. 1963, p. 370; Vernehmung von Karl Spiess vom 25.6. 1963, 
in:  BArchL, B 162/5542, pp. i35-38;  Vernehmung von Paul Klose vom 2.12. 1968, in:  BArchL, B 
162/5542, p. j140; Vernehmung von Richard Gloth vom 14.8. 1962, in: BArchL, B 162/5542, p. i2; 
Vernehmung von Klaas Kruizenga vom 9.4. 1964, in: BArchL, B 162/5542, p. j67.
398 Vernehmung von Josef Zorn vom 21.5. 1963, in: BArchL, B 162/5542, p. i30.
399 Vorschlag für die Verleihung des Deutschen Kreuzes in Gold an Hermann Gadischke vom 19.4. 
1942, in: BArchB, SSO Hermann Gadischke.
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the war.400 In these two cases,  too,  personal  gallantry and brutality went hand in 
hand: von Zastrow was responsible for the killing of at least 100 Jews at Serniki and 
for further acts of violence committed at Mozyr’, whereas Goertz led the second 
squadron of the 1st Regiment when it killed thousands of Jews at Khomsk, Ivanovo, 
Khoiniki and other places. Both officers were killed during the fighting at Rzhev.401 
Another casualty of the SS cavalry’s winter campaign was Stefan Charwat, who had 
played a key role in organising the mass murder at Pinsk, where his conduct had 
been  praised  by  Erich  von  dem  Bach-Zelewski  himself.402 These  cases  are 
emblematic of the character of the SS Cavalry Brigade: men like Gadischke, von 
Zastrow, Goertz or Charwat could be placed in any situation by their superiors and 
carried out their orders regardless of any moral qualms. They quickly grew into the 
‘dual role’ of the unit by becoming involved in killings and proving themselves in 
combat. Their deaths not only meant losses of qualified leaders for the SS cavalry 
but  also  complicated  post-war  investigations  as  the  men  could  no  longer  be 
questioned  about  or  indicted  for  the  crimes  they  had  committed  in  the  Soviet 
Union.403
  An  analysis  of  the  officers  of  the  SS  Cavalry  Brigade  has  to  go  beyond  the 
commanders of the mounted units during the summer of 1941. Even several officers 
from the lower levels of the unit’s hierarchy made an astonishing career in the SS, 
most notably Kurt Becher, who served as a junior officer in the brigade staff and was 
involved  in  the  composition  of  killing  orders  during  the  missions  in  the  Pripet 
400 For  von  Zastrow’s  commendation,  see  chapter  4.  For  Goertz’s  decorations,  see  Todesanzeige 
Ulrich Goertz (undated), BArchB, SSO Ulrich Goertz. 
401 Zusammenfassender Bericht der Tagesmeldungen der SS-Divisionen vom 13.1. 1942, BArchB, NS 
19/1520, fiche 20-24; Zusammenstellung der Verluste der SS-Divisionen vom 17.4. 1942, ibid., fiche 
71-78; Todesanzeige Ulrich Goertz.
402 For  the  involvement  of  von  Zastrow,  Goertz,  and  Charwat  in  crimes  of  the  SS  cavalry  in 
Belorussia, see ch. 4.
403 Gadischke did not survive the war either; the sources do not provide much information on his death 
but it can be assumed that he was killed at Budapest in 1945. See Abschlußbericht der ZStl vom 20.8. 
1963, pp. 380-381; Einstellungsverfügung gg. Lombard u.a., p. 1772. 
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Marshes.404 He became Fegelein’s aide and remained with the SS Cavalry Brigade 
until  the end of 1941, when he was transferred to the  SS-Führungshauptamt and 
became responsible for the acquisition of horses for the SS throughout 1942 and 
1943.405 Becher established a close relationship with Heinrich Himmler, for whom he 
fulfilled  special  tasks  in  Hungary  in  1944,  such  as  the  expropriation  of  a  large 
industrial group, the Manfred Weiss company, which led to the incorporation of the 
group into the economic empire of the SS. But Himmler’s interests went beyond 
such transactions: he also meant to establish contact with the Western allies through 
a trade which envisaged the exchange of one million Hungarian Jews for trucks and 
other  supplies  for  the  German  army.  Kurt  Becher  carried  out  the  necessary 
negotiations  with  Jewish  organisations;  this  deal,  however,  was  not  accepted  by 
Germany’s wartime enemies.406 
  In  his  importance  to  the  Reichsführer (which  also  was  reflected  in  the  high 
decorations he received, along with reaching the rank of Standartenführer until the 
end  of  the  war)  and  his  relative  youth,  Kurt  Becher  resembled  other  men  like 
Joachim Peiper and Hermann Fegelein. They all were protégés of Heinrich Himmler 
who had been selected by him personally to serve in key positions throughout the 
Third Reich and the Second World War. It is possible that Himmler believed to be 
able to form them as he thought best, as opposed to the older but more experienced 
soldiers  under  his  command with  whom he  often  was  in  conflict,  such  as  Josef 
‘Sepp’ Dietrich or Paul Hausser.407
  As far as the officer corps of the SS Cavalry Brigade in general is concerned, its 
404 Müller-Tupath, Becher, pp. 99-103.
405 Ibid., pp. 114-122.
406 Ibid., pp. 125-142 and pp. 149-157.
407 For  Dietrich,  see  Clark,  ‘Josef  ‘Sepp’ Dietrich’,  pp.  119-133, especially p.  121-123;  see  also 
Weingartner, ‘Sepp Dietrich, Heinrich Himmler, and the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler’, pp. 264-284, 
especially pp. 274-275 and pp. 279-281. For Hausser, see Enrico Syring, ‘Paul Hausser, ‘Türöffner’ 
und Kommandeur ‘seiner’ Waffen-SS’, in R. Smelser and E. Syring (eds.), Die SS – Elite unter dem 
Totenkopf. 30 Lebensläufe (Paderborn, Munich, Vienna, Zurich 2000), pp. 190-207, especially p. 193.
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key importance for the behaviour of the unit has to be noted. On different hierarchy 
levels,  a  very  successful  cooperation  was  established.  This  was  based  on  four 
elements: Fegelein's ambition (which had helped to found the brigade in the first 
place),  a  strong  National  Socialist  attitude,  previous  experience  in  the  military 
(sometimes stretching back to the First World War), and a career in the SS. To this 
added  a  whole  new  dynamic  once  the  SS  cavalry  was  ordered  to  carry  out 
ideological tasks: in their attempt of 'working towards the Führer', whose will was 
represented by their superiors Heinrich Himmler and Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, 
they executed the brutal mechanisms and intentions of the Nazi state. Although their 
military qualifications were often insufficient,  the SS cavalry officers carried out 
their duty as best they could, which brought them to fulfil the 'dual role' of the unit in 
1941 and 1942. Thus, it can be stated that the institutional-level conduct of the SS 
Cavalry Brigade was determined by the officer corps, which was characterised by 
ambition, fanaticism, endurance, and flexibility.
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4) Conditioning to mass killing: the SS cavalrymen in the Pripet Marshes
  With the start of their mission in Belorussia, the SS cavalrymen underwent another 
phase of radicalisation: from executions of small groups of people, the units went 
over  to  acts  of  mass  violence  with  thousands  of  victims.  The  ideological  role 
continued to dominate the military aspect as only a small number of soldiers from 
the 1st Regiment had seen action near Bialystok, whereas for the vast majority of the 
men deployment in the Soviet Union began with killings of innocent people. This did 
not change until late 1941, with the exception of occasional skirmishes with Red 
Army stragglers and an encounter at Turov in August.  It  has to be noted that an 
intensification of violence was witnessed by many German soldiers both at the front 
and in the hinterland; the two SS cavalry regiments, however, soon carried out a 
murderous campaign that can only be compared to that of units which were deployed 
for  that  purpose  only,  namely  the  police  battalions  of  the  order  police  and  the 
Einsatzgruppen of the SS. What set the brigade apart from these killing squads was 
an institutional brutalisation from above: the issuing of radical orders by Heinrich 
Himmler triggered a new dynamic of violence as Hermann Fegelein and his officers 
adjusted their instructions to the point of complete annihilation of those defined as 
enemies by National Socialist ideology. Within this frame of reference, most of the 
victims were unarmed civilians and predominantly Jews. As before in Poland, the 
soldiers became accustomed to the new situation very quickly. 
 After setting out from Arys, the SS cavalry advanced eastward through the territory 
in which the 1st SS cavalry regiment had just fought two weeks earlier. Via Osowiec, 
Bialystok, Volkovysk, and Slonim, they were to reach Baranovichi, from where their 
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new mission was to start on 28 July.408 
Map 1: Operational area of the SS Cavalry Brigade, July – September, 1941
  Hermann  Fegelein  and  the  staff  of  the  1st Regiment  took  their  quarters  at 
Liakhovichi, some 10 miles southeast of Baranovichi.409 As soon as they had arrived 
in  Belorussia,  the  commander  of  the  Kommandostab,  Knoblauch,  and  Fegelein 
consulted with the HSSPF, von dem Bach-Zelewski, about the deployment of the SS 
cavalry in the Pripet Marshes.410 On this occasion, Knoblauch delivered a  special 
order from Heinrich Himmler, the so-called Kommandosonderbefehl. It assessed the 
capabilities of the mounted SS units, defined the guidelines for their actions in this 
area, including military tactics, and also established the close collaboration between 
408 Kommandobefehl Nr. 19 vom 19.7. 1941, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 1, file 170.
409 Abschlußbericht der ZStl vom 20.8. 1963, p. 367.
410 KTB KDOS, entry from 27 July, 1941.
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units  of  the  Waffen-SS and  order  police. The  marshes  were  to  be  patrolled  and 
‘cleansed’  of  ‘marauders’  and  partisans.  As  far  as  the  local  population  was 
concerned, the order divided it up into groups which were viewed as being well-
disposed to  the Germans,  such as Ukrainians,  and potentially hostile  groups  like 
Russians and Poles. Jews were not mentioned explicitly but the order demanded that 
if the inhabitants of the area were ‘racially and humanly inferior’ they were to be 
shot  ‘if  they were suspected of  supporting  the partisans’.  Moreover,  women and 
children were to be deported (without any further specification), livestock and food 
should be seized and villages burned to the ground.411
  This rather general and very brutal  instruction included every possible political, 
military  or  racial  opponent  of  the  Germans  and  was  in  breach  of  the  Hague 
Convention  which  forbade  any  inclusion  of  the  civilian  population  in  combat 
operations, let alone the pre-emptive destruction of settlements based on politically 
motivated suspicions.  It marks the beginning of ideological warfare in the Pripet 
Marshes and  was  the  first  step  of  Himmler’s  orders  for  murder.  Based on  the 
Kommandosonderbefehl Hermann  Fegelein  issued  the  first  order  regarding  the 
mission of the two SS Cavalry Regiments in the Pripet Marshes on the same day. 
The general task was to ‘comb and pacify’ an operational area which was defined as 
a rectangle that stretched some 160 miles from west to east and about 50 miles from 
north  to  south.  The  river  Pripet  ran  in  the  middle  of  it  and  roughly formed the 
dividing line between the sector of the 1st Regiment in the north and the 2nd in the 
south.  Both units  were ordered to  dispatch their  horse squadrons as fast  moving 
detachments which were to cross the marshes along the main roads and to conduct 
reconnaissance missions deeper into the swamps. Whereas regular enemy soldiers 
were  to  be  taken  prisoner,  ‘Russian  soldiers  in  plain  clothes’ and  ‘armed  and 
411 Kommandosonderbefehl.  Richtlinien  für  die  Durchkämmung  und  Durchstreifung  von 
Sumpfgebieten durch Reitereinheiten, 28 July, 1941, in Unsere Ehre heißt Treue, pp. 210-213.
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sabotaging civilians’ should be shot. ‘Combing’ and ‘pacifying’ did not only refer to 
the securing of the area in this case but  were also euphemisms for mass killing, as 
becomes clear by the detailed definitions given by Fegelein. He demanded that male 
Jews were ‘to be treated as looters for the most part’, which meant they were to be 
killed. Only doctors and skilled workers were exempt from this directive. Women 
and children, on the other hand, were to be ‘driven away’, an instruction that was not 
specified further at this point.412 In the prospective operational area of the SS Cavalry 
Brigade, the SS leadership anticipated villages which were inhabited by ‘criminals’ 
who had been deported to the swamps, thus hinting at the Soviet prison camp system 
and Stalin’s policies of exiling undesirables.413 The orders by Himmler and Fegelein 
also aimed at  the  formation  of  local  ‘militias’,  which  were to  be  recruited from 
volunteers.414 The  Reichsführer intended  to  deploy  these  Schutzmannschaften as 
guards and as a support force in killing operations.415
  The content of the directives demonstrates that the Germans failed to fully take into 
412 Regimentsbefehl Nr. 42 für den Einsatz Pripec-Sümpfe, 27 July, 1941, in: BArchL, Dokumenten-
Sammlung, Ordner Verschiedenes 291-17, pp. 2-5. For the sequence, content and formulation of the 
two  orders,  see  also  Cüppers,  Wegbereiter,  pp.  138-139,  esp.  p.  138,  footnote  76.  Although  the 
wording of the order did not imply the killing of all Jews, the intention of mass executions becomes 
clear. This was also true for the general agreements between the SS and the Wehrmacht: as Christian 
Hartmann has proven, the nature of the agreements between Heydrich and Wagner, for example, was 
clearly criminal and aimed at giving the SS free rein for executions.  See  Hartmann,  Wehrmacht im 
Ostkrieg, p., p. 645.
413 Kommandosonderbefehl, 28 July, 1941, in Unsere Ehre heißt Treue, p. 212; Regimentsbefehl Nr. 
42, 27 July, 1941, in: BArchL, Dokumenten-Sammlung, Ordner Verschiedenes 291-17, p. 4.
414 Martin  Dean,  Collaboration  in  the  Holocaust:  crimes  of  the  local  police  in  Belorussia  and  
Ukraine, 1941-44  (Basingstoke, 2000), p. 21 and p. 30.  This directive was influenced by different 
agencies  on  the  German  side:  the  Wirtschaftsstab  Ost (Economic  Staff  East)  recommended  the 
establishment of a local  auxiliary police as a security measure that was supposed to aid the new 
occupation authorities in ensuring ‘the intended policy for feeding the Army off the land’; see Martin 
Dean, ‘Local Collaboration in the Holocaust in Eastern Europe’, in D. Stone (ed.), Historiography of  
the  Holocaust (Basingstoke,  2004),  p.  127.  This  source  does  not  state  when  exactly  the 
Wirtschaftsstab  Ost approached  other  German  agencies  for  more  security  personnel.  For  the 
Wirtschaftsstab  Ost,  see  also  Rolf-Dieter  Müller,  ‘Von  der  Wirtschaftsallianz  zum  kolonialen 
Ausbeutungskrieg‘, in H. Boog and others, Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Bd. 4: Der  
Angriff auf die Sowjetunion (Stuttgart, 1987), pp. 129-135. As the safeguarding of the rear areas was 
the task of  the  SS,  the  army high command asked for  more security forces,  which  led Heinrich 
Himmler to the issuing of orders regarding the formation of so-called Schutzmannschaften (auxiliary 
police forces), consisting of ‘Ukrainians, the inhabitants of the Baltic states and Belorussians’. See 
RFSS to the Higher SS and Police Leaders, 25 July, 1941, in: BArchF, RW 41/4, quoted in Dean, 
‘Local Collaboration in the Holocaust in Eastern Europe’, p. 126.
415 Dean, Collaboration in the Holocaust, pp. 27-28.
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account  the  extremely  bloody  developments  that  had  swept  through  Belorussia 
during  the  past  twenty  years.  There  were  no  villages  which  were  inhabited  by 
‘criminals’, but the locals had been subject to many radical changes. After the end of 
the First World War, it was not until the treaty of Riga ended the Polish – Bolshevik 
war in 1921 that a real eastern border was established for Poland. The Soviet Union 
was founded in the following year,  and Belarusians,  Ukrainians and Poles  found 
themselves  living  on  both  sides  of  the  new  border  in  a  still  heavily  contested 
region.416 There was now a Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic with a capital in 
Minsk,  and  the  Polish  ‘eastern  border  regions’,  or  ‘Kresy  Wschodnie’,  which 
stretched  far  to  the  east  and  included  the  provincial  centres  of  Baranovichi  and 
Pinsk.417 After the beginning of the Second World War, the Soviet Union invaded 
eastern Poland and incorporated the ‘Kresy Wschodnie’  into the Belorussian Soviet 
Republic, which was thus significantly extended: its territory grew by 45% and the 
population rose from 5.6 million to 10.4 million.418 The Jewish minority expanded 
from 400,000 to about one million.419
  Ethnic  minorities  had  become  subject  to  different  measures  of  the  respective 
authorities during the interwar period: on the Polish side, Belarusian identity was 
416 Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands. Europe between Hitler and Stalin (London, 2010), p. 8.
417 Timothy  Snyder,  The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine,  Lithuania, Belarus, 1569 – 
1999  (New  Haven,  Conn.,  London,  2003),  pp.  65-68.  The  ‘Kresy  Wschodnie’ consisted  of  the 
voivodeships  of  Wilna,  Nowogrodek,  Polesie  and  Volhynia  as  well  as  the  eastern  parts  of  the 
Bialystok  region;  see  Bernhard  Chiari,  Alltag  hinter  der  Front.  Besatzung,  Kollaboration  und  
Widerstand in Weißrußland 1941-1944 (Düsseldorf, 1998), p. 32.
418 David R. Marples, ‘Die Sozialistische Sowjetrepublik Weißrußland (1917-1945)’, in D. Beyrau and 
D. Lindner (eds.),  Handbuch der Geschichte Weißrußlands (Göttingen, 2001), p. 148; Chiari, Alltag 
hinter der Front, p. 29 and pp. 36-38. Other parts of the ‘Kresy Wschodnie’ further south became part 
of the Ukraine; see ibid., pp. 37-38.
419 Before 1939, about 400,000 Jews lived in Soviet Belorussia; see Mikola  Iwanou, ‘Die jüdische 
Welt  in  Weißrußland  vom Ende des  19.  Jahrhunderts  bis  zum Holocaust’,  in  D.  Beyrau  and  D. 
Lindner  (eds.),  Handbuch  der  Geschichte  Weißrußlands (Göttingen,  2001),  p.  402,  and  Joshua 
Rubenstein  and  Ilya  Altman  (eds.),  The  Unknown  Black  Book.  The  Holocaust  in  the  German-
occupied Soviet Territories (Bloomington, IN 2008), p. 233. Bernhard Chiari estimates that 940,000 
Jews lived in Belorussia on the eve of the German invasion in 1941; see  Chiari,  Alltag hinter der  
Front, p. 48. Rubenstein and Altman, on the other hand, assume that 1,075,000 Jews lived in the 
Soviet republic in 1941. Their higher estimate is based on the assumption that many Jews fled from 
the  German-occupied  to  the  Soviet-occupied  part  of  Poland;  see  Rubenstein  and  Altman,  The 
Unknown Black Book, p. 233.
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suppressed throughout the 1920s and 1930s. The Soviet government, on the other 
hand, strongly supported Belarusian and Polish culture and language in the 1920s in 
order to prepare the assimilation of Polish regions. The freedom granted to these 
ethnicities was taken from them again in the 1930s when national minorities were 
persecuted throughout the Soviet Union. Belorussia was russified, a process that was 
extended to the former parts of eastern Poland after their annexation by the Soviet 
Union in  1939.420 The Belorussian Soviet  Republic,  before and after  its  wartime 
enlargement, also became the scene of massacres and deportations that were part of 
the so-called ‘Great Terror’ and other radical initiatives of the Stalin administration. 
Measures in the late 1920s and early 1930s were predominantly directed against 
peasants in the course of the ‘collectivisation’, the brutal synchronisation of Soviet 
agriculture. Later campaigns until the German attack in 1941 were aimed at ethnic 
minorities, especially the Poles, who had formed the elites in the western part of the 
Belorussian Soviet  Republic.421 It  is  estimated  that  at  least  some 200,000 people 
belonging to different ethnicities and social levels were deported from Belorussia or 
executed between 1921 and 1939,  and another  120,000 between 1939 and 1941, 
when  the  Soviet  government  consolidated  its  power  in  the  newly  annexed 
territories.422
  In their ignorance of the political situation and the composition of the population in 
the  Pripet  Marshes,  the  orders  given  out  by  Himmler  and  Fegelein  somewhat 
420 Snyder, Bloodlands, p. 98; Bernhard Chiari, ‘Deutsche Herrschaft in Weißrußland. Überlegungen 
zum lokalen und historischen Umfeld’, in: W. Kaiser (ed.): Täter im Vernichtungskrieg. Der Überfall  
auf die Sowjetunion und der Völkermord an den Juden (Berlin, 2002), pp. 142-143; Chiari,  Alltag 
hinter der Front, pp. 28-32.
421 Bernhard Chiari, ‘Die Kriegsgesellschaft Weißrußland im Zweiten Weltkrieg (1939-1944)’, in D. 
Beyrau and D. Lindner (eds.), Handbuch der Geschichte Weißrußlands (Göttingen, 2001), p. 412.
422 Mikola Iwanou, ‘Terror, Deportation, Genozid: Demographische Veränderungen in  Weißrußland 
im 20. Jahrhundert’, in D.  Beyrau and D. Lindner (eds.),  Handbuch der Geschichte Weißrußlands 
(Göttingen, 2001), pp. 431-433. Snyder estimates that ‘as a result of executions and death sentences 
the number of Poles in Soviet Belarus fell by more than sixty thousand during the Great Terror’; see 
Snyder, Bloodlands, p. 99.
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resemble the inadequate preparation of the  Einsatzgruppen for their task.423 Upon 
entering Belorussia and the Pripet Marshes, Fegelein’s soldiers found themselves in 
a region ‘where people proverbially had difficulty ascertaining the nationality of the 
locals’.424 Their  preconceptions  of  potentially  hostile  or  friendly  ethnic  groups, 
however, proved to be false: the local population was not hostile at all but rather 
‘pro-German’, an impression that was also shared by the HSSPF and the Wehrmacht 
commander  of  the  rear  areas  of  Army  Group  Centre,  general  Max  von 
Schenckendorff.425 The SS cavalrymen were presented with gifts of bread and salt; at 
one occasion they were even greeted by a band that played for them. Franz Magill 
noted that there were differences in how members of different ethnicities reacted to 
the  presence  of  the  Germans:  whereas  Ukrainians  and  Belorussians  were  very 
accommodating,  Russians  and  Poles  were  more  reserved.  All  of  these  groups, 
however,  welcomed  the  fact  that  ‘the  Bolsheviks  had  been  expulsed’.426 Gustav 
Lombard described the local population in the same way. Both officers also noted the 
anti-Semitism of the locals.427
423 The personnel of the Einsatzgruppen had to deal with numerous shortcomings of their preparation 
immediately before and after the beginning of their deployment in the Soviet Union. As the Reich 
Security Main Office (RSHA), the SS agency that organised the killing squads, only had fragmentary 
information about the Soviet security apparatus, lists of enemy officials were incomplete; they even 
missed Lavrentiy Beria, the head of the Soviet security and secret police (NKVD). There also were 
not enough interpreters so that captured Soviet documents could not be evaluated straightaway.  See 
Michael  Wildt,  Generation des Unbedingten. Das Führungskorps des Reichssicherheitshauptamtes 
(Hamburg, 2002), p. 554, and Krausnick and Wilhelm, Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges, pp. 
170-172.
424 Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations, p. 66.
425 Hasenclever, Wehrmacht und Besatzungspolitik, pp. 207. 
426 Bericht  über  den  Verlauf  der  Pripjet-Aktion  vom  27.7.  –  11.8.  1941,  12  August,  1941,  SS-
Kavallerie-Regiment 2, Reitende Abteilung, in: Unsere Ehre heißt Treue, p. 217.
427 Abschlußbericht  des  Rgts.  1  vom  11.8.  1941,  in:  BArchL,  Dokumenten-Sammlung,  Ordner 
Verschiedenes 291-17, pp. 6-7. For the anti-Semitism of the locals, see ibid., p. 6 and Bericht über den 
Verlauf der Pripjet-Aktion vom 27.7. – 11.8. 1941, 12 August, 1941, in: Unsere Ehre heißt Treue, p. 
220.
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The first mission in Belorussia (30 July – 11 August, 1941)
  The cleansing operations commenced immediately once the SS cavalry units had 
set  up their  command centre  at  Liakhovichi.  The  squadrons  conducted extensive 
searches  of  woodlands  as  well  as  settlements,  a  procedure  which  involved  the 
mounted detachments as well as parts of the staff units and other squadrons. Non-
mounted units of the 1st Regiment remained stationary for the most part, whereas the 
2nd Regiment  sent  out  everything  apart  from  its  staff.428 In  Liakhovichi,  SS 
cavalrymen  also  executed  communists  who  had  been  denounced  by  the  local 
population.429 At Turki, a small village nearby, soldiers of the mounted battery of the 
1st Regiment arrested six members of the Communist party and shot them.430 The 
subunits of the 2nd Regiment were ordered to conduct reconnaissance in the forests 
south and southeast of Liakhovichi, between the town and the northern boundary of 
the ‘combing’ sector of the 1st Regiment. Partly in collaboration with local militias, 
they  searched  forests,  villages  and  houses,  and  arrested  Jews,  communists  and 
suspected partisans; most of those arrested were shot straightaway. Within a week, 
114 people were executed, most of them ‘Bolsheviks’ and male Jews.431
428 Situation reports  of  the  2nd Regiment  give  evidence  on  the  involvement  of  three  independent 
platoons, the infantry support gun squadron, the mounted battery and all of its baggage trains, which 
were combined in a separate detachment; see Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit v. 28. – 30.7.  1941, SS-
Kav. Rgt. 2, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 2; Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit v. 31.7. – 
3.8. 1941, SS-Kav. Rgt. 2, ibid.; Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit v. 3. – 6.8. 1941, SS-Kav. Rgt. 2, ibid. 
The reason for the difference in deployment between the two regiments is not given in the original 
documents. I assume that, as the staff of the 1st Regiment took on the function of a brigade staff from 
early August, 1941, the other squadrons and support units were needed to provide security for the staff 
and reserves for the units in the field so that not all of them could be used for combing operations.
429 Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit v. 27. – 31.7. 1941, SS-Kav. Rgt. 1, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, 
box 24, file 1, p. 485.
430 Vernehmung Otto Prade vom 30.10. 1962 in  BArchL, B 162/5543, p. 31; see also  Vernehmung 
Heinz Büttner vom 19.5. 1961, ibid., p. 5.
431 Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit v. 28. – 30.7. 1941, SS-Kav. Rgt. 2, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, 
box  24,  file  2;  Tätigkeitsbericht  für  die  Zeit  v.  31.7.  –  3.8.  1941,  SS-Kav.  Rgt.  2,  ibid.; 
Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit v. 3. – 6.8. 1941, SS-Kav. Rgt. 2, ibid.; radio message no. 5 from HSSPF 
Mitte to KDOS RFSS, 4 August, 1941, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 1, file 4.  As in many 
other  reports  which  were  to  follow,  the  reasons  for  some  of  these  executions  appeared  to  be 
constructed along the lines mentioned above: twenty Jews, who had been shot by the motorcycle 
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  Three significant conclusions can be drawn from these first operations. First, the SS 
cavalrymen only targeted  Jewish  men at  the  beginning  of  their  mission.  This  is 
important because it was in accordance with the general approach of the German 
killing units in the Soviet Union at this time but changed just a few days later to an 
even more radical method, the murder of all Jews in the operational area. Thus, by 
differentiating  between the  modus  operandi  at  the  beginning  of  the  mission  and 
during its further course, it is possible to demonstrate the effect of the brutal orders 
and the initiative of the leaders in the SS cavalry. Second, non-mounted components 
of both regiments were involved in the murder operations as well – in the case of the 
2nd Regiment,  almost  the  entire  available  manpower  apart  from  the  staff  was 
employed in missions similar to those of the horse squadrons. They compensated for 
their comparatively limited mobility, which ruled out deployment in more difficult 
terrain, by ‘cleansing’ areas they could reach on roads, primarily near their quarters. 
Third,  regional inhabitants  actively supported the occupants by turning in former 
representatives  of  the  Soviet  system  and  by  forming  local  militias,  which  also 
engaged in searching operations. They also supplied the Germans with information 
on the whereabouts of Red Army stragglers. Deeper in the marshes, where German 
forces had not yet penetrated, the mounted squadrons soon encountered the same 
phenomena  and  also  triggered  other  forms  of  collaboration  themselves,  most 
importantly the identification of Jews, and the appointment of mayors.
  From the  beginning  of  their  mission,  the  SS  cavalry  was  integrated  into  the 
structure of the occupation administration. The Higher SS and Police Leader Centre, 
Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, and the commander of the rear area of Army Group 
Centre,  general  Max  von  Schenckendorff,  closely  coordinated  the  operations  of 
platoon, were accused of ‘sympathising with the Red Army’ and ‘suspected of supporting the gangs 
[of partisans] in the woods’; a Red Army man, on the other hand, was said to have returned to his 
village in the course of the Soviet retreat but allegedly had continued to uphold the connection with 
the Soviet army; see Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom 28. – 30.7. 1941, SS-Kav. Rgt. 2, in: VUA, 
Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 2.
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troops under their respective command. These two officers shared the same concept 
of the enemy, defined as ‘Jewish Bolshevism’, which they intended to destroy. The 
Wehrmacht general approved of the massacres which were committed by SS and 
police forces as he viewed them as a contribution to the safeguarding of his sector. 
He was also involved in the planning of their operations and developed an excellent 
relationship with von dem Bach-Zelewski.432
  On 30 July, 1941, the cavalry detachments of the 1st and 2nd Regiment began with 
the ‘combing’ of the marshes from starting points along a north-south line that ran 
from Kobrin in south-western Belorussia to Kovel’ in the north-western Ukraine.433 
The  sectors  they  had  been  assigned  were  quite  different  in  nature.  Whereas  the 
subunits of the 1st regiment were to traverse a largely inaccessible area with small 
hamlets, villages and only a few towns north of the Pripet river, subunits of the 2nd 
regiment received orders to ‘pacify’ the more densely populated region south of it, 
which also included some market towns and the regional centre of Pinsk.434 What the 
designated ‘combing’ areas  of the two regiments  had in  common was their  very 
mixed  ethnic  composition.  The  dominating  groups  were  Poles  and  Ukrainians; 
Russians,  Lithuanians  and  others  were  only  minorities.  Jews  made  up  a  strong 
contingent, especially in the larger villages and towns; at some places, they even 
constituted the majority of the population.435
432 Hasenclever,  Wehrmacht  und  Besatzungspolitik,  pp.  174-176  and  pp.  474-496.  With  few 
exceptions, commanders of the Wehrmacht, SS and police generally cooperated very closely during 
the first months of the German war against the Soviet Union. This happened not only at command 
level,  but  also  locally,  for  example  between  police  units  and  Feldkommandanturen or 
Ortskommandanturen.  Both  sides  profited  from  a  division  of  labour:  the  army  could  delegate 
executions to SS and police units, which in turn could count on logistical and military support from 
the Wehrmacht. See Pohl, Die Herrschaft der Wehrmacht, pp. 153-158.
433 Regimentsbefehl  Nr.  42,  27  July,  1941,  in:  BArchL,  Dokumenten-Sammlung,  Ordner 
Verschiedenes 291-17, pp. 2-3. Each squadron was allocated a front that was about 6 miles wide; see 
Abschlußbericht der Zentralen Stelle vom 20.8. 1963, p. 368. See also  Justiz und NS-Verbrechen:  
Sammlung deutscher Strafurteile wegen nationalsozialistischer Tötungsverbrechen 1945 – 1966. Bd.  
20, pp. 45-46 and Einstellungsverfügung gg. Lombard u.a., p. 1752.
434 Cüppers, ‘Vorreiter der Shoah’, p. 93.
435 Bericht über den Verlauf der Pripjet-Aktion vom 27.7. – 11.8. 1941, 12 August, 1941, quoted in 
Unsere Ehre heißt Treue, p. 217.
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  For operations in the swamps, a reporting scheme was given out by the regimental 
commanders:  on  a  daily  basis,  the  squadrons  were  to  report  their  position,  the 
numbers of prisoners, the numbers of ‘looters’ who had been shot, and their losses of 
weapons, horses, and men. Within this scheme, the third point should soon become 
infamous as ‘looters’ stood for the number of Jews killed by the SS cavalrymen.436 
The regimental staffs compiled these reports, added information on the general status 
of their units and passed on detailed situation reports to the Kommandostab. These 
two types of accounts are the main sources which give evidence about the missions 
of the SS cavalry in the Pripet Marshes.
  While the motorised and mounted detachments had begun to operate, two important 
decisions  were  made  regarding  the  new  structure  of  the  SS  cavalry  and  the 
incorporation of the unit in mass killings in the Soviet Union. On 31 July, Heinrich 
Himmler came to Baranovichi and met with von dem Bach-Zelewski to discuss the 
pacification’ mission of the mounted SS units. He also ordered the amalgamation of 
the two cavalry regiments, which now formed a brigade.437 Thus, the structure the 
two  regiments  had  assumed  for  the  march  into  Belorussia  was  maintained  and 
became the new institutional framework of the  SS cavalry.  It was, however, only 
officially acknowledged by the SS-Führungshauptamt with effect from 1 September, 
1941, a step which lagged behind operational practice by about four weeks.438 Whilst 
the regiments were deployed as a brigade in the second half of 1941, new subunits 
such as the bicycle reconnaissance detachment were formed as well, a development 
that began during the second mission in the Pripet Marshes.
436 Funkspruch des Stabs des SS-Kav.Rgts. 2 an Reitende Abteilung, 30 July, 1941, in: BArchF, RS 3-
8/36.
437 Witte, Der Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers, p. 189.
438 Verfügung des SS-Führungshauptamts über die  Umgliederung der SS-Kav.Regimenter 1 und 2 
vom 6.9.  1941, in:  BArchB, NS 19/3487, fiche 19-20. This discrepancy was also noticed by the 
investigators in the 1960s. They did not find any explanation for this but stressed that the important 
restructuring of  the  brigade  leadership  under  Fegelein's  command had been  completed  when the 
official acknowledgement was issued; see Abschlußbericht der ZStl vom 20.8. 1963, pp. 359-361.
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  By means of an order which can be considered as the ‘founding document’ of the 
SS Cavalry Brigade, Hermann Fegelein appointed several brigade staff officers and 
made  further  administrative  decisions  concerning  the  cooperation  of  the  two 
regiments with effect from 28 July, 1941. In his usual haughty manner, he expressed 
his aspiration that the brigade, as the first major cavalry formation of the Waffen-SS, 
might prove itself in battle and thus earn a reputation that would be known in the 
entire German army.  This could only be done by showing unfaltering rigour and 
overcoming any weakness of character; according to Fegelein, Himmler would not 
tolerate flaws any longer and ‘decide cold-bloodedly’ about any officer who broke 
rank.439
  Himmler’s visit in Baranovichi marks a turning point for the SS cavalry, not only 
because of the fusion of the two regiments. More importantly, he now changed the 
role  of  the  unit  from that  of  a  security  force  to  that  of  an  ideological  weapon. 
According to the communication between the regiments, the HSSPF Centre and the 
Kommandostab, about one thousand male Jews, communists and soldiers of the Red 
Army had been shot in the first few days of the new mission.440 The cavalrymen had 
not even come across major Jewish communities yet,  but nevertheless this policy 
was far from the ‘systematic combing of the marshes’ the Reichsführer had in mind. 
Thus, Himmler sent a telegram to Fegelein on 1 August in which he considered the 
number of civilians who had been killed so far as ‘too insignificant’. He stated that it 
was ‘necessary to act radically’ and that ‘the detachment commanders display too 
439 Schreiben an die Kommandeure und Chefs der SS-Kav.Brigade, 1 August, 1941, in: BArchF, RS 3-
8/20.
440 Files of the 1st Regiment do not contain information on Jews who fell victim to its squadrons in the 
last days of July. A report of the HSSPF states that 788 people had been shot by the 1 st Regiment until 
2 August; see situation report of the HSSPF Centre, 2 August, 1941, quoted in Christian Gerlach, 
Kalkulierte Morde. Die deutsche Wirtschafts- und Vernichtungspolitik in Weißrußland 1941 bis 1944 
(Hamburg, 1999),  p. 559. Before the order of 1 August, members of the 2nd Regiment shot 20 male 
Jews;  see  Tätigkeitsbericht  für  die  Zeit  vom  28.  –  30.7.  1941,  SS-Kav.  Rgt.  2,  in:  VUA, 
Kommandostab  RFSS,  box  24,  file  2.  In  the  four  days  after  that,  173  people  were  killed;  see 
Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit v. 31.7. – 3.8.  1941, SS-Kav. Rgt. 2, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, 
box 24, file 2.
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much leniency in  carrying  out  their  operations’.  The  number  of  people  shot,  he 
demanded, was to be reported to him daily.441
  Not only were more potential enemies to be eliminated; Himmler also aimed at 
significantly increasing the scope of the killings by including Jewish women and 
children,  which  meant  that  the  SS  Cavalry  Brigade  was  to  target  entire  Jewish 
communities. This directive came in the form of a clarification of regimental order 
no.  42.  It  has  been  preserved  in  two different  forms:  the  statement  of  a  former 
messenger  of  the  2nd Regiment  and  a  radio  message  received  by  the  mounted 
detachment of the same unit. According to the testimony, Himmler ordered to shoot 
all male Jews from the age of fourteen in the ‘combing areas’. Women and children 
were to be driven into the swamps and drowned. The Jews were to be considered as 
the  reservoir  of  the  partisans  and  as  their  supporters.  Executions  were  to  be 
conducted on instructions of local branches of the security service of the SS. In the 
town of Pinsk, executions were to be carried out by the first and the fourth squadron 
of the regiment, which were to be dispatched at once. The operation was to start 
immediately and was to be reported on a regular basis.442 The radio protocol, on the 
other hand, is very plain; it reads: ‘Explicit order from the R[eichs]F[ührer-]SS: All 
Jews must be shot, drive Jewish women into the swamps’.443
  The  inclusion  of  women  and  children  was  an  important  amendment  to  the 
instructions the SS cavalry had received so far. Himmler’s order of 1 August was the 
second step of the ‘political pacification’ of the Polesie region but had consequences 
441 Radio  message  no.  37  from  the  commander  of  the  SS  Cavalry  Brigade  to  the  mounted 
detachments, quoted in: Soviet Government Statements on Nazi Atrocities (London, 1946), p. 46. This 
work does not give a date for the telegram. Cüppers dates it 1 August, 1941, by viewing it in the 
context  of  the  Himmler order  given out  on August  1;  he views the  order  as  a  follow-up of  the 
message. See Cüppers, Wegbereiter, pp. 142-143 and p. 153. Gerlach assumes that this telegram was 
sent on 2 August, 1941; see Gerlach, Morde, p. 559.
442 Justiz  und  NS-Verbrechen:  Sammlung  deutscher  Strafurteile  wegen  nationalsozialistischer  
Tötungsverbrechen 1945 – 1966. Bd. 20, p. 48. According to the findings in the Magill case, this order 
reached the mounted detachment either on 2 August, 1941, or the following day.
443 Radio message, KavRgt. 2 an Reitende Abteilung, 1 August, 1941 (10 a.m.), in: BArchF, RS 3-
8/36.
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that reached far beyond this particular area. Not only did the policy of the SS cavalry 
units become even more radical: soon, other killing squads of the SS and police in 
the occupied Eastern territories,  who until  now had followed orders like the one 
given out by the HSSPF on 11 July and only had executed male Jews of a certain 
age, started to abide by the same approach. By the end of September 1941, all of 
Himmler’s murder units had gone over to killing Jews regardless of their gender and 
age; thus, Fegelein’s men had become ‘Wegbereiter der Shoah’, as Martin Cüppers 
has put it, the precursors to the total annihilation of all Jews in Europe.444
  In both regiments of the brigade, the commanders passed the instruction on to the 
mounted detachments which organised the deployment of individual units. Squadron 
leaders were informed about the Himmler order by a courier in most cases; some 
received it per radio message. They in turn briefed their subordinates and then sent 
them out to execute the order.445 But despite the fact that all SS cavalrymen received 
the same instructions, documents from the two regiments and postwar testimonies 
prove  that  Himmler’s  directive  was  carried  out  in  different  ways  by  the  two 
regiments of the brigade. Sturmbannführer Gustav Lombard, the commander of the 
444 For  a  detailed delineation of the inclusion of  Jewish women and children in the killings,  see 
Matthäus in  Browning, Die Entfesselung der ‘Endlösung’,  pp. 411-427. In  his work on the order 
police,  Wolfgang  Curilla lists executions of women and children which were carried out by police 
units and Einsatzgruppen before 1 August, 1941; see Curilla, Die deutsche Ordnungspolizei und der 
Holocaust im Baltikum und in Weißrußland 1941 – 1944, pp. 89-95. Most of these incidents did not 
result in the destruction of entire Jewish communities, apart from killings perpetrated by Reserve 
Police Battalion 45 in the Ukraine in July, 1941, and Einsatzkommando 2 in Latvia, also in July, 1941. 
In both places, the order was given for one particular town; see ibid., p. 90 and p. 92. In the case of 
Police Battalion 105, which also operated in Latvia, the exact date for a killing order regarding all 
Jews in one town could not be ascertained; see ibid., pp. 94-95. Therefore, the SS cavalrymen were 
the  first  to  receive  orders  for  the  indiscriminate  killing  of  all  Jews  they  encountered  in  their 
operational area. 
445 Within the 1st Regiment, the leader of the fourth squadron, SS-Hauptsturmführer Gadischke passed 
the order on. He acted as a messenger between the mounted detachment and the other squadrons; see 
Abschlußbericht der ZStl vom 20.8. 1963, p. 366, and Vernehmung von Georg Vieth vom 13.9. 1962, 
in: BArchL, B 162/5541,  p. g10.  Vieth, who at this time led the second platoon in the regiment’s 
second squadron, also confirmed the issue of the order by the squadron commanders who told their 
platoon and squad leaders to shoot all Jews they encountered; see ibid., p. g11. In the 2nd Regiment, 
the order was transmitted per messenger from the commander to the mounted detachment, whose 
commander informed the subordinate squadrons; see Justiz und NS-Verbrechen: Sammlung deutscher  
Strafurteile wegen nationalsozialistischer Tötungsverbrechen 1945 – 1966. Bd. 20,  pp. 46-49. The 
courier, a non-commissioned officer from the regimental staff, served the document directly to Magill 
in written form in a closed envelope; see Zwischenbericht der Sonderkommission Z, p. 576.
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mounted detachment of the 1st Regiment, slightly reworded the order by demanding 
from his  men:  ‘No  male  Jew stays  alive,  no  residual  family  in  the  villages’.446 
Following  his  instructions,  all  Jews  encountered  by  Lombard’s  men  were  killed 
immediately  in  mass  shootings,  a  method  that  was  cynically  termed  Entjudung 
(dejewification) by their commander. Lombard had borrowed this neologism from 
the Nazi economy, which used it for the exclusion of Jews from business since 1933; 
according to Martin Cüppers, he was the first person ever to use the word in the 
context of physical destruction.447 The principle of Entjudung resulted in the murder 
of the entire  Jewish population in  an area of more than 4,000 square kilometres 
within two weeks.448
  As they failed to actually ‘drive Jewish women into the swamps’, the men under 
Lombard’s command changed their killing method. A former soldier stated that when 
the women did not want to move on and held up their children to keep them from 
drowning, the soldiers ruthlessly machine-gunned those wading in the water.449 After 
this incident, women and children were shot at the same killing sites as the men. The 
troopers of the 2nd Regiment under the command of Sturmbannführer Franz Magill, 
on the other hand, gave up the idea of killing all Jewish women and children very 
quickly: 
446 Abteilungsbefehl Nr. 28, Kommandeur Reitende Abteilung, 1 August, 1941, in: BArchF, RS 4/441.
447 Cüppers, Wegbereiter, pp. 143-144, and Cüppers, ‘Vorreiter der Shoah’, pp. 90-92.
448 Cüppers, ‘Vorreiter der Shoah’, p. 96.
449 Vernehmung von Klaas Kruizenga vom 9.4. 1963, in: BArchL, B 162/5542, p. j68. According to 
the statement of a former SS cavalryman, the fourth squadron of the 1st Regiment shot 800 Jews who 
refused to be driven into the swamps; the trooper did not give any more details. See Müller-Tupath, 
Becher, p. 82. Another veteran stated that cavalry soldiers tried to drive Jews into a lake, which failed 
as the victims stopped walking further into the water. Allegedly Hermann Fegelein, who was present 
at the scene, then cancelled the mission and let the Jews go. See ibid., p. 107. This view is highly 
doubtful and not backed up by any other statement or evidence. Also, Müller-Tupath did not state the 
names  of  the  two  questioned  soldiers  or  give  any  other  details  from  their  testimony.  The  first 
statement was taken from the indictment in the case against Magill and others, whereas the second 
statement was part of the questioning of a former SS cavalryman in the Lombard trial. See also Birn, 
‘Zweierlei Wirklichkeit’,  p. 278; Birn has noted that even after the war witnesses of these atrocities 
were very reluctant to give any details about them.
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Jewish looters [Jewish males] were shot.  Only a few craftsmen who were 
working in repair shops of the Wehrmacht were left behind. To drive women 
and children into the swamps did not have the desired effect as the swamps 
were not deep enough [for them] to sink. In a depth of 1 metre there was solid 
ground  (possibly  sand)  in  most  cases  so  that  sinking  [bodies]  was  not 
possible.450 
  In the following weeks, mostly male Jews were executed by members of the 2nd 
Regiment. In some cases, women and children were included in the massacres as 
well: at Adryšyn, a village that was not close to any waters or swamps, the troopers 
took their order literally and drowned their victims in a pond.451 This, however, was 
an exception. Throughout the first mission in the Pripet Marshes, Magill followed a 
different strategy than Lombard, which he justified with the unsuccessful attempt of 
driving people into the swamps. It was not until the second mission that the men of 
the 2nd Regiment began to kill Jewish women and children indiscriminately.452
  The squadrons always proceeded by the same method: individual platoons were 
deployed  to  a  particular  town  or  village.  After  arriving,  they  surrounded  the 
settlement  and the  leader  of  the  unit  ordered  the  mayor  to  point  out  the  Jewish 
inhabitants to his men, a procedure that was open to arbitrariness. Groups of two or 
three SS soldiers then went from house to house and arrested the Jews regardless of 
gender or age.  They were shot straightaway or on the next day in an open field 
outside the village. In some cases the bodies where left where they fell; sometimes 
the cavalrymen let the locals dig graves or trenches before the shootings, in which 
the victims were buried afterwards. Depending on the size of the Jewish community, 
450 Bericht über den Verlauf der Pripjet-Aktion vom 27.7. – 11.8. 1941, 12 August, 1941, quoted in 
Baade, Unsere Ehre heißt Treue, pp. 219-220. Jewish saddlers who worked for the SS Cavalry were 
exempt from the killing for the time being.
451 Cüppers, Wegbereiter, p. 153.
452 Cüppers, ‘Vorreiter der Shoah’, pp. 93-96; Cüppers, Wegbereiter, pp. 164-165 and pp. 196-197.
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the number of victims in most cases ranged from about 20 to 200.453 German patrol 
commanders  also  enquired  about  other  potentially  hostile  elements  such  as 
communists or partisans, who were sought out, questioned and then either set free 
again or shot; like the search for Jews, this happened at the discretion of informers 
and German soldiers. At places where no militia had been set up yet, this was done 
immediately.454 Collaborators not only helped to identify Jews. Local militiamen also 
rounded them up, guarded them on the march to the execution sites, and took part in 
the killings.455
  Only a comparatively small number of troopers belonged to the vanguard and tried 
to track down enemy forces consisting of regular Soviet troops. For the bulk of the 
manpower of the SS Cavalry Brigade, the nature of their mission was very different. 
Their perspective was that of a brutal ideological campaign in which the boundary 
between  civilians  and  combatants  was  obliterated  as  virtually  everybody  they 
encountered could be an enemy of one kind or another. There were so many killing 
missions  that  they  became  indistinguishable;  when  questioned  about  particular 
incidents after the war, many former soldiers could only state that the scene of the 
murder had been a village in the swamps.456 The rank and file clearly understood that 
they were not actually ‘pacifying’ the marshes but primarily targeted the Jews who 
lived there. Their superiors, in accordance with the orders they had received from 
Himmler and Fegelein, instructed them to consider Jews as suspected of supporting 
the partisans and to treat them accordingly, a fate from which women and children 
453 Bericht über den Verlauf der Pripjet-Aktion vom 27.7. – 11.8. 1941, 12 August, 1941, quoted in 
Baade,  Unsere Ehre  heißt  Treue,  p.  219;  Abschlußbericht  der  ZStl  vom 20.8.  1963,  p.  369.  The 
activity reports of the 2nd regiment do not contain detailed information on the number of Jews who 
were shot in the first days of the mission in the swamps; they only state that “pacification was carried 
out in the way it had been ordered”. See also Birn, ‘Zweierlei Wirklichkeit’, p. 278.
454 Bericht über den Verlauf der Pripjet-Aktion vom 27.7. – 11.8. 1941, 12 August, 1941, quoted in 
Baade, Unsere Ehre heißt Treue, p. 219.
455 Birn, ‘Zweierlei Wirklichkeit’, p. 278;  Bericht über den Verlauf der Pripjet-Aktion vom 27.7. – 
11.8. 1941, 12 August, 1941, quoted in Baade, Unsere Ehre heißt Treue, p. 220. In his report, Magill 
did not elaborate on the participation of locals in the shootings, i.e. in how many killings they had 
assisted or if they had played a leading role in them or not.
456 Abschlußbericht der ZStl vom 20.8. 1963, p. 368.
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were not excluded.457 It was, however, obvious for officers and soldiers alike that 
Jews  did  not  pose  a  danger  as  they  were  unarmed  and  not  hostile  towards  the 
Germans.458 A  former  trooper  spoke  about  this  discrepancy in  his  post-war 
questioning,  which can be viewed as a summary of the entire mission of the SS 
Cavalry Brigade in the Pripet Marshes in the words of an ‘ordinary man’: 
They were shot because they were Jews. There cannot have been any other 
reason from my point of view. It is out of the question that they supported the 
partisans or were partisans themselves.  I  don’t  know anything about  Jews 
resisting the German troops at all. According to my observations they always 
were friendly and loyal. And most of them were women and children down to 
the smallest baby. With them, too, there were no exceptions made [and they 
all were killed].459 
Moreover, the same man also said that not even orders were needed to carry out the 
killings: wherever the SS riders appeared, Jews were simply rounded up and shot, 
either straightaway or in the following days.460 This behaviour points at a very high 
level of initiative, a characteristic of the subalterns in the SS cavalry.
  Executions  were  not  only  carried  out  during  village  searches  and  after 
denunciations. When the mounted detachments reached towns with a large Jewish 
share  of  the  population,  they  destroyed  entire  Jewish  communities  in  massacres 
which cost thousands of lives. The SS cavalrymen began implementing this radical 
policy  before  the  Einsatzgruppen and  police  units;  it  was  this  behaviour  which 
determined their particular role in the destruction of the Jews in Belorussia in the 
457 Einstellungsverfügung gg. Lombard u.a., pp. 1747-1749 and pp. 1755-1756.
458 For the reaction of the men, see Birn, ‘Zweierlei Wirklichkeit’, p. 277. As far as the officers were 
concerned, it has been proven that they were fully aware of the criminal nature of the orders but 
nevertheless passed them on and executed them; see Justiz und NS-Verbrechen: Sammlung deutscher  
Strafurteile wegen nationalsozialistischer Tötungsverbrechen 1945 – 1966. Bd. 20, pp. 48-49.
459 Vernehmung von Kurt Ziegler vom 8.7. 1964, in: BArchL, B 162/5539, p. c85.
460 Ibid., pp. c77-78.
143
summer  of  1941.  As  far  as  the  organisation  and  course  of  the  executions  are 
concerned, it can be stated that they did not differ from the methods used by other 
killing squads.461 The first such mission was carried out by members of Lombard’s 
staff  and the second squadron of  the 1st Regiment  in  the town of  Khomsk on 2 
August, 1941. This was a typical shtetl: the majority of the inhabitants were Jewish. 
The SS troopers rounded up about 2,000 Jewish men, women, and children,  and 
detained them in a church over night. Early on the next morning, the prisoners were 
marched out of town to a field were pits had been prepared. There, they were shot by 
SS  soldiers  with  machineguns,  a  massacre  that  completely  wiped  out  the  local 
Jewish community.462
  After this first killing, the SS cavalry developed a scheme which facilitated the 
capture of their  victims.  When the first squadron reached Motol’,  a village some 
twenty miles east of Khomsk, the SS troopers first summoned all male Jews between 
the ages of fifteen and sixty to the market square. Then they went from house to 
house  and identified  the  remaining  Jews  with  the  help  of  Belarusian  Christians. 
About 800 Jewish boys and men were arrested and held on the square while some 
2200 women and children were driven into a synagogue and a nearby school. The 
Jewish males were executed and buried outside Motol’ in the afternoon of 3 August; 
the remaining Jews suffered the same fate a day later.463
  At Telekhany, another  shtetl to the northeast, the first squadron proceeded in the 
same way on 5 August: first, Jewish men were ordered to assemble at a community 
centre; then, the SS cavalrymen sought out women and children by clearing houses. 
461 Birn, ‘Zweierlei Wirklichkeit’, p. 277.
462 Cüppers,  Wegbereiter, p. 144; Vernehmung von Otto Krumwiede vom 14.3. 1963, in: BArchL, B 
162/5541, pp. g43-45; see also Einstellungsverfügung gg. Lombard u.a., p. 1765.
463 Cüppers, Wegbereiter, pp. 144-147; see also the ‘yizkor book’ on Motol’ by A.L. Polick, (ed.), The 
Destruction  of  Motele.  Translation   of  Hurban  Motele  (Jerusalem,  1956),  translated  by  Edward 
Ehrlich, http://www.jewishgen.org/yizkor/motol/motol.html (accessed on 22 March, 2011),  ch. 6-9. 
According to the situation report of the 1st Regiment of 4 August, 1941, 3000 people had been shot 
until that date by the mounted detachments; seeTätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom 31.7. – 3.8. 1941, 4 
August, 1941, SS-Kav. Rgt. 1, in: VUA, KDOS RFSS, box 24, file 1.
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All of their  victims were shot at  prepared graves near Telekhany,  which claimed 
about 2,000 lives.464 At Svyataya Volya and other places near Telekhany, more than 
1,000 Jews were murdered on 6 and 7 August by all four squadrons of the mounted 
detachment.465 On their way eastward, the unit soon reached the town of Gantsevichi 
not far from the regimental headquarters. There, all local Jews were told to gather at 
on a particular road with hand luggage. After having been deceived thus, men and 
women were separated and led away. They had to leave their belongings and were 
kept under guard over night. Throughout the next morning, 2,500 men, women and 
children were shot. This massacre on 11 August, 1941, marked the end of the unit’s 
first mission in the Pripet Marshes.466
  For  the  mounted  detachment  of  the  2nd Regiment,  the  ‘pacification’ of  the 
marshland began rather slowly.  Although the area traversed by its squadrons was 
more densely populated, they hardly encountered any Jews in the first four days, a 
fact  that  alarmed  SS-Standartenführer Heimo  Hierthes,  the  commander  of  the 
regiment: in a radio message sent on 3 August, 1941, he asked ‘why no numbers for 
figure no. 3 were reported’, a camouflaged request for more killings that referred to 
the reporting scheme of the brigade.467 At this time, the detachment also received the 
Himmler  order  of  1  August.  The  men  proceeded  in  a  similar  manner  as  their 
comrades of the 1st Regiment further north: when they reached the town of Ivanovo, 
a  shtetl some  25  miles  west  of  Pinsk,  the  SS  troopers  of  the  second  squadron 
rounded up Jewish men aged 16 and above with the help of local collaborators. In 
the  afternoon,  at  least  500  Jewish  men  were  shot  outside  Ivanovo.  Shortly 
afterwards, at least 100 more Jewish men were executed by the second squadron in 
464 Cüppers, Wegbereiter, pp. 148-149.
465 Ibid., pp. 149-150. 
466 Cüppers, Wegbereiter, p. 150.
467 Radio message from the 2nd regiment to the mounted detachment, 3 August, 1941, 10.57 a.m., in: 
BArchF, RS 3-8/36.
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the nearby villages of Borobice and Lahišyn.468
  On their march eastward, the staff of the mounted detachment as well as the first 
and  fourth  squadrons  soon  approached  Pinsk,  a  regional  centre  with  a  Jewish 
community of about 26,000 people, or about 70% of the population.469 The town had 
been occupied by German forces on 4 July, 1941, and an Ortskommandantur of the 
Wehrmacht had been established. Beside the military administration, there was also a 
branch of the Lublin Security Police and the Security Service based in Pinsk, which 
later  became part  of  Einsatzgruppe z.b.V. It  comprised a small  detail  of SD men 
under  the  command  of  Hermann  Worthoff  and  had  the  task  of  supporting 
Einsatzgruppe B in coordinating killing operations in the Pinsk area.470 The German 
authorities also had a Polish police force at their disposal. This unit had been trained 
by the occupants immediately after their arrival and assisted them in searching for 
communists and former Soviet officials. The Poles, like the Germans, also looted 
Jewish property and humiliated as well as denunciated their Jewish neighbours.471 On 
30 July, 1941, the Ortskommandantur ordered the establishment of a Jewish agency, 
the  so-called  Judenrat,  which  was  to  be  elected  by local  Jews  and  ‘to  mediate 
between the commander and the Jewish population; and to carry out the former’s 
orders’. The instructions given by the Judenrat, on the other hand, were to be obeyed 
by all local Jews.472
468 Cüppers, Wegbereiter, p. 154.
469 Tikva Fatal-Knaani, ‘The Jews of Pinsk, 1939-1943, Through the Prism of New Documentation’, 
Yad Vashem Studies  29 (2001), pp. 2-3. The figures given for the Jewish share of the population of 
Pinsk in July, 1941 vary from 20,000 to more than 30,000 with most authors giving an estimate of 
circa 30,000;  as  she  has  extensively used  archival  sources  from Pinsk,  I  am going to  use  Fatal-
Knaani’s estimate. For other figures see ibid., p. 3; see also Büchler,  ‘Kommandostab Reichsführer-
SS’, p. 16, and Cüppers, Wegbereiter, p. 155.
470 Fatal-Knaani, ‘The Jews of Pinsk’, p. 11; Büchler, ‘Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS’, p. 13; for the 
Einsatzgruppe z.b.V., see also Krausnick and Wilhelm, Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges, pp. 
180-181.
471 Fatal-Knaani, ‘The Jews of Pinsk’, pp. 11-12; see also the ‘yizkor book’ on Pinsk by Rabinowitsch, 
W.Z.  (ed.),  Pinsk  Historical  Volume:  History  of  the  Jews  of  Pinsk,  1506-1941  (Volume  1), 
http://www.jewishgen.org/yizkor/pinsk1/Pine12_102.html#P1-Chap1 (accessed on 25 March, 2011), 
ch. 1.
472 Fatal-Knaani, ‘The Jews of Pinsk’, p. 12. In her article, Fatal-Knaani also quotes the order from the 
Ortskommandantur to the mayor of Pinsk in full (see ibid., p. 36); the original can be found in the Yad 
146
  Initiated by Franz Magill, who carried out the direct order of the Reichsführer, all of 
these  institutions  cooperated  with  the  SS  Cavalry  in  order  to  exterminate  a 
significant part of the Jews of Pinsk in a concerted action in early August, 1941. 
First, the mounted detachment liaised with the German authorities: contact with the 
military administration was established and Magill sent the commander of the first 
squadron,  SS-Hauptsturmführer Stefan Charwat, to Pinsk to pass on the Himmler 
order  to  the  SD  branch  and  to  organise  the  operation  with  Worthoff.  The  SD 
commander expressed his concern that it would not be possible to drive women and 
children into the swamps.473 After this meeting, which took place on 5 August, the 
Judenrat was ordered to assemble the Jewish men of Pinsk on the following day. For 
this purpose, placards were put up all over town reading that all male Jews between 
the  ages  of  16  and 60  were  to  gather  at  the  freight  railway station  for  a  work 
assignment of three days. Also, at least 200 Jewish men were taken hostage during 
the night and held at the SD headquarters, a former NKVD building, where many of 
them were abused.  The Germans threatened to  kill  them if  the  Judenrat did  not 
manage to assemble the male Jews of Pinsk as demanded.474
  Early on 6 August,  1941, the SS cavalrymen marched out to  Pinsk from their 
quarters  on  a  collective  farm  near  the  town.  In  order  to  provide  the  necessary 
manpower  to  support  the  SD  unit  in  carrying  out  the  killings,  the  entire  first 
squadron was to be used, including most members of the baggage trains. Just like at 
Ivanovo a few days before, the Germans succeeded in deceiving the majority of the 
Vashem Archives, M-41/945.
473 Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom 31.7. – 3.8. 1941, 4 August, 1941, SS-Kav. Rgt. 2, in: VUA, 
Kommandostab  RFSS,  box  24,  file  2;  Büchler,  ‘Kommandostab  Reichsführer-SS’,  p.  16; 
Zwischenbericht der Sonderkommission Z, p. 576.
474 See http://www.jewishgen.org/yizkor/pinsk1/Pine12_102.html#P1-Chap1 (accessed on 25 March, 
2011),  ch.  1;  Cüppers,  Wegbereiter,  p.  155;  Büchler,  Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS, p.  16.  The 
beginning of the actual killings is given as 5 August in the verdict against Magill and his officers; this 
date was also used by the Jewish survivors in the delineation of the events in Pinsk. As Cüppers has 
dated the beginning of the executions to 6 August,  based on the thorough evaluation of preserved 
radio messages, I am using his age determination.  See also  Justiz und NS-Verbrechen: Sammlung 
deutscher Strafurteile wegen nationalsozialistischer Tötungsverbrechen 1945 – 1966. Bd. 20, pp. 49-
50.
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Jewish population and many men had come to the assembly point voluntarily. With 
the help of local militiamen, the SS troopers rounded up more Jews from the town, to 
which were added the hostages who had been arrested the day before. Thus, several 
thousand  boys  and  men  were  assembled  at  the  train  station,  where  they  were 
searched by SD men and had their valuables taken from them. More than 2,000 Jews 
were then driven out of town in a marching column; along the way, some of them 
managed to escape. The others carried on until they reached an open field where 
several  mass  graves  had  been  prepared  by  collaborators.  A chain  of  SS  guards 
surrounded them and the Jews were told to kneel down or lie on the ground. In 
groups, they were led to the pits where they were shot in the neck by the troopers.475 
Upon seeing  this,  some of  those who were  waiting  panicked,  broke through the 
cordon and ran away across the field, where most of them were shot.476 Preserved 
radio messages from the 2nd Regiment  indicate  that  2,461 people were killed by 
midday.  At  some  point  on  this  day,  the  HSSPF  Centre,  Erich  von  dem  Bach-
Zelewski, paid a visit to the execution site after having landed nearby with his plane. 
He approved of the progress of the killings and commended Charwat for his conduct 
and that of his men.477 Throughout the day, the SS drove Jews to the killing fields 
and the mounted detachment reported another 2,300 victims at 6 pm.478 When dusk 
was falling and there were still Jews waiting for their execution, Charwat ordered his 
men to shoot them with machineguns.479 A survivor who had managed to escape 
from the murder site later stated that by 9 pm the killing had ended; thus, it can be 
475 http://www.jewishgen.org/yizkor/pinsk1/Pine12_102.html#P1-Chap1  (accessed  on  29  March, 
2011),  ch.  1;  Cüppers,  Wegbereiter,  pp.  155-158;  Justiz  und NS-Verbrechen: Sammlung deutscher  
Strafurteile wegen nationalsozialistischer Tötungsverbrechen 1945 – 1966. Bd. 20, p. 50.
476 http://www.jewishgen.org/yizkor/pinsk1/Pine12_102.html#P1-Chap1  (accessed  on  29  March, 
2011), ch. 1; Cüppers, Wegbereiter, pp. 157-158.
477 Justiz  und  NS-Verbrechen:  Sammlung  deutscher  Strafurteile  wegen  nationalsozialistischer  
Tötungsverbrechen 1945 – 1966. Bd. 20, p. 53; Cüppers, Wegbereiter, pp. 157-158.
478 Radio message no. 56 from the mounted detachment to the 2nd regiment, 6 August, 1941, 1.21 pm, 
in: BArchF, RS 4/936. The message itself mentions 2,461 victims but a note on the margin reads, 
‘2300 were reported at 1800’.
479 Vernehmung Hugo Link, in: BArchL, B 162/2329, p. 1643.
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assumed that the number of victims on August 6 was far higher than the 4,761 who 
were officially registered.480
  The mass murder at Pinsk continued for two more days. During the night after the 
first execution, about 150 Jewish men were arrested in their houses and taken to the 
pits as a work detail. After burying some of those who had been shot throughout the 
day, they were killed, too. Early the next morning, four Jews were brought to the 
quarters of the first squadron by local militiamen and executed near the farm.481 At 
the same time,  a  massive searching mission which included the entire  town was 
conducted by the first squadron and the fourth squadron, which had arrived in Pinsk 
the day before. As the town was divided in half by a main street, each squadron was 
assigned one of the two sectors. Again, the SS troopers were assisted by the Polish 
militia in searching houses for Jewish men, who were told they were to join a labour 
detail.  This  time,  children  from the  age  of  six  and elderly men over  sixty were 
rounded up as well. The Jews were killed at two different execution sites outside 
Pinsk. At least 2,450 people fell victim to the SS cavalry on the second day.482
  Court files from the case against Franz Magill and four of his subalterns provide 
many details of the events at Pinsk. They bear witness to the brutality of the mass 
shootings,  show  how  the  victims  met  their  death  and  how  the  perpetrators 
themselves  were  affected.  At  the execution site,  which  must  have  resembled the 
scenes of other mass killings in the summer and autumn of 1941 such as Baby Yar or 
480 http://www.jewishgen.org/yizkor/pinsk1/Pine12_102.html#P1-Chap1  (accessed  on  29  March, 
2011), ch. 1.
481 Justiz  und  NS-Verbrechen:  Sammlung  deutscher  Strafurteile  wegen  nationalsozialistischer  
Tötungsverbrechen 1945 – 1966. Bd. 20, p. 51; Cüppers, Wegbereiter, p. 159.
482 Radio message no. 56 from the mounted detachment to the 2nd regiment, 6 August, 1941, 1.21 pm, 
in:  BArchF,  RS  4/936.  Justiz  und  NS-Verbrechen:  Sammlung  deutscher  Strafurteile  wegen  
nationalsozialistischer Tötungsverbrechen 1945 – 1966.  Bd. 20, pp. 52-53. It is possible that up to 
3,600 people were killed by the 2nd Regiment on 7 August, 1941, as a radio message from the HSSPF 
Centre indicates; see situation report of the HSSPF Centre, 7 August, 1941, in: VUA, Kommandostab 
RFSS, box 1, file 4. For the calculation of victims of the SS cavalry, see below; the HSSPF Centre 
generally assumed numbers of killings that were too low, which was due to the fact that the cavalry 
officers lost count of their victims themselves. Also, he only spoke of the SS cavalry as a whole in his 
reports, which makes it harder to distinguish the particular subunits involved in the crimes. Thus, the 
number of 3,600 victims may or may not refer to killings at Pinsk.
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Kamenets-Podolsk, thousands of Jews waited, sometimes for hours, and were forced 
to watch as others were murdered. Most of them stayed calm, others burst into tears 
or wailed loudly. A few prayed or sang religious songs. Apart from those who had 
managed to run away and very few who had fallen into the pits either unhurt or just 
wounded, no one survived.483
  Some former SS troopers later testified openly that the bloodshed at Pinsk put a 
great strain on them and they tried to get away from it or only carried it out with 
great reluctance. The method they were ordered to apply proved to be very bloody: 
the Jews, including the children, were either shot in groups with machineguns or 
individually  with  carbines.484 From  a  distance  of  only  five  to  six  metres,  each 
rifleman had to shoot one victim at a time. As the soldiers were aiming for the neck, 
some of them were splattered with blood and pieces of brain. A few men were sick 
and could not continue the executions; at least two troopers were then sent away by 
an officer  who called them cowards.485 One man asked his  platoon leader not  to 
assign him to the firing squad; he was then ordered to hold the officer’s horse during 
the execution.486 After the returning to their quarters on that day, the soldiers were 
given alcohol, which in all likelihood was meant to drown out their memories of 
what they had just done.487
  But not all of the SS cavalrymen at Pinsk resented what they had to do, not least 
because they were given an opportunity to loot the belongings of the Jews. Erich 
Mirek, a Wehrmacht soldier and communist, witnessed how the soldiers treated their 
483 Justiz  und  NS-Verbrechen:  Sammlung  deutscher  Strafurteile  wegen  nationalsozialistischer  
Tötungsverbrechen 1945 – 1966. Bd. 20, p. 51; Birn, ‘Zweierlei Wirklichkeit’, p. 277.
484 Justiz  und  NS-Verbrechen:  Sammlung  deutscher  Strafurteile  wegen  nationalsozialistischer  
Tötungsverbrechen 1945 – 1966. Bd. 20, pp. 50-51 and p. 53. See also Vernehmung Helmut Fenslaf, 
in: BArchL, B 162/2329, p. j1647-1648.
485 Vernehmung Max Mahn,  in:  BArchL,  B 162/2329,  p.  1647;  Vernehmung Walter  Reichert,  in: 
BArchL, B 162/2329, p. 1650.
486 Vernehmung Gerhard Blum, in: BArchL, B 162/2329, p. 1648.
487 Cüppers,  Wegbereiter, p. 160. Christopher Browning has noticed the same with Reserve Police 
Battalion 101; see Browning,  Ordinary Men, p. 69. To the policemen, alcohol was also given out 
before and during some executions; see ibid., p. 61 and p. 80. Some of the men even turned into 
alcoholics as they could not carry out executions in a sober state; see ibid., p. 82.
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victims before the killings on the second day: 
The SS bandits  took off  their  steel  helmets,  walked through the  rows [of 
Jews] and forced the victims to put their valuables into the helmets. Rings, 
gold,  even  dentures  had  to  be  handed  over.  The  men  were  completely 
helpless. Those who resisted were brutally beaten up immediately. […] The 
SS officers sent for some of the best shoemakers and ordered them to make a 
pair of boots to measure over night. On the next morning, the SS bandits put 
on the boots and drove the craftsmen to the execution.488
  Mirek also noticed the general attitude of the cavalry soldiers, an impression which 
greatly differs from the possibly self-exculpatory view expressed by many veterans 
after the war. In his opinion,  ‘the SS men were all quite young, very arrogant and 
apparently proud of their atrocities’.489
 On the third day,  the executions proceeded on a more limited scale than before. 
From the SS radio protocols, it becomes clear that the original intention of Magill 
and Hierthes, his superior, was to continue the executions, which would have meant 
certain  death  for  the  remaining  Jews  in  Pinsk.490 But  as  it  was  not  possible  to 
transport  the  victims  to  the  killing  fields  by  truck,  the  regimental  commander 
488 Erich  Mirek,  Enthüllung  faschistischer  Grausamkeiten,  in  In  den  Wäldern  Belorußlands: 
Erinnerungen sowjetischer Partisanen u. deutscher Antifaschisten (Berlin, 1977), p. 175. Mirek had 
been imprisoned and tortured by the  Gestapo in Germany in November, 1933. During the war, he 
served with the 293rd infantry division of the  Wehrmacht, which was based at Pinsk for some time 
during the summer of 1941. Mirek managed to save about twenty skilled Jewish workers by claiming 
that  they  were  urgently  needed  for  the  Wehrmacht;  he  also  passed  on  photographs  and  other 
information on the mass killings at Pinsk to the German military resistance. See ibid., pp. 172-176.
489 Ibid.
490 Magill himself had estimated that it would take several days to complete his task at Pinsk; see radio 
message no. 57 from the mounted detachment to the 2nd regiment,  6 August,  1941, 1.21 pm, in: 
BArchF, RS 4/936. On 8 August, the mounted detachment received the order to continue its task, even 
if  several  days were necessary for  this;  see radio message from the 2nd regiment  to the mounted 
detachment, 8 August, 1941, 11.10 am, in: BArchF, RS 3-8/36. See also Justiz und NS-Verbrechen: 
Sammlung deutscher Strafurteile wegen nationalsozialistischer Tötungsverbrechen 1945 – 1966. Bd.  
20, pp. 53-54.
151
changed his mind: apparently, Hierthes was afraid of being unable to keep up with 
the other SS cavalry units and aborted the massacre, a tactical decision which for the 
moment spared the lives of Jewish women and many children. In the evening, the 
mounted detachment received the order to resume its advance towards the line it had 
been given as a target a week earlier.491 To this day, it remains uncertain how many 
people were murdered by the SS cavalry and their  helpers in Pinsk. It has to be 
assumed that at least 7-8,000, if not more than 9,000 Jewish men, male youths and 
children were executed there between 6 and 8 August,  1941.492 Those who were 
killed represented a large part of the male Jewish inhabitants; they came from all 
parts of society and were often well educated. Only a few doctors and some skilled 
workers, who were employed in workshops of the Wehrmacht, had been spared.493
  Unlike most other acts of mass violence which were committed by the SS Cavalry 
Brigade in the summer of 1941, the murder of the Jews of Pinsk is comparatively 
well-documented and provides valuable insights into both the minds of the killers 
and those of their victims. Here, at least some survivors were left to tell how the SS 
troopers  skilfully  exploited  the  available  structures  and  institutions  of  German 
occupation, including the Judenrat and willing local collaborators, and how Magill 
491 Justiz  und  NS-Verbrechen:  Sammlung  deutscher  Strafurteile  wegen  nationalsozialistischer  
Tötungsverbrechen 1945 – 1966. Bd. 20, p. 54; Cüppers, Wegbereiter, p. 160.
492 Characteristically, the SS tried to put the blame for the mass murder on the Jews themselves: a 
report of  Einsatzgruppe B described the operation as retaliation for the murder of a militiaman and 
gave the number of victims as 4,500; see Ereignismitteilung Nr. 58 vom 20.8. 1941, in BArchB, R 
58/216, quoted in Cüppers,  Wegbereiter, p. 161. According to a report of the 3rd company of Police 
Battalion 322, which conducted a search at Pinsk on 25 and 26 August, 1941, 5,000 Jews had been 
shot there just before; see Durchsuchungsaktion in Pinsk, 26 August, 1941, in: VUA,  N POL.RGT. 
(2),  file 8. The court before which Magill and his officers were sentenced in 1964 assumed that at 
least 5,254 people had been killed; see Sagel-Grande, I. et al.,  Justiz und NS-Verbrechen, Bd. 20, p. 
27. Based on a thorough analysis of available statistics, Tikva Fatal-Knaani estimated that 7-8,000 
Jews were murdered; see Fatal-Knaani, T., The Jews of Pinsk, p. 15. Cüppers places his estimate at 
more than 9,000 victims (see Cüppers, Wegbereiter, p. 161), whereas survivors believed that a figure 
of about 11,000 was realistic; see Justiz und NS-Verbrechen: Sammlung deutscher Strafurteile wegen  
nationalsozialistischer Tötungsverbrechen 1945 – 1966. Bd. 20, pp. 62-63. Büchler, who used works 
based on the testimony of survivors, even assumes that more than 11,000 Jews were murdered at 
Pinsk: 8,000 on the first day, an unknown, smaller number on the second day, and 3,000 on the third 
day; see Büchler, ‘Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS’, pp. 16-17.
493 Fatal-Knaani,  ‘The  Jews  of  Pinsk’,  p.  15;  Justiz  und  NS-Verbrechen:  Sammlung  deutscher  
Strafurteile wegen nationalsozialistischer Tötungsverbrechen 1945 – 1966. Bd. 20, p. 53.
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managed to combine these factors with the murderous efficiency of his own men. As 
opposed to more localised operations, which often took place in remote hamlets in 
the  marshes,  the  three  days  of  killing  at  Pinsk  strongly  resemble  those  mass 
executions carried out by the  Einsatzgruppen:  all details are similar, from central 
coordination and meticulous planning over the division of labour and deployment of 
individual killing squads to the steps of the killing (rounding up of victims – robbing 
of valuables – executions done by different units). Even the reluctance and the effort 
it sometimes cost the men to carry out their task (which led to the deadening or burn-
out of entire units  later  that  year and worried Himmler, who feared that his plan 
could not be fulfilled) are the same.
  There are two major differences, however: the brigade’s integration into another 
chain of command within the SS and the development of orders for annihilation in 
the field rather than their specification from the SS command in Berlin. Unlike the 
Einsatzgruppen, the SS Cavalry Brigade was subordinate to the HSSPF Centre, not 
the head of the security police and the security service, Reinhard Heydrich. Also, a 
very high level  of initiative was displayed by the SS cavalry officers,  especially 
Gustav Lombard, who supplemented the sometimes vague orders they received from 
Himmler.  As  opposed  to  this  approach,  the  Einsatzgruppen rather  stuck  to  the 
Heydrich order of 2 July and only slowly added new groups of victims, a process 
that was triggered by the radical measures of the SS cavalry in August.494
  Whilst some SS cavalrymen found ways to avoid killings at the very beginning of 
the deployment in the Pripet Marshes, the vast majority of the men did not see a 
reason to act differently than their comrades or did not dare to do so. This kind of 
behaviour has been noticed by Christopher Browning with Reserve Police Battalion 
101 as well: soldiers tended not to break ranks by showing deviant behaviour, such 
494 Büchler views the role of the brigade the other way around: in his opinion, the Einsatzgruppen 
operated more flexibly. See Büchler, ‘Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS’, p. 17.
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as refusing to kill, so that they would not lose comradely bonds and support. As a 
reason for this, Browning has identified a habituation to killings and their conduction 
as a unit, together with the situation of being stationed on enemy territory.495 
  Despite the fact that many troopers had taken part in executions in Poland before, 
this was sometimes a difficult and very gruesome process. Superiors in some of the 
squadrons had to ask for volunteers at the beginning of the mission in order to shoot 
the Jews who had been rounded up.496 This principle was sometimes also extended to 
subunits which did not have to participate normally: a man who had served in the 
supply unit of a machine-gun squadron said that his sergeant major frequently asked 
for volunteers during the mission in the swamps and some of his comrades reported 
for this.497 It came to particularly appalling scenes in early August, 1941, when the 
men were not used to killing large groups of people yet. Victims were ‘mowed down’ 
and often badly wounded rather than killed by well-directed fire.498 In one situation 
like  this,  platoon  and  squad  leaders  of  a  squadron  had  to  ask  for  volunteers  to 
perform the coup de grâce; shooters were offered a special leave of ten days. As 
enough people came forward, no one had to be assigned for this task.499 
  When they were questioned in the 1960s, some veterans of the SS cavalry openly 
stated that they had difficulties in adjusting to what they were asked to do. This was 
often the case with soldiers who were very young in the summer of 1941: together 
with older men who had been serving in the units for one or two years already, 
recruits aged 17 or 18 years became part of the killing squads. 500 Often, they could 
495 Browning, C., Ordinary men, pp. 184-186. Andrej Angrick and his co-authors also observed this 
with Police Battalion 322, where the policemen – just  like their  comrades of the Reserve Police 
Battalion 101 – had developed an internal norm according to which every member of the unit had to 
take part in executions at least once. See Angrick and others, ‘Das Polizeibataillon 322’, pp. 361-362.
496 Vernehmung von Otto Mittelstädt vom 22.5. 1963, in: BArchL, B 162/5538, p. b36.
497 Vernehmung von Josef Zorn vom 21.5. 1963, in: BArchL, B 162/5542, pp. i28-29.
498 Vernehmung von Bruno Schröder vom 4.10. 1962, in: BArchL, B 162/5542, p. j45.
499 Vernehmung von Otto Krumwiede vom 14.3. 1963, in: BArchL, B 162/5541, p. g45.
500 One example for this was Walter Reichert who was part of an execution squad at Pinsk; he was 18 
years old at the time; see BArchL, B 162/5539, p. 1650.
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not endure the shootings; their leaders dealt with this by assigning them different 
tasks, for example when the 2nd Regiment was deployed at Pinsk just a few days after 
the arrival in Belorussia. Others, too, admitted having been in similar situations: one 
former soldier testified that he found it hard to round up Jews as they knew what was 
going to happen to them.501 Several men said they only took part in executions very 
reluctantly.502 Many of the SS cavalrymen were fully aware of the fact that they were 
committing  crimes;  protocols  of  questionings  document  a  ‘discrepancy  between 
inner rejection and outer  conformity’.503 This ‘inner  rejection’ expressed itself  by 
various physical and psychological reactions: men were sick at the execution sites or 
broke into tears when they reflected what they had done, especially those who had 
children  themselves.  Some  former  soldiers  even  said  that  the  majority  of  their 
comrades  had shown intense indignation  about  being  deployed for  executions  of 
Jews. They viewed their involvement in the killing of innocent people as abuse: it 
was not only considered to be brutal  and unnecessary but also to be unsoldierly. 
Amongst each other, the men referred to massacres as ‘schweinerei’ (mess).504 
  After  this  initial  phase,  a  pattern  emerged  that  again  matches  Christopher 
Browning’s  observations,  dividing  the  squadrons  in  groups  of  perpetrators  who 
obeyed killing orders, perpetrators who acted excessively and non-conformists.505 It 
is hard to quantify these factions as statements from former SS cavalrymen are often 
fragmentary: in many cases, the men did not give full particulars or were only asked 
501 Vernehmung von Otto Krumwiede vom 14.3. 1963, in: BArchL, B 162/5541, p. g44.
502 Vernehmung von Helmut Fenslaf, in:  BArchL, B 162/5539, pp. 1647-1648; Vernehmung August 
Sündermann, in: BArchL, B 162/2329, p. 1642; Vernehmung Bernd Wenzel, in BArchL, B 162/2329, 
pp. 1644-1645; Vernehmung Hans Saggau, in: BArchL, B 162/2329, p. 1646.
503 Birn, ‘Zweierlei Wirklichkeit’, p. 280; for the awareness of the criminal character of the shootings, 
see  for  example Vernehmung von Josef  Hagl  vom 15.1.  1964,  in:  BArchL,  B 162/5542,  p.  j87; 
Vernehmung Kurt Ziegler vom 8.7. 1964, in: BArchL, B 162/5539, pp. c85.
504 Vernehmung  von  Ernst  Grützmacher  vom  21.8.  1963,  in:  BArchL,  B  162/5542,  p.  j76; 
Vernehmung von Karl Spiess vom 25.6. 1963, in:  BArchL, B 162/5542, p. i39; Vernehmung Klaas 
Kruizenga vom 9.4. 1963, in: BArchL, B 162/5539, p. j68; Vernehmung Bernd Wenzel, in BArchL, B 
162/2329, pp. 1644-1645.
505 The same pattern applied to Police Battalion 322; see  Angrick and others, ‘Das Polizeibataillon 
322’, pp. 359. According to this work, excesses as well as refusal were rare exceptions.
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about particular incidents.506 Evidence suggests, however, that the officers did not 
have any trouble enforcing discipline as the men, however unwillingly, conformed to 
the principle of order and obedience. The vast majority of the cavalry soldiers carried 
out their tasks, however cruel and inhumane. Over the course of several weeks, the 
men became accustomed to killing and functioned even if morale was low under the 
impression of terrible atrocities. Often, they numbed themselves by means of alcohol 
abuse.507 In many protocols of questionings, statements such as the following can be 
found: ‘We did not want to do this [the executions] but an order was an order, what 
could you do as an ordinary man’.508 Another veteran said: ‘As far as I gathered it 
from conversations of my comrades after the execution, none of them undertook the 
task out of enthusiasm or voluntarily; they all appeared to be depressed and it was 
obvious that they, just as me, only acted under orders’. 509 
  Post-war legal proceedings were predominantly directed against former officers of 
the  SS Cavalry Brigade  (with  one  former  non-commissioned officer  as  the  only 
exception), which is why investigators mostly did not enquire about the personal 
motives or anti-Semitism of the men they heard as witnesses, but rather about their 
function  in  the  horse  units  and  their  role  in  the  killing  process.510 There  were, 
however, other reasons to commit murder apart from carrying out one’s duty and 
other attitudes towards the killings than resentment. Some of the veterans openly 
approved of the killings even twenty years after the war; one man even stated that he 
still regretted that not enough people were killed in Russia and that he would shoot 
506 The trial against Magill and others, for example, focused on the mass executions carried out by the 
SS cavalry at Pinsk; other executions, even if they were mentioned by witnesses, were mostly not 
followed up by the investigators. This information was obtained through an interview with Bernhard 
D., retired chief inspector of the Landeskriminalamt Niedersachsen, 26 January, 2011.
507 This has also been noted by Browning for Reserve Police Battalion 101; see Browning, Ordinary 
men, p. 61, pp. 68-69, and pp. 85-87.
508 Vernehmung August Sündermann, in: BArchL, B 162/2329, p. 1642.
509 Vernehmung von Ferdinand Henschke vom 5.12. 1962, in: StAW, 62 Nds. Fb.2, Nr. 1013, p. 177.
510 Interview with Dr  Heinrich  K.,  retired  regional  prosecutor  in  Braunschweig,  3  August,  2011; 
interview with  Bernhard  D.,  retired  chief  inspector  of  the  Landeskriminalamt  Niedersachsen,  26 
January, 2011.
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women, children and men ‘without batting an eye’, should he ever come there as a 
soldier again.511 Another attitude displayed was indifference: when asked about his 
opinion and reasons for one particular execution he was involved in, one former SS 
cavalryman said that he and his comrades did not give reasons much thought and 
only complained about having to clean their rifles again after the shooting.512 
  After  the  massacres  at  Pinsk,  the  mounted  squadrons  of  the  2nd Regiment 
recommenced the ‘combing’ of the marshes and advanced further eastward until they 
reached their  destination,  the David-Gorodok – Luninets  – Baranovichi line,  two 
days  later.513 Between  9  and  12  August,  1941,  all  subunits  of  the  mounted 
detachment were involved in further acts of mass violence. The first squadron left 
Pinsk to the northeast and killed about 140 Jews at Pagost Zagorodny, whereas the 
fourth squadron executed 1,312 Jews at Luninets.514 Furthest to the south was the 
third squadron; it moved towards David-Gorodok through the northern Ukraine and 
passed Pinsk at a distance of about 25 miles. In a small village called Serniki, its 
soldiers rounded up about between 100 and 120 Jewish men, publicly humiliated 
them by forcing them to dance in the street, marched them to the local cemetery and 
shot  them.515 When  this  squadron  reached  David-Gorodok  a  few days  later,  the 
511 Birn,  ‘Zweierlei  Wirklichkeit’,  p.  279;  Vernehmung von Severin  Dörner  vom 22.4.  1963,  in: 
BArchL, B 162/5541, p. h66.
512 Cüppers,  Wegbereiter,  p.  122;  Vernehmung von Karl  Lückel  vom 25.7.  1963,  in:  BArchL,  B 
162/5538, p. b67.
513 Radio message no. 79 from the mounted detachment to the 2nd regiment, 9 August, 1941, 6.40 pm, 
in: BArchF, RS 4/936; radio message no. 83 from the mounted detachment to the 2nd regiment, 10 
August, 1941, 6.30 am, ibid.; radio message no. 84 from the mounted detachment to the 2nd regiment, 
10 August, 1941, 12.03 pm, ibid.
514 Cüppers,  Wegbereiter,  p.  161.  At  Luninets,  all  Jewish  males  aged  12  or  older  were  killed 
immediately, apart from 36 who were able to save themselves; see Philip Friedman (ed.),  Roads to  
extinction: essays on the Holocaust (New York, Philadelphia 1980), p. 143.
515 David  Bevan,  A case to answer: the story of Australia’s first European war crimes prosecution 
(Kent Town, South Australia, 1994), p. xi, pp. 3-5, p. 56, p. 94, p. 163. The exact date of the massacre 
is unknown; the author assumes it happened in July or August, 1941. The reconstruction of this event 
is based on testimony of survivors; most of them gave the number of victims as 100 persons, whereas 
one former inhabitant of the village gave it as 120. The witnesses remembered that the Germans had 
come to Serniki on horseback; in an expertise for an Australian trial, Konrad Kwiet identified the 
perpetrators as having belonged to the SS cavalry; see p. 56. From the verdict of the Magill case, it 
becomes clear that this must have been the third squadron as it was furthest to the south; see Justiz  
und  NS-Verbrechen:  Sammlung  deutscher  Strafurteile  wegen  nationalsozialistischer  
Tötungsverbrechen 1945 – 1966. Bd. 20, p. 58. Martin  Dean  gives the number of victims as 250, 
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troopers rounded up about 2,500 Jews together with local collaborators. Just like in 
Pinsk,  the  victims  were  told  they were to  work for  the  Germans.  A few Jewish 
doctors and craftsmen, such as saddlers who had to repair the horse-gear of the SS 
cavalrymen,  were  spared.  The  remainder  of  the  apprehended,  more  than  2,000 
people, were shot outside the town. Ukrainians, Belarusians and Poles expelled all 
Jewish women and children from David-Gorodok on the next day in a spontaneous 
outbreak  of  anti-Semitic  violence;  the  victims  were  left  wandering  through  the 
vicinity until they had to return to the town, where they were interned in a ghetto and 
murdered  in  the  following year.516 The  horse  squadrons  of  the  2nd regiment  also 
committed massacres in a number of other small towns and villages east of Pinsk. As 
hardly any sources are available about these incidents, it can only be surmised that 
Jews were also killed at Lunin, Stolin, Lakhva, and Kozian-Gorodok, and possibly at 
other, unspecified places as well by the 2nd Regiment before 12 August.517
 The successful completion of the vanguard operation coincided with the arrival of 
the horse squadrons at the target line of their first mission. Around the middle of 
August, the SS cavalrymen had a break of a few days during which the units rested 
and carried out maintenance before they launched their next operation, the ‘combing’ 
of the eastern Pripet Marshes.518 Parts of the SS Cavalry Brigade were regrouped for 
the new task: whereas the brigade staff and some of its support units remained based 
at  Liakhovichi,  the 2nd Regiment moved its  subunits  further  to the southeast:  the 
regimental staff took up quarters at a school in Lakhva, some 50 miles east of Pinsk, 
followed by the other squadrons and trains which stayed at other small villages along 
the road from Liakhovichi to Luninets.519
which is possibly exaggerated; see Dean, Collaboration in the Holocaust, p. 35 and p. 37.
516 Cüppers, Wegbereiter, pp. 161-163.
517 Cüppers,  Wegbereiter,  p.  161.  For  this  assumption,  Cüppers  quotes  the  following  document: 
Zwischenbericht der Sonderkommission Z, p. 572. 
518 Fernschreiben des HSSPF Mitte an RFSS, 13 August, 1941, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 
1, file 4.
519 Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom 14.-17.8. 1941, 18 August, 1941, SS Cavalry Brigade, in: VUA, 
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  The  Reichsführer closely followed the activity of Fegelein and his men: for the 
third time in just over a month, Himmler now paid a visit to the SS Cavalry on one 
of his  inspection tours  through the occupied Eastern territories.  Accompanied by 
high-ranking SS officers such as the head of his personal staff,  SS-Gruppenführer 
Karl  Wolff,  and the  HSSPF North,  SS-Gruppenführer Hans-Adolf  Prützmann,  he 
conferred  with  leaders  of  SS  and  Wehrmacht at  the  headquarters  of  the  HSSPF 
Centre in Baranovichi on 14 August. Present at this meeting were the HSSPF Centre, 
SS-Gruppenführer  Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, the commander of the rear areas 
of Army Group Centre, general Max von Schenckendorff, as well as the commanders 
of the two SS cavalry regiments, the Standartenführer Hermann Fegelein and Gustav 
Lombard.  Von dem Bach-Zelewski  and Fegelein reported on the first  part  of the 
‘cleansing’ of the Pripet Marshes. When Himmler continued his journey to Minsk on 
the  same  day,  he  also  greeted  staff  officers  of  the  cavalry  brigade  and  the  1st 
Regiment on the market square of Liakhovichi. It can be assumed that the head of 
the SS approved of the cavalry brigade’s modus operandi and urged its commanders 
to continue their practice.520
  The further development of the SS cavalry towards a ‘dual role’ now saw a shift in 
focus from a parallel execution of military and ideological orders to the character of 
a  plain killing unit.  Thus far,  soldiers  of the vanguard had mostly killed regular 
Soviet soldiers in combat situations, but also ‘partisans’, ‘Russian soldiers in plain 
clothes’,  and  ‘Jews  who  supported  the  Russians’  as  well  as  three  Soviet 
commissars.521 The mounted squadrons, on the other hand, had shot thousands of 
Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 3.
520 Witte,  Der  Dienstkalender  Heinrich  Himmlers,  p.  193;  Cüppers,  Wegbereiter,  pp.  182-183; 
Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom 14.-17.8.  1941, 18 August, 1941, SS Cavalry Brigade, in: VUA, 
Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 3. This document wrongly gives the date of Himmler’s visit as 15 
August, 1941.
521 Bericht über die Tätigkeit der V[oraus].A[bteilung] vom 27.7. – 3.8. 1941, in: Baade, Unsere Ehre 
heißt Treue, p. 221 and p. 223; Bericht über die Tätigkeit der V[oraus].A[bteilung] vom 3. – 12.8. 
1941, ibid., p. 224 and p. 226.
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Jewish civilians. These mass executions, together with another operation at Bobruisk 
at the beginning of September, put the SS Cavalry Brigade on the same level as the 
Einsatzgruppen and  police  battalions:  even  if  they  had  only  just  arrived  in 
Belorussia,  they  had  already  become  much  more  than  a  security  detail  for  the 
hinterland. The SS cavalrymen were now an instrument of mass violence, which is 
proven by the enormous death toll they inflicted; a few days after the beginning of 
the killing missions, the perpetrators started to lose count already. As far as the 1st 
Regiment was concerned, three thousand Jews were killed by this unit alone in only 
two days.522 The 2nd Regiment, on the other hand, killed 173 ‘looters, communists 
and Jews’ in the same time.523 3 August, 1941, is the last day with an accurate body 
count by the SS cavalry officers and their superior, the HSSPF Centre; after this day, 
it  can  no  longer  be  defined  precisely.  The  number  given  for  this  day  is  ‘3274 
partisans and Jewish Bolsheviks’, which represents the more than 3,000 victims of 
the 1st Regiment at Khomsk and the male Jews killed at Motol’ as well as the 173 
people who were murdered by the 2nd Regiment between 31 July and 3 August.524 
  The trend of reporting incorrect numbers of victims continued until the SS Cavalry 
Brigade left Belorussia. It is also reflected by the reports given by the SS officers 
after  the  completion  of  their  first  mission.  Sturmbannführer Lombard  of  the  1st 
Regiment informed his superiors that the mounted detachment under his command 
had shot 6,504 Jews and 411 Red Army soldiers up to and including 11 August.525 
The corresponding document from the 2nd Regiment states that 6,450 Jews and 76 
Soviet  soldiers  and  communists  had  been  killed.526 Hermann  Fegelein  gave  two 
522 Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom 31.7. – 3.8. 1941, 4 August, 1941, SS-Kav. Rgt. 1, in: VUA, 
Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 1.
523 Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit v. 31.7. – 3.8. 1941, SS-Kav. Rgt. 2, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, 
box 24, file 2.
524 Situation  report  of  the  HSSPF Centre,  4  August,  1941,  in:  NAK,  HW 16/45,  German Police 
Decodes: 4.8. 41.
525 Befriedung des Raumes Prypecsümpfe, 11 August, 1941, in: BArchL, Dokumenten-Sammlung, 
Ordner Verschiedenes 291-17, p. 6.
526 Übersichtsbericht über den Verlauf der Pripjet-Aktion vom 27.7. – 11.8. 1941, 12 August, 1941, 
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rather  inaccurate  numbers  within  a  matter  of  days:  whereas  he  spoke  of  10,844 
‘looters and soldiers in civilian clothes’ in his summary of the vanguard operation on 
11 August, the summary of the entire operation from 13 August reported that 13,788 
Jews had fallen victim to the brigade.527 This calculation indicates that the leadership 
of the SS cavalry found it hard to assess how many people had been killed. The 
speed and varying nature of their operations and faulty equipment also took their 
toll: both combat and ‘combing’ missions had to be coordinated at the same time, 
sometimes with poor means of communication. Both regiments must have murdered 
far more people than they stated in their reports: whereas the men under Lombard’s 
command had killed more than six thousand Jews at Khomsk, Motol’ and Telekhany 
already, at Pinsk alone more people had been executed than Magill had assumed for 
the two weeks his unit had spent in Belorussia so far.528 When adding up the figures 
which can be estimated today, a number of some 10,800 for the 1st Regiment and at 
least 11,000 for the 2nd Regiment seems more appropriate.529
  Again, the HSSPF took up these numbers and reported them to Himmler in turn. On 
6 August,  1941, he  grossly underestimated the number of people who had fallen 
victim to the SS Cavalry Brigade until this point as he spoke of ‘4,219 looters, Red 
Army men etc.’.530 A day later, when the two squadrons of the 2nd Regiment were still 
involved in  the  murder  of  the Pinsk Jews,  von dem Bach-Zelewski  gave  a  total 
SS-Kavallerie-Regiment  2,  Reitende  Abteilung,  in:  BArchL,  Dokumenten-Sammlung,  Ordner 
Verschiedenes 291-17, p. 8.
527 Zusammenfassende Meldung über die Kampfhandlungen der Vorausabteilung der SS-Kav.Brigade, 
11 August, 1941, in: Baade, Unsere Ehre heißt Treue, p. 228; Abschlußmeldung, SS Cavalry Brigade 
to HSSPF Centre, 13 August, 1941, in: Baade, Unsere Ehre heißt Treue, p. 214.
528 Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom 4.8. – 6.8. 1941, SS-Kav. Rgt. 2, 7 August, 1941, in: VUA, box 
24, file 2. On the first day at Pinsk, Magill assumed a death toll of 2,689 whereas in all likelihood at 
least more than twice as many Jews had been shot that day.
529 These figures are the best available estimate based on the reports of the two SS cavalry regiments 
and testimonies of survivors. As Raul Hilberg has pointed out in his review of Wegbereiter der Shoah, 
Martin Cüppers has assumed a number of about 14,000 victims for both units during the first mission 
in the Pripet Marshes. This is rather speculative as the reports are not accurate enough about killings 
in remote areas; see Hilberg, ‘The Kommandostab Revisited’, pp. 363-364. I have arrived at a lower 
estimate as I only used figures which I could sufficiently back up with evidence.
530 Situation report of the HSSPF Centre, 6 August, 1941, in VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 1, file 
4. See also Einstellungsverfügung gg. Lombard u.a., p. 1756.
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number of 7,819 executions, 3,600 of which had been committed by midday of 7 
August. He did not provide any information on the background of the victims.531 In 
the same report, he said that more than 30,000 people had been executed in his area 
so far, a statement which was interpreted by British secret service analysts who had 
intercepted this message as indicating ‘that the leaders of the three sectors [the three 
HSSPF’s]  stand somewhat in competition with each other  as to their  ‘scores’’.532 
Whether  or not  this  is  true it  perhaps never  will  be ascertained but  the way the 
numbers of victims were subsumed nonetheless shows the complete disregard for 
human  life,  a  fact  that  becomes  apparent  throughout  all  reports  both  of  the  SS 
cavalry and their superiors. To the historian who views these sources today it seems 
as if the perpetrators were not even interested in the nationality or situation of their 
victims as long as they could report high numbers of suspected enemies who had 
been destroyed.
  Another important aspect for the assessment of  the deployment of the unit is the 
almost complete absence of casualties which speaks for a largely non-military role 
during the first mission in the Pripet Marshes. This impression is supported by the 
reports of the two commanders of the mounted detachments. Gustav Lombard only 
mentions ‘individual encounters’ with Red Army men, whereas Franz Magill openly 
states that his detachment was not involved in combat. 533 The discrepancy between 
531 Situation report of the HSSPF Centre, 7 August, 1941, in VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 1, file 
4.
532 Situation  report  of  the  HSSPF Centre,  7  August,  1941,  in:  NAK,  HW 16/45,  German Police 
Decodes: 4.8. 41; for the interpretation by the British secret service, see Summary of German Police 
Decodes, 21 August, 1941, NAK, HW 16/1, quoted in Mallmann and others, Deutscher Osten 1939 –  
1945, p. 144. It  is possible that this report by von dem Bach-Zelewski helped to prepare an even 
larger massacre: as the quick advance of Army Group Centre had facilitated the killings of the SS and 
police in this sector, the HSSPF Centre surpassed his colleague in the South, SS-Obergruppenführer 
Friedrich Jeckeln. The Reichsführer was not satisfied with Jeckeln’s progress. When the HSSPF South 
reported to Himmler on 12 August, 1941, he might have offered the mass killing of Hungarian Jews 
as a solution, a measure that was implemented at Kamenets-Podolsk from 26-28 August, 1941 and 
claimed  23,600  victims.  See  Klaus-Michael  Mallmann,  ‘Der  qualitative  Sprung  im 
Vernichtungsprozeß.  Das  Massaker  von  Kamenez-Podolsk  Ende  August  1941’,  Jahrbuch  für  
Antisemitismusforschung 10 (2001), p. 239 and pp. 246-247.
533 For the 1st Regiment, see Befriedung des Raumes Prypecsümpfe, 11 August, 1941, in: BArchL, 
Dokumenten-Sammlung, Ordner Verschiedenes 291-17, p. 6.  Gerlach assumes that the ‘individual 
encounters’ were just a euphemism for the murder of unarmed prisoners of war; see Gerlach, Morde, 
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the number  of  SS soldiers  who had been killed and the number  of  military and 
civilian deaths inflicted by the SS cavalry is striking: as opposed to approximately 
more than 20,000 Jews and Red Army soldiers, only two SS soldiers had been killed 
and  15  had  been  wounded,  two  of  whom  were  officers.  Other  than  that,  both 
regiments had come out of their first missions unscathed. In this context it appears 
very  bizarre  that  Hermann  Fegelein  intended  to  give  the  operations  more  of  a 
military touch in order to gain further prestige. He stressed the extreme conditions 
and the tough terrain in which his men had fought, a perception that referred mostly 
to the vanguard. Just like after the 1st regiment had seen combat near Bialystok, he 
now called for his men to be decorated, as he was of the opinion that a medal would 
lose its value if it was not awarded immediately after a combat operation. Despite the 
tough missions, he complained, no Iron Crosses had been given to the men so far, 
which neglected the first  batch of medals the SS cavalry had received six weeks 
earlier.534 Fegelein’s grave worry was soon to be relieved: three days after he had 
filed his report, twelve soldiers of the Cavalry Brigade were awarded the Iron Cross 
Second Class.535 On 17 August, the commander of the 162nd infantry division gave 
further decorations to the men of the vanguard: one bar to the Iron Cross First Class, 
two Iron Crosses First Class and fifteen Iron Crosses Second Class.536
p. 561; for the 2nd Regiment, see Bericht über den Verlauf der Pripjet-Aktion vom 27.7. – 11.8. 1941, 
12 August, 1941, SS-Kavallerie-Regiment 2, quoted in Baade, Unsere Ehre heißt Treue, p. 217.
534 Abschlußmeldung, SS Cavalry Brigade to HSSPF Centre, 13 August, 1941, in: Baade, Unsere Ehre  
heißt Treue, p. 214. Of the two deaths, only one could be verified (the NCO who had been killed in 
the ambush  on  the  motorcycle  platoon of  the  2nd Regiment);  it  can  be  assumed that  another  SS 
cavalryman died of wounds he had received during the first mission in the Pripet Marshes.
535 Situation report of the HSSPF Centre, 16 August, 1941, in VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 1, file 
4.
536 Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom 18.-21.8. 1941, SS Cavalry Brigade, 21 August, 1941, in VUA, 
Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 3.
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The second mission in the Pripet Marshes and deployment in southeastern Belorussia 
(15 August   – 22 September, 1941) 
  The ‘combing’ of the eastern Pripet Marshes began on 15 August, 1941 for the 2nd 
Regiment and two days later for the 1st Regiment. The vanguard remained based at 
Starye Dorogy; although under the direct command of the SS Cavalry Brigade, the 
252nd division of the  Wehrmacht could still  dispose of it  if  necessary. For Gustav 
Lombard, the beginning of the second mission brought a promotion: he was now 
appointed commander of the 1st Regiment, an important step in his SS career.537 For 
their second mission, the men were again indoctrinated: according to the order of the 
day of 13 August, 1941, ‘gangs of partisans were working hand in hand with the 
Jewish population’, a renewal of the already known justification for mass killings.538 
The advance of the horse squadrons started from the line they had reached a few 
days  earlier.  By sending  out  fast-moving  reconnaissance  patrols,  the  SS  cavalry 
officers tried to find out what lay ahead of them.
  Soon, the SS cavalrymen had to deal with a new situation: when they reached the 
small  town of  Turov,  some 22 miles  east  of  David-Gorodok,  soldiers  of  the  2nd 
Regiment’s  third  squadron  suddenly  confronted  an  enemy  position.  After 
encountering stiff resistance from Red Army troops on the night of 15 August, the 
squadron took Turov and pushed the enemy out to the east at the break of dawn. 
During the morning of the next day, the town was shelled by the Soviets; as the SS 
troopers were lacking ammunition and to avoid further casualties, Magill decided to 
pull  back  this  unit  to  nearby Maryampole,  where  the  squadron  took up  defence 
537 Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom 14.-17.8. 1941, 18 August, 1941, SS Cavalry Brigade, in: VUA, 
Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 3.
538 Brigadebefehl Nr. 1, 13 August, 1941, in: BArchF, RS 3-8/20.
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positions against a possible Soviet counterattack. The Soviets reacted immediately 
and reoccupied Turov. In the initial fighting, two SS men had been killed and six 
were wounded, a number that rose to eleven wounded until the end of the day. After 
this setback, the brigade staff gave orders to send reinforcements and heavy weapons 
to  Turov,  which led to  the regrouping and concentration of almost  the entire  2nd 
Regiment  in  the  nearby  towns  of  Lakhva,  Mokrots,  and  Marjampole.  The  first, 
second, fourth and sixth squadrons were sent there, along with the mounted batteries 
of both regiments.539
  For the first time since their arrival in Belorussia, SS cavalrymen had made contact 
with  a  strong  contingent  of  regular  enemy forces  stubbornly  defending  a  fixed 
emplacement. This Soviet group threatened the advance of the 2nd Regiment and the 
supply route of the 35th corps of the Wehrmacht.540 Therefore, it had to be destroyed 
before the SS cavalry could continue its mission. Over the next two days, the 2nd 
Regiment further reconnoitred the vicinity of Turov. As its scouts found out, enemy 
forces in that town and nearby Zapiesocze consisted of about 600 armed civilians 
and  100  –  200  uniformed  Soviet  soldiers.  They had  several  artillery  pieces  and 
infantry  guns  as  well  as  light  and  heavy  machineguns,  felt  absolutely  safe  and 
repelled  all  probing  attacks.  Apart  from  these  groups,  there  were  also  Soviet 
positions to the rear of Turov and at other places nearby.541 After the necessary troops 
had been assembled, the attack on Zapesoch’ye and Turov was ordered for the early 
539 Lagebericht  beim  SS-Kav.Regiment  2  vom  15./16.8.  1941,  16  August,  1941,  in:  VUA, 
Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 3; Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom 14.-17.8. 1941, 18 August, 
1941, SS Cavalry Brigade, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 3.
540 Lagebericht beim SS-Kav.Regiment 2, 16 August, 1941, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, 
file 3.
541 Aufklärungsergebnis bei SS-Kav.Rgt. 2, 19 August, 1941, in: VUA, KDO Kommandostab RFSS, 
box  24,  file  3.  In  this  case,  too,  the  next  higher  authority  reported  different  figures  to  Berlin: 
according to the HSSPF, 21 cavalrymen had been wounded and the enemy forces holding Turov and 
Zapiesocze had a strength of 400 men. See situation report of the HSSPF Centre, 16 August, 1941, in 
VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 1, file 4. A Wehrmacht report spoke of ‘regular enemy forces of 
battalion strength including cavalry and partly motorised infantry with many weapons and artillery’; 
see radio message from SS Cavalry Brigade to  SS-Hauptsturmführer Friedrich, [SS Cavalry recruit 
deport] Warschau, 22 August, 1941, in: BArchF, RS 4/212 (part 2), p. 92.
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morning of 21 August. The main assault on the enemy positions was to be carried out 
by the first and third squadrons of the 2nd Regiment, which had been reinforced with 
heavy machineguns of the fourth squadron. Covering fire was to be provided by the 
two artillery batteries; other subunits of the regiment were to block escape routes to 
the east. The SS cavalry could also dispose of an engineer unit of the  Wehrmacht 
which operated several captured boats and pontoons armed with anti-tank guns; they 
were to attack targets in Turov from the river Pripet. 542
  The attack on Turov went as planned: artillery fire proved to be effective,  and 
despite the fact that the SS cavalrymen had to resort to close combat in some places 
as  the  Soviets  had  erected  fortifications,  the  town  fell  within  three  hours.  The 
Germans kept pushing forward and took four other villages east of Turov during the 
morning; only a few Red Army soldiers managed to escape. Fegelein was very proud 
of this quick victory as the enemy had been about battalion strength and consisted of 
cavalry, motorised infantry, and artillery. The SS cavalry had lost only four men and 
20 had been wounded (two of whom died in the following days); enemy losses, on 
the other hand, amounted to approximately 400 men and only ten prisoners were 
taken.  543 For the conduct of the 2nd Regiment at Turov, the commander of the rear 
area of Army Group Centre, general von Schenckendorff, expressed his appreciation 
and  gratitude  to  Hermann  Fegelein.  He  particularly  mentioned  the  gallantry 
displayed by the third squadron under Hauptsturmführer von Zastrow and hoped for 
further fruitful and comradely cooperation between Wehrmacht and SS.544
542 Regimentsbefehl, 2nd SS Cavalry Regiment, 20 August, 1941, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 
24, file 3. For the subordinated Wehrmacht engineers, see also Korpsbefehl Nr. 42 vom 18.8.  1941, 
Befehlshaber des rückwärtigen Heeresgebiets Mitte, in: BArchF, RS 22/224, p. 217.
543 Situation report of the HSSPF Centre, 21 August, 1941, in VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 1, file 
4; radio message from HSSPF Centre to the Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS, 22 August, 1941, in 
VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 1, file 4; situation report of the HSSPF Centre, 22 August, 1941, in 
VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 1, file 4; Beute- und Verlustmeldung, Unternehmen Turov am 21.8. 
1941, 2nd SS Cavalry Regiment, 22 August, 1941, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 3; 
Gefechtsbericht über die Kampfhandlungen in und um Turov, brigade commander, 29 August, 1941, 
in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 3.
544 Message from the commander of the rear area of Army Group Centre to the commander of the SS 
Cavalry Brigade, 24 August, 1941, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 3.
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  Fegelein’s attitude towards two of the officers involved in the fighting at Turov may 
also help to shed light on his leadership abilities. Von Schenckendorff’s message had 
been based on the report  of major Schönwald,  his adjutant,  who acted as liaison 
officer with the SS Cavalry during the attack on Turov and had also judged their 
efforts very favourably.  545 In return, Fegelein recommended him for a decoration 
and  Schönwald  received  the  bar  to  the  Iron  Cross  First  Class.  This  instance 
particularly upset the Higher SS and Police Leader Centre, SS-Gruppenführer Erich 
von dem Bach-Zelewski, who was impatiently waiting for a reward for his services; 
according to him, the Wehrmacht major had been a mere ‘spectator’ at the attack on 
Turov and  did  not  play  a  role  in  the  combat  operation.546 In  contrast,  Hermann 
Fegelein later court-martialled the commander of the 2nd Regiment for breaching his 
duty: he accused Hierthes of having failed as a leader during the combat operations 
at Turov due to hesitant behaviour and a lack of initiative. The highest SS and police 
court  dismissed  the  process  as  it  found that  Hierthes  was  not  guilty  of  a  crime 
according to military law.547 Hierthes, who had already been at odds with Fegelein 
before (when he allegedly had failed to track down a group of Red Army soldiers), 
was  replaced  as  commander  of  the  regiment  by  Sturmbannführer Hermann 
Schleifenbaum at  the  end  of  August,  1941.  As  these  two  cases  show,  Hermann 
Fegelein displayed a high degree of unscrupulousness, both in favour of or to the 
disadvantage of others:  Schönwald,  who had helped him,  was  rewarded for  this, 
whereas the career of Hierthes, an older but experienced man who had seen service 
as a cavalry and police officer as well as in the SS before, was effectively over after 
545 Radio message from SS Cavalry Brigade to  SS-Hauptsturmführer Friedrich, [SS Cavalry recruit 
deport] Warschau, 22 August, 1941, in: BArchF, RS 4/212 (part 2), p. 92.
546 Tagebuch des Chefs der Bandenkampfverbände, entries from 5 and 6 September, 1941, pp. 11-12.
547 Verfügung des  Obersten SS- und Polizeigerichts  München vom 28.8.  1942, in:  BArchB,  SSO 
Heimo Hierthes. Fegelein had also accused Hierthes of another breach of duty: allegedly, he had left 
his regiment during heavy fighting in the winter of 1941 – 1942 after having reported sick;  this 
charge, too, was dismissed.
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his departure from the regiment.548
  As  a  follow-up  to  the  capture  of  Turov,  the  combat  zone  was  searched  and 
‘cleansed’ by SS troopers on 22 and 23 August, which claimed another 200 to 300 
lives on the Soviet side. As a ‘collective punishment’, Turov and nine other localities 
were razed to the ground.549 This search and retaliation was so brutal that it even 
invoked some sort of pity from Hierthes: when evaluating the combat at Turov, he 
found that many local Belarusians had been forced to fight on the Soviet side, often 
at gunpoint. Therefore, many of them had fled the town to avoid recruitment. When 
the Germans had defeated the Red Army,  they were welcomed as  liberators and 
offered food and religious icons, even in the almost completely destroyed town of 
Turov. They were also asked to give out weapons so that the locals could defend 
themselves and help the Germans to search for stragglers in the woods. Under the 
impression of a population that was friendly towards the SS despite all the suffering 
it had caused, Hierthes ordered to stop reprisals such as executions and the burning 
of villages.550
  This comparative leniency did not last. During the combing of the eastern Pripet 
Marshes, the SS Cavalry Brigade was involved in mass violence of the same kind as 
in the first  two weeks of August and conducted further searches and executions, 
often with hundreds of victims. Two developments now influenced their approach: as 
the SS cavalrymen got further to the east,  they could find fewer Jews, and their 
methods became even more brutal. Evidence from other German agencies suggests 
548 Sturmbannführer Hermann Schleifenbaum succeeded Hierthes in the command of the 2nd Regiment 
with effect  from 1 September,  1941; see Führerstellenbesetzungsliste,  SS-Kavallerieregiment  2,  1 
September, 1941, in: BArchL, B 162/21679, p. 330. For the continuation of Hierthes’s service in the 
SS see Cüppers, Wegbereiter, p. 181; Cüppers assumes that a lack of initiative in carrying out killings 
was what turned Fegelein against Hierthes.
549 Gefechtsbericht über Unternehmen Turov, 2nd SS Cavalry Regiment, 22 August, 1941, in: VUA, 
Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 3;  situation report  of the HSSPF Centre,  21 August, 1941, in 
VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 1, file 4; Gefechtsbericht über die Kampfhandlungen in und um 
Turov, brigade commander, 29 August, 1941, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 3.
550 Erfahrungsbericht zu den Kämpfen bei Turov, commander of the 2nd Regiment, 23 August, 1941, 
in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 3.
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that the approach of ‘combing’ large areas as thoroughly as possible (including the 
execution  of  all  possible  enemies  and the  recruitment  and installation  of  willing 
collaborators)  was  universally  accepted  and practiced  in  the  rear  areas  of  Army 
Group Centre. In doing so, different units pursued different routes: security divisions 
of  the  Wehrmacht were  allocated  specific  areas,  police  battalions  searched  and 
‘pacified’  villages  and  towns  along  the  major  thoroughfares,  subunits  of 
Einsatzgruppe  B committed  massacres  in  larger  towns,  the  SS  Cavalry  Brigade 
‘combed’ rural as well as built-up areas, and all of these formations cooperated in 
huge massacres.551 Wherever possible, local institutions such as the SD branch or the 
Ortskommandantur at  Pinsk  were  informed  and  asked  to  supply  additional 
manpower to carry out killings or logistic duties. A comparison of  Wehrmacht and 
SS orders shows that there was no difference between these two institutions: general 
von Schenckendorff particularly endorsed radical measures and gave out directives 
which closely resembled those of Himmler, Fegelein, Lombard, and Magill.552 He 
also saw that the relationship with the SS was good and sincere. The SS Cavalry 
Brigade was a prime example for this cooperation of German agencies.
  After  taking  Turov,  the  SS  cavalry  units  proceeded  further  eastward:  the  1st 
Regiment  turned  to  the  southeast  from  Liakhovichi,  whereas  the  2nd Regiment 
followed the river Pripet. They were to reach the confluence of the Ptich and Pripet 
rivers until  31 August.553 Upon reaching the town of Mozyr’,  the SS cavalrymen 
immediately targeted the Jewish population with a brutality that has been described 
551 Korpsbefehl  Nr.  39  vom 11.8.  1941,  Befehlshaber  des  rückwärtigen  Heeresgebiets  Mitte,  in: 
BArchF, RS 22/224, pp. 201-203; Korpsbefehl Nr. 42 vom 18.8. 1941, Befehlshaber des rückwärtigen 
Heeresgebiets Mitte, ibid., p. 217; Krausnick and Wilhelm, Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges, 
pp. 181-183;  Befriedung des Raumes Prypecsümpfe,  11 August,  1941, in: BArchL, Dokumenten-
Sammlung, Ordner Verschiedenes 291-17, p. 7.
552 See for example Korpsbefehl Nr. 39 of 11 August, 1941: this order contains a section on ‘cleansing 
operations’ which calls for exactly the same method as described by Magill in his report on the first 
mission in the Pripet Marshes. Magill’s report, on the other hand, shows the practical implementation 
of Himmler’s ‘Kommandosonderbefehl’ of 28 July, which had been specified by Fegelein. See also 
Hasenclever, Wehrmacht und Besatzungspolitik, pp. 351-352 and pp. 357-364.
553 Brigadebefehl  an SS-Kav.Rgt. 1 für Fortsetzung des Auftrages 2 – Pripjet-Sümpfe,  24 August, 
1941, in: BArchF, RS 4/430, p. 2.
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in great detail by a survivor, the Jewish engineer Basja Pikman. According to her, 
atrocities  were  directed  also  at  Poles  and  Belarusians,  several  of  whom  were 
murdered. With the help of local collaborators, the soldiers searched houses, beat up 
and killed  people with different  ethnic  and religious  backgrounds,  and  displayed 
particular brutality towards the Jews. The Germans stayed in the town for several 
days. At first, only individual Jews were killed, whereas a group of about 200 Jewish 
men of all ages was executed outside the town a few days later.554 Responsible for 
these outrages was the third squadron of the 2nd Regiment  under  Hauptsturmführer 
von Zastrow, which had already shown great cruelty and viciousness towards the 
Jews of Serniki. The same was true for their behaviour at Mozyr’, where absolute 
cold-bloodedness was observed as well: after the execution, the cavalrymen marched 
back into town singing, like a group of recruits coming back from a field exercise – 
perfect military fashion in the face of mass violence.555
  Radio traffic between the third squadron and regimental headquarters about the 
assignment  at  Mozyr’ serves  as  a  perfect  example  for  the  use  of  camouflage 
language by the SS cavalry: first, the town was described as ‘occupied by looters’; 
on the next day, the population was reported to have been ‘looting’ at first and was 
then ‘pacified’.556 As in other  cases,  the true meaning of these messages and the 
extent of the events can only be gathered by comparing different SS documents and 
including post-war sources in the analysis. Another characteristic feature is the very 
broad description of the situation and actions of SS cavalry units. Official documents 
554 Bericht der Ingenieurin Basja Pikman, in: Wassilij  Grossman and others,  Das Schwarzbuch: der  
Genozid an den sowjetischen Juden (Reinbek, 1995), pp. 332-336.  Radio messages from the third 
squadron indicate that it stayed at Mosyr from 2 – 12 September, 1941, and executed at least 122 
people during that time; see Funkspruch Nr. 36, 3. Schwadron an Rgt. 2, 2 September, 1941, 6 pm, in: 
BArchF, RS 4/936, p. 116, Funkspruch Nr. 3, 3. Schwadron an Rgt. 2, 10 September, 1941, 1.30 pm, 
in: ibid., p. 54, and Funkspruch Nr. 6, 3. Schwadron an Rgt. 2, 12 September, 1941, 6.15 am, in: ibid., 
p. 51. Cüppers estimates that several hundred Jews were killed at Mosyr; he has used court files and 
documents of the SS cavalry for his reconstruction. See Cüppers, Wegbereiter, p. 197.
555 Bericht der Ingenieurin Basja Pikman, in Grossman and others, Das Schwarzbuch, p. 334.
556 Funkspruch Nr. 36, 3. Schwadron an Rgt. 2, 2 September, 1941, 6 pm, in: BArchF, RS 4/936, p. 
116; Funkspruch Nr. 37, 3. Schwadron an Rgt. 2, 3 September, 1941, 6 am, in: BArchF, RS 4/936, p. 
115.
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of the brigade often do not contain much information about particular incidents or 
localities that were touched by its squadrons. Instead, there are more general remarks 
along the line of, ‘The designated area was combed’, which serve to subsume whole 
days or even weeks of deployment in the operational area. What lies beneath this 
short and mostly inaccurate wording can only be gauged from first-hand accounts in 
many cases, such as post-war testimony of former SS cavalrymen. They indicate a 
continuous radicalisation,  which not only influenced the killing methods but also 
strongly affected the perpetrators.  
  In order to accelerate executions, SS cavalrymen had begun to use machine-guns 
immediately  after  the  start  of  the  first  mission,  when  they  drove  Jews  into  the 
swamps;  this  has  also  been  documented  for  the  mass  executions  at  Pinsk.  The 
mounted units soon combined the use of the available weaponry with a division of 
labour as different groups of soldiers were deployed for different tasks. As a result, 
they became more efficient in killing.  Throughout the second mission in the Pripet 
Marshes, even heavy weapons were utilised: a former soldier of the fifth squadron of 
the 1st Regiment  testified  that  during a  killing  mission  near  Liakhovichi  in  mid-
August 1941 he and his comrades had to open fire on a group of 200-300 Jews with 
an infantry support gun, a light artillery piece. At the execution site, another gun 
crew and the three machine-gun platoons of the fourth squadron of the regiment had 
surrounded  the  victims  in  a  semi-circle.  Whereas  the  two  heavy  weapons  were 
withdrawn after some time, the machine-gunners kept firing at the victims until all of 
them had been killed, apart from a few who managed to escape.557 The platoon that 
particular soldier belonged to was assigned to the fourth squadron for a period of 
about three weeks, until the two units reached the town of Rechitsa.558 During that 
557 Vernehmung Paul Klose vom 2.12. 1968, in: BArchL, B 162/5542, p. j138-139.
558 Vernehmung Paul Klose vom 2.12. 1968, in: BArchL, B 162/5542, p. j138-139; the exact date for 
the arrival of the SS cavalry units is not given in the files but the HSSPF Mitte stated that the 1 st 
Regiment and the bicycle reconnaissance detachment had reached that town on September 9, 1941. 
See situation report of the HSSPF Mitte, 9 September, 1941, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 1, 
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time, the soldiers of the fifth and fourth squadrons carried out executions almost 
every other day.
  The already brutal procedure of village searches and executions often escalated 
even further, as has been described by another cavalryman of the fifth squadron. He 
testified that roundups of the Jews were done ‘bestially’: some of the soldiers beat 
their victims with whips and rifle butts or kicked them. After that, the Jews were led 
to an open space and shot ‘with all available weapons’. In the case of an execution at 
Pagost, a small town some 15 miles south of Sluck, more than 1,000 Jewish men, 
women and children were led to a meadow in the swamp, where SS cavalrymen 
opened fire at  them with machine-guns,  carbines,  and even mortars.  Some threw 
hand-grenades  into  the  group.  The  firing  continued  until  there  was  no  more 
movement in the pile of bodies; this was, however, not observed every time: after 
some executions, moaning and whining could be heard for hours, and some of the 
bodies were still moving.559
  The same man also noticed that, after the shootings had been carried out in this 
brutal way for some time, the morale of the SS cavalrymen reached a low in some of 
the units in the second half of August, 1941; it could be considered ‘catastrophic’. 
Huge quantities of alcohol were given out, including an ‘extra ration’ after killing 
missions. Without this, the questioned veteran assumed, the officers would not have 
been able to motivate the men to do their task.560 Not all of the soldiers, however, 
were able to numb their  feelings:  after  the executions,  many did not want to eat 
anything, as was later stated by former cooks of the squadrons. One man even said: 
‘The events were just horrifying for me. […] I know of myself that I was so down I 
file 5.
559 Vernehmung  Klaas  Kruizenga  vom 9.4.  1963,  in:  BArchL,  B  162/5539,  p.  j67-68.  See  also 
Abschlußbericht der Zentralen Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen vom 20.8. 1963, p. 372.
560 Vernehmung Klaas Kruizenga vom 9.4. 1963, in: BArchL, B 162/5539, p. j68-69.
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did not eat for three days’.561 Soldiers lost the respect for their superiors who ordered 
these actions; some even thought of writing to leaders of the Nazi party they knew or 
even to Hitler himself and tell them about the outrages they had to commit.562 Just as 
during the first mission in the Pripet Marshes, the SS cavalrymen felt that their task 
was contradictory to the war they were supposed to be fighting as it had a largely 
non-military character: they stated that ‘they had come to the Soviet Union to fight’ 
and that ‘this [the executions] could not be the duty of our soldiers’.563 One former 
soldier said that he had felt desperation as he had been brought up to respect the 5th 
and the 7th commandment and all of a sudden had to commit murders.564 Another 
former cavalryman stated that he did not have anything against Jews personally as he 
had  grown up with  them in  his  hometown;  nevertheless,  he  had  to  kill  Jews  at 
Pinsk.565
  Statements  of  former  cavalrymen  about  the  killing  process  and  their  personal 
feelings (shock, depression, and disgust in most cases) are very rare in the court files. 
A former investigator in the case against Franz Magill and his subalterns of the 2nd 
Regiment said that although some veterans spoke about these issues, most of them 
preferred  not  to  give  any  particulars  of  the  gruesome  scenes  they  witnessed.  A 
majority of the people who were questioned only acknowledged matters that could 
be thoroughly proven by using other testimonies or written sources. If at all, they 
would have spoken about the war only with former comrades, not even with their 
families. They often found it very hard to confront their experiences when they were 
asked about them some twenty years later.566
561 Birn, ‘Zweierlei Wirklichkeit’, p. 279.
562 Vernehmung Klaas Kruizenga vom 9.4. 1963, in: BArchL, B 162/5539, p. j68.  Interestingly, the 
sources do not contain any information indicating  that the commanders were worried about order 
breaking down.
563 Vernehmung  August  Sündermann,  in:  BArchL,  B  162/2329,  p.  1642;  Birn,  ‘Zweierlei 
Wirklichkeit’, p. 278.
564 Vernehmung Hans Saggau, in: BArchL, B 162/2329, p. 1646.
565 Vernehmung von Helmut Fenslaf, in: BArchL, B 162/5539, pp. 1647-1648.
566 Interview with Bernhard D., retired chief inspector of the Landeskriminalamt Niedersachsen, 26 
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  Towards the end of the brigade’s second mission,  new administrative decisions 
were made. The fusion of the two regiments, which had been ordered in late July but 
was officially announced only now, left the subunits largely unchanged: the previous 
staffs of the mounted detachments, for example, now became regimental staffs.  In 
order  to  improve  the  tactical  efficiency  of  the  support  units,  the  two  engineer 
platoons now formed an engineer squadron. The brigade was also assigned a signals 
platoon from an SS infantry regiment that had been disbanded, and the veterinary 
company of the Kommandostab. Apart from changes in staff and support formations, 
other subunits received a new status as well: the squadrons which had operated as a 
vanguard  thus  far  were  merged  to  form a  Radfahraufklärungsabteilung (bicycle 
reconnaissance  detachment,  often  referred  to  as  RAA in  the  court  files),  which 
consisted of two bicycle squadrons, an anti-tank squadron, a staff unit and a signals 
platoon. Throughout its deployment in the swamplands, the  bicycle reconnaissance 
detachment proved to be far more practical and mobile than the horse squadrons, 
which were slowed down by their support units. Finally, the new structure of the SS 
Cavalry Brigade was announced by the SS-Führungshauptamt on 6 September.567
  At the beginning of September, the brigade staff was relocated from Liakhovichi to 
Bobruisk.568 There, the SS cavalry participated in a mass execution comparable to the 
murders at Pinsk which, unlike this other massacre in August or the final liquidation 
of the Jewish community of Bobruisk in November, 1941, has not been documented 
at the time and could only recently be reconstructed by historical research. Between 
4  and  9  September,  1941,  about  7,000  Jewish  men,  women  and  children  were 
January, 2011; Vernehmung Heinz Frenken vom 24.6. 1963, in: BArchL, B 162/5539, p. c9.
567 Verfügung des SS-Führungshauptamts über die  Umgliederung der SS-Kav.Regimenter 1 und 2 
vom 6.9. 1941, in:  BArchB, NS 19/3487, fiche 19-20;  KTB KDOS, entries from 30 August and 4 
September, 1941; Abschlußbericht der ZStl vom 20.8. 1963, pp. 359-361; Einstellungsverfügung gg. 
Lombard u.a., pp. 357-358 and pp. 360-361. For the RAA, see Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit v. 30.8. – 
5.9.  1941,  SS-Kav.  Brigade,  in:  VUA,  Kommandostab  RFSS,  box  24,  file  3;  according  to  this 
document, the merging of the bicycle squadrons was ordered on 31 August, 1941.
568 Brigadebefehl Nr. 4 vom 31.8. 1941, quoted in: Abschlußbericht der ZStl vom 20.8. 1963, p. 367.
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executed  at  a  military  airfield  by  members  of  various  German  paramilitary  and 
military  units.569 A subunit  of  Einsatzkommando  8,  which  in  turn  was  part  of 
Einsatzgruppe  B,  had  been  based  at  Bobruisk  earlier  and  was  familiar  with  the 
surroundings.  Its  members  rounded  up  Jews  and led  them to  the  execution  site. 
Soldiers of a Wehrmacht transport unit brought other victims there in lorries. At the 
airfield, airmen of a Luftwaffe ground unit and SS cavalrymen drove the Jews to pits 
which  had  been  dug  out,  beating  and  insulting  the  helpless  people.  They  also 
cordoned off the killing field and carried out the shootings, which happened in an 
extremely brutal manner: once a group of Jews had been killed, the next group had 
to lie down on top of the dead bodies. The murder continued for at least two days; at 
night, the headlights of trucks illuminated the site. Statements of witnesses to these 
crimes  contain  information  on  the  involvement  of  numerous  other  German 
formations, including military police, an anti-aircraft  unit,  and convalescents of a 
military hospital.  Some of the perpetrators,  especially the  Luftwaffe men and the 
patients, volunteered for the job because they wanted to ‘try out their pistols’. Of the 
SS cavalry, the mounted battery and the fifth squadron of the 1st Regiment its took 
part in the shootings; it is possible that the third squadron was involved as well.570
569 To this day, reasons and initiators of this execution remain unclear. Christian Gerlach has made the 
case that the numerous acts of mass killing carried out in Bobruisk and the vicinity in the second half 
of 1941 were part of a concerted action aimed at Jewish people who did not work for the Germans; 
thus, a local food crisis was to be solved radically. Other documented incidents in this area include 
three massacres committed by the security police in September and October, which led to the death of 
2205 Jews, the killing of about 4,000 prisoners of war at the Bobruisk citadel on 7 November and the 
annihilation of the Jewish ghetto on 7-8 November,  during which  Einsatzkommando 8 and Police 
Battalion 316 killed at least 5,281, perhaps even 6,600 Jews. After this series of atrocities, Bobruisk 
was reported to be ‘judenfrei’ by the German authorities. See Gerlach, Morde, pp. 599-600; Curilla, 
Die deutsche Ordnungspolizei und der Holocaust im Baltikum und in Weißrußland 1941 – 1944, pp. 
540-542.
570 Cüppers,  Wegbereiter,  pp.  198-199;  Gerlach,  Morde,  pp.  599-600  and  p.  609;  Krausnick  and 
Wilhelm, Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges, pp. 181-182; Vernehmung Otto Prade vom 30.10. 
1962, in: BArchL, B 162/5543, pp. m34-m36; Vernehmung Heinz Büttner vom 19.5. 1961, ibid., pp. 
m6-m7;  Vernehmung  Richard  Gloth  vom  14.8.  1962,  in:  BArchL,  B  162/5542,  pp.  i4-i5; 
Einstellungsverfügung  gg.  Lombard  u.a.,  pp.  1788-1802;  information  on  the  involvement  of 
Luftwaffe soldiers, who belonged to the Fliegerhorstkommandantur E 26/XI, can be found in the files 
of  the  case  Ermittlungen  gegen  Schreiber  u.a.  wg.  Judenerschießungen  in  Sluzk  –  Bobruisk,  in: 
BArchL,  B  162/1548  –  1549;  see  especially  Anzeige  von  Alfred  Habeck  vom 30.3.  1960  betr. 
Judenerschießungen in Bobruisk in B 162/1548, pp. 1-4, and Vernehmung Alfred Habeck vom 30.3. 
1960, ibid., pp. 11-15.
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  The involvement and presence of the HSSPF Mitte at the execution on the airfield 
in early September has been proven; in all likelihood he supervised the deployment 
of  forces  under  his  jurisdiction,  namely  the  men  of  the  security  police  and  the 
security service and the SS cavalrymen. The wide range of other German formations 
that  took part  in the massacre on the airfield  can be explained by a  shortage of 
manpower on the part of the subunit of Einsatzkommando 8: as this was only a small 
troop, German authorities basically ordered all available soldiers to help with the 
logistics, security, and implementation of the killings. A Luftwaffe soldier stated that 
the Wehrmacht commander of Bobruisk had given his unit the order to take part in 
the executions; to these killing details added an unknown number of volunteers.571
  An evaluation of statements of former soldiers provides more details; it emphasises 
the role of the local Einsatzkommando detail, the scope of action of those involved, 
and the barbaric nature of the events at Bobruisk. The SS cavalrymen seemed to 
have been incorporated into the execution squads immediately after  their  arrival: 
members of an advance party of the mounted battery were used in small groups for 
sealing off the site and for the shooting itself under the command of an officer of the 
security service even before the main body of their unit had reached Bobruisk. They 
were  posted  to  killing  squads  again  in  the  following  days;  according  to  one 
statement, they killed between 600 and 1200 people. 572 A former soldier of the fifth 
squadron stated that one of his comrades had to shoot Jews, including women and 
children,  for  a  whole  day.  The  whole  field  had  been  full  of  corpses;  Jews  were 
machine-gunned in the evening as their execution could not be done by riflemen 
alone before nightfall. When the killing was over, Russians were ordered to bury the 
571 Tagebuch des Chefs der Bandenkampfverbände, entry from 5 September, 1941, in:  BArchB, R 
20/45b, p. 11; Gerlach, Morde, p. 609.
572 Einstellungsverfügung gg. Lombard u.a., pp. 1782-1797.  See also  Vernehmung Otto Prade vom 
30.10. 1962, in: BArchL, B 162/5543, pp. m34-m36;  Vernehmung Heinz Büttner vom 19.5. 1961, 
ibid., pp. m6-m7.
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dead and threw them into the pits with pitchforks.573
  Throughout the missions in the Pripet Marshes and especially in the light of events 
such  as  the  massacre  at  the  airfield  near  Bobruisk,  a  demoralisation  of  the  SS 
cavalrymen  became  apparent. Behavioural  patterns  that  had  been  displayed  in 
Poland already reappeared in Belorussia: some of the men went beyond their orders 
by  humiliating their  victims  before  they  killed  them.  This  happened  very  often 
during the two months in the Pripet Marshes and was observed by witnesses both in 
small  towns  and  villages  as  during  large  missions.  On  numerous  occasions  the 
soldiers robbed the Jews, either collectively as at Pinsk or individually, when victims 
were rounded up and begged for their lives by offering watches or other valuables.574 
Also, Jews were humiliated  publicly: in one village, they had to clean stables with 
their bare hands so the SS cavalrymen could use them for their horses.575 At other 
places, victims were forced to dance in the street. They also were sometimes kicked 
and punched on the march to the killing sites.576 Some of the men who mistreated 
Jews even boasted about this later in front of their comrades.577 
  In this atmosphere of brutality, there was also plenty of room for perpetrators who 
embraced  violence  openly  and  relished  participation  in  killings,  thus  setting 
themselves apart from the other men. Their comrades were appalled at what they 
saw:  a  former  soldier  described  a  junior  officer  as  ‘bloodthirsty’.  The  SS-
Untersturmführer not only murdered arbitrarily but also trampled down wounded 
people at execution sites until his trousers were full of blood.578 Another example for 
573 Vernehmung Richard Gloth vom 14.8. 1962, in BArchL, B 162/5542, pp. i4-i5.
574 Vernehmung von Otto Krumwiede vom 14.3. 1963, in: BArchL, B 162/5541, p. g44.
575 Vernehmung von Horst Winkler vom 17.7. 1962, in: BArchL, B 162/5542, p. j4; Vernehmung von 
Karl Neumann vom 30.7. 1962, in: BArchL, B 162/5542, p. j10.
576 Birn, ‘Zweierlei Wirklichkeit’, p. 279. At Pinsk, a cook from the first squadron of the 2nd Regiment 
brutally beat up a Jew and continued to kick him when he was lying on the ground. A former soldier 
who witnessed this scene later assumed that the Jew was kicked to death during this incident. This 
statement was taken from the indictment in the case against Magill and others; see Müller-Tupath, 
Becher, p. 75.
577 Vernehmung von Klaas Kruizenga vom 9.4. 1964, in: BArchL, B 162/5542, p. j68.
578 Vernehmung Klaas Kruizenga vom 9.4. 1963, in: BArchL, B 162/5539, p. j69.
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this deviant behaviour was  SS-Oberscharführer Hans-Walter Zech-Nenntwich,  the 
reconnaissance  officer  of  the  2nd Regiment’s  second  squadron.  On  the  advance 
through the marshes, he shot eight people who appeared ‘suspicious’ to him; his 
former comrades later testified that this claim was highly dubious as some of the 
victims were women. One person, full of fear of death, asked Zech-Nenntwich to be 
shot  first  so  he  would  not  have  to  suffer  anymore.  The  SS  man  replied  cold-
bloodedly, ‘Wait till it is your turn’, pushed the man back and shot him last.579 At 
another incident when Jews had been rounded up and were about to be shot, Zech-
Nenntwich pushed himself forward although he did not have to do this as a superior. 
He ordered one of his men to hand over his rifle and shot a Jewish woman himself. 
The court before which he was tried after the war viewed this as an excessive crime 
which was committed out of base motives such as lust to kill and racial hatred.580
  Not all of the SS cavalry soldiers, however, did have to kill or became willing 
executioners. Examples of soldiers’ biographies demonstrate how easily a man could 
find himself within a killing unit as a shooter or within a staff or supply unit as a 
non-involved  bystander:  whether  one  became  a  murderer  was  in  most  cases 
determined by pure chance. The soldier’s specialism was of key importance in this 
context as riflemen and machine-gunners bore the brunt of the killings. As the SS 
Cavalry Brigade needed more support personnel than an infantry unit, many soldiers 
were employed to take care of the horses and to transport supplies. They did not have 
to take part in executions normally and often used their function as an excuse in their 
questionings after the war, both regarding their own participation and knowledge of 
the crimes.581 There is evidence, however, that some of them came forward when 
579 Birn, ‘Zweierlei Wirklichkeit’, p. 279 and p. 288.
580 Justiz  und  NS-Verbrechen:  Sammlung  deutscher  Strafurteile  wegen  nationalsozialistischer  
Tötungsverbrechen 1945 – 1966. Bd. 20, pp. 56-57 and pp. 90-91; Birn, ‘Zweierlei Wirklichkeit’, p. 
279; interview with Bernhard D., retired chief inspector of the Landeskriminalamt Niedersachsen, 26 
January, 2011; interview with Dr Heinrich K., retired regional prosecutor in Braunschweig, 3 August, 
2011.
581 See for example Vernehmung von August Gerber vom 15.8. 1962, in: BArchL, B 162/5541, p. h9; 
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volunteers  were  wanted;  also,  support  personnel  were  called  upon  in  cases  of 
manpower  shortage  during  large  operations.  At  Pinsk,  for  example,  even  drivers 
were assigned to guard Jews on the way to a killing site.582 Apart from their personal 
function  in  the  squadrons,  veterans  also gave  other  reasons  for  not  having  been 
involved in shootings: they claimed to have been on cordon duty or had to guard the 
horses at execution sites.583 Whether or not these were exculpatory statements could 
often not be verified by the investigators.584
  Several  cases  of  non-conformist  behaviour  have  been  documented  for  the  SS 
cavalry as well; some soldiers tried to come up with possibilities to shirk executions. 
When he learned of an upcoming mission after a roundup of Jews and was ordered to 
leave the quarters, one of Zech-Nenntwich’s subordinates attempted to stay with the 
horses of the unit, pretending to groom them. The SS-Oberscharführer noticed this 
and barked at him, ‘That concerns you, too!’ The private then left with the rest of the 
troop and killed two Jews during shootings on the same day.585 Others were more 
successful in avoiding participation. One man asked his platoon leader not to assign 
him to a firing squad and was sent away; thus, he did not have to kill anybody at 
Pinsk.586 During the second mission in  the Pripet  Marshes,  a  cook from the first 
squadron of the 1st Regiment was ordered by a drunken officer to shoot a woman 
with  a  child,  thus  giving  an  example  of  moral  degeneracy and  the  influence  of 
alcohol:
Vernehmung von Karl  Spiess vom 25.6. 1963, in:  BArchL, B 162/5542, p. i37;  Vernehmung von 
Richard Gloth vom 14.8. 1962, in: BArchL, B 162/5542, p. i1 and p. i16; Vernehmung von Josef Zorn 
vom 21.5. 1963, in: BArchL, B 162/5542, p. i28.
582 At Pinsk, most of the soldiers from the baggage trains of the first squadron of the 2nd Regiment 
were used as guards; see Müller-Tupath, Becher, p. 74.
583 Vernehmung von Johann Salz, in: BArchL, B 162/5539, p. 1653; Vernehmung von Horst Winkler 
vom 17.7. 1962, in:  BArchL, B 162/5542, p. j5;  Vernehmung von Josef Hagl vom 15.1. 1964, in: 
BArchL, B 162/5542, pp. j83-j84.
584 Interview with Dr Heinrich K., retired regional prosecutor in Braunschweig, 3 August, 2011. 
585Justiz  und  NS-Verbrechen:  Sammlung  deutscher  Strafurteile  wegen  nationalsozialistischer  
Tötungsverbrechen 1945 – 1966. Bd. 20, pp. 56-57.
586 Vernehmung Gerhard Blum, in: BArchL, B 162/2329, p. 1648.
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Once the drunken  SS-Untersturmführer Karl  Weeke came to  me and told 
[me] that partisans had been captured. All of a sudden he said to me: ‘For 
you, cook, I have a fine task. You have never shot anybody. You will shoot a 
woman with a child, she belongs to the partisans.’ I was then supposed to 
report the execution of that order. I wanted to avoid this task and could only 
achieve it because our medic […] agreed to carry out the shooting for me.587
  Thus  far,  historical  research  regarding  the  SS  Cavalry  Brigade  has  not  found 
examples of open refusal to commit killings.588 There has, however, been at least one 
instance: a soldier from the fifth squadron of the 1st Regiment was assigned to a 
firing squad that was ordered to execute an alleged partisan. The soldier refused to 
obey the order and told his superior that he could not shoot defenceless people. For 
this refusal, the man was punished by having to march the next day. Some of his 
comrades looked down on him but he did not have to face any serious consequences: 
he was not court-martialled or threatened with execution.589 
  This was absolutely contrary to the statements of most of the other questioned 
veterans, many of whom pleaded superior orders and said that they could not have 
refused  taking  part  in  killings  as  they  were  afraid  of  being  executed  for 
insubordination.590 Thus, they found themselves in a situation that has been termed 
‘putative duress’: ‘Even if the consequences of disobedience would not have been so 
587 Vernehmung Klaas Kruizenga vom 9.4. 1963, in: BArchL, B 162/5539, p. j69.
588 Birn, ‘Zweierlei Wirklichkeit’, p. 280. Martin Cüppers, who analysed the behaviour of men of the 
1st and 2nd SS Infantry Brigade as well as the SS Cavalry Brigade, has found examples of refusals with 
the first few units but does not mention any for the SS cavalry. He assumes that only a ‘vanishingly 
small’ number of SS men openly refused to participate in killings of Jews for personal reasons; see 
Cüppers, Wegbereiter, pp. 109-113.
589 Vernehmung von Daniel Teske vom 4.10. 1962, in: BArchL, B 162/5542, pp. j37-38.
590 Vernehmung von Bruno Schröder vom 4.10. 1962, in:  BArchL, B 162/5542, p. j46; Vernehmung 
Hans Saggau, in: BArchL, B 162/2329, p. 1646;  Vernehmung von Helmut Fenslaf, in:  BArchL, B 
162/5539,  pp.  1647-1648;  Vernehmung von  Walter  Reichert,  in:  BArchL,  B  162/5539,  p.  1650; 
Vernehmung von Ferdinand Henschke vom 5.12. 1962, in: StAW, 62 Nds. Fb.2, Nr. 1013, p. 177.
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dire, the men who complied could not have known that at the time. They sincerely 
thought that they had had no choice when faced with orders to kill’.591 Also, they 
referred to the strict discipline in the horse units and the nature of their superiors: 
particular  squadron commanders  like Gadischke  or  Charwat  had  a  reputation for 
being  brutal  and  the  men  declared  that  these  officers  would  not  have  tolerated 
disobedience; one even said it was not possible to fake illness.592 Some claimed that 
their entire squadron had to participate so nobody could avoid obeying orders to kill 
people.593 The argument of superior orders, however, has been made insubstantial 
both by examples taken from protocols of questionings and historical research. As 
the  calling  for  volunteers  at  the  beginning  of  the  mission  in  Belorussia  and the 
various incidents of shirking and even refusal show, it  was possible to avoid the 
killings. Regarding possible consequences it has been proven that no case of serious 
punishment for the refusal to carry out an execution is known for the SS and other 
institutions involved in the Holocaust.594
  On 5 September, the brigade had received a new task: upon request of the Second 
Army,  it  was  to  ‘pacify’ the  south-easternmost  part  of  Belorussia,  continuing  its 
advance from the line it had reached so far. The reason for this mission was a safety 
issue: with its forces in rear areas spread dangerously thin, supply columns of the 
army were attacked by enemy groups up to company strength,  and bridges were 
blown up. Thus, the SS cavalry was sent into an area which was more clearly defined 
by the railway line from Mozyr’ to Gomel’ in the north, the river Pripet in the west 
and south and the river Dnieper in the east (until its confluence with the Pripet). The 
591 Browning, Ordinary men, p. 170.
592 Vernehmung  von  Karl  Spiess  vom  25.6.  1963,  in:  BArchL,  B  162/5542,  p.  i35  and  i37; 
Vernehmung Hugo Link, in: BArchL, B 162/2329, p. 1643; Vernehmung Bernd Wenzel, in BArchL, 
B 162/2329, p. 1645.
593 Vernehmung von Karl Spiess vom 25.6. 1963, in: BArchL, B 162/5542, p. i35; Vernehmung Klaas 
Kruizenga vom 9.4. 1963, in: BArchL, B 162/5539, p. j67 and p. j69.
594 Herbert  Jäger,  Verbrechen  unter  totalitärer  Herrschaft.  Studien  zur  nationalsozialistischen 
Gewaltkriminalität (Olten, 1967), pp. 81-82, pp. 95-122, and pp. 158-160.
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two  regiments  were  assigned  Rechitsa  and  Mozyr’ as  destinations  respectively, 
which they were to reach as soon as possible. The territory which was to be traversed 
was not only vast; the HSSPF Mitte even claimed exaggeratedly that this region had 
not been touched by German soldiers before.595  When the new order was given, 
some parts of the brigade had arrived at their targets already, as is proven by the 
killing missions of the 2nd Regiment at Mozyr’ in early September. Others continued 
their  advance:  the  commander’s  squadron,  a  part  of  the  brigade  staff,  arrived  at 
Mozyr’ on  7  September  and  relocated  to  Khoiniki  a  day  later.  Supplies  for  the 
brigade  had  to  come  from  Bobruisk  at  that  point,  which  led  to  shortages  of 
ammunition, fuel, and food for the horses: transport routes were overstretched and 
roads in eastern Belorussia were very bad. Nevertheless, the SS cavalry continued to 
engage in combat with Red Army stragglers and to eliminate Jews, wherever the 
soldiers could get hold of them. The deployment east of the Bobruisk – Mozyr’ line 
closely  resembled  that  of  the  previous  weeks  as  it  took  the  form of  ‘combing’ 
allocated areas.596 
  The  ‘pacification’ of  the  area  between  Pripet  and  Dnieper  also  saw  the  first 
involvement  of  the  bicycle  reconnaissance  detachment  in  the  destruction  of  the 
Jewish population of Belorussia.597 Post-war testimonies indicate that the two bicycle 
squadrons and the staff unit conducted a number of executions along the road from 
Mozyr’ to Rechitsa. As most of the settlements touched by the SS cavalrymen in this 
area were little villages, and questionings only took place about twenty years after 
595 KTB KDOS, entry from 7 September, 1941; Hartmann, Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg, p. 686; Tagebuch 
des Chefs der Bandenkampfverbände, entry from 13 September, 1941, in: BArchB, R 20/45b, p. 13; 
Lagebericht  des  HSSPF  Mitte,  7  September,  1941,  in:  VUA,  Kommandostab  RFSS  1,  file  5; 
Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit v. 6. – 12.9. 1941, SS-Kav. Brigade, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, 
box 24, file 3;  Vorbefehl für den Einsatz der SS-Kav.Brig. im Dreieck Mosyr – Gomel – Prypec – 
Mündung , 5 September, 1941, ibid.
596 Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit v. 6. – 12.9. 1941, SS-Kav. Brigade, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, 
box 24, file 3.  Cüppers assumes that Fegelein came to Mosyr himself to supervise the killings and 
further radicalised them; see Cüppers, Wegbereiter, p. 197.
597 Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit v. 30.8. – 5.9. 1941, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 3; 
Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit v. 6. – 12.9. 1941, SS-Kav. Brigade, ibid.
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the actual events, the men were often not able to specify the killings. From the court 
files, four different executions with more than ten victims can be reconstructed; their 
exact time and place is unknown. The scene of the first of these massacres was a 
camp in the forest near Khoiniki, a former Soviet training institution, where the RAA 
was based for about two weeks in September, 1941. At this camp, 80 – 100 Jewish 
men, women, and children were shot by the first squadron, which also had cordoned 
off the area. From there, the unit conducted further searches and roundups.598 At one 
such incident, the first and second squadrons drove about 150 Jewish inhabitants of a 
small town into a church, from where they were taken in trucks of the 1st Regiment 
on the next day, presumably to their execution. Shortly afterwards, another group of 
about 120 – 180 Jews was arrested by the first squadron and taken away.599 Several 
former soldiers also described a mission in a village where between 30 and 50 Jews 
were held at a school over night and shot on the next day.600 To these four incidents 
added a number of smaller killings with fewer victims. It can be assumed that the 
highly  mobile  cyclists  participated  in  about  ten  different  missions  until  their 
relocation  to  Rechitsa,  where  they arrived around 27 September.  The number of 
victims can only be estimated but ranges between about 400 and 500; possibly, it 
was even higher.601
  The  two cavalry regiments  continued  their  search  east  of  the  Pripet  river  and 
598 Vernehmung  Heinz  Frenken  vom  24.6.  1963,  in:  BArchL,  B  162/5539,  pp.  c6-c10;  zweite 
Vernehmung von Kurt Hellwig vom 19.5. 1965, in: BArchL, B 162/5539, pp. b358; Vernehmung Kurt 
Ziegler vom 8.7. 1964, in:  BArchL, B 162/5539,  pp. c74-75. According to  Tätigkeitsbericht für die 
Zeit v. 6. – 12.9.  1941, SS-Kav. Brigade, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 3, the RAA 
was  sent  to  Choiniki  on  8  September,  1941.  It  was  still  based  there  on  20  September;  see 
Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit v. 13.-19.9. 1941, ibid.
599 Vernehmung Otto Mittelstädt vom 22.5. 1963, in: BArchL, B 162/5539, pp. b34-35; Vernehmung 
Heinz Frenken, ibid., pp. c8-9.
600 Vernehmung Kurt Ziegler, ibid., pp. c78-80; Vernehmung Samuel Grieb vom 23.7. 1963, BArchL, 
B 162/5538, p. b56; Vernehmung Rudolf Delfmann, ibid., pp. b75-76; Vernehmung Kurt Hellwig, 
ibid., pp. b112-113; Vernehmung Karl Gottschalk, ibid., b246-247.
601 One incident with 20 victims and another one where five Jews were killed during this time are 
mentioned  in  Einstellungsverfügung  gg.  Lombard  u.a.,  pp.  1814-1815  and  p.  1822.  As  of  27 
September, the location of the RAA is given as Retschiza; see Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit v. 20. – 
26.9.  1941, SS-Kav. Brigade, September 26, 1941, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 3. 
The investigators did not find any evidence for an involvement of the anti-tank squadron of the RAA 
in executions; see Einstellungsverfügung gg. Lombard u.a., p. 1826.
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quickly approached their destination: at the end of September, the 1st Regiment had 
arrived at Rechitsa, whereas the 2nd Regiment had reached Loev on the Belorussian – 
Ukrainian  border.602 On the march  and from local  bases  where  squadrons  stayed 
overnight, they now followed a slightly modified approach during their ‘combing 
missions’: instead of scouting and surrounding a village elaborately before searching 
it, the SS cavalrymen entered it at dawn, crossed it at full speed and occupied its 
outskirts. Subsequently, the entire population of the settlement was called together 
and examined by the commanding officer and allocated units of the security police 
and the secret field police of the Wehrmacht with a special focus on local males. The 
Germans  then  ‘decided  their  fate  in  order  to  secure  and  pacify  the  area’.  This 
method, as  described by the  commander of the rear areas of Army Group Centre, 
was soon recommended as best practice for guard units in the hinterland.603 In an 
order to the SS Cavalry Brigade that was issued two weeks later, Hermann Fegelein 
again  stressed  the  importance  of  the  cooperation  of  SS  and  Wehrmacht units 
deployed in combing missions; he also urged his men to make it plain to the locals 
during village searches that ‘the commanding officer was master of life and death’.604 
A prime example for this practice was a mission at Starobin in late August, where 
Gustav  Lombard  addressed  the  inhabitants  after  the  Jewish  population  had  been 
eliminated.605
  Hermann Fegelein presented the final  report  on the ‘pacification’ of  the Pripet 
Marshes on 18 September,  1941. This document  shows that  what  seems like the 
602 Staff and troops of the 1st Regiment had reached Retschiza on 22 September; see Lagebericht des 
HSSPF Mitte,  22 September,  1941,  in:  VUA, Kommandostab  RFSS 1,  file  5.  The  2nd Regiment 
arrived at Loev on 21 September; see Lagebericht des HSSPF Mitte, 21 September, 1941, in: VUA, 
Kommandostab RFSS 1, file  5.  The staff of  the cavalry brigade was to arrive at  Rechitsa on 19 
September; see Brigadebefehl für die Übernahme des Raumes zwischen Prypjet u. Dnjepr, SS-Kav.-
Brigade, 16 September, 1941, in: BArchL, B 162/21679, p. 281.
603 Korpsbefehl  Nr.  52  vom 14.9.  1941,  Befehlshaber  des  rückwärtigen  Heeresgebiets  Mitte,  in: 
BArchF, RS 4/930, p. 28.
604 Brigadebefehl Nr. 8, SS-Kav.Brigade, 28 September, 1941, in: BArchF, RS 3-8/20.
605 For the mission at Starobin, see ch. 5.
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indiscriminate killing of hundreds was actually following a detailed plan and deemed 
a very successful mission. The commander praised his men for fulfilling their tasks 
and overcoming any obstacle. He also paid respect to the military enemy who fought 
bravely until  the  point  of  complete  annihilation;  his  depiction  of  other  enemies, 
however, contained strong elements of racism: partisans were described as ‘cold-
blooded’, ‘asiatically cruel’,  and ‘dastardly’.  Jews, he claimed again, were in fact 
acting as informers for partisans and maintaining communications between different 
groups of insurgents. Apart from Fegelein’s view of the mission of the SS Cavalry 
Brigade between late July and early to mid-September, 1941, the report also contains 
the sum of own and enemy losses, which again presents a staggering discrepancy: 
14,178 Jews, 1,001 partisans  and 699 Red Army men were shot whereas the SS 
cavalry  had  suffered  casualties  of  17  dead,  three  missing,  and  36  wounded.606 
Fegelein’s  judgement  regarding  the  Pripet  Marshes,  which  he  now  considered 
‘pacified’, presumably referred more to the destruction of the Jewish communities. 
As  far  as  the  entire  region  is  concerned,  it  was  premature  to  say  the  least  as 
Belorussia became a stronghold of the Soviet partisan movement as was to be the 
case from the following year.
  At this time, the SS Cavalry Brigade had left an unprecedented blood trail across 
the entire  southern half  of  the Soviet  republic.  It  had changed the course of  the 
Holocaust by including even more groups of victims, a development that was soon 
taken over by the  Einsatzgruppen  and order police units.  This was only possible 
through the good relationship of the SS cavalry’s command with the Wehrmacht and 
the  very  effective  hierarchy  of  the  SS.  Heinrich  Himmler  triggered  a  steady 
escalation  of  the  killings  by  direct  orders,  personal  visits,  and  through  his 
representative Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski. The army was generally supportive of 
606 Abschlussmeldung der SS-Kav.Brigade über Befriedung der Prypec-Sümpfe, 18 September, 1941, 
in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 3.
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a very brutal policy of cleansing the occupied territories. 
  The conduct and deployment of the SS Cavalry Brigade in Belorussia were shaped 
by a unique  combination of characters and circumstances. Hermann Fegelein was 
able to continue the leadership principle he had developed in Poland, a clear division 
of labour within the brigade staff  and the subunits.  The brigade commander was 
responsible for leading the unit as a whole and for liaising with superior Wehrmacht 
and SS agencies including the Reichsführer. Several trusted officers from the middle 
level of the chain of command, most importantly Kurt Becher and Gustav Lombard, 
played a crucial role in implementing Himmler’s directives: they formulated killing 
orders and developed killing methods, which were then executed by their subalterns 
in the field.
  Lombard’s approach (which included women and children in the killing process) 
became general  practice – first  in the mounted detachment of the 1st SS Cavalry 
Regiment, then in the brigade, and finally in all German killing squads in the Soviet 
Union. The trust Fegelein had in this particular officer is also illustrated by the fact 
that Lombard was appointed commander of the 1st Regiment at the beginning of the 
second mission  in  the  Pripet  Marshes.  His  level  of  initiative  even surpassed  the 
brutality  of  the  Einsatzgruppen:  despite  the  fact  that  these  units  and  police 
formations had executed women and children on some occasions during the summer 
of 1941, they were following guidelines from Berlin more strictly. In the SS Cavalry 
Brigade, however, radical initiative was more strongly encouraged as the leadership 
of the unit was based on trust and the dynamics of 'working towards the Führer'. It 
was  this  flexibility,  in  combination  with  the  criminal  aims  of  the  SS  and  the 
unscrupulousness of those in charge, which set the SS Cavalry Brigade apart as a 
precursor for the Holocaust. 
  The  soldiers  of  the  brigade  fulfilled  the  task  they  had  been  given  by  the 
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Reichsführer although they had to overcome their personal inhibitions. In the process 
of getting used to mass murder, different types of perpetrators emerged: most of the 
men obeyed the killing orders; some acted very brutally and committed excesses; 
and a very small number of men avoided or refused participation in mass murder. 
Two  other  aspects  were  of  importance  when  the  SS  Cavalry  Brigade  became 
involved in acts  of mass violence during the summer of 1941. In Belorussia,  the 
Germans found many willing collaborators who helped them to find and round up 
the Jews. In a region as ethnically diverse as this one, the Holocaust would not have 
been possible without the help of the locals. Also, the SS cavalrymen did not have to 
fight on the frontline and took hardly any casualties. They did, however, also have 
encounters with enemy troops, which helped them to gain more combat experience. 
The missions in the Pripet Marshes represent the first phase in the history of the unit 
during which the ‘dual role’ became apparent, with the ideological side dominating 
the  character  of  deployment.  This  focus,  in  combination  with  the  institutional 
brutalisation from above, was the decisive factor that formed the character of the SS 
Cavalry Brigade during the summer of 1941. Towards the end of 1941, this situation 
changed as the brigade’s operations against Soviet partisans and the Red Army were 
of a military nature.
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5) The SS Cavalry Brigade and its   atrocities during the first phase of    partisan   
warfare in the Soviet Union
  The fight against insurgents in the theatre of operations is a central aspect in the 
history of the SS Cavalry Brigade. It went through three different stages between 
1939 and 1942: operations against the Polish underground during the first two years 
of  its  existence,  deployment  in  Belorussia  during  the  summer  of  1941  (where 
partisan  warfare  was  only a  small  part  of  its  actual  task),  and  the  fight  against 
organised Soviet partisans in the Toropets area in 1941 – 1942. As not all squadrons 
of the two cavalry regiments were used against guerrillas in Poland and the units 
were not generally combat-ready during the first two years of the war, this chapter 
focuses on the missions of the brigade from mid-1941 onwards. After the beginning 
of the invasion of the Soviet Union, a partisan scare developed on the German side, 
both in response to the threat from Red Army stragglers behind the frontline and as a 
justification  for  the  brutal  treatment  of  potential  enemies.  For  the  SS  Cavalry 
Brigade, this coincided with the perpetration of acts of mass violence which were 
directed predominantly against Jews. Towards the end of the year, many non-Jewish 
civilians fell victim to the unit as well. Using the alleged fight against insurgents in 
Belorussia and actual counter-insurgency missions from Toropets as examples, the 
role of the SS Cavalry Brigade in the war of annihilation behind the front will be 
discussed  in  relation  to  the  beginning  of  the  partisan  movement  in  the  Soviet 
Union.607
607 Regarding the historical context of partisan warfare, I have decided to use the chronology given by 
Jörn Hasenclever as his work represents the actual state of research on German occupation policy in 
the sector of Army Group Centre and its hinterland. According to his definition, the first phase of 
partisan warfare in the Soviet Union began with the German invasion and ended with the battle of 
Moscow.  During  the  second  phase,  the  Wehrmacht lost  the  initiative  to  Soviet  guerrillas  in  the 
summer of  1942.  Nevertheless,  it  was only after  the battle  of  Kursk that  the partisan movement 
proved to be a decisive part of Soviet warfare. Thus, the time from the summer of 1943 until the 
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Belorussia
  In the Pripet Marshes, the frame of reference changed again and even developed an 
official and an unofficial version this time. The official frame, which was represented 
by the general orders to the two regiments, was termed ‘pacification’ and aimed at 
giving the regimental commanders the freedom to carry out their killing tasks. The 
unofficial version, which was the reality for the men serving in the cavalry units, did 
not have anything to do with ‘partisan warfare’ but consisted of the murder of the 
Jewish population, plus that of any other individuals considered potentially hostile. 
This system still reverberated some twenty years later, when the surviving members 
of the SS Cavalry Brigade were questioned about the events of the summer of 1941. 
Defence pleas of former officers in the Magill trial who upheld the version of Jews 
allegedly supporting partisans as a reason for executions were dismissed by the court 
as untruthful.608 By contrast, many witnesses clearly differentiated between the two 
frames,  with  most  of  them  supporting  the  unofficial,  actual  version.  From  the 
protocols of questionings of the rank and file, four different patterns of testimony can 
be extracted: 
1) Some  former  soldiers  said  that  their  superiors  had  claimed  a 
correspondence between Jews and partisans, which had not been true.609
extensive liberation of Soviet territory in 1944 represents the third phase of the war against partisans. 
See Hasenclever,  Wehrmacht und Besatzungspolitik, p. 344. As the SS Cavalry Brigade was mostly 
fighting on the front  from late  1941 until  its  withdrawal from the Soviet  Union in mid-1942,  its 
operations against guerrillas fall into the first phase for the most part. The anti-partisan missions of 
the later 8th SS Cavalry Division Florian Geyer will not be discussed in this dissertation.
608 Justiz  und  NS-Verbrechen:  Sammlung  deutscher  Strafurteile  wegen  nationalsozialistischer  
Tötungsverbrechen 1945 – 1966.  Bd. 20, p. 67 and p. 72. Junior officers from both regiments who 
were heard as witnesses often held the same view: see Vernehmung von Felix Jahn, in:  BArchL, B 
162/5539, pp. 1645-1646; Vernehmung von Georg Vieth, in: BArchL, B 162/5541, p. g11.
609 Vernehmung August Sündermann, in: BArchL, B 162/2329, p. 1642; Vernehmung von Ferdinand 
Henschke vom 5.12. 1962, in:  StAW,  62 Nds. Fb.2, Nr. 1013, p. 176;  Vernehmung Heinz Frenken 
vom 24.6. 1963, in: BArchL, B 162/5539, p. c11; Vernehmung von Richard Gloth vom 14.8. 1962, in: 
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2) Some stated that their squadron had killed partisans and Jews alike with 
Jews having been a much larger group of victims.610
3) Some testified that they had killed only Jews.611
4) A few claimed that they had only been deployed against partisans.612
  It is, however, very difficult to evaluate the actual situation of the SS cavalrymen in 
hindsight as they found themselves in a region with an ethnically diverse population, 
where anticipated concepts of the enemy often did not prove to be true. It was up to 
their superiors to declare who was a partisan or a Jew and therefore to be killed; at 
many occasions, especially before their first executions in the Pripet Marshes, the 
men only learned  just  before  the  actual  shooting what  they were about  to  do,  a 
modus operandi the officers might have chosen deliberately so that their men would 
not ask questions about the inclusion of women and children.613 It becomes evident 
from the court files that the men did not think that all Jews were partisans; with a 
large number of different missions within a very short time, however, it was perhaps 
not always possible for the men to decide whether the people they encountered could 
be considered hostile or not.614
  In spite of the all-encompassing German orders, there were no organised partisans 
in Belorussia and the Pripet Marshes at the time. The advance of the Wehrmacht had 
been  too  quick  for  the  Soviets  to  organise  the  necessary  structures  for  an 
underground movement and next to nothing had been done in the preceding years.615 
BArchL, B 162/5542, p. i2.
610 Vernehmung Kurt Ziegler vom 8.7. 1964, in:  BArchL, B 162/5539,  pp. c76-78 and pp. c85-86; 
Vernehmung von Josef Zorn vom 21.5. 1963, in: BArchL, B 162/5542, pp. i27-28.
611 Vernehmung  von  Karl  Spiess  vom  25.6.  1963,  in:  BArchL,  B  162/5542,  p.  i34  and  p.  i39; 
Vernehmung von Josef Hagl vom 15.1. 1964, in: BArchL, B 162/5542, p. j87.
612 Vernehmung von August Gerber vom 15.8. 1962, in: BArchL, B 162/5541, p. h9; Birn, ‘Zweierlei 
Wirklichkeit’, p. 278.
613 Interview with  Dr  Heinrich  K.,  retired  regional  prosecutor  in  Braunschweig,  3  August,  2011; 
Vernehmung von Richard Gloth vom 14.8. 1962, in: BArchL, B 162/5542, p. i2.
614 Birn, ‘Zweierlei Wirklichkeit’, pp. 278-279.
615 Slepyan, Stalin’s guerrillas, pp. 19-22; Overy, Russia’s War, p. 143.
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What happened after 22 June 1941 was a hasty and unprofessional improvisation of 
units without central leadership that were completely ineffective in the field: those 
who were meant to act as insurgents were often not willing to fight as they were 
under the impression of a general atmosphere of chaos, disintegration of the Soviet 
system and German military success.616 The potential reservoir of partisans consisted 
essentially of vostochniki (members of the Soviet administration, for example from 
the NKVD or the Communist party), okruzhentsy (stragglers of the Red Army who 
had not been captured), and Soviet prisoners of war who had escaped from German 
captivity. Many of these men had no intention to fight; if  at all,  they carried out 
spontaneous actions against the Germans and were not capable of effective partisan 
activity. Primarily, they were concerned with their own survival: to avoid persecution 
by  the  Germans,  many  took  refuge  in  remote  villages  where  they  worked  as 
farmhands, hid in the forests or tried to make their way to the Soviet lines instead of 
confronting the enemy.617
  On the German side, different impressions, reactions and general directives can be 
distinguished. The intelligence section of Army Group Centre did actually capture 
Soviet instructions for partisan groups in late July.618 Also, the Red Army made use 
of  saboteurs  who  parachuted  behind  the  front  or  tried  to  infiltrate  through  the 
German lines from the first weeks of the war. When viewed in the context of the 
616 Gerlach, Morde, p. 558; Bogdan Musial, Sowjetische Partisanen in Weißrußland. Innenansichten  
aus dem Gebiet Baranoviči 1941 – 1944. Eine Dokumentation  (Munich, 2004), pp. 17-20;  Bogdan 
Musial,  Sowjetische Partisanen 1941 – 1944. Mythos und Wirklichkeit (Paderborn, Munich, Vienna, 
Zurich 2009), pp. 71-75.
617 Musial, Baranoviči, pp. 33-34; Musial, Mythos und Wirklichkeit, p. 65 and pp. 73-74. According to 
these works, there were only scattered groups of partisans in the operational area of the SS cavalry. 
Some uncoordinated groups existed in the Baranovichi, Pinsk, and Mozyr’ districts in the summer of 
1941; see Musial, Baranoviči, p. 36, and Musial, Mythos und Wirklichkeit, p. 73. They did not present 
a serious danger to the Germans.
618 Auszugsweise Übersetzung der Kampfanweisung für Partisanen-Gruppen, in: BArchF, RH 22/224, 
pp. 179-182. This captured document was forwarded to all units subordinate to the commander of the 
rear area of Army Group Centre on 26 July, 1941. It  contained information on tasks, tactics,  and 
equipment of the partisans. The focus was on the destruction of enemy transport and supplies as well 
as attacks on enemy troops by means of surprise attacks and ambushes. Partisans were advised to take 
cover in the forests and to use captured weapons and Molotov cocktails.
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German  war  against  the  Soviet  Union,  these  incidents  only  constituted  a  small 
phenomenon and did not influence the outcome of the fighting. But for propaganda 
use,  the German High Command blended them with reports of Soviet  attacks on 
Wehrmacht units in the hinterland and atrocities such as mutilations or shootings of 
prisoners of war and wounded soldiers, which often occurred in the heat of the battle 
and were committed by the Germans as well.619
  This amalgamation happened both on an official level as well as in the form of 
instructions for troops. A typical example is  presented by a situation report  from 
Police Battalion 307 after a reconnaissance mission near Sluck, a small town some 
70 miles  east  of  Baranovichi.  Whereas  most  of  the area was completely free  of 
enemy activity,  the  commander reported  hundreds  of  armed Soviet  soldiers  who 
gathered  in  the  village  of  Starobin  and  ‘were  presumably  supplied  by  Jewish 
inhabitants’. Some locals claimed that a Wehrmacht officer had been murdered and 
mutilated near Starobin a few days earlier, an incident which was blamed on Jews as 
well.620 It was not proven but deemed credible; it also incited German agencies to 
even  harsher  measures.  The  HSSPF,  Erich  von  dem  Bach-Zelewski,  ordered 
merciless retribution where cases of mutilations of German prisoners of war became 
known.621 This was in accordance with instructions given to the  Wehrmacht at the 
same  time:  in  order  to  secure  their  designated  areas,  army  formations  in  the 
hinterland were to apply ‘draconian measures’. One day later, on 25 July, 1941, the 
German army High Command issued an order regarding the ‘treatment of enemy 
civilians and Russian prisoners of war in the army rear areas’. Behind the front, any 
619 Hartmann,  Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg, pp. 716-718; Klaus Jochen  Arnold,  Die Wehrmacht und die 
Besatzungspolitik in den besetzten Gebieten der Sowjetunion. Kriegführung und Radikalisierung im 
‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’ (Berlin, 2005), pp. 177-180.
620 Erkundungs- und Aufklärungsergebnis vom 29.7. 1941 südlich Sluzk, 30 July, 1941, in: BArchF, 
RS 3-8/20.
621 Ergänzender Befehl zu dem Befehl Nr. 42, SS-Kavalleriebrigade an SS-KavRgt. 2, 29 July, 1941, 
in: BArchF, RS 4/936.
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respect for these two groups was to be given up; German soldiers should rather shoot 
innocent people than take any security risks.622
  As these sources show, every kind of brutality could be justified on the German side 
by claiming it was merely a reaction to the way the Soviets were fighting, especially 
behind the front line. The enemy, whether he appeared in the form of a Red Army 
soldier in combat, a prisoner of war, or a civilian, was depicted as being treacherous 
and  cruel,  an  image  which  was  reinforced  with  strong  elements  of  racism  and 
propaganda. German agencies used impressions from the intense combat operations 
of the first four weeks of the campaign in the east to embellish the concept Hitler 
himself had proclaimed: every person who was actually or even potentially hostile 
towards the invaders or did not fit  their  racial ideal was to be killed.  In fact the 
Germans were fully aware that opposing forces in the hinterland consisted of Red 
Army stragglers or  even largely intact  military units  rather  than partisans  at  this 
time.623 Thus, in reality it  did not make any sense to accuse civilians or Jews in 
particular  of  supporting  insurgents,  as  an  underground  movement  had  not  been 
formed in this area yet; it did, however, work on a rhetorical level.
  From the perspective of ordinary SS cavalrymen, a picture emerges that shows how 
violence soon spiralled out of control as the ‘combing’ and ‘cleansing’ of the Pripet 
622 Ergänzung  Keitels  zur  Führerweisung  Nr.  33,  24  July,  1941,  OKW /  WFst  /  L (IV  /  Qu), 
Sicherungskräfte, BArchF, RW 31/97, quoted in Arnold,  Wehrmacht und Besatzungspolitik, p. 208; 
Befehl des Generals z.b.V. ObdH beim OKH zur Behandlung feindlicher Zivilpersonen und russischer 
Kriegsgefangener  im  rückwärtigen  Heeresgebiet,  25  July,  1941,  NOKW-182,  quoted  in  Arnold, 
Wehrmacht  und  Besatzungspolitik,  pp.  208-209.  The  order  police  had  already  received  radical 
instructions, presumably in connection with the Heydrich order of 2 July, 1941. In an order for Police 
Battalion 322 of the same day, it said: ‘Every civilian with a rifle is to be shot’; see Kriegstagebuch 
Nr.  1 des  Polizei-Bataillon 322 (III./Pol.-Regt.-Mitte)  vom 10.6.  1941 – 29.5.  1942,  in:  VUA, N 
POL.RGT. (1), file 1, p. 27. See also  Angrick and others, ‘Das Polizeibataillon 322’, pp. 330-331. 
This was in line with the orders the SS cavalry received on 27 and 28 July, 1941; see ch. 4, pp. 2-3.
623 Heeresgruppe Mitte / Ia an OKH / GenStdH / Op., 29 June, 1941, BArchF, RH 20-4/147, p. 178, 
quoted in Arnold,  Wehrmacht und Besatzungspolitik,  p. 204.  The SS Cavalry Brigade received an 
impression similar to that of the  Wehrmacht: a report from Gustav Lombard on the first ‘combing 
mission’ in the Pripet Marshes lists nine encounters during the first two weeks, only one of which did 
not exclusively involve Red Army soldiers but also partisans (a woman, an adolescent and several 
other combatants); see [Bericht zur] Durchkämmung der Pripetsümpfe vom 11.8. 1941, in: BArchF, 
RS 4/441, pp. 178-186.
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Marshes also contained a strong element of terror which was directed at non-Jewish 
civilians. This is exemplified by the treatment of suspected guerrillas during village 
searches according to a former soldier: 
If one of the men [who were found during a search] was carrying weapons 
and obviously was a partisan, […] the partisan was shot by command of the 
squadron commander. […] It was standard practice to tell the partisan that he 
had been released and could go. Once he turned his back to us, he was shot 
with  a  carbine.  This  happened  in  the  presence  of  the  other  assembled 
villagers,  so  that  they  were  deterred  [from  joining  or  supporting  the 
partisans].624
  Fegelein’s men also used even more radical measures which were meant to act as a 
deterrent. In some cases, entire villages were cleared: a former member of the RAA 
witnessed  an  operation  during  which  SS  cavalry  squadrons  rounded  up  all 
inhabitants  of  a  particular  area,  leaving  several  settlements  completely  deserted. 
After  this,  Einsatzgruppe men carried  out  killings  in  another  village  nearby;  the 
veteran estimated that about 500 people were executed.625 As with the interpretation 
of killing orders regarding Jews, differences between the squadrons regarding the 
treatment  of  the  local  population  could  be  observed.  Some  subunits  even  went 
beyond the directive of destroying settlements where the inhabitants ‘were suspected 
of  supporting  the  partisans’.626 The  first  squadron  of  the  1st Regiment  generally 
levelled  every  village:  after  the  inhabitants  had  been  deported  or  executed,  the 
624 Testimony of a former soldier of the first squadron of the 1st Regiment, in Müller-Tupath, Becher, 
p. 85. This statement was part of the questioning of a former SS cavalryman in the Lombard trial; his 
name is not given in the work.
625 Vernehmung  Heinz  Frenken  vom  24.6.  1963,  in:  BArchL,  B  162/5539,  pp.  c6-c7.  For  the 
cooperation of the SS cavalry and subunits of Einsatzgruppe B in the area of Mozyr’ and Rechitsa see 
also Cüppers, Wegbereiter, pp. 199-200.
626 Kommandosonderbefehl, 28 July, 1941, in Baade, Unsere Ehre heißt Treue, p. 212.
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houses were burnt down. Even twenty years after the war, the former soldier who 
spoke  about  these  atrocities  claimed  that  they  had  been  committed  out  of  self-
preservation as guerrillas or stragglers of the Red Army might have found refuge in 
the villages.  He also admitted,  however,  that  he had not  seen any stragglers  and 
hardly  any  partisans.627 According  to  the  statement  of  a  veteran  of  the  fourth 
squadron of the 1st Regiment, his unit had applied the same tactic; altogether, 66 
villages had been destroyed by the SS Cavalry Brigade in the Pripet Marshes.628
  Former SS cavalry soldiers also blended killings of Jews with reprisals or ‘anti-
partisan missions’ when they were questioned about them after the war. One man 
stated that when his squadron took surprise fire from a village near which ‘partisans’ 
(presumably Soviet soldiers) were hiding in a forest, an NCO ordered the execution 
of the Jews living in the village. Unlike in other cases, the village was not destroyed 
and at least some of its inhabitants were left alive as non-Jewish locals looted the 
corpses after the shooting.629 Another veteran described how the medical unit of the 
SS  Cavalry  Brigade  retaliated  upon  a  village  for  the  alleged  shooting  of  three 
wounded German soldiers. This act of violence included the burning of the village, 
which claimed the lives of 50 – 60 people, mostly women and children.630
  A very well-documented example for this radicalisation is the conduct of the SS 
cavalry at Starobin. The unit, which had already killed thousands of victims until the 
end of August, continued to merge reports on enemy activity with its murderous task. 
In  south-eastern  Belorussia,  the  SS  cavalrymen  were  to  carry  out  ‘complete 
627 Testimony of a former soldier of the first squadron of the 1st Regiment, in Müller-Tupath, Becher, 
pp. 85-86. This statement was part of the questioning of a former SS cavalryman in the Lombard trial; 
his name is not given in the work.
628 Vernehmung Richard Gloth vom 14.8. 1962, in: BArchL, B 162/5542, p. i4. In his questioning, the 
veteran  did  not  specify how he  had  come to  know about  the  number  of  villages  that  had  been 
destroyed. 
629 Testimony of a former soldier of the first squadron of the 1st Regiment, in Müller-Tupath, Becher, 
pp. 64-65. This statement was part of the questioning of a former SS cavalryman in the Lombard trial; 
his name is not given in the work.
630 Vernehmung Heinz Frenken vom 24.6. 1963, in: BArchL, B 162/5539, pp. c10-11. This incident 
has not been mentioned in other questionings or original sources from the SS Cavalry Brigade.
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pacification’ in the same way as before. The commander of the rear areas of Army 
Group Centre  expected scattered groups of enemy soldiers,  some of whom were 
equipped with heavy weapons. Interestingly, this document describes the expected 
hostile  forces  in  the  operational  area correctly  as  consisting  of  stragglers,  not 
partisans. The real enemy, however, was identified by the order to ‘dejewify Starobin 
and the vicinity’. 631 This district had been spotted by the Wehrmacht as a stronghold 
of resistance against the German occupants and their local helpers, despite the fact 
that ‘pacification’ had been attempted twice already. In the words of the SS, ‘Jews 
terrorised the smaller, peaceable part of the population’ and ‘made Starobin a base 
for partisans’. A mission which was carried out by five squadrons of the 1st Regiment 
in the area between Starobin and Morots from 25 to 29 August, 1941, provides one 
example of how inextricably the fight against small groups of Red Army men, the 
alleged ‘partisan warfare’, had become compounded with the actual task of killing 
Jews. First,  local inhabitants had reported the presence of a ‘stong partisan unit’, 
consisting of groups of Soviet  soldiers and Jews from Starobin,  to which the SS 
cavalry responded with an encirclement operation that left 154 partisans dead, and 
117 were  taken prisoner.  Many farmhouses  as  well  as  a  collective farm and the 
village of Domanovichi  – allegedly partisan bases –  were burned to  the ground. 
From the deployed SS squadrons, only one man got killed and one was wounded. 
These low figures and the fact that many of the alleged ‘partisans’ stepped out of the 
forest and surrendered after their hiding place had been shelled by artillery again 
indicate that the enemy consisted of stragglers of the Red Army rather than organised 
guerrillas.632 
631 Brigadebefehl an SS-Kav.Rgt. 1 für Fortsetzung des Auftrages 2 – Pripjet-Sümpfe, in: BArchF, RS 
4/430, p. 2.
632 Zusammengefaßte Meldung über Tätigkeit der SS-Kav. Brigade in der Zeit v. 25.8. bis 3.9. 1941, 
in:  BArchL,  Dokumenten-Sammlung,  Ordner  Verschiedenes  291-17, pp.  17-18;  Bericht  über  die 
Befriedung des  Raumes Starobin,  SS-Kavallerie-Regiment 1,  4 September,  1941, in:  BArchF,  RS 
4/430, pp. 4-9; Bericht über die Säuberung des Raumes um Starobin, SS-Kav.Rgt. 1, 25 August, 1941, 
in: BArchF, RS 4/430, p. 3;  Bayer, Kavallerie der Waffen-SS, pp. 36-37.
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  At the same time, all Jews living in Starobin were shot, an act of violence that 
claimed the lives of at least 500 men and women.633 The commander of the regiment 
also gave a speech to the local population in which he justified this measure by 
claiming that Himmler had ordered to help the cooperative part of the population and 
to annihilate those who kept resisting. This triggered another ‘cleansing’ by local 
militias, who shot 21 people and arrested eight others. In general, the relationship 
with the (predominantly Polish) inhabitants of Starobin was described as positive. 
The Germans viewed the initiative of the locals in forming and using a militia as an 
act of self-defence. Again, a familiar pattern can be recognised: there were many 
willing  collaborators  who  engaged  in  roundups  and  executions;  others  acted  as 
informers or led the cavalrymen to the hideouts of Red Army soldiers, which was 
greatly  welcomed  by the  SS.  German  officers  made  a  clear  distinction  between 
different  ethnic  and  religious  groups:  Poles  and  Belarusians  were  considered 
supporters  whereas  Jews  were  equated  with  partisans,  as  becomes  clear  by 
Lombard’s statement on behaviour of the guerrillas: ‘The partisan has an excellent 
communications system and does not confront a strong [opposing] force. The Jew is 
his helper, he supplies him and is mainly responsible for communications’.634
  During their second mission in Belorussia, which was completed on 4 September, 
the men had met little resistance; apart from the operation near Starobin, there had 
only been skirmishes. Further village searches had been done as well, some of which 
had  resulted  in  atrocities.  This  has  been  documented  for  Petrikov,  a  small  town 
between Turov and Mozyr’, where 12 Jews were shot and 43 prisoners were taken; 
633 Cüppers,  Wegbereiter, p. 194.  The shooting of Jewish women was not mentioned in Lombard’s 
report but is proven by radio message protocols of the cavalry squadrons that were involved.
634 For  the  help  of  the  local  militia,  see  Bericht  über  die  Befriedung des  Raumes  Starobin,  SS-
Kavallerie-Regiment 1, 4 September, 1941, in:  BArchF, RS 4/430,  p. 5 and  Bayer,  Kavallerie der  
Waffen-SS, pp. 36-37.  For further collaboration, see  Zusammengefaßte Meldung über Tätigkeit der 
SS-Kav.  Brigade in der  Zeit  v.  25.8.  bis 3.9.  1941, in:  BArchL,  Dokumenten-Sammlung,  Ordner 
Verschiedenes 291-17, p. 17; this document states that a Belarusian forester showed the Germans 
where Soviet soldiers were hiding. For Lombard’s statement, see Bericht über die Befriedung des 
Raumes Starobin, p. 8.
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at  Lenin, about 60 Jewish men, women, and children were killed. In his situation 
report, Hermann Fegelein announced the ‘pacification’ of the operational area but 
also stated that small groups of guerrillas would continue to appear there as it was 
impossible to track them down in the vast swamps and forests. As a result of the 
combing of the eastern marshes, 189 people had been taken prisoner, 192 Red Army 
men and persons identified as partisans had been killed,  and 363 Jews had been 
shot.635 As opposed to the first mission, SS cavalrymen did not come across large 
Jewish communities in this area, which is why the numbers of executed ‘looters’ are 
far smaller for the second half of August, 1941. Just like Lombard, Fegelein falsely 
insinuated the cooperation of partisans and Jews, thus giving a perfect example of 
his racist views and the function of his unit in the war of annihilation: ‘Connections 
between  partisan  detachments  are  being  upheld  mainly  by  Jews.  Villages  and 
homesteads which are free of Jews have not been bases for partisans in any case so 
far but were often raided and looted by gangs [of partisans]’.636
  As during other missions (such as the killings at Pinsk and Bobruisk), the HSSPF 
Mitte  visited the soldiers in  the field  on a  regular  basis  and came together  with 
Hermann Fegelein in order to coordinate further measures. In his diary, he vividly 
described one such mission, which took place between 8 and 12 September, 1941. A 
corresponding report of the SS cavalry shows that this operation had been triggered 
after the staff had received hints from locals about a partisan group with a strength of 
400 – 500 men operating in the area between Krasny Ostrov and Malodush near 
Rechitsa. It was decided that the guerrillas were to be encircled and destroyed, for 
635 KTB KDOS, entries from 29 August and 1 September, 1941; Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit v. 30.8. 
–  5.9.  1941,  in:  VUA,  Kommandostab  RFSS,  box  24,  file  3;  Zusammengefaßte  Meldung  über 
Tätigkeit der SS-Kav. Brigade, p. 18. Apparently not all killings had been reported to the brigade staff 
and  included  in  the  final  report,  as  the  discrepancy  between  the  numbers  of  victims  given  in 
Lombard’s and Fegelein’s reports shows. For Petrikov, see Fernschreiben des HSSPF Mitte an RFSS, 
30 August, 1941, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 1, file 4. For Lenin, see Cüppers, Wegbereiter, 
p. 198.
636 Zusammengefaßte Meldung über Tätigkeit der SS-Kav. Brigade, pp. 18-21.
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which five combat groups with a total strength of about 1,000 men from the first five 
squadrons of the 1st Regiment and the RAA were formed. Von dem Bach-Zelewski 
observed the entire  operation,  beginning with a  visit  to  Fegelein and his  staff  at 
Khoiniki, followed by a reconnaissance flight over south-eastern Belorussia during 
which he also visited the 1st Regiment. After his return to the headquarters of the SS 
cavalry, he spent a day there during which further scouting and planning were done. 
The actual mission took place on the night of September 10, when a forest between 
Khoiniki and Rechitsa was searched. The HSSPF claimed to have taken part in the 
operation and to  have made 22 prisoners himself  in  a village.  However,  he also 
commented on the treatment of the prisoners: every person bearing arms was shot 
after  a  court-martial,  whereas  the  remaining  soldiers  were transported  into  POW 
camps.637
  A comparison of the documentation of this  incident shows how to what extent 
‘partisan warfare’ and killing missions were blended by German agencies: according 
to the report of the SS cavalry for this operation, 38 Red Army soldiers were taken 
prisoner  and  384  partisans  were  shot;  von  dem Bach-Zelewski’s  daily  situation 
report contains the figure of 430 dead partisans.638 The fact that the deployed forces 
did not suffer any casualties, although encounters with a high number of potential 
enemies had been expected, casts doubt on the nature of the ‘enemies’ who were 
killed.  In  a  radio message,  Fegelein referred to  the number of executed as ‘shot 
partisans including Mozyr’ 384’, which means that many of the victims were in fact 
637 Tagebuch des Chefs der Bandenkampfverbände, entry from 13 September, 1941.  This entry also 
mentions the presence of a propaganda company which presumably observed the ‘combing’ mission 
as well. As in other entries, von dem Bach-Zelewski presented himself as a competent military leader 
who was close to his troops. Details such as his own involvement in the village search cannot be 
verified by means of other sources but his attendance and reconnaissance flight are also mentioned in 
the brigade’s report; see Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit v. 6. – 12.9. 1941, SS-Kav. Brigade, in: VUA, 
Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 3.
638 Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit v. 6. – 12.9. 1941, SS-Kav. Brigade, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, 
box 24, file 3; Lagebericht des HSSPF Mitte, 12 September, 1941, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS 1, 
file 5.
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Jews from that town.639 This formulation resembles that of his subaltern, who spoke 
of having to ‘pacify’ the ‘looting’ population of Mozyr’. Although official documents 
of  the  brigade,  the  HSSPF  Mitte  and  the  Wehrmacht speak  of  ‘strong  partisan 
activity’ in this  area,  for example at  Rechitsa,  where ambushes did occur,  Soviet 
collaborators were killed, and roads were mined, it can be assumed that, as in the 
preceding  weeks,  most  of  the  sufferers  and  casualties  were  completely innocent 
people  who were targeted because they were Jewish.  Acts  of  sabotage  were not 
committed by a hostile population, incited by or consisting of Jews, but by small 
groups of men who were well-organised and equipped. 640 Hundreds fell victim to the 
SS cavalrymen and two other SS units, Sonderkommando 7b and Einsatzkommando 
8,  at  Khoiniki,  Bragin,  Rechitsa,  and  possibly  also  at  other  locations  east  and 
southeast of Mozyr’, as a Wehrmacht report indicates.641
  The mission of the SS cavalry in Belorussia did not end after the crossing of the 
Pripet Marshes. As the rear areas of Army Group Centre were brought forward with 
effect from 22 September, 1941, the brigade was assigned to ‘cleanse’ the ‘Dnieper – 
Sosh triangle’.  This new operational  area lay between the cities of  Rechitsa and 
Gomel’; the Dnieper formed the western boundary, whereas the Sosh bordered it to 
the east. Loev, at the confluence of the two rivers, marked the tip of the triangle. The 
SS cavalry only spent about a week in the ‘Dnieper – Sosh triangle’ as it was ordered 
to assemble in the Gomel’ area by 30 September. Before that town could be reached, 
639 The  HSSPF  first  estimated  enemy strength  at  3,000  partisans  on  11  September,  which  was 
corrected to 300 – 400 later on the same day; see Lagebericht des HSSPF Mitte, 12 September, 1941, 
in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS 1, file 5, and another Lagebericht from the same day, ibid. The SS 
cavalry assumed a strength of 400-500 men; see Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit v. 6. – 12.9. 1941. For 
Fegelein’s radio message, see Cüppers, Wegbereiter, p. 201.
640 For partisan activity at Rechitsa, see Lagebericht des HSSPF Mitte, 10 September, 1941, in: VUA, 
Kommandostab  RFSS  1,  file  5;  see  also  Korpsbefehl  Nr.  52  vom 14.9.  1941,  Befehlshaber  des 
rückwärtigen Heeresgebiets Mitte, in: BArchF, RS 4/930, p. 28.
641 In the town of Rechitsa itself, about 30 Jews were murdered by members of the mounted battery 
and the RAA; see  Einstellungsverfügung gg. Lombard u.a.,  pp. 1802-1803 and p. 1827. Hundreds 
more were executed outside the town; see Cüppers, Wegbereiter, pp. 198-200. The commander of the 
rear areas spoke of 604 ‘partisans’ who had been killed until 14 September, 1941; see Tagesmeldung 
Berück Mitte / Ia, 14 September, 1941, in: BArchF, RH 22/226, quoted ibid., p. 201.
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the two regiments and the bicycle reconnaissance detachment had to cross the river 
Dnieper, for which makeshift ferries had to be used as all bridges had been blown up 
by the retreating Soviets.642 The nature of the brigade’s deployment was changed to 
some extent: in order to cover a wider area, the squadrons were dispersed down to 
individual platoons that were to stay in a village for several days. This measure and 
the formation of rapid deployment forces with both regiments and the RAA can be 
interpreted as a new tactic in the face of what was perceived as a growing threat from 
partisans.643 This  was  also  reflected  by  an  even  harsher  treatment  of  the  local 
population: on 23 September, the RAA was ordered to publicly hang all Bolsheviks, 
partisans and Jews in Rechitsa and within a radius of 20 kilometres in the following 
two days. Also, a curfew from 6 pm until 5 am was introduced which included a 
threat of execution in case it was violated.644 The soldiers were ordered to intern Jews 
in ghettos ‘in case they cannot be exterminated straightaway’.645 In the course of the 
brigade’s  deployment  between  Dnieper  and  Sosh,  352 partisans,  16  Jews,  and  9 
communists were shot by the cavalrymen according to figures of the HSSPF Mitte.646
  Whilst his men were still in the field, Gustav Lombard presented the ‘findings’ of 
the SS cavalry in partisan warfare at an ‘anti-partisan course’ which was hosted by 
Army  Group  Centre  at  Mogilev  between  24  and  26  September,  1941.  His 
presentation culminated in the words, ‘The Jew is the partisan!’ - this statement was 
viewed as the quintessence of the course. High-ranking officers of SS, Wehrmacht, 
642 Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit v. 20. – 26.9. 1941, 26 September, 1941, SS-Kav. Brigade, in: VUA, 
Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 3.
643 Brigadebefehl für die Übernahme des Raumes zwischen Prypjet u. Dnjepr, SS-Kav.-Brigade, 16 
September, 1941, in: BArchL, B 162/21679, pp. 281-283.
644 Brigadebefehl Nr. 6, 23 September, 1941, in: BArchF, RS 3-8/20.
645 Brigadebefehl Nr. 8, SS-Kav.Brigade, 28 September, 1941, in: BArchF, RS 3-8/20.
646 According to a document compiled by the HSSPF, 259 partisans and 16 Jews had been executed by 
the SS Cavalry Brigade between 22 and 24 September, 1941; see List of executions, HSSPF Mitte to 
RFSS,  Kdo.  Stab  RFSS  and  Chef  O[rdnungs]  P[olizei],  24  September,  1941,  in:  VUA, 
Kommandostab RFSS, box 1, file 5; in the following four days, 93 partisans and 9 communists were 
killed; see List of executions, HSSPF Mitte to RFSS, Kdo. Stab RFSS and Chef O[rdnungs] P[olizei], 
28 September, 1941, ibid. The brigade reported the execution of 280 partisans and 87 Jews between 
20 and 26 September; see Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit v. 20. – 26.9. 1941, 26 September, 1941, SS-
Kav. Brigade, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 3.
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and police took part in this seminar, during which even an exemplary village search 
including an execution of about 30 Jews was carried out by Police Battalion 322 and 
Einsatzkommando  8.  The  equalization  of  Jews  and  partisans,  as  exemplified  by 
Lombard’s speech, had already become official doctrine and common practice of the 
Wehrmacht in the fight against insurgents.647 In September, 1941, the command of 
the German army also issued orders which extended the definition of partisans to 
stragglers of the Red Army. These two measures, in combination with the already 
radical  directives,  led  to  another  escalation.648 Also,  the  Germans  encountered 
stronger  resistance  of  guerrillas  east  of  the  river  Dnieper,  which  in  turn  put  the 
military  administration  under  pressure  to  pacify  their  respective  areas  of 
responsibility.649 There was a sharp increase in  the number of victims during the 
second half of 1941. This trend applied to Belorussia in particular as this part of the 
occupied Soviet Union was to become the centre of the Soviet partisan movement 
from 1942 and was occupied by the Germans until the summer of 1944.650
647 Cüppers,  Wegbereiter,  pp.  221-222;  Johannes  Hürter,  Hitlers  Heerführer.  Die  deutschen 
Befehlshaber  im Krieg  gegen  die  Sowjetunion  1941/42 (Munich,  2006),  pp.  559-560;  Hartmann, 
Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg, pp. 725-726. For examples of atrocities committed by Wehrmacht and police 
units  under  this  doctrine before the course,  see ibid,  pp.  678-682.  On the participation of  Police 
Battalion 322, see Angrick and others, ‘Das Polizeibataillon 322’, pp. 345-346. On the course and the 
equalization  of  Jews  and  partisans  in  the  Wehrmacht  as  well  as  the  good  cooperation  between 
Wehrmacht and SS, see also Förster in Boog, Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, pp. 1043-
1045.
648 Dieter Pohl estimates that about 4,000 alleged partisans and Red Army men were killed in the rear 
areas  of  Army Group Centre  until  mid-August,  1941;  see  Pohl,  Die Herrschaft  der  Wehrmacht.  
Deutsche Militärbesatzung und einheimische Bevölkerung in der Sowjetunion 1941 – 1944 (Munich, 
2008), p. 167. Between September and November, “anti-partisan” measures in this sector turned into 
outright massacres. General von Schenckendorff estimated that during this phase 300 – 400 suspected 
partisans were shot every day; see Gerlach, Morde, p. 876.
649 Hasenclever, Wehrmacht und Besatzungspolitik, p. 354.
650 For the time between June, 1941 and February, 1942, estimates range from 20,000 to more than 
62,000 victims of partisan warfare in the rear areas of Army Group Centre. The Wehrmacht agencies 
in the northern and southern sectors  of the eastern front  reported over  8,000 and at  least  10,000 
victims respectively. Dieter Pohl assumes that the German anti-partisan policy claimed a total number 
of between 40,000 and 85,000 victims in the Soviet  Union during the year  1941. See Pohl,  Die 
Herrschaft der Wehrmacht,  p. 168. Throughout the war, in Belorussia alone 345,000 people were 
killed in operations of ‘partisan warfare’.  About 90% of them were civilians. See Babette Quinkert, 
Propaganda und Terror in Weißrußland 1941 – 1944: die deutsche “geistige“ Kriegführung gegen 
Zivilbevölkerung und Partisanen (Paderborn, 2009), p. 13.
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Russia
  Shortly after  the cynical demonstration at  Mogilev,  the stay of the SS Cavalry 
Brigade  in  Belorussia  came to  an  end  when  its  subunits  arrived  at  Gomel’.  On 
September 29, the brigade received a new order: it was to be transported to Toropets, 
some 120 miles north of Smolensk, where its forces were subordinated to a security 
division  of  Army Group Centre.  For  that  purpose,  all  parts  of  the  brigade  were 
relocated from Gomel’ to Rogachev,  where soldiers,  horses,  and equipment  were 
loaded onto trains. Via Mogilev, Orša, and Vitebsk, they travelled north and arrived 
at their destination around 11 October, 1941.651 In their new operational area, the SS 
cavalrymen were confronted with a real threat from partisans. This was in line with a 
general tendency: behind the front, stragglers, trained saboteurs and local guerrillas 
began to form an underground movement, which grew stronger and stronger in the 
second half  of  1941.  The  Germans  reacted to  this  development,  which began to 
seriously jeopardise their thinly-occupied rear areas and overstretched supply lines, 
by brutal reprisals against the civilian population, whilst the annihilation of the Jews 
continued. As most of the victims were innocent locals, this only helped to radicalise 
the inhabitants of the occupied territories and to escalate the war on another front, for 
which the Germans were ill-prepared. Commanders in the rear did not seem to be 
aware of how utterly counterproductive and dangerous this approach was.652 In fact, 
they acted in accordance with the leadership of the German army in the east: on 10 
October and 20 November, 1941, field marshals von Manstein and von Reichenau 
651Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom 27.9. – 4.10. 1941, 5 October, 1941, SS-Kav. Brigade, in: VUA, 
Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 3; Brigadebefehl Nr. 12 für den Marsch zur Verladung, SS-Kav. 
Brigade, 30 September, 1941, ibid.; Brigadebefehl für den E[isenbahn]-Transport von Rogatschew 
nach Orscha, 1 October, 1941, SS-Kav. Brigade, ibid.; Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit v. 5. – 11.10. 
1941, 11 October, 1941, SS-Kav. Brigade, ibid.
652 Hartmann, Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg, pp. 327-331 and p. 344.
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issued orders which dehumanised Soviet  soldiers and partisans; these instructions 
incited  German  soldiers  not  to  give  quarter  anymore.  They  were  to  fight  their 
enemies ruthlessly and thus to destroy what was referred to as ‘Jewish-Bolshevist 
system’ in  its  entirety.653 This  shows  how the  ambition  of  fulfilling  the  aims  of 
National  Socialist  ideology,  which  could  already be  observed  with  Army Group 
Centre and its acquiescence and encouragement of harsh measures towards Jews and 
partisans during the summer of 1941, was now implemented by senior  Wehrmacht  
commanders in the Soviet Union on their own initiative.
  From September to December,  1941, the ‘pacification’ missions  of the brigade 
continued. They consisted mostly of reconnaissance patrols and localised searches; 
on some occasions, SS cavalrymen captured camps and depots in the forests and had 
skirmishes with partisans.654 They also safeguarded important supply routes such as 
the railway line from Velikie Luki to Toropets and the road towards Rzhev. Unlike 
during their mission in Belorussia, where they had been part of the same chain of 
command for the entire  time,  subordination was more flexible  now: for different 
tasks,  they were either  subordinate  to  the commander  of the rear  areas of  Army 
Group  Centre,  general  von  Schenckendorff  (who  still  closely  cooperated  with 
Gruppenführer von dem Bach-Zelewski, the Higher SS and police leader), or came 
under the direct command of the Ninth Army. The Soviets had retreated from the 
region to the north and east of Toropets so that German forces encountered stragglers 
and some rearguard forces but there was no combat activity. As this coincided with a 
decrease  in  acts  of  sabotage,  the  brigade  reported  its  sector  as  ‘pacified’ on  25 
653 Armeebefehl  des  Oberbefehlshabers  der  6.  Armee,  Generalfeldmarschall  von  Reichenau,  vom 
10.10.  1941,  quoted  in  Ueberschär  and  Wette,  “Unternehmen  Barbarossa“,  pp.  285-286; 
Armeebefehl des Oberbefehlshabers der 6. Armee, Generaloberst von Manstein, vom 20.11. 1941, 
ibid, pp. 289-290; see also Armeebefehl des Oberbefehlshabers der 17. Armee, Generaloberst Hoth, 
vom 17.11. 1941, ibid., pp. 287-289. On the rise in partisan activity, the directives given out by von 
Manstein and von Reichenau, and the often drastic consequences of these orders see also Förster in 
Boog, Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, pp. 1041-1056.
654 Michaelis, Kavallerie-Divisionen der Waffen-SS, pp. 26-27.
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October, which soon proved to be a complete misinterpretation of the situation.655 
The  army,  however,  viewed  the  contribution  of  the  SS  Cavalry  Brigade  in  the 
‘pacification’  of  the  hinterland  very  favourably,  as  is  proven  by  the 
acknowledgement  the  unit  received  from  the  commander  of  the  253rd infantry 
division on 6 November, 1941.656
  Despite the fact that Hermann Fegelein stated that there had been some ‘heavy 
gunfights’, the numbers of killed enemies and captured weapons reported by him are 
disproportionate: between 18 October and 18 November, 1941, 3,018 partisans and 
‘suspicious persons’ as well as 141 Red Army men were reported to have been killed 
and 112 Soviet soldiers were taken prisoner. Over the same period, less than 200 
weapons had been captured and the SS Cavalry Brigade only suffered casualties of 7 
dead and 9 wounded. This leads to the assumption that most of the Soviet victims 
were  not  partisans  or  soldiers  who  had  offered  armed  resistance  but  unarmed 
civilians and Jews.657
  There is  evidence,  however,  that  some well-organised partisan groups operated 
between Velikie Luki and Rzhev. They had been formed from July, 1941 onwards, 
based  on  detailed  guidelines  which  had  been  given  out  by  the  Political 
Administration  of  the  North-West  Front  of  the  Red  Army.  From late  November 
655Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom 12. – 17.10. 1941, 18 October, 1941, SS-Kav.Brigade, in: VUA, 
Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 1; Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom 18. – 24.10. 1941, 25 Octo-
ber, 1941, SS-Kav.Brigade, ibid.; see also Michaelis, Kavallerie-Divisionen der Waffen-SS, pp. 26-27.
656 KTB  KDOS,  entry  from  6  November,  1941.  See  also  Christoph  Rass,  ‘Menschenmaterial’:  
deutsche Soldaten an der Ostfront. Innenansichten einer Infanteriedivision 1939 – 1945 (Paderborn, 
2003), p. 341.
657 Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit v. 18.10. – 18.11. 1941, 21 November, 1941, SS-Kav.Brigade, in: 
VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 3; Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom 18. – 24.10. 1941, 25 
October,  1941,  SS-Kav.Brigade,  ibid.;  Tätigkeitsbericht  für  die  Zeit  vom  25.  –  31.10.  1941,  1 
November,  1941,  SS-Kav.Brigade,  ibid.;  Tätigkeitsbericht  für  die  Zeit  vom  1.  –  7.11.  1941,  7 
November,  1941,  SS-Kav.Brigade,  ibid.;  Tätigkeitsbericht  für  die  Zeit  vom 8.  –  14.11.  1941,  14 
November, 1941, SS-Kav.Brigade, ibid. See also Cüppers, Wegbereiter, pp. 201-203: he states that in 
one report the brigade even indirectly admitted that there had been no partisan activity during the 
given period so that the victims must have been civilians. Partisan attacks that led to casualties were 
often explicitly mentioned in the reports, for example the wounding of two men in a firefight near 
Vitebsk and  the death of a trooper by a landmine near Orša; see Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit v. 5. – 
11.10. 1941, 11 October, 1941, SS-Kav.Brigade, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 3. 
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onwards, underground activity in this region was on the increase again. The SS tried 
to counter assaults on supply lines and collaborators not only with searches, but also 
by erecting checkpoints along important railway lines and roads and by establishing 
permanent  bases  throughout  the  searching  areas.  Although  Fegelein’s  men  only 
suffered twenty losses before the beginning of December,  it  became clear  at  the 
beginning of winter that ‘pacification’ had failed: often, the cavalrymen only found 
empty camps; in other cases, patrols near partisan strongholds led to constant contact 
with the enemy. Once, an operation even had to be aborted because the soldiers were 
outgunned by the guerrillas.658 Casualties on the German side were answered by 
brutal retaliation against the civilian population: in two cases, entire villages were 
burned to the ground after their inhabitants had been rounded up and killed by the SS 
cavalry.  This  happened  after  alleged  killings  of  Wehrmacht soldiers  between 
Toropets and Rzhev.659
  In late November, 1941, the entire formation underwent a strict reviewing process 
as  squadron  leaders  were  asked  to  submit  reports  on  partisan  warfare  and  their 
general  experiences  in  the  Soviet  campaign.  These  accounts  give  details  of  the 
tactics employed by the SS cavalrymen in tracking down and destroying partisans 
and testify to the brutal nature of the fighting behind the frontline, including war 
crimes. Soviet guerrillas proved to be a well-informed enemy who was hard to find; 
the Germans identified the questioning and cooperation of the local population as a 
key  factor.  According  to  them,  the  best  results  were  achieved  when a  squadron 
658 Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit v. 15. – 21.11. 1941, 22 November, 1941, SS-Kav.Brigade, in: VUA, 
Kommandostab  RFSS,  box  24,  file  3;  Tätigkeitsbericht  für  die  Zeit  v.  22.  –  28.11.  1941,  29 
November, 1941, SS-Kav.Brigade, ibid.; John Erickson, The road to Stalingrad (London, 1975), pp. 
242-243;  Cüppers,  Wegbereiter,  pp.  224-227;  Urteil  gegen  Heinrich  Strähle,  in:  Justiz  und  NS-
Verbrechen: Sammlung deutscher Strafurteile wegen nationalsozialistischer Tötungsverbrechen 1945  
– 1999. Bd. 29: Die vom 11.05.1968 bis zum 28.06.1968 ergangenen Strafurteile. Lfd. Nr. 677-685, 
ed.  K.  D.  Bracher  and  others  (Amsterdam,  2003),  pp.  555-609,  esp.  pp.  561-567.  According  to 
Erickson and documents from the SS cavalry quoted in the collection of verdicts, Soviet guerrillas 
used German uniforms and weapons as well.
659 Cüppers, Wegbereiter, p. 233. One of these incidents claimed about 30 lives, the number of victims 
in the other case is unknown.
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stayed  at  a  particular  place  for  several  days  so  that  the  soldiers  could  gain  the 
confidence of the locals, who were generally scared of the guerrillas in the forests. 
Denunciation and nightly searches led to many arrests and executions; also, the SS 
cavalrymen  did  not  hesitate  to  use  violence  to  gain  valuable  information  from 
captured partisans.660 
  To the searching of villages and forests was added the elimination of so-called 
‘wanderers’.  SS  cavalrymen  were  ordered  to  shoot  every  Jew  and  every  Soviet 
citizen  fit  for  military  service  caught  travelling  on  foot  and  unable  to  produce 
identification from a German agency.  Between mid-October and early November 
alone,  dozens  of  Red Army stragglers  and civilians  were shot  in  the Toropets  – 
Rzhev area as a result of this policy. Officially, the soldiers acted in accordance with 
orders from the commander of the rear areas of Army Group Centre.661 In one case, 
however,  this  was  done so cruelly that  an investigation was launched against  an 
NCO of the SS cavalry who had exceeded his orders by shooting two male civilians, 
twelve women and a fourteen-year-old boy.662 Killings as a result of this policy have 
660 Erfahrungsbericht  der  2./SS-Kav.Rgt.  1  über  den  Einsatz  im  Osten,  24  November,  1941,  in: 
BArchF, RS 4/420, pp. 3-5;  Erfahrungsbericht [ü]ber Kampf mit  Partisanen vom 23.11. 1941 [3rd 
squadron of the 1st Regiment], ibid., pp. 9-10; Erfahrungsbericht vom 24.11. 1941 [5th squadron of the 
1st Regiment],  ibid.,  pp.  11-13;  Erfahrungsbericht  im Kampf  mit  Partisanen  vom 17.9.  1941 [1st 
Regiment], ibid., pp. 21-22. Denunciation was rife in the Toropez area; see Cüppers, Wegbereiter, p. 
231. The use of violence during questionings of suspected partisans, which was mentioned in the 
report of the 3rd squadron, was sanctioned by the commander of the rear areas of Army Group Centre 
as  well:  amongst  all  subordinate  units,  general  von  Schenckendorff  circulated  a  report  on 
reconnaissance missions from a sergeant of the 354th infantry regiment (a subunit of the 286th security 
division). Apart from general information on tactics which could be used against guerrillas, this report 
also recommended the beating of locals, which was viewed as a measure of facilitating questionings. 
It did not contain any advice on actually winning the trust of the locals.  See Berück Mitte / Ia vom 
14.10.  1941,  btr.  Kampf  gegen  die  Partisanen,  in:  BArchF,  RH 22/225,  quoted  in  Hasenclever, 
Wehrmacht und Besatzungspolitik, p. 366. The SS Cavalry Brigade received this report as well; see 
Erfahrungsbericht des Oberfeldwebels Schrade von der 12./IR 354 vom 13.10. 1941, SS-Kav. Rgt. 1; 
Partisanenbekämpfung, Erfahrungsberichte vom 19.7. 1941 – 28.11. 1941, in: BArchF, RS 4/420, pp. 
18-20.
661 For the general order to shoot wandering Jews and Russians, see Erfahrungsbericht im Kampf mit 
Partisanen, SS-Kav.Rgt. 1, 17 September, 1941, in: BArchF, RS 4/420, p. 22. For the documentation 
of killings, see regimental orders no. 2-4 and 6-7 from 19-21 October and 23-25 October, 1941, in: 
BArchF, RS 4/441, pp. 74-76 and pp. 71-72. See also regimental order no. 1 from 3 November, 1941, 
ibid., p. 61.
662 This  precedent  was  taken  up  again  after  the  war  by  West  German  judicial  authorities,  who 
acquitted  the  man;  see  Justiz  und  NS-Verbrechen:  Sammlung  deutscher  Strafurteile  wegen  
nationalsozialistischer  Tötungsverbrechen  1945  –  1999.  Bd.  29, pp.  555-609;  see  also  Cüppers, 
Wegbereiter, p. 230.
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also  been  documented  for  Wehrmacht units  in  this  operational  area;  both  in  the 
regular forces and the SS, the tactic soon spiralled out of control:  when German 
soldiers  had to  face a  new level  of  threat  from guerrilla  attacks  and setbacks in 
combating the underground movement, this led to a general feeling of insecurity to 
which the men responded by indiscriminately killing all civilians who did not have 
identification or were considered hostile in any way.663 At Olenino, for example, 20 – 
40 Soviet citizens were shot by soldiers of the SS cavalry in March, 1942 because 
they were not from that village and accused of being spies. The Russian village elder 
helped  the  Germans  to  find  the  suspects.664 At  this  time,  however,  anti-partisan 
missions were not a prime concern of the SS Cavalry Brigade anymore as the unit 
now had to stand its ground in combat.
  The importance of the development of the unit in the context of partisan warfare 
lies in a combination of different aspects: first in Belorussia and later in the Toropets 
region, the SS Cavalry Brigade amalgamated missions against Jews, stragglers of the 
Red Army, and guerrillas. This approach also included violence against non-Jewish 
civilians and,  to some extent,  military operations.  In each of the two operational 
areas, there was a different focus. ‘Partisan warfare’ served as a welcome cover-up 
for  the  brigade’s  actual  task,  the destruction  of  the Jews,  in  the Pripet  Marshes. 
Between  Toropets  and  Rzhev,  on  the  other  hand,  the  brigade went  through  a 
transitional period of about three months during which it saw actual encounters with 
insurgents.
663 In the operational area of the SS Cavalry Brigade, the 206th infantry division committed atrocities 
against  prisoners,  civilians,  and  suspected  partisans  as  well  and  included  this  in  official  reports. 
According to an undated list, 99 prisoners of war, 169 civilians, 4 partisans, and 27 Red Army men in 
civilian clothes were shot by this unit between 3 November and 13 November, 1941; see Gefechts- 
und Tätigkeitsberichte, Einsatzberichte, Wochenmeldungen der unterstellten Einheiten. Bd. 2: 2.10. 
41 – 22.5. 42, 206th infantry division, BArchF, RH 26-206/17, p. 276. The policy of the Wehrmacht 
(with the examples of the Ninth Army and Korück 580) is also described in Hartmann, Wehrmacht im 
Ostkrieg, p. 726, and Gerlach, Morde, pp. 877-882. Omer Bartov has noticed this with the Wehrmacht 
units from his sample as well; see Bartov, German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare, pp. 121-
122.
664 Vernehmung Daniel Teske vom 4.10. 1962 in BArchL, B 162/5542, p. j40.
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  There are two key elements which determined the institutional-level conduct of the 
unit during the first phase of partisan warfare in the Soviet Union. The first factor is 
the close collaboration with the army and the commander of the rear areas of Army 
Group  Centre  in  particular.  Especially  in  Belorussia,  there  was  a  strong 
interdependence  between  the  aims  of  the  Wehrmacht   and  the  SS.  The  military 
administration, which from the beginning was responsible for the implementation of 
radical orders for safeguarding the hinterland, came to view the destruction of the 
Jews  and the  killing  of  Red Army men as  a  necessary part  of  this  and  actively 
supported the actions of Himmler’s men. The SS, with the SS Cavalry Brigade as 
one of its main killing units in the central sector of the eastern front, greatly profited 
from this  cooperation.  The  participation  of  Gustav  Lombard in  the  ‘anti-partisan 
course’ at Mogilev shows that the SS cavalrymen helped to trigger an escalation of 
the German occupation policy. 
  The second factor is the habituation to violence the soldiers experienced during 
their killing missions. Operating as an instrument of ideological terror rather than a 
disciplined  combat  unit,  the  SS  Cavalry  Brigade  soon  no  longer  differentiated 
between  potential  enemies  and  peaceful  civilians.  Even  towards  some  friendly 
villagers in the Toropets region, they displayed the same behaviour as towards their 
Jewish  victims  in  Belorussia  a  few  months  earlier.  Despite  Fegelein’s  boastful 
claims, however, the brigade failed in combating insurgents when based in Russia in 
late 1941. It can safely be assumed that the brutal approach followed by the unit 
gained it even more enemies and did not solve any problems. When they got drawn 
into a fight for survival against a Soviet counteroffensive, the SS cavalrymen were 
still ill-prepared for real combat, despite the fact that they had proven their brutality 
in every possible way thus far.
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6) Participation in the winter battle west of Moscow  , 1941 – 1942  
Baptism of fire: the SS Cavalry Brigade in combat   at Toropets and Rzhev 
  In late 1941, the frame of reference changed a final time, this time to a military 
character, which the SS Cavalry Brigade was to retain until the summer of 1942. 
During the nine months spent in the Toropets – Rzhev area, the unit experienced both 
fighting against partisans and deployment at the front. This time was also a transition 
between both extremes of its ‘dual role’: whereas the unit had been a killing squad in 
Belorussia for the most part, it was to become a military unit from the last month of 
the year onwards. The SS Cavalry Brigade was also expanded in size whilst being 
based at Toropets. What Heinrich Himmler and Hermann Fegelein had in mind was 
to build up a strong combat unit they termed a ‘reinforced cavalry brigade’ but it was 
never intended that it should be used for  combat missions  before this process was 
completed.  The  SS  cavalry  nevertheless  got  drawn  into  the  fighting  as  the 
Reichsführer’s grip loosened: the influence of the army on this unit became stronger 
when the situation at the front turned against the Germans. The order for the first real 
combat mission caught the men off guard: despite the fact that many of them had 
originally volunteered for the Waffen-SS to fight, they were in no state to confront the 
Red Army. First behind the lines, then at the focal point of battle SS soldiers had to 
be deployed as no other troops were available in many cases. Although they lacked 
training they  fought bravely almost until their total annihilation. At the same time 
they  fell  back  into  old  patterns  of  behaviour:  outnumbered  and  outgunned,  the 
cavalry soldiers  displayed  extreme  violence  towards  civilians,  partisans  and Red 
Army men (both active soldiers and prisoners of war). Thus, they fulfilled the ‘dual 
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role’ of the unit even when there were no Jews in their current operational area. The 
two main lines of argument in this chapter are how the brigade developed into a 
combat unit despite being far from operational readiness, and how the unit served 
two different masters, namely the Wehrmacht and the SS.
Map 2: Operational area of the SS Cavalry Brigade west of Moscow, 1941 – 1942
  Whilst  the  SS cavalry had  traversed  the  Pripet  Marshes,  the  German advance 
eastward continued. It was, however, slowed down by Soviet resistance, bad roads 
and a conflict on strategy between Hitler and the army leadership: whereas the chief 
of the general staff, colonel general Franz Halder, advocated the thrust on Moscow 
led by Army Group Centre, Adolf Hitler intended to take all three main objectives 
before the end of the year. His generals followed this approach, which meant that 
strong forces had to be diverted from the most powerful spearhead in the central 
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sector to Army Group North and Army Group South respectively in August, 1941. 
Operation  ‘Typhoon’,  the assault  on the Soviet  capital,  began in  late  September, 
although the opportunity to seize Moscow at an early stage was now lost. On other 
fronts, the Wehrmacht was able to achieve triumphant successes: when the battle for 
Kiev ended on 26 September,  1941, 665,000 Soviet  soldiers were taken prisoner 
after a giant encirclement operation. Two weeks later, about 650,000 more went into 
captivity at Vyazma and Bryansk after operations that marked the end of the first 
phase of  ‘Typhoon’.  Although the Red Army did  not  collapse even after  having 
suffered these terrible blows, and despite the fact that of the three targets Leningrad, 
Moscow, and Kiev only one had been reached so far, the German high command and 
its agencies in the field were still very enthusiastic about defeating the enemy and 
reaching  Moscow  soon.  Setbacks  like  an  almost  complete  standstill  during  the 
autumn rain period in October, which turned roads into impassable mud trails, were 
viewed as temporary in the face of the most recent enormous victories.665
  The SS and police formations had now gone over to a policy of eliminating entire 
Jewish  communities.  What  had  begun with  the  massacres  carried  out  by the  SS 
Cavalry  Brigade  at  places  like  Pinsk  and  Bobruisk  was  now  common  practice: 
mobile execution squads from the Einsatzgruppen and battalions of the order police 
claimed more and more victims. This led to killings on an unprecedented scale: at 
Kamenets-Podolsk and Babi Yar alone, 23,600 and 33,771 Jews were murdered in 
late August and late September, 1941, respectively within just a few days. Often, 
executions were organised in close collaboration with the  Wehrmacht:  army units 
provided logistic support and sometimes even participated in the killings.666 
665 John  Keegan,  The  Second  World  War (London,  1989),  pp.  157-161  and  p.  164;  Gerd  R. 
Ueberschär,  ‘Das  Scheitern  des  ‘Unternehmens  Barbarossa’.  Der  deutsch-sowjetische  Krieg  vom 
Überfall bis zur Wende vor Moskau im Winter 1941/42’, in: G. R. Ueberschär, and W. Wette (eds.), 
Der deutsche  Überfall auf die Sowjetunion.  ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’ 1941 (Frankfurt, 1991),  pp. 
98-99; Erickson, The road to Stalingrad, pp. 213-222.
666 Matthäus in Browning, Die Entfesselung der ‘Endlösung’, p. 424; Mallmann, ‘Kamenez-Podolsk’, 
pp. 239-264; Lozowick, ‘Rollbahn Mord’, p. 223 and p. 227; Krausnick and Wilhelm, Die Truppe des  
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  Violence took a toll on the killers as well. The problems which could already be 
observed in the SS cavalry in August escalated and affected many other German 
killing units  as they went over to  the murder  of women and children during the 
autumn of 1941. Continuous executions led to callousness, alcoholism, and nervous 
breakdowns. In order to encourage them and boost their morale, Himmler travelled 
along the eastern front and spoke to the men.667 These phenomena, however, did not 
disturb  the  overall  continuation  of  the  Holocaust  in  the  Soviet  Union.  The 
annihilation policy of the occupants now had reached a new stage: the inclusion of 
women  and  children  was  to  result  ultimately  in  the  murder  of  all  Jews  in  the 
occupied territories. This was only made possible by the interaction of very vague 
orders  (which  gave  the  killing  units  a  wide  scope  of  action),  the  initiative  of 
commanders in the field, and constant adjustment by the higher levels in the chain of 
command.  Thus,  a  complex  process  of  radicalisation  had  been  completed  in  the 
second half of 1941.668
  The SS Cavalry Brigade played an important role in this development. It was not, 
however, confined to being a highly mobile killing squad alone: in the course of its 
deployment in Belorussia, it had also been involved in military operations and fought 
against stragglers of the Red Army, although the unit’s function in the Holocaust had 
dominated its mission throughout the summer of 1941. When analysing the unit, it is 
striking how it had become a ‘hybrid’: although the participation in large massacres 
resembles the role of the  Einsatzgruppen, the SS cavalrymen had undergone more 
military  training  than  the  personnel  of  these  formations.  They  also  had  heavy 
weapons at their disposal and cooperated more with the Wehrmacht, be it in scouting 
Weltanschauungskrieges, pp. 232-243; Hartmann, Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg, pp. 341-342.
667 For  his  visit  to  Einsatzgruppe  D on  4  October,  1941,  see  Angrick,  Besatzungspolitik  und 
Massenmord,  pp.  253-254.  The  general  situation  of  the  members  of  killing  squads  is  accurately 
described in Ronald Headland,  Messages of Murder: A Study of the Einsatzgruppen of the Securtiy  
Police and the Security Service, 1941 – 1943 (Rutherford, N.J., London 1992), pp. 211-212. For the 
situation in Einsatzgruppe D, see also Angrick, Besatzungspolitik und Massenmord, pp. 247-250.
668 Longerich, Politik der Vernichtung, p. 372.
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or plain military missions such as the capture of Turov. Its ‘dual role’ also makes the 
unit comparable to similar ‘hybrids’ in the  Wehrmacht,  the security divisions and 
Korücks, which also were to ‘pacify’ the hinterland.669 But these were predominantly 
occupation troops with many different tasks,  including logistics.  They lacked the 
mobility  and  ideological  determination  of  the  SS  Cavalry  Brigade,  which  was 
intensified by the fact that it  was under Heinrich Himmler’s direct command and 
received its instructions in the field from Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, one of the 
Reichsführer’s  most  loyal  and brutal  lieutenants.  Despite  having fought  in  minor 
engagements in Belorussia, the brigade was not ready for frontline duty yet. It seems 
more appropriate  to state  that  the SS cavalrymen were still  rather  slowly getting 
accustomed to fighting, as opposed to soldiers in other units of the Waffen-SS or the 
Wehrmacht, who received more training, were better prepared, and thus played a full 
combat role.
  A prime example for this contrast was the Ninth Army, with whom the SS cavalry 
had already cooperated at Bialystok. Together with Panzergruppe 3, this formation 
had  first  formed  the  northern  part  of  the  pincer  movement  at  Vyazma and  then 
moved forward towards the east and northeast. In the course of this advance, the 
towns of Bely, Sychevka and Rzhev had been taken and Panzergruppe 3 had reached 
Kalinin (today Tver). Near Rzhev a new frontline was built up which was to form the 
‘cornerstone of the eastern front’ for more than a year.670 The difference between the 
soldiers of the Ninth Army and those of the SS Cavalry Brigade could hardly have 
669 For these formations, see  Hartmann,  Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg, pp. 61-69 and pp. 70-76.  Security 
divisions  were  second-rate  infantry  divisions  of  the  Wehrmacht  which  were  deployed  against 
stragglers and partisans in rear areas, whereas a  Korück (short for  Kommandantur im rückwärtigen  
Heeresgebiet) had mainly administrative duties and supervised a network of  Feldkommandanturen 
and Ortskommandanturen in a given district.  Korücks could also be allocated police or army forces 
for security purposes as well. See also Hasenclever, Wehrmacht und Besatzungspolitik, pp. 148-149: 
this  work  demonstrates  the  inadequate  equipment  and  the  low  combat  value  of  the  security 
formations, which consisted of soldiers and officers who were considerably older than their comrades 
in the frontline divisions.
670 Wjasmaschlacht und Weiterstoß nach Osten, in: BArchF, RH 20-9/635, p. 1; Oleg A. Kondratjew, 
Die Schlacht von Rshew. Ein halbes Jahrhundert Schweigen (Munich, 2001), pp. 10-16.
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been greater: despite the fact that Hermann Fegelein did his best to make the unit 
look like an elite formation, his cavalrymen with their comparatively very limited 
time  spent  at  the  frontline  could  hardly  measure  up  to  combat  veterans  of  a 
spearhead formation of the  Wehrmacht, who had been fighting constantly since 22 
June and come within 130 miles of Moscow until mid-October of the same year.671 
Not only was there a difference as far as combat experience was concerned but also 
with regard to their new task in general: instead of joining their army comrades for 
the second part  of operation ‘Typhoon’,  the assault  on the Soviet  capital,  the SS 
Cavalry Brigade played a subordinate role as a security formation in the hinterland. 
Commanders of the Ninth Army welcomed this as some of their own forces could 
thereby be relieved from guard duty and sent to the front.672
  Parallel  to  the  task  of  securing  rear  areas,  the  SS Cavalry Brigade  was  to  be 
enlarged to form a so-called ‘reinforced cavalry brigade’. This was a continuation of 
the  growth of  the  unit  that  had begun after  the  merger  of  the  two regiments  in 
September. For this purpose, new subunits were integrated at Toropets: in October, a 
signals company was formed and replacements from Warsaw arrived. Towards the 
end of the year, the brigade also received a medical company and an anti-aircraft 
battery.673 As the unit was undergoing a constant change, the staff sometimes found it 
hard to report its strength.674 Not only was there a continuous personnel flow and 
regrouping of existing subunits; in November, Heinrich Himmler even ordered the 
withdrawal of troops from the front and their transport back to Warsaw. This process 
concerned  the  entire  1st Regiment,  the  two  mounted  batteries,  and  the  engineer 
671 Klink in Boog, Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, pp. 568-579.
672 AOK 9, Kriegstagebuch Ia Nr. 3, 7.2. 1941 – 31.12. 1941, Bd. 4: 30.9. 1941 – 31.10. 1941 (Copy), 
entries from 1 October and 10 October, 1941, in: BArchF, RH 20-9/13a, p. 11 and pp. 70-71.
673 Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom 12. – 17.10. 1941, 18 October, 1941, SS-Kav.Brigade, in: VUA, 
Kommandostab  RFSS,  box  24,  file  3;  Tätigkeitsbericht  für  die  Zeit  vom 27.9.  –  4.10.  1941,  5 
October,  1941,  SS-Kav.Brigade,  ibid.;  Tätigkeitsbericht  für  die  Zeit  vom 29.11.  –  5.12.  1941,  6 
December, 1941, SS-Kav.Brigade, ibid.
674 Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom 27.9. – 4.10. 1941, 5 October, 1941, SS-Kav.Brigade, in: VUA, 
Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 3.
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squadron.  With  cadres  from the  existing  units,  a  third  cavalry  regiment  and  an 
artillery battalion were to be formed in the General Government.675 As during the 
previous steps in the development of the SS cavalry, the creation of a ‘reinforced 
cavalry  brigade’ was  modelled  on  the  Wehrmacht equivalent  with  its  battalion-
strength artillery.676 
  Moreover, according to the memoirs of a former officer of the army’s 1st Cavalry 
Division  this  unit  was  approached  as  well,  presumably  by  Fegelein.  After  the 
division had been pulled out of the front in order to be restructured as an armoured 
division in late 1941, the SS offered to take it over as a whole, which was rejected. 
An attempt to entice individual officers away from the unit was unsuccessful as well. 
Hans von Herwarth wrote about this episode: ‘We are proud of the fact that none of 
us was willing to change his army uniform for the SS uniform’.677 He saw the reasons 
for this attitude in the conservative tradition of the Wehrmacht cavalry: many of the 
officers  came  from  the  former  Prussian  Guards  Cavalry  Division  and  ‘had  no 
sympathy for National Socialism’.678
675 Radio message from Kommandostab RFSS to SS Cavalry Brigade, 14 November, 1941, 10 am, in: 
BArchB, NS 33/309, fiche 1, no. 57. The message contains no information on planned changes in the 
engineer squadron. It was also intended to withdraw the veterinary company and to divide it into two 
companies;  see radio message from SS-Kav[allerie]-Ers[atz]-Abt[eilung] Warschau to SS Cavalry 
Brigade, 29 November, 1941, 4.55 pm, in: BArchB, NS 33/309, fiche 2, no. 128. At the beginning of 
December, the signals company was to be withdrawn as well; see radio message from Kommandostab 
RFSS to SS Cavalry Brigade, 1 December, 1941, 5.20 pm, in: BArchB, NS 33/310, fiche 1, no. 6; 
Beurteilung der Lage am 25. November 1941, in: StAW, 62 Nds. Fb.2, Nr. 1310, Bl. 43.
676 Whereas the brigade in its form of summer, 1941, had strongly resembled the army’s 1st Cavalry 
Brigade, the ‘reinforced’ version was to become stronger than that as some of its subcomponents, 
such as the engineer and signalling units, were to be increased to battalion strength. For the structure 
of  the  1st Cavalry  Brigade  of  the  Wehrmacht,  see  Friedrich  Stahl  (ed.),  Heereseinteilung  1939: 
Gliederung, Standorte und Kommandeure sämtlicher Einheiten und Dienststellen des Friedensheeres  
am 3.1. 1939 und die Kriegsgliederung vom 1.9. 1939 (Friedberg, 1980), pp. 23-24.
677 Hans von Herwarth, Zwischen Hitler und Stalin: erlebte Zeitgeschichte 1931 bis 1945 (Frankfurt, 
1985), p. 236. Von Herwarth, who had served as a diplomat before the war, had a Jewish grandmother 
and joined the military in order to obtain a secure position and to escape persecution in the Nazi state. 
He resented National Socialism, but despite his ancestry he made a career both in the diplomatic 
service and the Wehrmacht. Von Herwarth even received the status of an 'honorary Aryan' from Adolf 
Hitler. See ibid., p. 111; for von Herwarth's biography, see  also Steffen R. Kathe,  Kulturpolitik um 
jeden Preis. Die Geschichte des Goethe-Instituts von 1951 bis 1990 (Munich, 2005), pp. 125-126. For 
the 1st Cavalry Division of the Wehrmacht, see the introduction to the finding aid for the file RH 29-1 
(Kavalleriedivisionen), BArchF: this index contains the information that the division was renamed as 
24th armoured division on 28 November, 1941, and restructured accordingly in East Prussia.
678 Herwarth,  Zwischen Hitler und Stalin,  p.  111 and p.  236.  The attitude of  the cavalry officers 
described in these memoirs resembles that of the officer corps of the prestigious 9 th Infantry Regiment 
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  The restructuring of the brigade was not a mere administrative measure. It shows 
that the growth of the SS cavalry was a declared objective of Himmler and Fegelein. 
Also, the circumstances of this development highlight a conflict of interests between 
Wehrmacht and SS, which was carried out at a critical point in time: as the planned 
pull-out of several subunits coincided with the preparation for the second phase of 
operation ‘Typhoon’, General von Schenckendorff refused to let them go as he was 
in need of guard troops. Some of his own forces had been sent to the front and the 
staff of the SS Cavalry Brigade feared that the unit was being sacrificed in order to 
close gaps behind the lines. To avoid an overstretching of its forces and to continue 
the reorganisation, the brigade appealed to the Higher SS and police leader Centre; 
Heinrich  Himmler  had  already approved  of  the  plan.  But  this  did  not  solve  the 
problem: the question of releasing parts of the unit hung in the balance from mid-
November until mid-December, despite repeated efforts of the Reichsführer and the 
Kommandostab. In this case, though, their plans were thwarted: first, the transfer of 
the troops was delayed due to intense patrolling activity of the 1st Regiment; at the 
beginning of December, the Soviet counteroffensive began which necessitated the 
effort of all available forces in this sector to hold the frontline.679
from Potsdam.  Richard  von  Weizsäcker,  who  later  became  president  of  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany, served in this regiment during the Second World War. He noticed that, despite a nationalist 
and conservative Prussian tradition which welcomed the German rearmament, atrocities of the Nazi 
regime were strongly resented, such as the Blood Purge in 1934. Many of the officers tried to keep 
their distance from the new regime but had to live with a contradiction as they were also loyal to their 
country, a situation which led some of them into the military resistance against Hitler. See Richard 
von Weizsäcker, Vier Zeiten. Erinnerungen (Berlin, 1997), pp. 74-76 and pp. 87-91.
679 Beurteilung der Lage am 25. November 1941, in: StAW, 62 Nds. Fb.2, Nr. 1310, pp. 43-44; for the 
delay, see Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom 15. – 21.11. 1941, 22 November, 1941, SS-Kav.Brigade, 
in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 3, and Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom 22. – 28.11. 
1941,  29  November,  1941,  SS-Kav.Brigade,  ibid.  Both  reports  mention  ongoing  searches  were 
conducted by the 1st Regiment,  which at  the same time prepared for the transfer to Warsaw. The 
Kommandostab impatiently asked when this was to be implemented; see for example radio message 
from Kommandostab RFSS to SS Cavalry Brigade, 18 November, 1941, 4.30 pm, in: BArchB, NS 
33/309, fiche 2, no. 82, and radio message from Kommandostab RFSS to SS Cavalry Brigade, 24 
November, 1941, 9.15 am, in: BArchB, NS 33/309, fiche 2, no. 105. On 11 December, 1941, it was 
decided that the 1st  Regiment was to remain at the front; see radio message from SS-Kav[allerie]-
Ers[atz]-Abt[eilung] Warschau to SS Cavalry Brigade, 11 December, 1941, 8.10 am, in: BArchB, NS 
33/310, fiche 1, no. 29.  For von dem Bach-Zelewski’s support of this decision, see Tagebuch des 
Chefs der Bandenkampfverbände, entry from 12 December, 1941, p. 20.
217
  Two conclusions can be drawn from this: first, the brigade leadership could not 
operate relatively independently anymore, as had been the case in Belorussia. There, 
the position of the SS and the ideological role of the unit had been stronger, which 
was accepted and actively supported by the  Wehrmacht. Now, the SS cavalry was 
just  a part  of the executive force in a complex military power structure and was 
deployed  according  to  military  exigency.  Himmler  had  not  been  able  to  assert 
himself; instead, the commander of the rear areas of Army Group Centre got his way 
and von dem Bach-Zelewski took his side. Second, neither a lengthy disposition of 
the  entire  brigade  in  Russia,  nor  a  frontline  deployment,  was  ever  intended  and 
impossible as the unit was still undergoing a process of build-up and training and had 
a rather low level of combat readiness. Even in the current situation, it had reached 
its limits as its units were spread out over a wide area and were not even always 
superior to guerrillas in their sector. The brigade, however, did remain a coherent 
formation as its squadrons took hardly any losses until it was transferred to the front 
at the end of the year.
  In  the  course  of  the  evaluation  process  the  squadrons  went  through  in  late 
November, 1941, SS cavalry officers also commented on the quality of the horses, 
vehicles, and weapons as well as the performance of their men since the beginning of 
the campaign against the Soviet Union. The equipment had withstood the sometimes 
extreme conditions even when covering enormous distances. But although the SS 
Cavalry Brigade had mastered most problems (often with inadequate supplies and 
communication),  some  of  the  cavalrymen,  especially  members  of  the  supply 
columns,  still  showed deficiencies in training.  Squadron commanders complained 
about a lack of riding and driving abilities and stated that some of their men ‘were 
just not appreciative enough of their horses’ and should ideally be transferred to an 
infantry unit. This shows that the SS Cavalry Brigade had entered the Soviet Union 
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with a lack of proficiency in some key areas, a problem that apparently had not been 
resolved by the training period in East Prussia in July.680 Disciplinary problems that 
had already occurred  in  Belorussia  flared up again:  deep in  enemy territory,  the 
soldiers were often not watchful and alert enough during rest periods as well as on 
the march, even in areas where partisan attacks had taken place.681 These deficiencies 
continued to occur; in the course of the brigade’s mission in Russia, commanders 
also noted  shortcomings in  basic  essentials  of  infantry tactics,  such as  a  lack of 
coordination between different subunits, advancing without covering fire, missing 
camouflage and defilade, and difficulties in adjusting to various combat situations.682
  The main reason for these problems went back even further: in many cases, the men 
had been drafted and were put to immediate use as auxiliary policemen in Poland. 
Unlike their  comrades from the  Wehrmacht,  they had not received very thorough 
military  training;  basically,  they  remained  ‘civilians  who  had  been  given  a 
uniform’.683 They were  now paying  the  price  for  this  as  they had  to  confront  a 
determined enemy who avoided an open confrontation. Their superiors, however, did 
not expect major operations for the final months of 1941. The priority was to prepare 
for the coming winter and to improve the training of the men in the winter quarters, 
for example by a course in horse-grooming. Towards the end of the year, a general 
tendency towards greater qualification and professionalism could be observed: the 
brigade  command sought  to  create  a  pool  of  new leaders  by organising  training 
courses  for  prospective  non-commissioned  officers,  junior  officers,  and  reserve 
officers who had been recruited from the ranks. These courses were to be held in 
680 Erfahrungsbericht der 2./SS-Kav.Rgt. 1 über den Einsatz im Osten, p. 7;  Erfahrungsbericht vom 
24.11. 1941 [5th squadron of the 1st Regiment], p. 13; Justiz und NS-Verbrechen: Sammlung deutscher  
Strafurteile wegen nationalsozialistischer Tötungsverbrechen 1945 – 1999. Bd. 29, p. 559.
681 Tagesbefehl Nr. 14 vom 16.10. 1941, in:  BArchF, RS 4/441, pp. 79-80;  Tagesbefehl Nr. 20 vom 
11.11. 1941, ibid., p. 56.
682 Merkblatt vom 30.12. 1941, in: BArchF, RS 4/441, p. 35.
683 Interview with Bernhard D., retired chief inspector of the Landeskriminalamt Niedersachsen, 26 
January, 2011.
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Warsaw  during  the  winter  months  and  aimed  at  ending  the  dependency  on 
allocations of reservists from the  Allgemeine SS.684 The brigade also received new 
officer cadets  who had undergone training at  the  SS-Junkerschulen and some SS 
cavalrymen who had proven themselves in combat received battlefield promotions.685
  After the abatement of the autumnal mud period, Army Group Centre launched its 
final  push  on  Moscow  on  19  November,  1941.  The  German  high  command 
completely  misjudged  the  exhaustion  of  its  troops  and  the  precarious  supply 
situation; it also ignored the unbroken will of the Red Army as well as intelligence 
reports of Soviet reinforcements from Siberia. Instead, the enemy was to be defeated 
in a decisive battle which was to gain the Wehrmacht, if not possession of the capital 
itself, a better position along its western fringe. Soon afterwards, the assault ground 
to a halt: despite initial successes, which had brought German troops within some 
twenty miles of the Kremlin, high losses and a lack of preparation for the Russian 
winter  took their  toll  and the offensive ended on 5 December.686 The Red Army 
immediately began a massive counterattack that soon threatened huge parts of the 
entire eastern front. In the sector of the Ninth Army, which had been tasked with an 
advance towards the Volga reservoir and the Moscow canal but failed to reach its 
objectives, the Soviets broke through and retook Kalinin on 16 December. In this 
critical situation, Army Group Centre decided to bolster the overstretched forces at 
the front by sending in troops from the SS cavalry. That the unit was not combat-
684 Erfahrungsbericht der 2./SS-Kav.Rgt. 1 über den Einsatz im Osten, p. 3;  Erfahrungsbericht vom 
24.11. 1941 [5th squadron of the 1st Regiment], p. 11; Merkblatt Nr. 1 zur Winterausbildung 1941/42 
vom 19.12. 1941 , in: BArchF, RS 4/441, p. 42; Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit v. 13. – 19.9. 1941, 19 
September,  1941,  SS-Kav.Brigade,  in:  VUA,  Kommandostab  RFSS,  box  24,  file  3.  See  also 
Brigadebefehl  Nr.  5  für  die  Durchführung  von  Lehrgängen  während  des  Winters  1941/42,  17 
September, 1941, ibid.
685 For the arrival of new officer cadets, see Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom 20. – 26.9. 1941, 26 
September,  1941,  SS-Kav.Brigade,  in:  VUA,  Kommandostab  RFSS,  box  24,  file  3,  and 
Tätigkeitsbericht  für  die  Zeit  vom  5.  –  11.10.  1941,  11  October,  1941,  SS-Kav.Brigade,  ibid. 
Battlefield promotions were mentioned in  Tagesbefehl Nr. 17, 5 November, 1941, in:  BArchF, RS 
4/441, p. 61.
686 Ueberschär and Wette,  ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’,  pp. 105-108;  Klink in Boog,  Das Deutsche 
Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, pp. 585-600.
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ready was  not  even  taken  into  account  by  the  Wehrmacht.  The  army command 
nevertheless reacted very positively to this and noted that it was ‘grateful for every 
man’.687 The  entire  brigade  came under  the  command of  the  Ninth  Army on 28 
December.  Leaving only the most  necessary guard troops  along a  section  of  the 
Velikie Luki– Rzhev railway, its regiments and the RAA were ordered to support the 
frontline at Selizharovo northwest of Rzhev.688
  Hermann Fegelein was well aware of the difficult situation at the front. His men 
were going into a sector without a coherent frontline; the Wehrmacht units they were 
about to support had already suffered great losses, especially from frostbite due to a 
lack  of  winter  clothing,  and  had  lost  much  of  their  artillery  and  armour.  They 
struggled to hold their position against enemy forces, who threatened to overwhelm 
them  by  sheer  numerical  superiority.  In  a  report  for  his  superiors  at  the 
Kommandostab, Fegelein compared the forces under his command with the battered 
formations on the front. He viewed the morale of his own soldiers as ‘excellent’ and 
stated:  ‘[The]  brigade with its  current  equipment and armament and in its  actual 
strength  has  the  value  of  1-2  front-line  divisions’.  This  claim  was  rather 
presumptuous  and  overestimated  the  ability  of  the  unit,  given  that  the  brigade 
numbered  4,428  men  in  total  at  this  time,  but  only  around  1,800  soldiers  were 
available  for  fighting.  They were,  however,  somewhat  better  prepared for  winter 
conditions than troops of the Wehrmacht: in order to ensure their mobility, the men 
of  the reconnaissance  battalion and the cavalrymen dismounted  and used sleighs 
instead; some of them were even given skis. They also received some winter clothing 
and reinforcements.689 
687 Erickson, The road to Stalingrad, p. 269 and p. 277; AOK 9, Kriegstagebuch Ia Nr. 3, entries from 
11 December, 20 December, and 24 December, 1941, p. 132,  p. 157 and pp. 165-167.
688 AOK 9, Kriegstagebuch Ia Nr. 3, entries from 15 December and 20 December, 1941, pp. 145-146 
and  pp.  155-156;  Tätigkeitsbericht  für  die  Zeit  v.  13.  –  19.12.  1941,  23  December,  1941,  SS-
Kav.Brigade,  in:  VUA,  Kommandostab  RFSS,  box  24,  file  3;  Bericht  über  den  Einsatz  der  SS-
Kav.Brigade im Winter 1941/42, 11 February 1942, in: BArchB, NS 19/3487, p. 2.
689 Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit v. 20. – 26.12. 1941, 29 December, 1941, SS-Kav.Brigade, in: VUA, 
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  The optimism of the brigade commander can only be explained by the desire to 
impress his superiors. Not only did he misjudge the strength of the unit;  he also 
explicitly mentions several factors that complicated the situation in the Toropets – 
Rzhev sector, especially the extreme weather conditions and the numerical inferiority 
of  German  troops  against  their  Soviet  opponents.  The  continuing  threat  from 
partisans, some of whom seemed to be in direct contact with the Red Army, appears 
in the document as well: SS cavalrymen had to face groups of up to several hundred 
men who had artillery at their disposal. Nevertheless, the commander thought that 
his  troops would be able  to negotiate  all  these problems.  In view of these facts, 
Fegelein’s  report  stands in stark contrast  to  the one that  was written four weeks 
earlier  by  SS-Hauptsturmführer Karl  Gesele,  his  deputy,  in  order  to  effect  the 
withdrawal of the unit. Gesele’s account, which was based on the assumption of a 
continued  deployment  in  anti-partisan  operations,  clearly  illustrated  supply  and 
weather problems as well as the assignment of an operational area that was far too 
large for the SS Cavalry Brigade. Gesele anticipated a significant diminution of the 
unit’s  fighting  strength  by  the  spring  of  1942  without  even  considering  combat 
missions against regular Soviet troops.690 Thus, Fegelein’s bravado stood against the 
realistic analysis of his closest aide. His assessment of the brigade’s abilities was yet 
another outrageous claim in a long series of reports which grossly overestimated 
what his men were able to achieve. The SS Cavalry Brigade was already struggling 
with its  current  objectives and not  ready for the role  it  had been given.  But  the 
army’s  decision  overrode  Himmler’s  intentions  and  Fegelein’s  word  was  more 
Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 3;  AOK 9, Kriegstagebuch Ia Nr. 3, entry from 24 December, 
1941, p. 168. The commander of the 1st Regiment noted that the supply of winter clothes had not been 
sufficient  as the men could only be given one item each (like fur caps  or trousers).  The quality, 
however, was good and the SS cavalrymen were still better off than their army comrades, who had not 
received anything. See Bericht über den Einsatz der SS-Kav.Brigade im Winter 1941/42, p. 19.
690 Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit v. 20. – 26.12. 1941, 29 December, 1941, SS-Kav.Brigade, in: VUA, 
Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 3;  Beurteilung der Lage am 25.  November 1941, in: StAW,  62 
Nds. Fb.2, Nr. 1310, pp. 43-45.
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important for the brigade than Gesele’s. As a result, the unit had to take on a task that 
was  doomed  to  failure  and  the  Wehrmacht’s  decision  to  continue  the  attack  on 
Moscow, combined with Fegelein’s need for recognition, became a death warrant for 
many SS cavalrymen.
  When the new mission of the SS cavalry began on 28 December, the situation was 
critical: the Ninth Army desperately tried to hold its ground as the subordinate corps 
continued to face strong attacks and took heavy casualties. In its war diary, the army 
command nevertheless glorified the struggle of its soldiers as a ‘heroic epic’ and 
expressed its hopes of holding out with reinforcements being on the way. The SS 
Cavalry Brigade was viewed as a ‘strong, cohesive and disciplined combat unit’ in 
this  context,  which  shows  how  desperate  the  army  was  for  support:  it  even 
overlooked the fact that the brigade was still lacking combat experience and about to 
be deployed in a new role – as an infantry unit.691 Just like at Bialystok, it now acted 
as a stopgap in the defensive front of the Ninth Army, but this time the Germans 
found themselves in a completely different situation.  Instead of pushing forward, 
they were fighting for survival in a battle that was so fierce that Adolf Hitler himself 
forbade the Ninth Army to take a step backwards.692 The Soviets, on the other hand, 
launched  another  major  offensive  on  4  January,  1942,  and  attempted  to  encircle 
Army Group Centre by taking Rzhev in the north, advancing towards the Minsk – 
Moscow  road,  and  combining  this  with  another  pincer  that  was  penetrating  the 
German lines from the south.693 The Red Army managed to almost completely cut off 
the  German  Ninth  and Third  Army as  well  as  the  Fourth  Tank Army;  the  most 
important  positions  and  supply  routes  could  only  be  defended  by  means  of 
counterattacks  led  by  armoured  forces  and  hastily  assembled  troops  from other 
691 AOK 9, Kriegstagebuch Ia Nr. 3, entries from 25 December, 27 December and 28 December, 1941, 
pp. 170-171, pp. 175-178, and pp. 179-181.
692 AOK 9, Kriegstagebuch Ia Nr. 4, 1.1. 1942 – 31.3. 1942, entry from 2 January, 1942, in: BArchF, 
RH 20-9/47, p. 7.
693 Die Winterschlacht von Rshew, AOK 9, in: BArchF, RH 20-9/66, p. 1.
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sectors of the front.694
  In the attempt to close off the breaches in the German front, the forces of the SS 
cavalry were split up: instead of integrating the entire unit into the frontline near 
Selizharovo,  the two horse regiments  were sent  to  the east  in  forced marches  to 
attack Red Army forces that  were to encircle Rzhev,  whereas the reconnaissance 
battalion was sent to Peno northwest of Rzhev. There, it  was to defend against a 
Soviet thrust from the north which had driven a wedge between the left wing of the 
Ninth Army and its northern neighbour. In the course of the following three weeks, 
heavy fighting ensued with Rzhev as the focal point: two Soviet armies continued 
their advance into the rear of the 6th corps, which held the town and the surrounding 
area. Soon, the German occupants of this sector were surrounded on three sides, with 
only  a  narrow corridor  being  open  to  the  south.  The  two  SS  cavalry regiments 
attempted to close the gap west of Rzhev by means of a relief attack but encountered 
a strong enemy who was well dug in. As individual cavalry squadrons took losses of 
60%, the attack was aborted and the Germans took up defensive positions, in which 
one squadron was partly annihilated in the days that followed.695
  In order to ease the dangerous situation, a simultaneous German attack from the 
east and west was carried out on 21 January, as a result of which large Red Army 
forces were cut off from their supply lines two days later. Soldiers on both sides were 
forced to fight under the conditions of exceptionally grim winter weather with snow 
flurries and temperatures at 45 degrees below zero. On the German side, a lack of 
supplies and heavy weapons made counterattacks extremely costly and difficult, a 
situation that applied to both Wehrmacht soldiers and SS cavalrymen. Together with 
694 Kondratjew, Die Schlacht von Rshew, p. 11.
695 Die Winterschlacht  von Rshew, AOK 9, pp. 1-2;  Kriegstagebuch Ia  Nr.  4,  entries from 5 – 8 
January, 1942, pp. 16-25; Bericht über den Einsatz der SS-Kav.Brigade im Winter 1941/42, pp. 2-4 
and p. 9-14; Tagesmeldung vom 9.1. 1942, SS Cavalry Brigade, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS 3, 
file 2.
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the 206th infantry division of the 23rd corps, the SS cavalrymen had fought their way 
through the rear of the Soviet 29th and 39th armies west of Rzhev and joined other 
German forces advancing from there so that the enemy was caught in a pocket.696
 The crisis, however, was not over yet: the enemy tried to re-establish his connection 
with the rear, from where other Soviet forces also attempted to get through to their 
comrades. From 4 February, the Germans closed in on the Soviet 29th and 39th armies 
west of Rzhev, having to defend themselves against enemy relief attempts. These 
were  carried  out  by  waves  of  infantry  and  supported  by  tanks,  artillery,  and 
aeroplanes. As the Red Army threw forward its men in an almost suicidal manner, 
the  success  of  the  German operation  remained uncertain  until  the  middle  of  the 
month. Step by step, the counteroffensive of Wehrmacht and SS gained ground and 
enemy groups west of Rzhev were destroyed. The SS Cavalry Brigade retook several 
strategic positions; for his personal bravery and leadership skills displayed in this 
operation, Hermann Fegelein was later awarded the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross, 
the highest German military decoration of the Second World War. The fighting on 
both sides of the pocket ended with the almost complete annihilation of the Soviet 
forces in this sector on 20 February; on their side alone, 26,647 men lost their lives 
and 4,833 were taken prisoner.697
  This episode is just one example for the intensity of the fighting in the Rzhev 
region,  which  escalated  over  the  course  of  several  months.  This  also  becomes 
evident from the image of the Soviets in the German sources: before the beginning 
of the counteroffensive which ended operation Typhoon, the Wehrmacht had tended 
696 Die Winterschlacht von Rshew, AOK 9, p. 4; AOK 9,  Kriegstagebuch Ia Nr. 4, entry from 20 
January,  1942,  p.  59;  Michaelis,  Kavallerie-Divisionen,  p.  27;  Bericht  über  den  Einsatz  der  SS-
Kav.Brigade im Winter 1941/42, p. 16.
697 Die Winterschlacht von Rshew, AOK 9, pp. 5-11; AOK 9, Kriegstagebuch Ia Nr. 4, entries from 5 – 
20  February,  pp.  96-133;  Michaelis,  Kavallerie-Divisionen,  pp.  27-28.  Hermann  Fegelein  was 
awarded the Knight’s Cross on 2 March, 1942; see Vorschlag für die Verleihung des Ritterkreuzes des 
Eisernen  Kreuzes  (undated),  in  BArchB,  SSO  Hermann  Fegelein,  and  Dienstlaufbahn  Hermann 
Fegelein,  Abschrift  einer  Auflistung  von  Auszeichnungen  und  Teilnahmen  an  Kampfhandlungen 
Fegeleins (undated), ibid., fiche 713.
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to underestimate the enemy, who was viewed as being badly led and having severe 
problems in coordinating his forces. The morale of Red Army men, according to the 
intelligence section of the German 23rd corps, was low and discipline could only be 
upheld by terror.  Despite acknowledging the achievements of individual soldiers, 
who were well-trained and skilled, the judgement was rather negative.698 During the 
ensuing operations, this attitude changed as the Soviets regained ground. This was 
often achieved by sending in masses of soldiers, a strategy which brought many of 
their own units to the verge of collapse. According to a report from the 253rd division 
of the Wehrmacht (to which the bicycle battalion of the SS cavalry was subordinate), 
a Soviet division attacking the German lines in its sector suffered such a high death 
toll that one of its three infantry regiments had to be disbanded after one day of 
fighting.699 Also,  second-rate  units  had  to  carry  out  frontal  assaults  on  fortified 
German  positions  as  well,  which  proves  that  the  Red  Army  used  all  available 
personnel to force the enemy back.700 On the whole, however, the Soviets fought 
very determinedly and made good use of their tanks, artillery, and air force, a fact 
that was even admitted by Gustav Lombard.701 Despite the fact that anti-Bolshevist 
ideology underpinned statements from Wehrmacht and SS units, the combat value of 
Soviet  soldiers  was  now  regarded  more  favourably,  especially  in  defence 
situations.702 The men of the Red Army continued to withstand their enemy in further 
698 Feindnachrichtenblatt vom 3.11. 1941, Generalkommando XXIII. A.K. Abt. Ic, in: BArchF, RH 24-
23/61, pp. 9-10.
699 The number of casualties of the Soviet division was given as 1,280 dead in one day; see Bericht 
über den Verlauf der Kampfhandlungen der 253. I.D. vom 9. - 22.1. 1942 und die Ursachen des dabei 
entstandenen Verlusts an Waffen und Gerät, in: BArchF, RH 24-23/68, p. 10. According to Erickson, 
The road to Stalingrad,  p. 501, a Soviet  rifle division had an average strength of 11,907 men in 
December, 1941, and consisted of three rifle regiments with an average strength of 2,957 men each. 
Losses of 1,280 dead would mean a casualty rate of 43% for one regiment, or almost 11% for the 
entire  division.  To this  percentage  added  possibly a  great  number  of  wounded,  about  whom the 
German document contains no information.
700 One division in the Rzhev area reported that badly trained older men from construction battalions 
had to attack German bunkers,  which was unsuccessful  and led to extremely high casualties;  see 
Gefechtsbericht über den russischen Angriff am 29.11. 1941 vom 29.11. 1941, 206th infantry division, 
in: BArchF, RH 26-206/17, pp. 338-340.
701 Bericht über den Einsatz der SS-Kav.Brigade im Winter 1941/42, p. 10.
702 Erfahrungsbericht [des XXIII. AK] im Winterfeldzug 1941/42 vom 18.6. 1942, in: BArchF, RH 24-
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costly battles in this region, which they named ‘the mincer of Rzhev’. To this day, 
their  total  number  of  casualties  is  not  known;  a  more  recent  Russian  source, 
however,  admits  that  Soviet  soldiers  were  driven  forward  regardless  of  the 
consequences, which is the main reason for their extremely high losses.703
  The SS cavalry experienced both success and failure during the winter battle: whilst 
the  two horse  regiments  were  involved  in  a  successful  counterattack,  Fegelein’s 
soldiers were defeated on another front at the same time. A Soviet thrust from the 
north led to the collapse of the German front in the sector between Toropets and 
Rzhev,  where  the  bicycle  reconnaissance  detachment  was  based.  Strong  enemy 
reinforcements and a likely direction of attack had been identified earlier but the left 
flank of the Ninth Army was too weak to withstand, despite the efforts to patch up 
the frontline with SS forces. From 9 January, the positions of the battalion at Peno 
came under attack from three sides. Despite carrying out daring counterattacks, the 
RAA was encircled; parts of the unit managed to escape but were almost completely 
wiped out during the breakout and retreat that followed. The battalion had basically 
ceased to exist after just three days of heavy fighting; the remainder of its squadrons 
reached Toropets on 17 January. Three days later, the town and its important supply 
depots fell into the hands of the Red Army after German forces desperately trying to 
hold it had suffered devastating losses.704 On 21 January, the SS Cavalry Brigade also 
lost  the  village  of  Basary  near  Toropets  after  heavy  fighting,  during  which  all 
inmates of a camp for Soviet prisoners of war were killed as the SS soldiers used 
23/77, p. 17.
703 Kondratjew, Die Schlacht von Rshew, pp. 19-37. Kondratjew estimates that between late 1941 and 
early 1943 1,109,143 Soviet soldiers died in operations in the Rzhev – Vyazma region; see ibid., p. 
32. German losses for the same time are placed at 300,000 – 450,000 soldiers, a number which is also 
still open to debate; ibid., p. 36.
704 Bericht über den Einsatz der SS-Kav.Brigade im Winter 1941/42, pp. 3-7; Bericht über die R.A.A. 
der SS-Kav.Brig. während der Unterstellungszeit unter 253. I.D., 253rd infantry division, 24 January, 
1942, in: BArchF, RH 24-23/68, pp. 22-25; Michaelis,  Kavallerie-Divisionen, p. 28; radio message 
from SS Cavalry Brigade to Kommandostab RF-SS, 12 January, VUA, Kommandostab RFSS 3, file 
2; Tagesmeldung, SS Cavalry Brigade, 12 January, 1942, ibid. The Germans lost 723 lorries and forty 
food dumps at Toropez, along with huge amounts of weapons and ammunition; see Erickson,  The 
road to Stalingrad, pp. 304-305.
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them as human shields.705
  From the records of the SS cavalry and the diary of Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski 
it becomes clear that staff and logistics of the unit had been destroyed or dispersed 
almost  completely as  they had  been  forced  to  a  chaotic  retreat  and  were  left  in 
disarray. At Toropets, the commander’s squadron lost contact with the subunits in the 
field during the Soviet attack which ultimately led the brigade staff and the supply 
sections to evacuate the town. A scattered group of officers finally reported to  von 
dem Bach-Zelewski, who noted on 24 January: ‘Staff incapacitated as all is lost’.706 
The situation at the front was so unstable that the survivors from Toropets had to be 
pulled back all the way to Vitebsk, where they were reassembled under Fegelein’s 
command. Communications for the brigade were handled by the staff of the HSSPF 
Mitte for the time being whereas supplies for the units still fighting at the front were 
provided by the 23rd corps.707 In addition to the organisational chaos, almost half of 
the horses, all motor and horse-drawn vehicles as well as a great deal of valuable 
equipment had become irrecoverably lost when the Soviets overran the brigade’s rear 
positions.  As the  horse  and reconnaissance  squadrons  were  fighting  at  the  front, 
these were manned by stablehands, soldiers of the baggage trains and some guard 
troops. For them, it had proved impossible to organise the defence of the supply 
bases against Soviet infantry and tanks.708
705 Cüppers, Wegbereiter, p. 234; Bericht über den Einsatz der SS-Kav.Brigade im Winter 1941/42, pp. 
7-8.
706 Tagebuch des Chefs der Bandenkampfverbände, entry from 24 January, 1942, p. 33.
707 Tagebuch des Chefs der Bandenkampfverbände, entries from 24 and 25 January, 1942, pp. 33-34; 
radio  message  from HSSUPF Russland  Mitte  to  Kdo.-Stab  RF-SS,  23  January,  1942,  in:  VUA, 
Kommandostab  RFSS  3,  file  2;  Lagebericht,  SS  Cavalry  Brigade,  24  January,  1942,  ibid.; 
Lagemeldung, SS Cavalry Brigade, 31 January, 1942, ibid.; Michaelis, Kavallerie-Divisionen, p. 28. 
The survivors of the anti-tank squadron of the RAA had been pulled back to Vitebsk, too; they came 
under the command of the 1st mountain division at Dobrina near Vitebsk; ibid. Two weeks after the 
loss of the town, Fegelein stated in a report that the events regarding the quartermaster squadron (a 
staff unit responsible for logistics that had defended Toropez until the last moment) were ‘irrelevant 
for the deployment of the brigade at the moment’; see radio message from SS Cavalry Brigade to 
Kdo.-Stab RF-SS, 2 February,  1942, in VUA, Kommandostab RFSS 3, file 3. Apparently,  the SS 
cavalry could rely on other units for supplies after losing some of its own staff units.
708 Bericht über den Einsatz der SS-Kav.Brigade im Winter 1941/42, pp. 2-3 and pp. 7-8.
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  At the end of February, 1942, the situation of the SS Cavalry Brigade was similar to 
that  of  many other  German  formations  on  the  eastern  front.  The  attackers  were 
confronted with a generally well-prepared enemy who not only outnumbered them 
but was also more able to adapt to the winter conditions. The Soviets dominated the 
timing and location of combat operations, whereas the Germans often struggled to 
react. In the sector of the Ninth Army alone, there had been no coherent frontline 
between Velikie Luki and Rzhev for some time during the months of January and 
February, 1942. The divisions of this formation had had to retreat some 70 miles and 
were badly damaged as many vehicles, tanks and other heavy weapons had been lost. 
What outweighed losses of equipment, though, were the casualties, especially in the 
infantry divisions. This was also true for SS and police units in this sector, such as 
the  infantry  regiment  Der  Führer of  the  division  Das Reich (which  was  almost 
completely annihilated) and Reserve Police Battalion 11, which had been fighting at 
Toropets as well.709
  As far as the SS cavalry was concerned, losses had been tremendous: of the soldiers 
of the bicycle reconnaissance detachment, 75% had been killed, wounded or been 
affected by frostbite only two weeks after the beginning of their assignment; when 
the rest of the battalion arrived in the rear after the evacuation of Toropets a month 
later, it only numbered 11 men. By that time, the entire brigade had lost 870 of the 
about 1,800 combat troops who had been dispatched to the front in late December, 
and at least 50 men of the depot personnel at Toropets and Basary.710 Nevertheless, 
709 AOK 9, Kriegstagebuch Ia Nr. 4, entry from 1 February, pp. 84-88; Die Winterschlacht von Rshew, 
AOK  9,  p.  11.  For  Soviet  winter  equipment,  see  Tagesmeldung,  11  January,  1942,  in  VUA, 
Kommandostab RFSS 3, file 2; according to this report, Soviet prisoners were equipped with furs and 
padded  jackets  as  well  as  snowshirts  for  camouflage.  Casualties  in  some  German  units  were 
extremely high: The regiment Der Führer had only 35 out of formerly 2,000 men left after a month of 
heavy fighting  near  Rzhev;  see  Höhne,  The Order  of  the  Death’s  Head,  p.  466.  Reserve  Police 
Battalion 11 took casualties at Toropez, lost most of its equipment and vehicles and was no longer 
operational as the majority of the men were sick; see Tagebuch des Chefs der Bandenkampfverbände, 
entry from 24 January, 1942, p. 33.
710 Michaelis,  Kavallerie-Divisionen, p. 28;  Bericht über den Einsatz der SS-Kav.Brigade im Winter 
1941/42, pp. 6-7;  radio message from SS Cavalry Brigade to  Kommandostab RF-SS,  12 January, 
VUA, Kommandostab RFSS 3, file 2. The RAA had lost more than 500 men since late December but 
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the SS cavalry soldiers stood their ground: their superiors, von dem Bach-Zelewski 
and Fegelein, closely followed the continuing combat and noted successes as well as 
a  seemingly unbroken spirit,  especially in  the  attacks  on encircled  Soviet  troops 
southwest of Rzhev.711 The grave defeat at Toropets was referred to as having caused 
losses of men and material but not seriously affected the morale of the soldiers: in a 
message to the  Kommandostab, Fegelein even claimed that they were fighting ‘in 
high spirits’.712 This was another rather flamboyant statement given that the soldiers 
under his command still had to put up with very grim conditions. Moreover, the SS 
Cavalry Brigade as such was only able to remain operational after Toropets because 
other agencies and units took over important tasks for them, especially in the field of 
logistics.
  Four main reasons for the high number of casualties can be identified: firstly, the 
intensity of the fighting – the SS Cavalry Brigade was deployed at the focus of the 
battle in which the Red Army intended to destroy Army Group Centre. Secondly, the 
extremely  cold  winter  weather,  for  which  the  SS  cavalrymen  were  inadequately 
prepared.  The  third  reason  is  the  lack  of  troops  on  the  German  side  which 
necessitated the participation of all available forces in heavy fighting for a time of 
several months, even if they – like the SS cavalry – were only meant to support 
particular  units  at  the front for a  limited time.713 Moreover,  for several  weeks in 
January,  1942, the  Wehrmacht was not  allowed to withdraw troops in the Rzhev 
some 160 – 180 non-commissioned officers and men, who had been only lightly wounded or were 
suffering from frostbite, were viewed as being able to return to the unit soon; see ibid., p. 18. For the 
losses of the entire brigade, see Bericht über den Einsatz der SS-Kav.Brigade im Winter 1941/42, p. 
17. The numbers given here for the brigade represent men who were killed, wounded, or missing in 
action.
711 In his daily report, the HSSPF Mitte noted on 30 January, 1942: ‘SS Cavalry Brigade continues to 
fight successfully on two fronts west of Rshew’; see radio message from HSSPF Mitte to  Kdo.-Stab 
RF-SS, 30 January, 1942, in VUA, Kommandostab RFSS 3, file 2. Six days later, he attributed the 
taking of an important village to the ‘outstanding fighting spirit of the men’; see radio message from 
HSSPF Mitte to RF-SS and Kdo.-Stab RF-SS, 6 February, 1942, ibid.
712 Lagemeldung, SS Cavalry Brigade, 31 January, 1942, in VUA, Kommandostab RFSS 3, file 2.
713 For the original intention of the mission, see  Bericht  über den Einsatz der SS-Kav.Brigade im 
Winter 1941/42, p. 3.
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sector without Hitler’s permission; when he finally consented to a straightening of 
the frontline, the soldiers of army and  Waffen-SS had already paid a high price.714 
Another cause for concern, which was viewed as having flawed the performance of 
the unit and caused further casualties, was the fragmentation of the mounted subunits 
and the bicycle reconnaissance detachment in different sectors together with various 
Wehrmacht units. According to the leadership of the brigade, this greatly complicated 
the supply situation and made a concerted deployment impossible.715 
  A characteristic both of the ferocity of combat and of the fighting spirit of the 
brigade is the high number of officer casualties. Subalterns in the SS cavalry tended 
to fight from the front and often exposed themselves in dangerous positions, which 
led to injuries and death. This is illustrated by a report Gustav Lombard compiled for 
the chief of staff of the SS-Führungshauptamt, SS-Gruppenführer Hans Jüttner. The 
document contains the example of a counterattack that was carried out at Peno by a 
squadron of the RAA on 9 January, 1942:
SS-O[ber]stu[rm]f[ührer]  Koppenwallner  attacks  the  enemy,  leading  an 
outnumbered, random troop with a ‘Sieg Heil’ on the Führer. After one hour 
of fighting, the enemy yields. At 9.15 pm, the breach is in the hands of the 
RAA  again.  SS-O[ber]stu[rm]f[ührer]  Koppenwallner  died  during  this 
[incident]. All other officers were badly wounded. In a call to the commander 
of the RAA, the divisional  commander  expressed his  appreciation for  the 
defence against a far greater enemy force.716
714 For the strict order to hold out, see AOK 9, Kriegstagebuch Ia Nr. 4, 1.1. 1942 – 31.3. 1942, entry 
from  2  January,  1942,  in:  BArchF,  RH  20-9/47,  p.  7,  and  Tagebuch  des  Chefs  der 
Bandenkampfverbände, entry from 22 January, 1942, p. 31. For the cancellation of that order, see 
ibid.
715 Bericht über den Einsatz der SS-Kav.Brigade im Winter 1941/42, pp. 19-20.
716 Ibid., p. 5.
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Although this account is written in typical Nazi terms and aims at glorifying what 
was viewed to be an example of heroic fighting against a vicious enemy, it can be 
assumed that it typifies a development that was very dangerous for the SS cavalry, as 
officer  losses  continued to  be high  throughout  the  entire  combat  mission  on  the 
eastern front. The unit could always fall back on its system of recruit depots and 
training facilities and also profited from official recruitment drives of the Waffen-SS 
in order to replace non-commissioned officers and men, but it was hard to replace 
experienced leaders, especially on platoon and squadron level.717
  In the winter of 1941 – 1942, the SS Cavalry Brigade found itself in a situation that 
predominantly required military skills of the soldiers. But instead of focusing on the 
military situation, the SS cavalrymen still very often directed their violence against 
those who could not or no longer defend themselves. There were no large Jewish 
communities in the operational area, but both regular and irregular enemy fighters 
had to  be  dealt  with.  The degree of  brutality that  was  displayed now cannot  be 
compared to earlier events in Belorussia as in this new phase different groups were 
treated  with  excessive  brutality  both  during  periods  of  occupational  duty and in 
combat, which the unit only had experienced on a very limited scale before. Apart 
from partisans, who generally could not expect mercy, two groups are of particular 
importance: the local population who got caught up in the conflict and had to suffer 
the consequences, and enemy soldiers. Whereas killings of civilians had been largely 
limited  to  Jews  in  Belorussia  (with  the  exception  of  the  unit’s  excesses  after 
suffering the first casualties at Turov), even friendly and helpful local inhabitants 
now became targets. 
  As far as their attitude towards the civilian population is concerned, it is remarkable 
717 Tagebuch des Chefs der Bandenkampfverbände, entry from 12 January, 1942, p. 28; according to 
this source, all squadrons of the brigade had lost platoon leaders already after about two weeks of 
fighting. According to the records of the SS-Führungshauptamt, 7 officers had been killed and 9 were 
wounded until the beginning of February; see Zusammenfassender Bericht der Tagesmeldungen der 
SS-Divisionen vom 9.2. 1942, in: BArchB, NS 19/1520, fiche 30-34.
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that members of the SS Cavalry Brigade seemed to be under the impression that they 
could do whatever they pleased with the locals, who at first were generally viewed as 
potentially hostile. Unlike in Belorussia, where the ethnic origin of the inhabitants 
facilitated collaboration in many cases, the SS cavalry was now based on Russian 
soil,  where  ethnic  tensions  or  revenge  for  Stalin’s  ruthless  policies  was  of  less 
importance. Nevertheless, many citizens of the Rzhev area tended to cooperate with 
the  Germans  and gave  them information  on the  underground movement.718 This, 
however,  did  not  lead  to  a  more  humane treatment:  the  locals,  who were  to  be 
deterred from joining the partisan movement, became victims of reprisals and were 
used  as  forced labourers  to  erect  bases  and fortifications  for  the  Germans.719 SS 
cavalrymen even committed crimes against them in situations when they should have 
been preparing to defend themselves against Soviet attacks: with little resources or 
reinforcements available to them, they were fighting with their backs to the wall. 
From a Soviet source, one such act of violence has been reconstructed. At Ksty, a 
small  village,  the  inhabitants  (only  old  people,  women,  and  children)  were 
assembled  in  a  field,  where  many children  were  killed  before  the  eyes  of  their 
mothers. One soldier killed a two-year-old boy by smashing his head against a post; 
after this, he shot his two sisters who were six and seven years old. About 70 women 
718 The commander of the rear areas of Army Group Centre had expected resistance from a population 
that had lived in a Communist society for decades. He was surprised to find that the locals were 
actually ‘pro-German’ for the most part.  See Bericht des ehemaligen Berück / Ic (1954), Reise mit 
General Wlassow zum Heeresgebiet Mitte, in: Institut für Zeitgeschichte Munich, ZS 417, quoted in 
Hasenclever,  Wehrmacht  und  Besatzungspolitik,  pp.  208. However,  traditional  stereotypes  of 
‘primitive’ Russians who had to be treated in a way that was ‘hard but fair’ prevailed and contained to 
shape his policy.  See Kom. Gen. d. S. Tr. u. Bef. i. H. G. Mitte v. 25.12. 42, Erfahrungen in der 
Verwaltung des Landes und politische Zielsetzung, in: BArchF, RH 22/235, quoted ibid.
719 Tagesbefehl Nr. 4/42 vom 28.1. 1942, in: BArchF, RS 4/441, p. 21. According to this source, the 
population of occupied villages was to be used ‘ruthlessly’ for the construction of defensive positions. 
This behaviour, like the use of violence against suspects during questionings and the shootings of 
villagers,  was  absolutely  contradictory  to  the  aims  which  had  been  formulated  by  general  von 
Schenckendorff  after  the  ‘anti-partisan  course’  of  Army  Group  Centre  in  September.  In  a 
memorandum  he  wrote  after  the  seminar,  the  general  focused  on  the  treatment  of  the  civilian 
population and identified three central aspects: finding and destroying partisan helpers, winning the 
trust of the local population, and gaining their support in partisan warfare.  See ‘Der Partisan, seine 
Organisation und seine Bekämpfung’, Berück Mitte / Ia Nr. 1001/41 g.v. 12.10. 41, in: BArchF, RH 
22/225, quoted in Hasenclever, Wehrmacht und Besatzungspolitik, pp. 364-365.
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and elderly people were locked in barns which were then set on fire. This incident 
happened just before the Soviet offensive which aimed at Peno.720
  In combat, too, soldiers of the SS Cavalry Brigade often displayed great brutality, 
which sometimes was a mutual reaction. Like their comrades in the Wehrmacht, they 
perceived the Soviet way of fighting as treacherous as it included extensive use of 
snipers, partisans, surprise fire, and raids. Although this was in accordance with the 
Hague  Convention,  it  was  considered  illegitimate.  The  Germans  viewed  such 
methods as ‘underhand fighting’ because they were not used to an enemy who often 
fought to the last and employed all available means including self-sacrifice. Also, 
Wehrmacht and SS units were often forced to fight in difficult terrain such as dense 
forests,  which  was new to  them.721 In  addition to  unusual  combat  situations,  the 
Soviets used stratagems which violated international law: the  Wehrmacht observed 
Red Army men who continued to fight after feigning wounds, death, or pretending to 
surrender. In some cases, the rights of negotiators were abused for the preparation of 
attacks.722 During intense combat operations,  German soldiers sometimes reacted to 
these Soviet tactics by not taking prisoners.723 
  Both in the army and the SS cavalry, losses had incurred as Red Army men had 
720 Soviet Government Statements on Nazi Atrocities (London, 1946), p. 45. Ksty is situated next to 
Peno; in this source no information is given about the nature of the killing, i.e. if it was a reprisal or  
not.  The  German unit  responsible  for  this  crime cannot  be  clearly  identified  as  the  source  only 
mentions that it was an SS formation; from the time and location of the crime, it can be assumed that 
it was the bicycle battalion of the SS Cavalry Brigade.
721Hartmann,  Wehrmacht  im  Ostkrieg,  pp.  534-540;  Abschlussmeldung  der  SS-Kav.Brigade  über 
Befriedung der Prypec-Sümpfe, 18 September, 1941, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 24, file 3; 
Tagesbefehl vom 24.1. 1942. An die Führer, Unterführer und Männer / SS-Kav.Rgt. 1, Reit. Battr., 
Flak-Battr., 1st SS Cavalry Regiment, in: BArchF, RS 4/441, p. 24.
722Hartmann, Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg, pp. 540-542.
723 Hartmann,  Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg, pp. 517-519; see also Hannes Heer,  Vom Verschwinden der  
Täter: der Vernichtungskrieg fand statt, aber keiner war dabei (Berlin 2004), pp. 116-118. Extreme 
brutality in combat was experienced by many German soldiers from the first days of the campaign 
against the Soviet Union. Heer cites the example of Siegfried Knappe, a young officer of the 87 th 
infantry division, alongside which the 1st SS Cavalry Regiment was deployed in the Bialystok region. 
In his memoirs, Knappe described how his unit was suddenly attacked from behind after capturing 
Soviet positions near the  German-Soviet line of demarcation. As a result, no prisoners were taken 
anymore during this  encounter.  See Siegfried Knappe and Ted Brushaw,  Soldat.  Reflections  of  a  
German soldier, 1936 – 1949 (New York, 1992), p. 193, quoted in Heer, Vom Verschwinden der Täter, 
p. 117.
234
opened fire from a very short distance, literally at the very last moment before the 
Germans could break into their positions. The SS cavalry adapted to this by using the 
same method and even  going  further:  Gustav  Lombard  swore  his  soldiers  to  be 
constantly on guard and to let Soviet soldiers come within twenty to thirty metres of 
their  positions.  SS men then  were  to  ‘harvest’,  that  is,  to  annihilate  the  enemy; 
Lombard  even  promised  a  special  leave  of  three  days  to  soldiers  who  reported 
having killed Red Army men ‘the Russian way’.724
  Even  when  Soviet  soldiers  had  been  taken  captive,  they  were  not  safe  from 
atrocities. After a combat operation in March, 1942, Hermann Fegelein suggested 
one of his soldiers to shoot a prisoner and take his felt boots. When questioned after 
the war, the man said that he did not take this advice but many of his comrades 
obtained  boots  that  way.725 Apart  from  individual  incidents,  SS  cavalrymen 
committed excesses beyond the already brutal conduct of the army as well. A prime 
example for this was the use of prisoners of war as ‘human shields’ at a camp near 
Basary, which demonstrated a complete disregard for human life. Whereas outright 
killings of captured Red Army soldiers and their inhumane treatment in camps were 
sanctioned by the leadership of the German army, their abuse during the defence of a 
camp against enemy troops was a situation which was not covered by the orders 
given out to occupation troops.726
724 Tagesbefehl vom 24.1. 1942. An die Führer, Unterführer und Männer / SS-Kav.Rgt. 1, Reit. Battr., 
Flak-Battr., 1st SS Cavalry Regiment, in: BArchF, RS 4/441, p. 24.
725 Vernehmung Daniel Teske vom 4.10. 1962 in BArchL, B 162/5542, p. j41. In the extremely grim 
winter of 1941 – 1942, this was common practice in the Wehrmacht as well. The army high command 
issued  an  order  that  was  based  on  a  directive  from Hitler,  who  had  ordered  to  'ruthlessly strip 
prisoners and locals of [their] winter clothing'. See  See OKW / WFSt / Abt. L/I, Fernschreiben an 
OKH / Op.Abt. vom 21.12. 1941, quoted in Hartmann, Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg, p. 520. Hartmann has 
proven the implementation of this order by the 4th armoured division and the 45th infantry division of 
the  Wehrmacht; see ibid.  For the 253rd infantry division of the  Wehrmacht, similar cases have been 
documented, including the killing of Soviet prisoners who had just before been robbed of all their 
winter clothing. See Rass,‘Menschenmaterial’, pp. 337-338.
726 See for example Bestimmungen über das Kriegsgefangenenwesen im Fall Barbarossa vom 16.6. 
1941,  quoted  in  Ueberschär  and  Wette,  ‘Unternehmen  Barbarossa’,  p.  261,  and  Verschärfte 
Anordnung  des  OKW  zur  Behandlung  sowjetischer  Kriegsgefangener  in  allen 
Kriegsgefangenenlagern  vom  8.9.  1941  mit  dem  Merkblatt  für  die  Bewachung  sowjetischer 
Kriegsgefangener als Anlage, ibid., pp. 297-300.
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  To a  certain  extent,  the  behaviour  of  the  SS cavalry in  combat  resembled  the 
brutality displayed by the Wehrmacht as similar atrocities have been documented for 
army divisions as well. Omer Bartov has argued that these crimes were committed 
for reasons such as the issuing of criminal orders, the brutality of the fighting itself, 
the  susceptibility  of  younger  officers  and  many men  for  Nazi  ideology,  and  the 
indoctrination  of  the  troops.727 Unlike  in  the  regular  forces,  however,  in  the  SS 
Cavalry  Brigade  a  process  of  radicalisation  and  acts  of  violence  did  not 
predominantly occur on a local level in the course of an escalation of combat, as the 
result of orders from fanatical junior officers. The officer corps of the SS cavalry was 
driven by Nazi ideology on all levels, as was indicated by the leadership of Hermann 
Fegelein,  Gustav Lombard,  and squadron as well  as platoon leaders.  Under their 
command,  the  unit  committed  numerous  atrocities,  a  development  which  began 
several months before the brigade was sent to the front for the first time. It can be 
stated  that  this  constituted  a  habituation  to  mass  violence  in  the  form  of  an 
institutional brutalisation. The level of brutality the unit  had reached before even 
entering  combat  is  reflected  by the  extremely  high  numbers  of  people  who fell 
victim to the SS Cavalry Brigade in Belorussia and Russia during the summer and 
autumn  of  1941:  the  destruction  of  Jews  and  the  terror  against  the  non-Jewish 
majority of the civilian population, cynically termed ‘partisan warfare’, claimed tens 
of  thousands  of  civilian  victims.  This  was  followed  by  a  mutual  escalation  of 
behaviour in combat from late December onwards, with some aspects (such as the 
offer of special leave for the shooting of Soviet soldiers at close range) resembling 
earlier conduct in Belorussia. Although the SS cavalrymen showed extreme violence 
both in combat as well as behind the front, their ideologically motivated missions are 
of  greater  importance  for  their  conditioning.  Thus,  an  increase  in  brutality  was 
727 Bartov, German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare, p. 106.
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brought about in a different way than has been described by Bartov. 
  Even though it had taken heavy blows during the winter, the SS Cavalry Brigade 
remained operational and continued to fight in the Rzhev sector during the following 
months.  Its  readiness  for  combat,  however,  continued  to  decline  as  casualties 
mounted and battle fatigue set in after the end of the Soviet winter offensive. The 
exhausted men had to fight against enemy stragglers and to withstand further heavy 
Soviet attacks. Fegelein saw his forces dwindle: after the fall of Toropets (at which 
point the brigade had lost more than 900 men or almost one fourth of its strength 
already), he began to recommend a pull-out and replenishment of the brigade from 
mid-February onwards, but to no avail. In late March and early April, 1942, staff 
officers of the SS cavalry had several consultations with the commander of the 23rd 
corps  and  the  supreme  commander  of  Army  Group  Centre.  As  the  Wehrmacht 
approved of the brigade commander’s plan, he again asked Heinrich Himmler for the 
unit to be relieved. At this point,  the SS Cavalry Brigade had sustained losses of 
2,220 men, or half its strength. On 1 April, 1942, its ‘trench strength’ amounted to 
only  421  soldiers,  a  number  which  could  only  be  maintained  by  ‘combing’ the 
supply units of the brigade and by leaving candidates for NCO and officer training 
courses in the frontline.728 Casualty rates of the SS cavalry had been nearly twice as 
high as in the 23rd corps in terms of soldiers who had been wounded or killed: of its 
average strength of 58,000 soldiers (or three infantry divisions), the army unit lost 
728 For Fegelein’s requests in February, 1942, see radio message from the SS Cavalry Brigade to the 
SS-Führungshauptamt  of  17  February,  1942,  in:  VUA,  Kommandostab  RFSS  3,  file  3.  For  the 
consultations,  see  radio  message  from Gustav  Lombard  to  Reichsführer-SS,  31  March,  1942,  in: 
BArchB, NS 19/3487, fiche 35-36; radio message from Gustav Lombard to Hermann Fegelein, 27 
March, 1942, ibid., fiche 40; radio message from SS Cavalry Brigade to SS-O[ber]stu[rm]f[ührer] 
Becher, 3 April, 1942, ibid., fiche 41; Michaelis, Kavallerie-Divisionen, p. 28. For the ‘combing’ of 
the supply units and the ‘trench strength’ of 21 March, 1942 (369 men), see radio message from SS 
Cavalry Brigade to Kav[allerie]Ers[atz]Abt[eilung], 21 March, 1942, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS 
3,  file  3;  for  the  deployment  of  NCO  and  officer  candidates,  see  radio  message  from  SS-
Sturmbannführer Lombard to Sta[ndarten]f[ührer] Fegelein, Warschau, 3 April, 1942, in: BArchB, NS 
19/3487, fiche 40. The SS-Führungshauptamt gave the strength of the SS Cavalry Brigade as 1,816 
men in total as of 20 March, 1942. Until then, 1,358 men had been killed, wounded or gone missing, 
1,648 were sick and 786 replacements had arrived; see BArchB, NS 19/1520, Aufstellung der Stärken 
und Verluste der SS-Divisonen vom 24.3. 1942, pp. 46-47.
237
9,931 men,  or  about  17% of  its  strength,  whereas  the  losses  of  the  SS Cavalry 
Brigade  amounted  to  1,267  men  or  almost  29%  of  its  former  force  of  4,428 
soldiers.729
  Whereas  Gustav Lombard had summed up the situation in  a  short  and precise 
manner, Hermann Fegelein’s assessment was more detailed and even less favourable. 
In  a  letter  to  the  chief  of  staff  of  the  SS-Führungshauptamt,  SS-Gruppenführer 
Jüttner,  he  expressed  his  fear  of  a  complete  breakdown of  his  weary men,  who 
thought that they were being sacrificed in order to hold the front. Most of their heavy 
weapons had been lost and many of the horses were in a very bad state as well. A 
withdrawal of the entire brigade or at least of those subunits that were no longer 
combat-ready  was  now  seen  as  the  only  feasible  option.  Fegelein  also  noted: 
‘Squadron commanders need pills and drugs on a daily basis just to encourage the 
lethargic men to get up in  the morning’.730 Presumably,  the SS cavalrymen were 
administered Pervitin, a methamphetamine which was used in the German military 
to push exhausted soldiers beyond their normal limits and to eliminate their need for 
sleep, especially in critical situations.731
  Fegelein’s report was the complete opposite of the rather positive assessment of 
December, 1941, before the SS cavalrymen were sent to the frontline. By now, he 
had fully understood the grim reality of combat against the Red Army. He did not 
have to face it anymore himself though: after winning the Knight’s Cross in March, 
1942, he went on a furlough and from 1 May, he began his new job as inspector for 
729 Verluste, Ausfälle und Beute im 7. bis 10. Vierwochenabschnitt des Osteinsatzes vom 21.12. 41 – 
20.4. 42, XXIII. AK, in: BArchF, RS 24-23/68, pp. 69-70; Aufstellung der Stärken und Verluste der 
SS-Divisonen vom 24.3. 1942, BArchB, NS 19/1520, pp. 46-47.
730 Letter to the chief of staff [of the SS-Führungshauptamt], SS-Gruppenführer Jüttner, 2 April, 1942, 
in: BArchB, NS 19/1520, fiche 37-39.
731 In the German armed forces, this drug was given out to revive exhausted soldiers; in one case, a 
group of  500 German soldiers  who had been  encircled  by the  Red Army in January,  1942,  was 
administered  Pervitin.  The  men,  thus  stimulated,  managed  to  break  out  of  the  encirclement;  see 
Jonathan  Lewy,  ‘The Drug Policy of  the Third  Reich’,  Social  History  of  Alcohol  and  Drugs  22 
(Spring 2008), pp. 147-149.
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mounted  troops  in  the  SS-Führungshauptamt at  Berlin.732 In  his  place,  SS-
Sturmbannführer August Zehender took command of the remaining men of the SS 
Cavalry Brigade, who now formed a battalion-strength unit named  ‘Kampfgruppe 
Zehender’.  It  comprised  four  squadrons  and  the  remnants  of  the  brigade’s  anti-
aircraft, artillery, and signals subunits and fought near Rzhev until June, 1942.733 The 
calls to fully withdraw the SS cavalrymen from the eastern front had not been heard, 
presumably because  they were  simply indispensable.  The  cooperation  with army 
units continued, but in April  the SS forces were so weakened that they could no 
longer remain at the front the entire time: they were relieved for short periods of 
guard duty and then returned to their old positions again.734 Heinrich Himmler finally 
seemed to have taken up a suggestion made by Gustav Lombard two months earlier: 
he now forbade the fragmentation of SS units under Wehrmacht command; they were 
only to  be  allocated  to  corps,  not  to  divisions.735 In  the  case  of  the  SS Cavalry 
Brigade, this did not make a difference anymore as so few soldiers were left that they 
could hardly be subordinated to different army units anyway.
  Throughout the fighting in the Toropets – Rzhev area, the SS Cavalry Brigade was 
praised for bravery and momentum in combat operations, both from the Ninth Army 
and some of its subordinate formations. One divisional commander also expressed 
his  gratitude  for  helping  out  at  a  critical  point;  another  Wehrmacht general 
recognised the ‘heroic conduct’ of the RAA which had just been overrun by Soviet 
troops.736 As these citations refer to particular incidents which match the records of 
732 Riess, ‘Fegelein’, p. 167.
733 Michaelis,  Kavallerie-Divisionen,  pp.  28-29.  Zehender’s  exact  appointment  date  could  not  be 
obtained from the Kommandostab files but according to a radio message from the SS Cavalry Brigade 
to the  SS-Führungshauptamt  of 17 February, 1942, the adjustment of Zehender to his new job was 
requested; see Kommandostab RFSS 3, file 3.
734 For the mutual relief of  Wehrmacht and SS units at the front, see the Tagesmeldung of the SS 
Cavalry Brigade from 23, 25, and 26 March, 1942, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS 3, file 4.
735 Message  of  Reichsführer-SS to  Oberstgruppenführer  Daluege  [and]  Gruppenführer  Jüttner,  27 
April, 1942, in: BArchB, NS 19/3514, fiche 90-96; see fiche 91-92 for this passage.
736 The SS Cavalry Brigade was included in the commendation for the Ninth Army and subordinate 
troops awarded by the army commander on 5 February; the war diary entry of that day mentions its 
‘dashing advance’ and subsequent taking of the village of Tchertolino; see AOK 9, Kriegstagebuch Ia 
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the brigade, it can safely be assumed that they were based on true appreciation and 
did not just spring from the fantasy of their officers. Also, the SS cavalry repeatedly 
attacked or held out against the enemy even despite hopeless odds and played an 
important role in the successful counterattack which led to the destruction of two 
Soviet armies west of Rzhev. Hermann Fegelein, always keen on acknowledgement 
from higher agencies and boastful about the success of his unit, did not hesitate to 
publicise these statements: in the letter to Jüttner from 2 April, 1942 he wrote, ‘both 
the commanding general of the 23rd army corps, general Schubert, and the supreme 
commander of the Ninth Army, colonel general Model, are well aware of the value of 
the remaining parts [of the SS Cavalry Brigade] in combat today’. He even quoted 
Model as having called the brigade ‘the bomb of the Ninth Army’.737 In doing so, he 
intended to capitalise on these commendations in order to improve the standing of 
his unit and to convince his superiors to save what was left of it. It is also notable 
that Fegelein wrote directly to Jüttner and asked him to show the letter to Himmler 
as well, if necessary. Thus, he made sure of reaching his two greatest benefactors in 
the SS.
  Fighting skills and bravery of the SS cavalrymen were also reflected in the medals 
that were awarded to them. The records of the unit contain information on two cases 
of  high  decorations  which  required  either  one  particular  act  of  bravery  or  even 
repeated  outstanding  valour:  the  recommendation  of  Hermann  Fegelein  for  the 
Nr. 4, entry from 5 February, pp. 96-97. This operation helped to close in on enemy troops southwest 
of Rshew; see  Die Winterschlacht von Rshew, AOK 9, p. 7. Eight days later, the army commander 
specifically commended the SS cavalry for the capture of Ersovo, a hard-fought Soviet base; see AOK 
9, Kriegstagebuch Ia Nr. 4, entry from 13 February, pp. 120. On 26 January, the commander of the 
206th infantry division expressed his gratitude for providing cover for the divisional supply base at 
Olenino and flank cover for the division at the front; see Michaelis, Kavallerie-Divisionen, p. 27. The 
RAA was  first  commended  for  its  ‘bold  work’ in  reconnaissance  missions  from  Peno  by  the 
commander of the 253rd infantry division; see Tagesmeldung, SS Cavalry Brigade, 2 January, 1942, 
in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 3, file 2. Ten days later, he expressed ‘highest appreciation and 
praise for  heroic conduct’;  see radio message from SS Cavalry Brigade to Kdo.-Stab RF-SS,  12 
January, 1942, ibid.
737 Letter to the chief of staff [of the SS-Führungshauptamt], SS-Gruppenführer Jüttner, 2 April, 1942, 
in: BArchB, NS 19/1520, fiche 37-38.
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Knight’s  Cross  of  the  Iron  Cross  and  that  of  SS-Hauptsturmführer Hermann 
Gadischke, commander of the fourth squadron of the 1st Regiment, for the German 
Cross  in  Gold.  The  brigade  commander  was  attributed  with  a  high  level  of 
decisiveness and credited with having led his men personally at the focal point of the 
battle. According to the commander of the 23rd army corps, general Schubert, who 
filed the official suggestion, Fegelein’s initiative played a key role in the destruction 
of enemy forces southwest  of Rzhev.738 Gadischke’s  recommendation,  which had 
been made by Fegelein, lists seven different combat operations between January and 
April, 1942, in which the squadron commander displayed bravery, toughness, and 
skill in assaults as well as in defending fixed positions.739 But not only officers of the 
SS cavalry received medals: the rank and file were also rewarded for their conduct in 
the winter battle. As in previous missions, the brigade commander and his direct 
superior,  the  Higher  SS  and  police  leader  Centre,  attentively  noted  this  in  their 
reports. During the months of January and February, 17 Iron Crosses First Class and 
159 Iron Cross Second Class as well as 60 War Merit Crosses Second Class with 
Swords were awarded. The high number indicates the intensity of the fighting as the 
bulk of them were given to the men just after combat operations west of Rzhev had 
ceased.740
  Decorations, however, were not only a sign of brave conduct for the SS cavalry; 
they could also become a matter of politics within the military leadership. In a letter 
738 Vorschlag für die Verleihung des Ritterkreuzes des Eisernen Kreuzes (undated), in: BArchB, SSO 
Hermann Fegelein.
739 Vorschlag für die Verleihung des Deutschen Kreuzes in Gold an Hermann Gadischke vom 19.4. 
1942, in: BArchB, SSO Hermann Gadischke. This recommendation is one of the few documents in 
Gadischke’s file, which does not state whether he received the decoration or not. It is possible that the 
application got rejected because military agencies did not believe Fegelein’s colourful depictions of 
Gadischke’s valour: this happened when Hermann Fegelein recommended his brother Waldemar (who 
commanded the first squadron of the 1st Regiment) for the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross.  See 
Personalakte von Fegelein, Waldemar 9.1. 12, in: BArchB, SSO Hermann Fegelein.
740 Tagesmeldung, HSSUPF Russ[land] Mitte, 30 January, 1942, in: VUA, Kommandostab RFSS, box 
3, file 2; radio message, SS Cavalry Brigade to Kommandostab RF-SS, 25 February, 1942, VUA, 
Kommandostab RFSS, box 3, file 3; radio message, SS Cavalry Brigade to Kommandostab RF-SS, 28 
February, 1942, ibid.
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to  Lombard  and Gesele,  his  deputy commanders  in  the  field,  Hermann Fegelein 
wrote on 7 April, 1942 that ‘the Reichsführer had complained that we did not file for 
enough high decorations’, such as Knight’s Crosses or German Crosses in Gold.741 
The context of the document was a negotiation about the future status of the brigade, 
which Fegelein had carried out with Himmler and Jüttner. There was a conflict of 
interests between the SS and the army about the recognition of the SS cavalry as a 
fully-fledged military force  with  the  possibility  of  its  enlargement  to  a  division. 
Apparently the head of the SS believed that more medals for his men would improve 
his standing with Hitler and convince the Wehrmacht of the quality of his soldiers, an 
intention which was to be supported in particular by awarding a Knight’s Cross to a 
private or an NCO.742 Fegelein made no secret of the fact that this idea suited him, 
another proof of his well-known eagerness for more prestige.
  When their comrades were still braving the Red Army, the rebuilding of the SS 
cavalry began in  the General  Government.  From April,  1942, the reconnaissance 
detachment was recreated.743 What  Himmler had in mind now was an even greater 
project:  the  forming  of  an  SS cavalry  division,  a  large  new formation  that  was 
modelled on the 1st cavalry division of the  Wehrmacht. To the existing two horse 
regiments, a third one was added; the artillery component was to be extended not 
only  to  battalion  but  to  regimental  strength.  The  implementation  of  these  far-
reaching plans, however,  was delayed by the situation on the front.  ‘Kampfgruppe 
Zehender’ had to face new enemy offensives and was also deployed in anti-partisan 
operations  so that  the  rest  of  the  former brigade did not  arrive  at  its  designated 
location, the SS training area at Debica near Tarnow, before 21 June, 1942. Only 
some  500  men  had  come  back  from  Rzhev;  their  new  commander,  who  was 
741 Letter from Hermann Fegelein to [Gustav] Lombard and [Karl] Gesele, 7 April, 1942, in: StAW, 
62 Nds. Fb.2, Nr. 1310, p. 79.
742 Ibid., pp. 79-80.
743 Michaelis, Kavallerie-Divisionen, p. 28.
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responsible for the replenishment of the unit,  was a highly decorated soldier and 
skilled organiser, SS-Brigadeführer Wilhelm Bittrich.744 
  When assessing the overall performance of the SS Cavalry Brigade in the winter 
battle  of 1941 – 1942,  it  can be stated that  the unit  had now become a combat 
formation, even if this development had not been intended. The cavalry soldiers had 
shown both skilful use of military tactics through fast mobile operations and bravery 
that  was  bordering  on self-sacrifice,  in  offensive as  well  as  defensive situations; 
nevertheless,  the  unit  only  narrowly  escaped  total  annihilation.  This  was  made 
possible by close cooperation with the Wehrmacht, ruthlessness and perseverance in 
combat,  personal bravery and sometimes very skilled leadership as well  as sheer 
luck. But analysing the institutional-level conduct of the brigade as a combat unit has 
to go beyond external circumstances and the view propagated in official documents. 
How did this particular frame of reference influence them and how did they fulfil 
their combat mission despite a lack of experience, the extremely grim conditions of 
the Russian winter,  and grave defeats  at  Peno and Toropets? Jean-Luc Leleu has 
identified five factors which made up the combat value of Waffen-SS units: loyalty to 
Hitler, loyalty to the fatherland, the personality of the commander, recompense such 
as  decorations,  and  fear  of  captivity.745 These  reasons  can  help  to  explain  the 
motivation of the SS Cavalry Brigade as well: in numerous orders and speeches, the 
men were sworn to loyalty by their superiors, who invoked the importance of their 
mission; Hermann Fegelein had the reputation of being an inspiring personality and 
exceptional  leader;  and as  the commendations from the  Wehrmacht and the high 
744 Message  of  Reichsführer-SS to  Oberstgruppenführer  Daluege  [and]  Gruppenführer  Jüttner,  27 
April,  1942, in:  BArchB,  NS 19/3514,  fiche 94;  Horst  Mühleisen,  ‘Wilhelm Bittrich.  Ritterlicher 
Gegner und Rebell’, in R. Smelser, and E. Syring (eds.),  Die SS – Elite unter dem Totenkopf. 30 
Lebensläufe (Paderborn,  Munich,  Vienna,  Zurich  2000),  p.  79;  Kriegstagebuch  Nr.  1  der  8.  SS-
KavDiv Florian Geyer, in: BArchF, RS 3-8/56, p. 4. The new SS cavalry division would not reach the 
strength of an army cavalry division as it was missing the fourth cavalry regiment; for the structure of 
the 1st Cavalry Division, see Gliederung der 1. KavDiv vom 1.4. 1941, in: BArchF, RH 29-1/4.
745 Leleu, La Waffen-SS, pp. 504-505.
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number  of  decorations  show,  the  soldiers  must  have  proven  themselves  in  the 
fighting. A fear of falling into the hands of the enemy is indicated by statements from 
veterans: in some cases, captured SS cavalrymen were mutilated by partisans.746 
  From this combination of factors and the acknowledgement he received from his 
army colleagues,  Hermann Fegelein  managed to  create  a  myth.  The  SS Cavalry 
Brigade’s previous lack of military ability and his own deficiencies as a leader were 
soon forgotten, and he continued to become one of the most celebrated war heroes of 
the  Waffen-SS.  Having  survived the fighting  at  Toropets,  it  was  this  and not  the 
inception of the Holocaust in Belorussia a few months earlier that defined the unit’s 
new  role:  it  was  now  viewed  as  one  of  the  best  German  formations  for 
‘Bandenbekämpfung’, a euphemism for the fight against partisans. In a new shape 
and  under  a  new  name,  SS  –  Kavallerie-Division,  it  was  soon  to  enter  combat 
again.747
The SS Cavalry Brigade in the operational history of the  Waffen-SS  
  During the period under observation in this work, the military branch of Himmler’s 
organisation was still a comparatively small force of about 110,000 men, whilst in 
the later stages of the war between 900,000 and 1,000,000 men served in it (of whom 
some 400,000 had been recruited all over Europe, including ethnic Germans).748 In 
746 See for example the ‘founding document’ of the SS Cavalry Brigade, Brigadebefehl vom 1.8. 1941, 
in:  BArchF, RS 3-8/20; see also Tagesbefehl Nr. 15 vom 29.10. 1941, 1st SS Cavalry Regiment, in: 
BArchF, RS 4/441, p. 69. For the fear of partisans, see  Vernehmung von Richard Gloth vom 14.8. 
1962, in: BArchL, B 162/5542, p. i4.
747 The unit was renamed again twice later in the war: when the divisions of the Waffen-SS received 
numbers in October, 1943, it became the 8th SS Cavalry Division; on 12 March, 1944, it was also 
given the title Florian Geyer. See Cüppers, Wegbereiter, p. 306.
748 This number refers to field units only as of 22 June, 1941. See  Stein,  The Waffen SS, p. 120; 
Aufstellung der Stärken und Verluste der SS-Divisonen vom 24.3. 1942, in:  BArchB,  NS 19/1520; 
Rohrkamp, ‘Weltanschaulich gefestigte Kämpfer’, p. 14.
244
1941 and 1942, however, it only consisted of a core of five full infantry divisions, 
with two others being in the process of formation. Units of the Waffen-SS took part in 
most German campaigns of the first phase of the Second World War; they did not, 
however, operate as independent forces but fought under the operational command 
of the OKH. It was not until later in the war that the SS divisions were given more 
freedom, for example in the attack on Kharkov in early 1943 and Operation Citadel 
later that year: in both cases, an entire SS armoured corps led the German attack in a 
particular sector of the front.749 In order to assess the role of the SS Cavalry Brigade, 
the earlier approach is of greater importance: in many different operations between 
1939 and 1942, SS regiments, combat groups of up to brigade size, or individual 
divisions were deployed alongside the Wehrmacht. 
  Only two of the first five divisions of the  Waffen-SS originated from the prewar 
Verfügungstruppe and  had  thus  undergone  military  training  before  1939:  the  1st 
division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (LSSAH) and the 2nd division  Das Reich.750 
The 3rd SS division Totenkopf had been recruited from the concentration camp guard 
units;  before  its  first  military  mission  in  the  spring  of  1940,  the  unit  had  gone 
through a process of overcoming difficulties regarding equipment and training which 
was further complicated by the fact that combat-readiness had to be achieved within 
six months.751 The fourth and fifth divisions had different unit histories as they had 
their roots in other organisations and ethnicities: the  Polizei-Division consisted of 
men from the  order  police,  whereas  the  Wiking division  was made up  of  ethnic 
Germans and volunteers from other European countries such as Holland, Belgium or 
the Scandinavian countries.  From campaign to campaign,  the  Waffen-SS played a 
749 Sydnor, Soldiers of Destruction, p. 277-291. On the role of the SS armoured corps at Kharkov and 
Kursk, see also Enrico Syring, ‘Paul Hausser. ‘Türöffner’ und Kommandeur ‘seiner’ Waffen-SS’, in in 
R. Smelser and E. Syring (eds.),  Die SS – Elite unter dem Totenkopf. 30 Lebensläufe (Paderborn, 
Munich, Vienna, Zurich 2000), pp. 198-199.
750 Rohrkamp, ‘Weltanschaulich gefestigte Kämpfer’, pp. 233-244 and p. 290.
751 Sydnor, Soldiers of Destruction, pp. 43-46 and pp. 64-85.
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more important part: in Poland, only formations of up to regimental size had fought, 
whereas against France two divisions and a reinforced regiment could be sent into 
battle. After the beginning of operation Barbarossa, all SS divisions and two combat 
groups were sent to the front against the Red Army (the last of them being the SS 
Cavalry Brigade in late 1941).752  It is notable that the first divisions of the Waffen-SS 
and the SS Cavalry Brigade were either predominantly or even exclusively deployed 
in the eastern theatre of war and fighting against the Red Army during the period 
under observation. Despite the fact that some of the units had already taken part in 
the campaigns against Poland and France, the fighting for most of their soldiers was 
characterised by an ideological concept of the enemy that focused on annihilation of 
any opposition (or groups declared hostile) rather than a restriction of violence to 
combat situations.
  In  some  cases,  the  involvement  of  SS  troops  in  combat  was  premature: 
Kampfgruppe Nord, a unit newly compiled from SS regiments in Norway and the 
predecessor of the later 6th SS mountain division  Nord,  took heavy losses on the 
Finnish front. What happened to the Kampfgruppe foreshadowed the fate of the SS 
Cavalry  Brigade;  even  Himmler  admitted  that  the  unit  had  entered  its  mission 
lacking appropriate training and equipment.753 But even the units which already had 
acquired some combat experience still  had to  learn how to fight against  the Red 
Army,  such  as  the  2nd division Das Reich:  although its  men had  received  better 
training than the SS cavalrymen they, too, took very high losses.754 The high casualty 
rate  during  the  first  winter  in  the  Soviet  Union  necessitated  a  thorough 
reorganisation, which applied to the Totenkopf division and the SS Cavalry Brigade 
752 Höhne, The Order of the Death’s Head, p. 456 and p. 459; Stein, The Waffen SS, pp. 33-34, p. 56 
and pp. 120-121.
753 Der  Reichsführer-SS  zu  den  Führern  der  Ersatzmannschaften  für  die  Kampfgruppe  Nord  am 
Sonntag, dem 13. Juli 1941, in Stettin, in: BArchB, NS 19/4008, pp. 36-38.
754 See for example the above mentioned casualties of the regiment  Der Führer, which was almost 
completely wiped out. See also Rohrkamp, ‘Weltanschaulich gefestigte Kämpfer’, pp. 450-451.
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in  particular:  of  the  17,265  men  with  which  Totenkopf had  started  the  Russian 
campaign,  only  about  6,700  were  left  after  heavy  fighting  during  the  German 
advance  through  the  Baltic  states  in  the  summer  of  1941 and in  the  Demyansk 
pocket during the following winter.755 Fegelein’s unit only had 50% of its original 
strength left in the spring of 1942. Other units like Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler and 
Das Reich had paid a high price as well but received preferential treatment regarding 
the allocation of recruits and new equipment. From late 1941 onwards, the original 
divisions of the  Waffen-SS were considered elite by the  Wehrmacht as well as the 
enemy and had the status of ‘fire brigades’ of the eastern front, which were sent into 
particularly dangerous missions.756 
  Unlike  the  core  divisions  of  the  Waffen-SS,  which  clearly  were  destined  for 
frontline  service,  the  cavalrymen  were  part  of  the  forces  of  the  Kommandostab 
Reichsführer-SS,  Himmler’s  private  army.  Thus,  they  had  not  received  sufficient 
military training and were supposed to carry out ideological tasks, first and foremost 
mass killings of Jews, which were to ‘harden’ them for later combat. As the conflict 
with the Wehrmacht over the subordination of Kommandostab troops in the first days 
of  Barbarossa shows,  Himmler  was  anxious  not  to  lose control  over  his  men,  a 
position he was forced to give up due to the circumstances only a few months later. 
This was only temporary though; like their comrades in the 1st and 2nd SS Infantry 
Brigade,  Fegelein’s soldiers retained a special  role and were mainly used for the 
fight  against  partisans and further  killings  of Jews after  the end of  their  combat 
mission.757 Of the five core divisions of the  Waffen-SS,  the  Totenkopf division in 
particular offers possibilities of comparison with the SS Cavalry Brigade: it, too, was 
755 Sydnor, Soldiers of Destruction, p. 222 and 229.
756 Höhne, The Order of the Death’s Head, p. 466-467.
757 Cüppers, Wegbereiter, pp. 351-352. The two infantry brigades were incorporated into other Waffen-
SS divisions in 1943 and began to form the core of several new units. At the end of the war, their 
former  personnel  served  in  the  16th SS  Panzergrenadierdivision  Reichsführer-SS,  the  18th SS 
Panzergrenadierdivision Horst Wessel, and several other infantry divisions which for the most part 
consisted of Latvian, Estonian, and Dutch SS volunteers; ibid., pp. 305-309.
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a ‘hybrid’ as it assumed a military character after having served in a different role; it 
was involved in mass violence as its soldiers had guarded the concentration camps at 
Dachau, Buchenwald, and Sachsenhausen and committed massacres when deployed 
as occupation troops in Poland; also, it was headed by a charismatic leader who did 
not possess comprehensive military experience.758 The SS Cavalry Brigade, however, 
differed from the Totenkopf division as it  spent far less time at the front: it was not 
thrown into combat straight after its formation and only deployed against the Red 
Army later because no other German forces were available in the Rzhev – Toropets 
sector. 
  The  Totenkopf division did experience ambivalence between an ideological and a 
military role, but not to the same extent as the SS cavalry: from the beginning of 
Barbarossa, the sole purpose of this formation was combat. Although they had taken 
part in mass shootings of Jews in Poland as well, the men under Theodor Eicke’s 
command did not become involved in the Holocaust in the Soviet Union on a scale 
comparable to the key role played by their comrades in  the SS cavalry. However, 
there were some important intersections with the Nazi extermination policy:  men 
from a special  Waffen-SS battalion which had been part of  Einsatzgruppe A were 
later transferred to the Totenkopf division; many high-ranking SS officials who had 
committed  terrible  atrocities  served  in  the  unit  for  some time,  such  as  Friedrich 
Jeckeln (responsible for the massacre of Babi Yar as Higher SS and Police Leader 
South); and throughout the war, there was a constant flow of personnel between the 
concentration camps and Totenkopf’s frontline units.759
  Three characteristics were shared by the original armed SS formations and the SS 
Cavalry Brigade: initiative and boldness which sometimes led to great success in 
758 On Theodor Eicke, the commander of the Totenkopf division, see also Charles W. Sydnor, ‘Theodor 
Eicke – Organisator der Konzentrationslager’, in R. Smelser and E. Syring (eds.), Die SS – Elite unter  
dem Totenkopf. 30 Lebensläufe (Paderborn, Munich, Vienna, Zurich 2000), pp. 147-159. 
759 Sydnor, Soldiers of Destruction, pp. 321-331.
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combat, fanaticism and readiness to make sacrifices which were often combined with 
deficiencies in training (at least at the beginning of the war), thus resulting in high 
casualties, and the perpetration of war crimes. An example of the first feature was the 
strategy of the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler during the campaign against the Low 
Countries: the commander, Josef Dietrich, interrupted the advance on Dunkirk and 
went  against  his  orders  to  take  the  Wattenberg  heights,  a  ridge  occupied  by the 
French army. This act was later viewed as ‘intelligent insubordination’ and earned 
him the Knight’s Cross.760 The SS Cavalry Brigade, despite being outnumbered and 
outgunned,  played  an  important  role  in  encircling  Soviet  troops  near  Rzhev,  for 
which Hermann Fegelein received the same decoration. 
  The second trait was very common in the Waffen-SS as well. In his speech to the 
replacement officers for Kampfgruppe Nord, Heinrich Himmler demanded that they 
should prevent their soldiers from panicking and fleeing from the enemy, at gunpoint 
if  necessary.  Casualties,  even  if  they reduced a  unit  to  a  fourth or  a  fifth  of  its 
original  strength,  were  no  reason  to  lose  the  fighting  spirit;  the  speech  of  the 
Reichsführer culminated in the words: ‘Gentlemen, as long as there are 500 men in a 
division these 500 men are capable of attacking’.761 An example of this policy of 
driving men into battle whilst relying more on fanaticism than military skills has 
been given by a captured general of the Wehrmacht who witnessed a reckless attack 
SS soldiers carried out against a village occupied by the Soviets in the winter of 
1941 –  1942.  The  SS commander  even  rejected  the  offer  from an  army unit  to 
provide supporting fire, a tactic which resulted in unnecessary casualties. This not 
only showed the negative consequences of the toughness ideal of the SS, but it also 
indicates that SS officers lacked training on cooperation with other branches of the 
760 Clark, ‘Josef ‘Sepp’ Dietrich’, p. 125.
761 Der  Reichsführer-SS  zu  den  Führern  der  Ersatzmannschaften  für  die  Kampfgruppe  Nord  am 
Sonntag, dem 13. Juli 1941, in Stettin, in: BArchB, NS 19/4008, pp. 36-38; see also Neitzel and 
Welzer, Soldaten, pp. 370-371.
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German forces like the artillery which impeded the participation of their units in the 
battle of combined weapons.762 
  In the SS cavalry, many shortcomings in infantry tactics were noticed even before 
the  combat  operations  near  Rzhev  where  the  men  had  to  attack  strong  enemy 
positions;  this  led to entire squadrons being wiped out.  Only together with more 
experienced  army formations  and  as  part  of  a  larger  offensive,  the  SS  Cavalry 
Brigade  was ultimately successful.  Instances  of  unbroken spirit  even  in  hopeless 
situations  have  been  documented  for  the  brigade  as  well,  such  as  the  above 
mentioned counterattack of a squadron of the bicycle battalion which led to the death 
of  the  commanding officer  and only momentary relief  of  the  unit.  In  a  letter  to 
Himmler, Hermann Fegelein also described how a corporal of the 2nd Regiment, who 
had received a headshot in battle near Rzhev, ‘first reported his being wounded, then 
his death’, which the commander viewed as the ultimate proof of obedience.763 It is 
at least doubtful if this incident ever happened but it can be assumed that Fegelein 
knew  very  well  that  anecdotes  like  this  one  would  have  the  desired  effect  on 
somebody who valued personal sacrifice as much as Himmler did.
  When compared with the  Wehrmacht,  Waffen-SS units also stood out in another 
field:  from  a  very  early  stage,  they  committed  war  crimes.  In  the  case  of  the 
Leibstandarte and Totenkopf divisions, this already happened in France in 1940: both 
Dietrich’s and Eicke’s men brutally massacred British and French prisoners of war. 
Totenkopf soldiers  often  did  not  even  take  prisoners  when  their  opponents  were 
762 Neitzel and Welzer, Soldaten, pp. 368-369. The tapping protocol quoted here does not specify the 
SS unit involved in this attack but from the context (the general stated that the SS men had been part 
of a ‘security division’ in the hinterland before they were sent to the front) it appears possible that 
they belonged to the 1st or 2nd SS Infantry Brigade or the SS Cavalry Brigade. The recklessness of 
Waffen-SS officers in battle has also been described for the division Das Reich: as Enrico Syring has 
stated, ‘even a general as experienced as Hausser was not always able to control the overeagerness of 
the subordinate, less well-qualified younger commanders, so that his divison also suffered dispropor-
tionate casualties’. See Syring, ‘Hausser’, p. 195.
763 Birthday greeting from Hermann Fegelein to Heinrich Himmler, 5 October, 1943, in: BArchB, 
SSO Hermann Fegelein.
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Africans  from the  French  colonies,  who  were  viewed  as  being  racially  inferior. 
Eicke’s division committed the highest number of war crimes of all German units 
during  this  campaign.764 Regarding  the  SS Cavalry Brigade,  Martin  Cüppers  has 
already pointed out that Soviet prisoners of war were presumably shot straightaway 
in  many  cases.765 Combat  missions  in  which  hundreds  of  enemy  troops  were 
involved,  such  as  Turov,  often  brought  hardly  any  prisoners,  which  supports 
Cüppers’s theory. Also, Fegelein’s men committed an absolutely heinous war crime 
by using captured Red Army soldiers as human shields at Basary. 
  Another  key  issue  of  the  operational  history  of  the  Waffen-SS is  the  often 
exceptional role of the unit commanders. The new armed forces created by Heinrich 
Himmler only had very few high-ranking officers who had undergone a traditional 
military education, such as Paul Hausser and Felix Steiner.766 Thus, the initiative and 
energy of commanding officers often had to compensate for their lack of experience. 
In the case of the SS Cavalry Brigade, the commander’s personality was of prime 
importance,  a trait the unit had in common with  Totenkopf and  Leibstandarte SS 
Adolf Hitler: Hermann Fegelein was the founder of the mounted forces in the SS, 
whereas  Theodor  Eicke  first  formed  guard  units  and  then  an  infantry  division 
according to his own ideas; Josef Dietrich on the other hand can be considered one 
of the founding fathers of the Waffen-SS.767 All three men made a meteoric career in 
the Nazi state and received the highest military decorations; also, they had enjoyed 
considerable freedom in combination with backing from Hitler and Himmler when 
764 Clark, ‘Josef ‘Sepp’ Dietrich’, p. 127; Sydnor, Soldiers of Destruction, pp. 106-108 and pp. 116-
117; Stein, The Waffen SS, pp. 76-78; Raffael Scheck, ‘‘They Are Just Savages’: German Massacres of 
Black Soldiers from the French Army in 1940’, Journal of Modern History 77 (2005), pp. 325–344; 
Neitzel and Welzer, Soldaten, p. 377.
765 Cüppers, Wegbereiter, pp. 215-219.
766 Mark P. Gingerich, ‘Felix Steiner. Himmlers ‘ausgesprochenes Lieblingskind’’, in R. Smelser and 
E. Syring (eds.),  Die SS – Elite unter dem Totenkopf. 30 Lebensläufe (Paderborn, Munich, Vienna, 
Zurich 2000), p. 431; see also Syring, ‘Hausser’, pp. 190-193.
767 On Josef Dietrich, see also Weingartner, ‘Sepp Dietrich, Heinrich Himmler, and the Leibstandarte 
SS Adolf Hitler’, pp. 264-284. See also Westemeier, Peiper, p. 11.
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they formed their units, a situation other SS commanders could only dream of, let 
alone  their  counterparts  in  the  Wehrmacht.  Eicke  and  Dietrich,  however,  were 
significantly older than Fegelein and belonged to the generation that had fought in 
the First World War. Thus, the commander of the SS cavalry can be better compared 
to younger SS officers such as Joachim Peiper. Both men were personal favourites of 
Heinrich Himmler and became ideal heroes of wartime propaganda (with Fegelein 
already having achieved huge success as a sportsman before 1939). Like Eicke and 
Dietrich, they were missing a formal military education and staff training and were 
put in charge of large armed formations, which was beyond their capacities. As a 
result, both the SS Cavalry Brigade and subunits of the Leibstandarte under Peiper’s 
command suffered high casualties.768 
  Despite their different unit history, the first divisions of the Waffen-SS and the SS 
Cavalry Brigade  became more  professional  in  the  course of  their  deployment  in 
combat;  this  applied  to  the  formations  as  a  whole  as  well  as  to  their  various 
components and different hierarchy levels. The main difference between units like 
Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler,  Das Reich, or Totenkopf on the one hand and the SS 
Cavalry Brigade on the other was the clear definition of a military role for the former 
(in the case of Totenkopf from mid-1941 onwards), and the assumption of ‘dual role’ 
for  the  latter  due  to  the  circumstances.  As  far  as  the  adaption  to  combat  was 
concerned, this process proceeded much faster for Fegelein’s soldiers: they were not 
part of a carefully drawn-up battle order but were thrown forward as a stopgap in an 
emergency.  Thus,  success  and  failure  went  hand  in  hand,  as  is  shown  by  the 
participation in the encirclement operations near Rzhev and the annihilation of the 
bicycle battalion at Peno. Its special role in the Holocaust separated the SS Cavalry 
Brigade  from  other  Waffen-SS units;  in  combat,  however,  the  behaviour  of  the 
768 Westemeier,  Peiper,  pp.  236-237;  see  also personnel  file  of  Joachim Peiper,  BA Berlin,  SSO 
Joachim Peiper.
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cavalrymen  was  not  different:  both  the  fanaticism  and  the  exceptional  brutality, 
features that were more distinct in the SS than in the Wehrmacht, characterised all SS 
military formations in 1941 – 1942. None of these units, however, could be classified 
as  elite  at  this  time:  their  sometimes  very  impressive  merits  in  combat  did  not 
outweigh the fact that most of them had to be replenished and restructured to a great 
extent  after  their  first  war winter  in the Soviet  Union,  as  many of their  original 
primary groups (which had made success possible) had been lost.
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Conclusion 
  The  story of  the  SS Cavalry Brigade  in  1941 –  1942 is  not  only part  of  the 
operational history of the Waffen-SS or the criminal history of the SS as a whole. It is 
also an attempt to look at the unit from the perspective of the participants. With its 
‘dual  role’,  it  became the  link  between the prewar  SS and the  Waffen-SS of  the 
second half of the Second World War, which not only encompassed highly skilled 
military formations but also the personnel of the concentration camps.  As it  was 
involved in the destruction of the Soviet Jews and the fight against the Red Army on 
the eastern front, the brigade combined the characteristics of institutions as different 
from each other as the  Totenkopf infantry division and the  Einsatzgruppen of the 
security  police  and  the  security  service. Even  more  than  other  paramilitary  and 
military forces of the Third Reich, the mounted SS and later the SS Cavalry Brigade 
underwent  not  only  a  rapid  but  also  a  very  complex  development.  In  the  time 
between  1939  and  1942,  the  composition  and  the  tasks  of  the  units  under  the 
command of Hermann Fegelein changed drastically, a process which has only been 
partially analysed so far. 
  The prewar period shows two aspects  which were very important  for the later 
development of the unit: its foundation on the basis of personal connections, namely 
the  relationship  between  Hermann  Fegelein  and  Heinrich  Himmler,  and  the 
dominance  of  equestrianism  over  political  functions.  The  Reiter-SS formed  by 
Fegelein,  an  organisation with unprecedented sporting  success,  was  a  product  of 
Gleichschaltung before 1939;  its  later  role  was  essentially a  product  of  the war. 
Despite  the  fact  that  ideological  aspects  such  as  indoctrination  and  selection  of 
candidates were important during the period from 1933 to 1939, the mounted SS was 
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essentially a parade formation. It nevertheless had multiple conjunctions with organs 
of repression of the Nazi state such as the concentration camps, and at least some of 
its members became entangled in the radical anti-Jewish policy of the regime at an 
early stage by participating in  the riots during the  Reichspogromnacht.  The ‘dual 
role’,  which  was  to  develop  later  on,  was  not  yet  recognisable:  despite  the 
paramilitary character of the Reiterstandarten and isolated attempts of going beyond 
basic infantry drills, they could not be compared to the armed forces the SS was 
building up at  the same time for guarding concentration camps or plain military 
tasks.  In  the  Reiter-SS,  military  training  was  neglected  until  the  Totenkopf-
Reiterstandarten were formed in Poland.
  Once in Poland, the men went beyond just donning a black uniform with lightning 
runes and became ‘ideological soldiers’ by taking a huge step into a new frame of 
reference. In the previous years, individual equestrians rather than the Reiter-SS as a 
whole had participated in the implementation of radical aims of the Nazi state. After 
the beginning of the Second World War, the mounted SS, now in the form of horse 
squadrons  and  later  cavalry  regiments,  committed  acts  of  mass  violence.  The 
cavalrymen, like the members of other German paramilitary units, quickly adapted to 
their new tasks as an executive organ and participated in every step of the escalation 
of radical racial policy in occupied Poland. With only a small fraction of members of 
the prewar units remaining after a turnover of personnel in 1940, a new SS cavalry 
force was formed. Those who were not able or not willing to fit into this process had 
left  voluntarily  or  had  been  discharged.  The  ranks  were  now  filled  with  young 
recruits  and volunteers from other  countries,  who were better  suited for the new 
tasks  and  had  often  been  politically  radicalised  already.  Although  the  military 
training of the SS horsemen was stepped up, it could not be fully completed before 
the beginning of the German campaign against  the Soviet  Union;  as a result,  its 
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shortcomings continued to impede the unit for a long time. For the preparation of the 
brigade’s role in mass killings of Jews in the Soviet Union, the two years in the 
General  Government  proved  to  be  essential:  in  an  environment  where  practical 
experience seemed to align with the racial stereotyping of the Nazi regime, the men 
began to implement a brutal occupation policy.
  Between their time in Poland and the deployment in Belorussia, some of the SS 
horsemen took part in a combat operation following the German attack on the Soviet 
Union. Although this was only a brief mission where the 1st SS Cavalry Regiment 
realised  its  limitations  (especially  in  mobile  warfare)  rather  than  achieving  great 
merits in battle, it was nonetheless pivotal as it marked the starting point of the SS 
cavalry’s  ‘dual  role’.  The  time  between  late  June  and  late  July,  1941  not  only 
changed the history of the SS cavalry regiments, but was also crucial in preparing 
them  for  the  role  they  were  to  assume  in  Belorussia.  The  new  character  was 
established  by two factors:  Hermann Fegelein’s  misconception  of  the  unit  being 
combat-ready (which mostly stemmed from his strong desire to prove himself as a 
leader in battle), and the need for military and paramilitary units that could fill the 
‘security vacuum’ in the vast, newly-occupied territories behind the front, where they 
would  execute  Himmler’s  tasks  of  annihilation.  These  two  aspects  continued  to 
define the missions of the SS Cavalry Brigade until  mid-1942. After the combat 
mission  near  Bialystok,  Heinrich  Himmler  assessed  the  combat  value  of  the  SS 
cavalrymen less favourably than Fegelein and sent them to East Prussia for further 
training, which only could be partially completed in the three weeks the units were 
given for this  task.  The  Reichsführer thought  the brigades of the  Kommandostab 
ready  only  to  carry  out  operations  on  a  smaller  scale,  which  largely  thwarted 
Fegelein’s  efforts  to  continue  fighting  alongside  the  army.  The  mobility,  proven 
ruthlessness  and not  least  their  availability for  further  tasks,  however,  led to  the 
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inclusion of the SS soldiers in the annihilation of Soviet  Jewry;  their  designated 
operational  area  became  the  Pripet  Marshes  in  Belorussia,  where  they  also  had 
encounters  with  regular  troops  of  the  Red  Army.  Their  leadership  at  this  time 
consisted  of  officers  who were  often  not  fully  qualified  as  military  leaders,  but 
strongly motivated by National Socialism and willing to be proactive regardless of 
the nature of their orders. 
  During its mission in Belorussia between late July and mid-September, 1941, the 
SS Cavalry Brigade played a leading role in the destruction of the Jews who lived in 
the Pripet Marshes, an area which had been by-passed by the  Einsatzgruppen and 
police units for the most part due to its inaccessibility. The SS cavalrymen were not 
only  the  first  Germans  who  were  involved  in  such  killings  in  this  part  of  the 
occupied Soviet Union, but they were also radicalised during this time: within a few 
days, they went from shooting only male Jews to becoming the first to annihilate 
entire Jewish communities, including women and children. In so doing, they took an 
important step which ultimately sealed the fate of the Jews in Eastern Europe in early 
August 1941. It is important to note that this escalation also happened much faster in 
the SS cavalry than in the Einsatzgruppen and formations of the order police which 
only executed male Jews during the first weeks of their deployment in the Soviet 
Union.  The  reason  for  this  is  the  institutional  brutalisation  of  the  SS  Cavalry 
Brigade,  which  was  based  on a  level  of  initiative  amongst  the  officers  that  was 
higher than in other killing units: Gustav Lombard was the first SS commander in 
the field who ordered his men to target all Jews they encountered. Moreover, the SS 
cavalrymen also  worked hand in glove with other German institutions such as the 
Higher SS and Police Leader ‘Centre’ and the  Wehrmacht commander of the rear 
areas of Army Group Centre. It has to be noted that although they were operating far 
away  from  the  frontline  in  an  area  without  many  roads  or  German  garrisons, 
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supervision  was  always  possible.  What  began  with  the  initiative  of  SS  cavalry 
commanders  and  officers,  who adjusted  their  orders  to  the  actual  situation,  was 
finalised  by  frequent  visits  of  Erich  von  dem  Bach-Zelewski,  Himmler’s 
representative,  who  relayed  to  them  that  every  single  step  of  the  escalation  of 
violence was approved by their authorities, including the army. Thus, Fegelein’s men 
not only became pacemakers of the Holocaust in Belorussia but found their killing 
methods accepted as a means of ‘cleansing’ an operational area of possible enemies. 
The  cooperation  with  the  military,  which  had  already  been  proven  during  the 
vanguard operation against Red Army divisions on the Brest – Bobruisk highway, 
was again practised during the first real combat operation of the SS cavalry at Turov. 
By the end of August,  1941, the newly-formed SS Cavalry Brigade had become 
exactly  the  instrument  the  Reichsführer intended  it  to  be:  a  force  of  ideological 
soldiers capable of carrying out military tasks on a limited scale. At this point, the SS 
cavalrymen had become used to the  process of killing innocents, despite an initial 
phase of low morale. Although most of them fully understood the criminal nature of 
their task, they did not question it openly and only isolated cases of shirking or even 
refusal have come to light. The majority of the men obeyed their orders and a few 
even showed an inclination to excessive violence, a result that is very similar to that 
which Christopher Browning has observed with the men of Reserve Police Battalion 
101. It can be stated that the SS cavalrymen not only led the way in the murder of the 
Soviet Jews, they also perfected their own killing methods up to the point of putting 
thousands to  death  in  just  a  few days,  and,  ultimately,  tens  of  thousands within 
several weeks.
  Officially, the SS cavalrymen had been tasked with the fight against partisans and 
stragglers  of  the  Red  Army in  the  Pripet  Marshes.  This,  however,  soon became 
secondary  even  though  the  regiments  were  involved  in  minor  anti-Partisan 
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operations and had several encounters with Soviet troops. The actual situation was 
very  different  from the  one  the  soldiers  had  been  told  to  expect.  Instead  of  a 
population that could easily be divided into potentially hostile and friendly groups (a 
distinction  that  was  to  be  made  along  ethnic  lines),  with  the  danger  of  an 
underground  movement  being  ever  present,  they  found  themselves  in  a  largely 
peaceful  environment.  There  were  no  organised  partisans;  the  locals  openly 
collaborated with the soldiers and turned in Jews and communists; and the threat 
from the Red Army was reduced to occasional skirmishes. Despite this, a generally 
very harsh occupation policy was carried out both by the  Wehrmacht and the SS 
from 22 June, 1941. By the end of the year, this was sanctioned by the leadership of 
the German army: in October and November, field marshals von Manstein and von 
Reichenau  gave  out  infamous  orders  on  fighting  against  the  ‘Jewish-Bolshevist 
system’,  which  were  reflecting  back  on  what  was  happening  in  the  field.  In  an 
atmosphere where it was perfectly legitimate to kill Soviet civilians for any reason 
however vague, and where Red Army soldiers behind the frontline often could not 
expect mercy, the soldiers under Fegelein’s command represented the most extreme 
interpretation  of  radical  orders,  even  by  the  standards  of  the  eastern  front.  The 
intensity of the fighting led army agencies to blend information from captured Soviet 
documents with actual incidents in the hinterland, which served as perfect atrocity 
propaganda for German soldiers. In the SS cavalry and the order police, this strategy 
was combined with their tasks of annihilating sections of the population: by singling 
out Jews as ‘helpers of the partisans’ or actual guerrillas, they had found the ideal 
justification for acts of mass violence, including the killing of thousands of innocent 
people. This, rather than partisan warfare, was clearly the main task and real frame 
of reference for the SS cavalrymen. Propaganda falsehoods not only found their way 
into the documentation of the SS Cavalry Brigade: by the end of September, the 
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Wehrmacht had begun to pass off innocent civilians as partisans as well, as is shown 
by the ‘anti-partisan course’ which was hosted by Army Group Centre. It was not 
until  October,  1941,  that  Fegelein’s  soldiers  had  to  confront  a  threat  from  real 
partisans in the Toropets area,  a task which often overstrained the men and their 
means. As a result, the cavalrymen showed even more violence towards civilians, 
both within and outside the context of partisan warfare.
  At the end of the year, the development of the ‘dual role’ of the SS Cavalry Brigade 
was completed as the unit went into its first major combat mission. An enlargement 
of the brigade by additions of special units, which was meant to improve its abilities 
in the field, was heavily promoted by Himmler and Fegelein but could only be partly 
implemented as the military situation deteriorated rapidly. Unlike at the beginning of 
‘Barbarossa’, when Himmler had managed to withdraw Kommandostab troops from 
the subordination under army units after a short time, the Reichsführer had now lost 
the  power  struggle  with  the  Wehrmacht.  Out  of  basic  necessity,  the  SS  Cavalry 
Brigade was thrown forward to hold the German line of defence during the Soviet 
counteroffensive in late December, 1941.  Whereas previous engagements with the 
Red Army at Bialystok and Turov had not necessitated the assignment of the entire 
brigade, both regiments as well as the bicycle reconnaissance detachment had to be 
deployed this time. Moreover, the cavalrymen were sent to the focal points of battle 
and soon had to fight for survival: their engagement between Toropets and Rzhev 
was  marked  by  a  dearly  purchased  victory  in  a  battle  of  encirclement  and  the 
destruction  of  one  of  its  battalions.  Fegelein’s  hubris  and  the  impossibility  of 
withdrawing  the  troops  led  to  unsustainable  losses  of  about  50%  of  the  unit’s 
manpower, which necessitated its complete reconstruction in 1942. The soldiers had 
assumed a new role in the fighting as they had been turned into frontline troops for 
the first time. This instance was a clear case of ‘learning by doing’ as the men still 
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displayed deficits in training and suffered much higher casualties than their more 
experienced army comrades. As far as ideology was concerned, they had nothing left 
to  learn as,  influenced by their  earlier  behaviour,  they gave no quarter,  either  to 
civilians, or to guerrillas, or to Red Army soldiers. Within the operational history of 
the Waffen-SS, the SS Cavalry Brigade is comparable to other formations as it shared 
some of their most important features, such as initiative and fanaticism in combat 
and  the  involvement  in  war  crimes.  Moreover,  it  operated  in  eastern  Europe 
exclusively, which parallels the deployment of the five core divisions of the Waffen-
SS. Its formation was also promoted by the strong personality of the commander. 
This  fact  and its  ‘dual  role’ bear  analogy to  the 3rd SS division  Totenkopf under 
Theodor Eicke in particular. What set the SS cavalry apart from other SS combat 
units was its precursor role in the Holocaust and the fact that it was not originally 
intended for frontline service.
  After the end of the Second World War, the surviving SS cavalrymen tried to find 
their way back into civilian life, often after long periods of captivity in the Soviet 
Union. Many veterans came back to West Germany, where they integrated into a 
society that did not care about what they had done during the war. The authorities did 
not take a great interest in bringing perpetrators to justice. Prosecution in the case of 
the SS Cavalry Brigade was also impeded by the fact that its former commander, 
Hermann Fegelein, was dead. During the night from 28 to 29 April, 1945, he had 
been executed on Hitler’s orders in the garden of the Reich chancellery in Berlin as 
the  Führer had  suspected  him of  treason  and  made  him a  scapegoat,  following 
Himmler’s unsuccessful attempt to make peace with the Western allies. For more 
than  a  decade  after  1945,  the  crimes  of  Himmler’s  horsemen  went  completely 
unpunished, and former SS soldiers,  amongst them also some of Fegelein’s men, 
organised  themselves  in  the  Hilfsgemeinschaft  auf  Gegenseitigkeit (HIAG),  the 
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association of Waffen-SS veterans. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, three particular 
events  helped  to  trigger  judicial  proceedings  against  former  members  of  the  SS 
Cavalry Brigade. Firstly, the Central Office of the State Justice Administrations for 
the Investigation of National Socialist  Crimes was founded at  Ludwigsburg on 1 
December, 1958. This institution finally provided a powerful instrument of justice, 
after many local investigations of Nazi crimes had been unsuccessful. Secondly, the 
witness statement of Franz Magill at the trial of Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, in 
which  the  former  SS cavalry officer  openly admitted  the  mass  murder  at  Pinsk, 
called the attention of judicial authorities to the crimes of the SS Cavalry Brigade in 
November,  1959. Thirdly,  the trial  of  Adolf  Eichmann in  1961 brought the West 
German government under international pressure to take other Nazi perpetrators to 
court.
  Several trials against former SS cavalrymen were conducted from 1960 onwards, 
the two most important ones of which aimed at bringing former officers to justice for 
the crimes they had committed in the Pripet Marshes during the summer of 1941. In 
their  course and verdicts,  the legal  proceedings  against  Gustav Lombard and his 
subordinates remarkably differed from those against Franz Magill and others. No 
officer  from  the  1st Regiment  was  brought  to  justice;  the  trial  dragged  on 
unsuccessfully for ten years (despite  the fact  that  the court  could use documents 
which clearly proved the guilt of the defendants) and became a prominent example 
for the setbacks in the complicated process of West Germany’s ‘coming to terms 
with the past’. In the case against former members of the 2nd Regiment, the situation 
was  different:  the  trial  was  held  before  a  different  court,  where  a  determined 
investigation led to four convictions. Despite the fact that prison sentences of four 
and five years may seem low in view of the terrible crimes of the unit, they represent 
the maximum penalty that could be imposed, as it had not been possible to prove 
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‘base  motives’ which  would  have  fulfilled  the  elements  of  murder  according  to 
postwar West German criminal law.
  The question of why the SS cavalrymen became perpetrators in  the Holocaust 
cannot be answered easily. Although the SS Cavalry Brigade played an important 
role in implementing radical  Nazi policies in Poland and at  the beginning of the 
campaign against the Soviet Union, it would be far too simplistic to attribute these 
crimes to a National Socialist attitude alone. It is also necessary to transcend the 
viewpoint  which  was  developed  during  the  court  proceedings  in  the  1960s.  The 
investigators discovered a recurring scheme: during their deployment in the Soviet 
Union, the soldiers did not question their tasks, did not revolt and for the most part 
did  not  try  to  find  ways  of  avoiding  participation,  either  for  fear  of  possible 
consequences or because they simply did not know how to do this.769 Ideology as a 
factor was neglected during the investigations; thus, judicial authorities concluded 
that ‘an order is an order’ was the basic principle through which the SS cavalry 
squadrons had functioned.
  In order to explain the behaviour of the SS cavalrymen, historical research has 
developed  two different  theories  so  far.  Martin  Cüppers  holds  the  view that  the 
‘majority of the brigade members strongly supported National Socialist ideology and 
identified themselves with its aims’.770 In his view, the combination of radical and 
very  vaguely  worded  orders  from  Hitler  and  Himmler  and  their  different 
interpretations by the commanders in the field formed the basis for mass murder; a 
compliance with the motives of the officers such as anti-Semitism, National Socialist 
ideology, and the will to ‘tear down the barriers of civilisation by individual actions’ 
continued from the top to the bottom of the hierarchy of units of the Kommandostab 
769 Interview with Dr Heinrich K., retired regional prosecutor in Braunschweig, 3 August, 2011.
770 Cüppers, Wegbereiter, p. 353.
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such as the SS Cavalry Brigade.771 As opposed to this viewpoint, Ruth Bettina Birn 
has assumed ‘a mixture of belief in authority and orders, the fear of being perceived 
as ‘weak’ and the feeling of a hopeless entanglement of which the men believed they 
could not escape it, out of respect for and under the pressure of their comrades’.772 
Although both of these hypotheses seem plausible, neither of them fully suffices to 
explain why the soldiers of the SS Cavalry Brigade became perpetrators. Cüppers’s 
approach, despite being based on a huge range of different sources and constituting 
the most recent and comprehensive work so far, is based too strongly on ideology, 
with a focus on the officers of the brigade. In the shorter and earlier study by Birn, 
the  aspect  of  ideology is  missing  from the  explanation  for  the  behaviour  of  the 
ordinary men. Nonetheless, she has viewed their perspective to a greater extent. A 
new study of this particular unit has to include the findings of both authors and must 
also take into account the latest research on perpetrator history. 
  This can be achieved by viewing the SS Cavalry Brigade according to Welzer’s 
‘frame of reference’ model: in each of the three situations the soldiers of the unit 
found themselves in between 1939 and 1942 – occupation duty, killing squad, and 
front-line military unit – they managed to adapt themselves to a new environment. 
Although ideology played an important role in this as the reason behind the criminal 
orders the unit received and the driving force of the officers (who had already shown 
their  strong National  Socialist  attitude before the war),  this  was not  the decisive 
factor. The character of the unit was defined by the interaction of ideology and the 
desire of the SS cavalry’s leadership to create a fully-fledged military unit, which 
manifested itself most strongly in the ‘dual role’ of the brigade in Belorussia and 
Russia. From the beginning, the leaders tried to instil a strong esprit de corps within 
the regiments; they stressed this by issuing numerous orders which expressed their 
771 Cüppers, Wegbereiter, pp. 177-178, p. 181.
772 Birn, ‘Zweierlei Wirklichkeit’, p. 280.
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desire to found a new cavalry tradition within the SS, an aim to which everything 
else became subordinate.773 The specific framework the rank and file was subject to 
consisted  of  a  military  atmosphere  which  propagated  toughness  as  an  ideal  and 
punished mistakes relentlessly; during these three years (with the period from the 
summer  of  1941  onwards  being  of  special  importance)  there  was  a  constant 
development towards the forming of killing squads and acts of mass violence. As 
members of an SS unit, the men were drilled not to question orders; during their 
often  brutal  basic  training,  they  built  up  the  desired  esprit  de  corps  as  well  as 
comradeship which made them function during the mass killings in the summer of 
1941  and  held  the  units  together  throughout  the  following  winter,  even  against 
hopeless odds.774
  After analysing the theories of Cüppers and Birn and viewing the perspective of the 
investigators from the Magill case (from whom Birn’s findings were partly derived), 
it can be stated that all three approaches contain very important findings. The central 
research  question  I  have  formulated,  however,  can  be  answered  by  applying  a 
combination  of  the  available  explanations  instead  of  one  single  theory.  The 
institutional-level conduct of the SS Cavalry Brigade was partly defined by ideology, 
as this aspect formed the basis of the SS Cavalry Brigade’s main tasks, the operation 
as a security force in Poland and as a killing squad in Belorussia. Undoubtedly, it 
strongly influenced the officers who commanded the unit; their subordinates, too, 
were susceptible to this to some extent as the above mentioned excesses have shown. 
A military background with strict rules of discipline, to which the vast majority of 
773 See  for  example Tagesbefehl  des  Kommandeurs  der  SS-T-Reiterstandarte  1  vom 27.11.  1940, 
quoted in: Bayer,  Kavallerie der Waffen-SS, p. 13; Brigadebefehl vom 1.8. 1941, in: BArchF, RS 3-
8/20;  Tagesbefehl Nr. 15 vom 29.10. 1941, 1st SS Cavalry Regiment, in:  BArchF, RS 4/441, p. 69; 
Tagesbefehl vom 24.1. 1942, ibid., p. 24. Of these orders, the Brigadebefehl of 1 August, 1941, is of 
most importance as it can be considered the ‘founding document’ of the SS Cavalry Brigade.
774 For the role of comradeship in military units, see Thomas Kühne, ‘Kameradschaft – ‘das Beste im 
Leben  eines  Mannes’.  Die  deutschen  Soldaten  des  Zweiten  Weltkrieges  in  erfahrungs-  und 
geschlechtergeschichtlicher Perspektive’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft 22 (1996), p. 509 and p. 515.
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the SS troopers conformed, formed the other component which made the brigade’s 
role  in  the  annihilation  process  possible.  This  being  the  situation,  the  actual 
behaviour was defined by an  institutional brutalisation from above: the element of 
fanaticism  filtered  down  from  Heinrich  Himmler  and  Hermann  Fegelein  to  the 
ordinary men, with the officer corps of the unit as the key element in between. The 
Reichsführer-SS and  his  most  senior  equestrian  created  a  unit  according  to  their 
radical aims which, in the course of several years, saw a change in personnel from a 
majority of sportsmen to one of radicalised recruits. Bound by order and obedience, 
a still heterogeneous group could be deployed in a ‘dual role’, which encompassed 




















SS-Oberstgruppenführer (SS colonel general)
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SS,  Wehrmacht   and police terms 
Befehlshaber des rückwärtigen supreme commander of the rear 
Heeresgebiets Mitte areas of Army Group Centre
Begleitbataillon Reichsführer-SS guard battalion of the 
Reichsführer-SS
Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei task forces of the security police 
und des SD and the security service, the Nazi 
party secret service
Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo) secret police in Nazi Germany
Höherer SS- und Polizeiführer Higher SS and police leader
Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS staff of the Reichsführer-SS at 
im SS-Führungshauptamt the SS main command office, 
Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS 
in short
Kommandantur im rückwärtigen a military agency that supervised 
Heeresgebiet (Korück) Feldkommandanturen (FK) and  
Ortskommandanturen (OK)
Kriminalpolizei (Kripo) criminal investigation 
department
Leichte Kavallerie-Kolonne light cavalry platoon, supply unit
Ordnungspolizei order police, regular German 
police
Reitende Abteilung cavalry detachment
Reitende Batterie mounted battery
Rückwärtige Armeegebiete Army Rear Areas
Rückwärtige Heeresgebiete Army Group Rear Areas
Sicherheitspolizei security police, the combined 
forces of the Gestapo and the 
Kripo
SS-Führungshauptamt SS main command office







FK Feldkommandantur,  regional  military headquarters  in 
the occupied territories
HIAG Hilfsgemeinschaft  auf  Gegenseitigkeit  ('mutual  aid 
organisation'),  an organisation of Waffen-SS veterans 
in West Germany
HSSPF Höherer SS- und Polizeiführer,  Higher SS and police 
leader
KDOS RFSS Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS
NAK National Archives Kew
NSDAP Nationalsozialistische  Deutsche  Arbeiterpartei,  the 
Nazi party
OK Ortskommandantur, urban military headquarters in the 
occupied territories
RAA Radfahraufklärungsabteilung,  bicycle  reconnaissance 
detachment of the SS Cavalry Brigade
SA Sturmabteilung,  paramilitary  arm  of  the  Nazi  party 
(Nazi stormtroopers)
SD Sicherheitsdienst,  the  intelligence  agency  of  the  SS 
and the Nazi party
SSO SS organisations, a database at the Federal Archive in 
Berlin
SS Schutzstaffel, paramilitary arm of the Nazi party
StAW Niedersächsisches  Landesarchiv  –  Staatsarchiv 
Wolfenbüttel
TV Totenkopfverbände, concentration camp guard units of 
the SS
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VT Verfügungstruppe, the first military units of the SS
VUA Vojenský ústřední archiv,  Central Military Archive of 
the Czech Republic at Prague
WLL Wiener Library London
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July – September, 1941           127
Map 2: Operational area of the SS Cavalry Brigade 
west of Moscow, 1941 – 1942           211
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      Structure of the SS Cavalry Brigade in Belorussia (July – August, 1941)
This scheme is a simplified version of the brigade roster during the summer of 1941. It is based on the 
following documents: Befehl zur Umgliederung des SS-Kav.Rgts vom 26.2. 1941, in: BArchB, NS 
19/3489;  Führerstellenbesetzungsliste  vom 30.7.  1941,  in:  BArchF,  RS  3-8/91;  Schreiben  an  die 
Kommandeure  und  Chefs  der  SS-Kav.Brigade,  1  August,  1941,  in:  BArchF,  RS  3-8/20; 
Abschlußbericht  der  ZStL  vom  20.8.  1963,  Beteiligung  der  SS-Kavalleriebrigade  Fegelein  an 
Vernichtungsaktionen  gegenüber  der  jüdischen  Bevölkerung  im  Pripjetgebiet  /  Weißrußland  im 
Sommer 1941 (Lombard u.a.), in: BArchL, B 162/5527, pp. 356-359.
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Brigade staff
SS-Standartenführer Hermann Fegelein 
(commander)
SS-Hauptsturmführer Christian Reinhardt 
(1st staff officer, deputy commander)
SS-Untersturmführer Kurt Becher 
(aide-de-camp)
1st SS Cavalry Regiment
SS-Standartenführer Hermann Fegelein 
(commander)
Reitende Abteilung (mounted detachment)
SS-Sturmbannführer Gustav Lombard 
(commander)
1st squadron - SS-Hauptsturmführer 
Waldemar Fegelein (commander)
2nd squadron - SS-Hauptsturmführer 
Ulrich Goertz (commander)
3rd squadron - SS-Hauptsturmführer 
Johann Schmid (commander)
4th squadron (machine gun squadron) - 
SS-Obersturmführer Hermann Gadischke 
(commander)
2nd SS Cavalry Regiment
SS-Standartenführer Heimo Hierthes 
(commander)
Reitende Abteilung (mounted detachment)
SS-Sturmbannführer Franz Magill 
(commander)
1st squadron - SS-Hauptsturmführer Stefan 
Charwat (commander)
2nd squadron - SS-Hauptsturmführer Walter 
Dunsch (commander)
3rd squadron - SS-Hauptsturmführer 
Hans-Viktor von Zastrow (commander)
4th squadron (machine gun squadron) - 
SS-Obersturmführer Kurt Wegener (commander)
Non-mounted units 
(1st SS Cavalry Regiment)
5th squadron (infantry gun squadron) - 
SS-Obersturmführer Siegfried Kotthaus 
(commander)
6th squadron (anti-tank squadron) - 
SS-Sturmbannführer Albert Faßbender 
(commander)
7th squadron (bicycle reconnaissance squadron) 
- SS-Obersturmführer Wilhelm Plänk 
(commander)
8th squadron (mounted battery) - SS-
Hauptsturmführer Arno Paul (commander)
Light  cavalry  platoon  (supply  unit)  -  SS-
Hauptsturmführer Franz Rinner (commander)
Non-mounted units 
(2nd SS Cavalry Regiment)
5th squadron (infantry gun squadron) - 
SS-Hauptsturmführer Herbert Schönfeldt 
(commander)
6th squadron (anti-tank squadron) – 
commander’s position vacant in August, 1941
7th squadron (bicycle reconnaissance squadron) - 
SS-Obersturmführer Paul Koppenwallner 
(commander)
8th squadron (mounted battery) - 
SS-Hauptsturmführer Friedrich Meyer 
(commander)
Light cavalry platoon (supply unit) - 
SS-Obersturmführer Paul Hoppe (commander)
          Structure of the SS Cavalry Brigade during the winter of 1941 – 1942
This scheme represents the structure of the brigade before it took major casualties at the beginning of 
1942. It is a simplified version of Führerstellenbesetzungsliste SS-Kav.Brigade, 20 November, 1941, 
in: BArchL, Dokumenten-Sammlung Verschiedenes, B 162/21679, pp. 317-323.
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Brigade staff
SS-Standartenführer Hermann Fegelein 
(commander)
SS-Hauptsturmführer Karl Gesele 
(1st staff officer, deputy commander)
SS-Obersturmführer Anton Ameiser 
(aide-de-camp)
1st SS Cavalry Regiment
SS-Sturmbannführer Gustav Lombard 
(commander)
1st squadron - SS-Hauptsturmführer Waldemar 
Fegelein (commander)
2nd squadron - SS-Hauptsturmführer Ulrich 
Goertz (commander)
3rd squadron - SS-Hauptsturmführer Johann 
Schmid (commander)
4th squadron - SS-Hauptsturmführer Hermann 
Gadischke (commander)
5th  squadron  -  SS-Obersturmführer  Hermann 
Schneider (commander)
2nd SS Cavalry Regiment
SS-Sturmbannführer Hermann Schleifenbaum 
(commander)
1st squadron - SS-Hauptsturmführer Stefan 
Charwat (commander)
2nd squadron - SS-Hauptsturmführer Walter 
Dunsch (commander)
3rd squadron - SS-Hauptsturmführer Hans-Viktor 
von Zastrow (commander)
4th squadron - SS-Hauptsturmführer Kurt Wegener 
(commander)
5th squadron - SS-Hauptsturmführer 
Herbert Schönfeldt (commander)
Bicycle reconnaissance battalion (RAA)
SS-Sturmbannführer Albert Faßbender 
(commander)
1st squadron - SS-Hauptsturmführer 
Wilhelm Plänk (commander)
2nd squadron - SS-Obersturmführer 
Paul Koppenwallner (commander)
3rd squadron (anti-tank squadron) - 
SS-Untersturmführer Rudi Schweinberger
(commander)
Supply and support units
Engineer squadron - SS-Hauptsturmführer Karl 
Fritsche (commander)
Veterinary squadron - SS-Obersturmführer Fritz 
Eichin (commander)
Medical unit - SS-Hauptsturmführer Otto 
Mittelberger (commander)
Ambulance platoon - SS-Obersturmführer Alfred 
Becker (commander)
Light cavalry platoon (supply unit) - 
SS-Obersturmführer Paul Hoppe (commander)
Brigade artillery unit
 
SS-Hauptsturmführer Arno Paul 
(commander)
1st battery - SS-Hauptsturmführer Arno 
Paul (commander)
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